SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 210660, January 21, 2015
FLOR G. DAYO, Petitioner, v. STATUS MARITIME CORPORATION AND/OR NAFTO TRADE SHIPPING COMMERCIAL S.A., Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents jointly and severally liable:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1) To pay complainant the amount of US$50,000.00, or its equivalent in Philippine Peso at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of actual payment, representing the death benefits of the late Eduardo P. Dayo;chanrobleslawOther monetary claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
2) To pay complainants the amount of US$1,000.00, or its equivalent in Philippine Peso at the prevailing rate at the time of actual payment, representing the burial expenses;chanrobleslaw
3) To pay complainant the amount equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total judgment award, as and for attorney’s fees;
SO ORDERED.18
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of respondents is GRANTED. Thus, the appealed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one entered DISMISSING the instant complaint for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.20
Time and again, we have ruled that self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are insufficient to establish a case before quasi-judicial bodies where the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact is substantial evidence. Often described as more than a mere scintilla, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. Thus, in the absence of substantial evidence, working conditions cannot be presumed to have increased the risk of contracting the disease.
. . . .
WHEREFORE, the premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 30 September 2010 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and its Resolution dated 30 December 2010 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.29 (Citations omitted)
Section 20. Compensation and Benefits
- Compensation and Benefits for Death
- In case of work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his contract the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
. . . .
- The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of work-related injury or illness during the term of employment are as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
- The employer shall pay the deceased’s beneficiary all outstanding obligations due the seafarer under this Contract.
- The employer shall transport the remains and personal effects of the seafarer to the Philippines at employer’s expense except if the death occurred in a port where local government laws or regulations do not permit the transport of such remains. In case death occurs at sea, the disposition of the remains shall be handled or dealt with in accordance with the master’s best judgment. In all cases, the employer/master shall communicate with the manning agency to advise for disposition of seafarer’s remains.
- The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippines [sic] currency equivalent to the amount of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
[u]nder the Amended POEA Contract, the important requirement of work-relatedness was incorporated. The incorporation of the work-related provision has made essential causal connection between a seafarer’s work and the illness upon which the claim of disability is predicated upon.
. . . .
It should be emphasized that it is petitioner who has the burden of evidence to prove that the illness for which she anchors her present claim for her husband’s disability benefits is work-related.40
[she] was not merely faking [her] husband’s disability. The Medical Records cannot lie and he was seen by a doctor abroad regarding his illness which eventually [brought] about his death.41
[u]nlike Section 20(A), Section 32-A of the POEA Contract considers the possibility of compensation for the death of the seafarer occurring after the termination of the employment contract on account of a work-related illness. But, for death under this provision to be compensable, the claimant must fulfill the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
- The seafarer’s work must involve the risks describe herein;chanrobleslaw
- The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the described risks;chanrobleslaw
- The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it;chanrobleslaw
- There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.49
Settled is the rule that for illness to be compensable, it is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer. It is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had.51 (Citation omitted)
[t]he Philippine Overseas Employment Administration or POEA regulations require certain provisions to be put in the employment contract. Necessarily, it prescribes a procedure that finds a balance of interest in both the amount and the process for recovery of compensation as a result of occupational hazards suffered by the seafarer. The cause of action in such recovery is based on contract inclusive of both statutory and regulatory provisions impliedly included in it.
While this may be the theory pursued in practice, substantive law still allows recovery of damages for injuries suffered by the seafarer as a result of a tortious violation on the part of the employer. This may be on the basis of the provisions of the Civil Code as well as special laws. These special laws may relate, among others, to environmental regulations and requirements to ensure the reduction of risks to occupational hazards both for the seafarer and the public in general. In such cases, the process for recovery should not be constrained by contract.55
12.3 In the case at bar, it bears to stress that Mr. Dayo was certified as “fit to work” based on a pre-employment medical examination. He was deployed on 8 June 2008 and was repatriated on 7 September 2008 due to HYPERTENSION. Upon his arrival in the Philippines, respondents refused to provide Mr. Dayo medical assistance. But due to his critical condition, Mr. Dayo went to Lucena United Doctors Hospital for medical evaluations. He was advi[sed] to undergo [a] series of medical and laboratory tests. Thereafter, Dr. Olitoquit, Mr. Dayo’s attending physician, came up with a conclusion that: “NORMAL LEFT VENT[R]ICULAR DIMENSION WITH ADEQUATE WALL MOTION AND CONTRACTILITY; NORMAL LEFT AND RIGHT ATRIA, RIGHT VENTRICLE, MAIN PULMONARY ARTERY AND AORTIC ROOT DIMENSION’S [sic]. STRUCTURALLY NORMAL TRICUSPID, PULMONIC, MITRAL AND AORTIC VALVE. CONCLUSION: NORMAL 2D ECHO-CARDIOGRAM STUDY.”56
[t]he PEME merely determines whether one is “fit to work” at sea or “fit for sea service,” it does not state the real state of health of an applicant. In short, the “fit to work” declaration in the respondent’s PEME cannot be a conclusive proof to show that he was free from any ailment prior to his deployment. Thus we held in NYK-F[il] Ship Management, Inc. v. NLRC:58chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
While a PEME may reveal enough for the petitioner (vessel) to decide whether a seafarer is fit for overseas employment, it may not be relied upon to inform petitioners of a seafarer’s true state of health. The PEME could not have divulged respondent’s illness considering that the examinations were not exploratory.59
Endnotes:
* Designated acting member per S.O. No. 1910 dated January 12, 2015.
1Rollo, pp. 2–21.
2 Id. at 25–37. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (Chair) and Mario V. Lopez of the Ninth Division.
3 Id. at 29–30 and 37.
4 Id. at 25–26.
5 Id. at 26.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 26–27.
10 Id. at 27.
11 Id. at 27–28.
12 Id. at 28.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 28–29.
16 Id. at 29.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 30.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 32.
23 Id. at 33.
24 521 Phil. 253, 260 (2006) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
25Rollo, p. 35.
26 Id. at 34–35.
27 Id. at 33.
28 Id. at 36.
29 Id. at 36–37.
30 Id. at 40–45.
31 Id. at 38–39. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (Chair) and Mario V. Lopez of the Former Ninth Division.
32 Id. at 10.
33 J. Brion, dissenting opinion in Abbott Laboratories, Phils., et al. v. Alcaraz, G.R. No. 192571, April 22, 2014 4–5 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
34Rollo, p. 10.
35 Id. at 11–13.
36 Id. at 60.
37 Id. at 63.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 67.
40 Id. at 35.
41 Id. at 14.
42 Id. at 18.
43 2000 POEA Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels, Definition of Terms, par. (12). This definition was amended by POEA Memorandum Circular No. 10 (2010).
44Rollo, p. 26.
45 Id. at 27.
46 Id. at 28.
47 Id. at 27.
48 G.R. No. 188595, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 233 [Per C.J. Sereno, First Division].
49 Id. at 246.
50 G.R. No. 195518, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 225 [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
51 Id. at 242.
52See Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Safety Management Manual, sec. 7.2.1. 3 (visited January 20, 2015). A bosun performs several functions on board a ship such as, but not limited to, keeping the Chief Mate updated on all ship matters, supervising unlicensed personnel “in the sanitation and maintenance of deck department spaces, decks, tools, equipment and associated gear,” and giving assistance in training crew members.
53Rollo, p. 14.
54 G.R. No. 181921, September 17, 2014 [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
55 J. Leonen, concurring opinion in Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Creer III, G.R. No. 181921, September 17, 2014 3 [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
56Rollo, p. 14.
57 Id.
58 534 Phil. 725, 739 (2006) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
59Quizora v. Denholm Crew Management (Philippines), Inc., G.R. No. 185412, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 309, 322 [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division], citing Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission (Second Division), 630 Phil. 352, 367 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]. See also The Estate of Posedio Ortega v. Court of Appeals, 576 Phil. 601, 610 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division] and Status Maritime Corporation v. Spouses Delalamon, G.R. No. 198097, July 30, 2014 11 [Per J. Reyes, First Division].