SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 180147, January 14, 2015
SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL.,1Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 180148]
ARIS PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL., Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 180149]
SARA LEE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL., Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 180150]
CESAR C. CRUZ, Petitioner, v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL., Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 180319]
FASHION ACCESSORIES PHILS., INC., Petitioner, v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL., Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 180685]
EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL., Petitioners, v. NLRC, ARIS PHILIPPINES, INC., FASHION ACCESSORIES PHILS., INC., SARA LEE CORPORATION, SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC., COLLIN BEAL AND ATTY. CESAR C. CRUZ, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
PEREZ, J.:
A. The Court failed to consider the “Motion for Leave of Court to file and Admit Herein Statement and Confession of Judgment to Buy Peace and/or to Secure Against any Possible Contingent Liability by Petitioner Sara Lee Corporation” (hereafter the “compromise agreement”) filed by petitioner Sara Lee Corporation on June 23, 2014 before receipt of the Decision of June 04, 2014 on July 31, 2014 with the conformity of the respondents in their “Manifestation and Conformity to the Petitioners’ Motion for Leave to File and Admit Statement of Confession of Judgment” dated July 04, 2014 which could have terminated the present cases and avoid delays with its remand for further proceedings below.
B. The Court did not duly rule on the violations of the rights of due process of Petitioner SLPI as shown by the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1. The Labor Arbiter has never acquired jurisdiction over Petitioner SLPI which was never impleaded as a party respondent and was never validly served with summons which fact was specifically mentioned in NLRC’s Resolution of December 19, 2006; andC. The Court did not duly rule on the violations of the rights of due process of Petitioner SLC because of the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2. There is no employer-employee relationships between Petitioner SLPI and the respondents.1. The Labor Arbiter has never acquired jurisdiction over Petitioner SLC which was never impleaded as a party respondent and was never validly served with summons which fact was specifically raised by the Court as an issue in page 12 of the Decision of June 04, 2014 but remained unresolved; andD. The Court did not duly rule on the violations of the rights of due process of Petitioner Cesar C. Cruz as shown by the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2. There is no employer-employee relationship between Petitioner SLC and the respondents.1. The Labor Arbiter has never acquired jurisdiction over Petitioner Cesar C. Cruz who was never impleaded as a party respondent and was never validly served with summons; andE. There was no legal impediment for the NLRC to issue its Resolution of December 19, 2006 vacating the Labor Arbiter’s Decision and remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceeding as no Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued by the Court of Appeals and the rule on judicial courtesy remains the exception rather than the rule.
2. There is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner Cesar C. Cruz and the respondents.cralawred
F. The Court did not duly rule on the applicability of the final and executory Decision of Fullido, et al., v. Aris Philippines, Inc. and Cesar C. Cruz (G.R. No. 185948) with respect to the present consolidated cases considering the identical facts and issues involved plus the fact that the Court in Fullido sustained the findings and decisions of three (3) other tribunals, i.e., the Court of Appeals, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter.
G. The Court failed to consider the prescription of the complaints for money claims filed by the respondents against the Petitioners under Article 291 of the Labor Code due to the lapse of three (3) years and four (4) months when Petitioners were impleaded as respondents only through the amendment of complaints by the complainants, the respondents’ herein.
H. The Court also did not consider that the Complaints filed by the respondents are barred by res judicata because of the final and executory decision rendered by the Voluntary Arbitrator on the identical facts and issues in the case filed by the labor union representing the respondents against Petitioner API.
I. Contrary to the Decision of June 04, 2014, the Abelardo petition (CA GR SP No. 95919, Pacita S. Abelardo v. NLRC, Aris, Philippines, Inc.) was filed earlier than the Macatlang petition (CA GR SP No. 96363) as shown by the lower docket number, thus, the Macatlang petition should be the one dismissed for forum shopping.
J. In fixing the bond to PhP725 Million which is 25% of the monetary award, the Court failed to consider the En Banc Decision in McBurnie v. Ganzon, 707 SCRA 646, 693 (2013) which required only the posting of a bond equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the monetary award.2
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96363 dated 26 March 2007 is MODIFIED. The Corporations are directed to post P725 Million, in cash or surety bond, within TEN (10) days from the receipt of this DECISION. The Resolution of the NLRC dated 19 December 2006 is VACATED for being premature and the NLRC is DIRECTED to act with dispatch to resolve the merits of the case upon perfection of the appeal.3
The foregoing shall not be misconstrued to unduly hinder the NLRC’s exercise of its discretion, given that the percentage of bond that is set by this guideline shall be merely provisional. The NLRC retains its authority and duty to resolve the motion and determine the final amount of bond that shall be posted by the appellant, still in accordance with the standards of "meritorious grounds" and "reasonable amount." Should the NLRC, after considering the motion’s merit, determine that a greater amount or the full amount of the bond needs to be posted by the appellant, then the party shall comply accordingly. The appellant shall be given a period of 10 days from notice of the NLRC order within which to perfect the appeal by posting the required appeal bond.
x x x [t]he principle of judicial courtesy to justify the suspension of the proceedings before the lower court even without an injunctive writ or order from the higher court. In that case, we pronounced that “[d]ue respect for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical considerations should have prompted the appellate court to wait for the final determination of the petition [for certiorari] before taking cognizance of the case and trying to render moot exactly what was before this [C]ourt.” We subsequently reiterated the concept of judicial courtesy in Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. v. Court of Appeals.
We, however, have qualified and limited the application of judicial courtesy in Go v. Abrogar and Republic v. Sandiganbayan. In these cases, we expressly delimited the application of judicial courtesy to maintain the efficacy of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and held that the principle of judicial courtesy applies only “if there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court.” Through these cases, we clarified that the principle of judicial courtesy remains to be the exception rather than the rule.7
x x x a motion for judgment on consent is not to be equated with a judgment by confession. The former is one the provisions and terms of which are settled and a agreed upon by the parties to the action, and which is entered in the record by the consent and sanction of the court, Hence, there must be an unqualified agreement among the parties to be bound by the judgment on consent before said judgment may be entered. The court does not have the power to supply terms, provisions, or essential details not previously agreed to by the parties x x x. On the other hand, a judgment by confession is not a plea but an affirmative and voluntary act of the defendant himself. Here, the court exercises a certain amount of supervision over the entry of judgment, as well as equitable jurisdiction over their subsequent status.11
ART. 227 Compromise Agreements. – Any compromise settlement, including those involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau or the regional office of the Department of Labor, shall be final and binding upon the parties. The National Labor Relations Commission or any court shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case of noncompliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion.
CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT
The undersigned counsel, by virtue of the special authority granted by HILLSHIRE earlier attached as Annex “B” and made an integral part hereof seeks the approval of this Honorable Court of this Judgment by Confession under the following terms and conditions, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. HILLSHIRE will pay to the 5,984 respondents (complainants) the total amount of THREE HUNDRED FORTY TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND AND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (PhP342,284,800.00) or at FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (PhP57,200.00) for each respondent (complainant) inclusive of the attorney’s fees of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS (PhP8,580.00) which each respondent (complainant) will actually pay to their counsel of record as the total consideration for the dismissal with prejudice of all the pending cases before this Honorable Court and all the cases pending before the National Labor Relations Commission against all the petitioners.
2. The above agreed amount of THREE HUNDRED FORTY TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND AND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (PhP342,284,800.00) shall be distributed as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary2.1 FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND SIX [HUNDRED] TWENTY PESOS (PhP48,620.00) to each respondent (complainant), and3. HILLSHIRE will deposit the amount of THREE HUNDRED FORTY TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND AND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (PhP342,284,800.00) with a local bank duly licensed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) within sixty (60) days from the date of the issuance of a Certificate of Finality and/or Entry of Judgment of the Decision of this Honorable Court on this Confession of Judgment.
2.2 EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS (PhP8,580.00) to the lawyer of each respondent (complainant) by virtue of the Special Power of Attorney given by each respondent (complainant) to lead Emilinda D. Macatlang who gave SPA to Atty. Alex Tan.
4. The amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY PESOS (PhP48,620.00) shall be paid directly to each respondent (complainant) and the corresponding attorney’s fees of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS (PhP8,580.00) shall be paid to their lawyers (duly authorized by an SPA) by the bank through a manager’s check.
5. The total deposit of THREE HUNDRED FORTY TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (PhP342,284,800.00) must be claimed by the respondents (complainants) from the depository bank within two (2) years from the date of the Certificate of Finality or Entry of Judgment issued by this Honorable Court.
6. Any balance of the deposited amount which remains unclaimed by the respondents (complainants) within the two (2) year period referred to above shall automatically revert and be returned to and may be withdrawn by HILLSHIRE and/or its attorney-in-fact, without the necessity of any prior Order or permission from this Honorable Court.
7. Thereafter, upon expiration of the two (2) year period referred to above, HILLSHIRE’s obligation to make any payment to the respondents (Complainants) shall ipso facto cease, expire and terminate and the judgment by confession shall be considered satisfied, fulfilled and terminated.
8. The bank to which the amount of the confessed judgment (PhP342,284,800.00) is deposited shall be authorized by HILLSHIRE through the undersigned attorney to pay to individual respondents (complainants) listed in the original Decision dated October 30, 2004 of the Labor Arbiter and/or their lawyers the above agreed amounts subject to the following conditions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary8.1 Complainants shall personally claim the payment to them from the bank upon presentation of any recognized government ID’s such as Driver’s License, Senior Citizen’s Card, Voter’s ID, SSS ID, Unified Multipurpose Identification Card, Postal ID, Passport, or Certification Under Oath by the Barangay Chairman as to the identity of the respondent (complainant), or9. The lead complainant, Ms. Emilinda D. Macatlang, and Atty. Alex Tan shall take adequate steps to inform all the respondents (complainants) by personal notice or media announcement of this confession of judgment upon receipt of the Decision of this Honorable Court.
8.2 By the duly authorized representative of respondent (complainant) evidenced by a duly notarized Special Power of Attorney in case the respondent (complainant) cannot personally claim his/her payment due to sickness or physical disability.
10. All fully paid respondents (complainants) shall execute a Waiver, Release and Quitclaim.
11. Upon the approval of this Confession of Judgment by this Honorable Court, all cases pending before this Honorable Court and the NLRC shall automatically be considered dismissed, terminated and of no force and effect.
Petitioners invite the attention of this Honorable Court that the above monetary consideration for both the respondents (complainants) and their counsel under the above terms and conditions have been agreed upon with Atty. Alex Tan before the filing of this confession of judgment.
To reiterate, this confession of judgment is made by HILLSHIRE for the purpose of buying peace and/or to secure to the said petitioner and the other Petitioners against any possible contingent liability which may accrue to them as a consequence of their having been made Respondents in the Complaints filed by the Complainants before the NLRC. 16
Not all quitclaims are per se invalid as against public policy. But, where there is clear proof that the waiver was wrangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, then the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction.24
Endnotes:
* Per Special Order No. 1910 dated 12 January 2015.
1 Due to the sheer number of complainants, the names of the 5,983 others were omitted but which could be found in the annexes of the Labor Arbiter’s decision. See Rollo (G.R. No. 180147), pp. 230-348.
2Rollo (G.R. No. 180319, Vol. III), pp. 2742-2744.
3 Id. at 2319.
4 G.R. Nos. 178034 and 178117, G.R. Nos. 186984-85, 17 October 2013.
5 G.R. No. 190253, 11 June 2014.
6 247 Phil. 387 (1988).
7Trajano v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, supra note 5.
8 Third Division Resolution dated 30 March 2009 with G.R. No. 185948, entitled “Gabriel Fulido v. Aris Philippines, Inc.”
9 46 Am Jur 2d Judgments § 204, citing Bank of Chatham v. Arendall, 178 Va. 183, 16 S.E.2d 352 (1941), Cheidem Corp. v. Farmer, 449 A.2d 1061 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982); Citibank, Nat. Ass'n v. London, 526 F. Supp. 793 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
10 171 Phil. 7 (1978).
11 Id. at 18.
12 David v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97240, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA 644, 650 citing Article 2028, Civil Code; Rovero v. Amparo, 91 Phil. 228, 235 (1952) citing Black's Law Dictionary, p. 382; Arcenas v. Judge Cinco, 165 Phil. 741, 748 (1976).
13 Magbanua v. Uy, 497 Phil. 511, 518 (2005) citing The Learning Child, Inc. v. Lazaro, 394 Phil. 378, 382 (2000); Calla v. Maglalang, 382 Phil. 138, 143 (2000); Salazar v. Jarabe, 91 Phil. 596, 601 (1952).
14Philippine Journalists, Inc. v. NLRC, 532 Phil. 531, 545 (2006).
15Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc. v. Go, 532 Phil. 317, 325 (2006).
16Rollo (G.R. No. 180319, Vol. III), pp. 2691-2695.
17Computer Innovation Center v. NLRC, 500 Phil. 573, 584 (2005).
18Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation v. Icao, G.R. No. 196047, 15 January 2014.
19 566 Phil. 178 (2008).
20 Id. at 195.
21 498 Phil. 752 (2005).
22 Id. at 760.
23 330 Phil. 291 (1996).
24 Id. at 303 citing Periquet v. NLRC, 264 Phil. 1115, 1122 (1990).