SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015
ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Petitioner, v. LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error. Closer scrutiny of the records reveals, as correctly noted by the Solicitor General, sexual infidelity are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. x xx.
xxxx
In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving declarations, the evidence adduced by Robert fell short of establishing the fact that at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived [her] of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
xxxx
We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellee’s undeserved marital plight. Yet, Our paramount duty as a court compels Us to apply the law at all costs, however harsh it may be on whomsoever is called upon to bear its unbiased brunt.
FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision dated September 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. 94-178 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.5
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ HOLDING THAT THE ABSENCE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE WIFE UNDERSCORES THE EVIDENTIAL GAP TO SUSTAIN THE DECISION OF THE RTC DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.II
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO DECLARED BY THE NATIONAL APPELLATE MATRIMONIAL TRIBUNAL OF THE CATHOLIC BISHOP’S CONFERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES AS GUILTY OF GRAVE LACK OF DUE DISCRETION.III
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND BY THE LOWER COURT AS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
Significantly, the chronological events after the trial court issued its March 7, 1996 Decision unmistakably show the collusion between the parties to obtain the reliefs pleaded. Among others, respondent’s Retraction of Testimony was executed without the presence of counsel sometime in 1998, a few months before she married an American. This irregularity was even noticed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54261:
cralawredx x x x
The involvement and active participation of the Solicitor General became indispensable, in the present recourse, when, in a whirlwind turn of events, the Appellee made a VOLTE FACE executed a “Retraction of Testimony” and a “Waiver of Custody” waiving custody of Franco Mark J Mallillin, still a minor, her son by the Appellant. It bears stressing that the Appellee, in the Court a quo, obdurately denied the material allegations of the Appellant’s complaint and declared that it was the Appellant who was psychologically incapacitated. The sudden turn-about of the appellee, in the present recourse, to the extent of disowning her testimony in the Court a quo and even praying for the reversal of the Decision of the Trial Court is strongly suggestive, if not constitutive, of collusion or a modus vivendi between the parties, outlawed by the Family Code of the Philippines and the Constitution. x x x
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligation of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.cralawred
x x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x xx.cralawred
x x x x
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x.cralawred
x x x x
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x xx.cralawred
x x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.cralawred
x x x x
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x xx.cralawred
x x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence – what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x xx. (Emphasis supplied)
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be specified.
The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law that based on the deposition of the petitioner – the respondent understandably ignored the proceedings completely for which she was duly cited for Contempt of Court – and premised on the substantially concordant testimonies of the Witnesses, the woman Respondent demonstrated in the external forum through her action and reaction patterns, before and after the marriage-in-fact, her grave lack of due discretion in judgement for marriage intents and purposes basically by reason of her immaturity of judgement as manifested by her emotional ambivalence x x x.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF APPEALS, having invoked the Divine Name and having in mind the Law, the Jurisprudence and the Facts pertaining to the Case, hereby declares and decrees the confirmation of the nullity decision rendered by the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manil on the Marriage Case MALLILIN – JAMISOLAMIN with Prot. N. 63/2000 on the ground provided by Canon 1095 par. 2 CIC on the part of the woman Respondent – but NOT on the part of the man Petitioner for lack of evidence. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)15
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
cralawred
- those who lack sufficient use of reason;
- those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
- those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner’s argument is without merit.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity to consider the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial Tribunal’s decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now raised before this Court and correctly held that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It stated:
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was forwarded to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:
[T]he FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother with whom [he] identified and on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was according to his friends, already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of his mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat up his wife and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final separation.WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself, petitioner-appellant offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: AldanaCeledonia (petitioner-appellant’s mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellant’s sister-in-law and friends of the opposing parties were never presented before said Court. As to the contents and veracity of the latter’s testimonies, this Court is without any clue.
True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:
cralawredSince the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence – what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void xxx.And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:
cralawredThe court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be specified.Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence presented before the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on record, We find no ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.31cralawlawlibrary
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give credence to the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different set of evidence of which We have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness.
Santos v. Santos18cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryCanon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contacting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x x x.Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.x x x.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC. (Emphases in the original; Underscoring supplied)
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
x x x x
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Endnotes:
* Designated Acting member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per Special Order No. 1910, dated January 12, 2015.
1Rollo, pp. 47-60, penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, and Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren and Associate Justice Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring.
2 Id. at 76-77.
3 Id. at 48.
4 Id. at 47 penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, and Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, with Associate Justice Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring.
5 Id. at 57-59.
6 Id. at 76.
7Republic v. Garcia, G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014.
8Ligarde v. Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 315, 320–321.
9 G.R. No. 159594, November 12, 2012, 685 SCRA 33, 42-43.
10 335 Phil. 664, 676 –678 (1997).
11Republic v. Encelan, G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013, 668 SCRA 215, 221.
12Republic v. Gracia, supra note 7.
13 Supra note 8, at 322.
14 Supra note 10, at 679.
15Rollo, p. 83.
16 310 Phil. 21, 37 (1995).
17 609 Phil. 316, 336 (2009), also citing Santos v. Santos, supra.
18 Supra note 16.
19 Supra note 16.
20 Supra note 10, at 679.
21 G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 524, 543-544.
LEONEN, J.:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. . . .
. . . . Thus correlated, “psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.23 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do's.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
cralawred“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.”Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.25 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Q: Can you explain to the court what is your recommendation? A: He is emotionally infantile and immature considering also that he is of age and as there is chronological age responsibility, we have profound emotional quotation chronologically. In one of my interview with client, he manifested that he was left out that most have created the vaccum. . . . often times in his relationship with woman, he would look for a woman, more or less has a mother figure. Q: As you said in your recommendation, Mr. Malillin is psychologically incapacitated to carry out responsibility with the emotional infantile and immature, egocentric and mother dependence? A: In our psychological examination, there is said stress in him as a person as that of the child, the ego, the adult, the parents, what is dominant traits in person, what behavior appear when I say youth, the individual display more on a child on him, it is the child who is concern with the feeling or reaction, if the person react more incapable impulses that is distracted, he is more of infantile than adult, in the case of Robert Malillin if we cite, he related to me that he is having some affairs with some women so I can see that he is quite speaking of nature and individual getting through serious responsibilities of married life. Q: Since you stated that you have interviewed this Robert Malillin, several incidents, have you talk matters regarding his wife? A: Yes, he told me that the wife had several affairs in fact, there was a short doubt of his first son because upon learning that he offered marriage, the woman refused and that fuel his doubt later because he learns that the woman is with another guys and he said that woman contracting loans without his knowledge and the woman is not even taking care of the child. Q: Considering that Mr. Malilllin had dispute with his wife, he would say that the wife is infantile and immature? A: The transaction is the same because they were both child and the child here has no decision made then there is nothing to reach up. Q: Base on your observation with this case Malillin is infantile and immature? A: Both parties were infantile, immature, what would happen, just imagine two children living, what would be the relationship of the husband and wife, they would keep on challenging each other.41 (Emphasis supplied)
The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law that based on the deposition of the Petitioner – the Respondent understand[a]bly ignored the proceedings completely for which she was duly cited for Contempt of Court – and premised on the substantially concordant testimonies of the Witnesses, the woman Respondent demonstrated in the external forum through her action and reaction patterns, before and after the marriage-in-fact, her grave lack of due discretion in judgment for marriage intents and purposes basically by reason of her immaturity of judgement as manifested by her emotional ambivalence and affective instability that were sufficiently evidenced by the three following more salient factors in the Case which are de officio abbreviated and generalized for judicial prudence in deference [to] her person: One, THAT the Respondent already practiced a fundamental ambivalence in her emotional constitution by engaging in multiple carnal attachements [sic] at an early age. Two, THAT the Respondent was in effect ultimately rendered pregnant by the Petitioner when she was but nineteen years old. Three, THAT the Respondent after her de facto marriage with the Petitioner demonstrated her affective instability by entertaining as well several carnal relationships that finally terminated the union of some fourteen years that were punctuated by several temporary separations and that brought to life no less than three children. As to the matter of the relatively long time frame of the union, it should be noted that just as the mere passage of time does not nullify an ab initio valid marriage, neither does it ipso facto validate an ab initio null and void marriage. As to the question of the number of children born of the union, just as there are valid marriages without children, the[re] are invalid marriages with children. The presence of children from a union directly prove biological potency on the part of both the Parties in Causa – not necessarily their tenure of due discretion in judgement for marriage.46 (Emphasis supplied)
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law, and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.
. . . .
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion dated 30 March 1995, citing the “lack of due discretion” on the part of respondent. Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, and the Roman Rota of the Vatican. In fact, respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.50 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
- those who lack sufficient use of reason;
- those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
- those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.53 (Emphasis supplied)
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
. . . .
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.68 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 52–53.
2 Id. at 68.
3 Id. at 72–74.
4 Id. at 59.
5 Id. at 11–12.
6 Id. at 286.
7 Id. at 289–290.
8 Id. at 289.
9 Id. at 285.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 286.
12 Id. at 284.
13 Id. at 212–213.
14 Id. at 217.
15 Id. at 219.
16 Id. at 201–204.
17 Id. at 219–220.
18 Ponencia, p. 16.
19 Id. at 200–201.
20 Id. at 205–206.
21 See Republic v. Galang, G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 524, 535–538 [Per J. Brion, Third Division].
22 310 Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
23 Id. at 39–40.
24 335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
25 Id. at 676–679. The eighth guideline on the certification from the Solicitor General briefly stating his or her reasons for agreeing or opposing the Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity has been dispensed with under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Re: Proposed Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages). See Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, 612 Phil. 1061, 1078 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division], Navales v. Navales, 578 Phil. 826, 839 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division], Tongol v. Tongol, 562 Phil. 725, 735 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division], Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337, 358 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division], and Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, 484 Phil. 396, 410 (2004) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
26 Navales v. Navales, 578 Phil. 826, 840–842 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, 549 Phil. 632, 639–640 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Tongol v. Tongol, 562 Phil. 725, 732–735 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, 545 Phil. 725 (2007) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division]; Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337, 356–358 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division]; Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485, 498–500 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division]; Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 735, 740–742 [Per J. Corona, Third Division]; Ancheta v. Ancheta, 468 Phil. 900, 915–916 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]; Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175, 186–187 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Pesca v. Pesca, 408 Phil. 713, 719–720 (2001) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division]; Republic v. Dagdag, 404 Phil. 249, 256–259 (2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 847–850 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919, 932 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
27 519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].
28 Another case where the parties successfully obtained a decree of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity is Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 294 (1997) [Per J. Torres, Jr., Second Division]. However, Chi Ming Tsoi was not decided under the Molina guidelines. This court had yet to promulgate Molina when Chi Ming Tsoi was decided.
29Rollo, p. 260.
30 Id. at 265 and 267.
31 397 Phil. 840 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
32 Id. at 850.
33 VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES RULE, sec. 2(d).
34 VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES RULE, sec. 14(b).
35Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 842 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
36 G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 461 [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
37 Id. at 487.
38Rollo, p. 266.
39 Id. Petitioner, in his Memorandum, enumerated the tests:
DAP - the client is asked to draw a person. The objective is to know the client’s inner side, and his emotional dynamics. . . .
HTP - to protect the client’s orientation to society and ability to realize it. . . .
LCT - the client is asked to arrange the color cards. The objective is to determine client’s monetary stress, roaming wishes, and conflicts. . . .
IQ - to tap the client’s intellectual function. . . .
BVMGT - to determine the client’s perceptual ability, a projective tool to determine the client’s emotional dynamics, preoccupation, inferiority, and immaturity. . . .
40 Id. at 266-A, citing TSN, May 7, 2001, p. 10.
41 Id. at 266-A–267, quoting TSN, May 7, 2001, pp. 11–14.
42 Ponencia, p. 10.
43 Id.
44Rollo, pp. 287–288.
45 Id. at 68.
46 Id. at 73–74.
47 519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].
48 Id. at 346.
49 Id. at 347.
50 Id. at 353–366.
51 609 Phil. 316 (2009) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
52 Id. at 335–336.
53 Id. at 335.
54 Id. at 324–325.
55 Id. at 334.
56 See Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines website (visited February 11, 2015).
57Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 679 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
58Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337, 370 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].
59 598 Phil. 666 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
60 Id. at 692.
61 Id. at 696.
62 Id. at 699.
63 Id.
64 601 Phil. 676 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
65 Id. at 692.
66 629 Phil. 157 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
67 Id. at 179.
68 Id. at 179–180.
69 606 Phil. 177, 199 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
70 607 Phil. 1, 8 (2009) [Per J. Corona, Special First Division].
71 G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 461, 495 [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
72 G.R. No. 175367, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 561, 564 [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
73 CONST., art. XV, sec. 3(1).
74Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337, 355 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].
75 CONST., art. XV, sec. 2.
76 FAMILY CODE, art. 1.
77 CONST., art. II, sec. 11 provides that “[t]he State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.”
78 FAMILY CODE, art. 1.
79 Family Code, art. 1.
80 CONST., art. III, sec. 1 states that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”
81 CONST., art. II, sec. 11.
82 CONST., art II, sec. 6.
83 CONST., art. II, sec. 12.