SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191710, January 14, 2015
DEMETRIA DE GUZMAN, AS SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS OLGA C. BARBASO AND NOLI G. CEMENTTNA;* LOLITA A. DE GUZMAN; ESTHER G.MILAN; BANAAG A. DE GUZMAN; AMOR G. APOLO, AS SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS ALBERTO T. APOLO, MARK APOLO AND GEORGE APOLO;* HERMINIO A. DE GUZMAN; LEONOR G. VTVENCIO; NORMA A. DE GUZMAN; AND JOSEFINA G. HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, v. FBLINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 petitioners question the extent of the easement of right of way granted to them and the indemnity for the same as fixed by the Court of Appeals (CA) in its September 25, 2009 Decision2 and March 1, 2010 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 87920.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioners Demetria de Guzman, Lolita A. de Guzman, Esther G. Milan, Banaag A. de Guzman, Amor G. Apolo, Herminio A. de Guzman, Leonor G. Vivencio, Norma A. de Guzman and Josefina G. Hernandez (petitioners)4 were co-owners in fee simple of a parcel of land measuring 15,063 square meters and situated in Barrio Bulao, Cainta, Rizal, which was later subdivided among them and for which individual titles were issued. The property is enclosed and surrounded by other real properties belonging to various owners. One of its adjoining properties is Filinvest Home Subdivision Phase IV-A, a subdivision owned and developed by respondent Filinvest Development Corporation (respondent) which, coming from petitioners' property, has a potential direct access to Marcos highway either by foot or vehicle. As such, petitioners filed on August 17, 1988 a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way5 against respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo.
Unwilling to grant petitioners a right of way within its subdivision, respondent alleged in its Answer that petitioners have an access to Sumulong Highway through another property adjoining the latter's property. In fact, the distance from petitioners' property to Sumulong Highway using the said other property is only 1,500 meters or shorter as compared to the 2,500-meter distance between petitioners' property and Marcos Highway using respondent's subdivision.6
On April 30, 1993, the RTC rendered a Decision7 granting petitioners the right of way across respondent's subdivision, ratiocinating as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court holds that a right of way as prayed in the complaint can be granted.As to the indemnity, the RTC said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The adverted route by [respondent] is unfeasible and unavailing. The route, aside from being hilly, has to traverse raw lands [denominated] 3043-A which belong to different owners with no designated road lot thus the impossibility of free access thereon. Aside from that fact it is not passable by vehicular means.
Whereas if [petitioners] would pass through the [respondent's] road lot particularly Lot 15 access to the Marcos Highway is readily available to [petitioners'] property. Only a fence [separates] the Filinvest Subdivision and the [petitioners'] property [which] could be removed x x x anytime.
While in the survey of the property of the [petitioners] it is shown that the distance from the subject lot to the Marcos Highway is approximately 2,350 meters and the distance from Sumulong Highway to the subject lot is 1,400 meters, such short distance could not be used as absolute basis to deny the [petitioners] the relief prayed for.
As held in Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. vs. Capitol Subd., Inc., L-25887, July 26, 1966 and by express provision of [A]rticles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, a compulsory right of way cannot be obtained unless four requisites are first shown to exist, namely: (1) that it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) that there is payment of proper indemnity; (3) that the isolation is not due to the dominant estate's own acts; and (4) that the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and in so far as consistent with this rule where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
The foregoing requirements are present in this case.
As already stated even if it appears that the distance from the subject property to Sumulong Highway is the shortest route, yet it is prejudicial to the [petitioners].
The road in said route is undeveloped, owned by several owners, a raw lot, hilly, while if it would be [respondent's] property which would be the [servient] estate it only takes the removal of the fence in order that [petitioners] could have access to the public highway.8cralawlawlibrary
Lastly, as a requirement for the granting of the easement indemnity is hereby placed at P400,000.00 considering x x x the benefits derived by the dominant estate and the type of the road therein which is concrete.9cralawlawlibraryUpon respondent's appeal, the CA, in its February 13, 1996 Decision,10 affirmed petitioners' entitlement to legal easement of right of way. However, it set aside the P400,000.00 indemnity fixed by the RTC considering that the exact area of the right of way, as well as its value per square meter, had not yet been determined. The CA thus remanded the case to the RTC for the determination thereof and the corresponding amount of indemnity.
As can be gleaned from the above, petitioners insisted that the right of way pertains only to Road Lot 15 where the fence separating their property from respondent's subdivision, which was supposed to be removed to grant them access thereto, is located. On the other hand, it was respondent's contention that the right of way covers the whole stretch from petitioners' property all the way to its subdivision's gate leading to Marcos Highway.
[Counsel for Petitioners] Atty. Barbaso: x x x But if we are going to [take it from] this affirmed decision of the trial court[,] it made [particular] mention of x x x Road Lot 15 access as found in page 4 of the said decision and the said decision also mentioned about a statement and [I] quote x x x: "and it only takes the removal of the fence in order [that] the [petitioners] could have access on the highway.["] So, this is [the] decision. I am quoting it from the decision. So if the decision says it [would] only take the removal of the fence, [it is only] the fence that we are going to remove. It's found on page 4 of the decision of the lower court. [Counsel for Respondent] Atty. Tolentino: [Ma'am], may I? Atty. Barbaso: There is no other decision. This is the only decision we are referring to. [It is] one and the same decision. Court: Decision of the Court of Appeals. Atty. Tolentino: Court of Appeals decision, page 12, states: ["]regrettably the lower court did not adequately explain the basis for fixing the indemnity at P400,000.00. There was no finding as to the exact measurement of the right of way, its area in square meters, its value by square meters, the cost of the construction.["] So... xxxx Atty. Tolentino: Where the easement is established in such a manner that its use may be continuous by the dominant [e]state [by] establishing a permanent passage the indemnity will consist [of] the value of the land occupied and the amount of damage. Atty. Barbaso: We are not occupying the whole of the entrance up to this very point [Road Lot 15]. Atty. Tolentino: But you cannot reach this point [Road Lot 15] if you don't pass the entrance. Atty. Barbaso: Only passing that's why the servitude was granted. That's why the easement was granted. Atty. Tolentino: We will submit, your honor, whatever ruling you make. Atty. Barbaso: Your honor... Court: The claim of [respondent] is from the gate up to here [Road Lot 15]. Atty. Tolentino: Yes, your honor. Court: [To Atty. Barbaso] And your claim is from that portion to here [from petitioners' property to Road Lot 15]. xxxx Court: Do it in writing including the jurisprudence in support of your respective claim[s].11
Based on the records of the case, the Decision of this Court and that of the Court of Appeals are pointing to Road Lot 15 as the subject lot of the right of way granted to the [petitioners]. The said Decisions had long attained finality with respect to the subjectlot which should be the basis for the determination of just compensation.13cralawlawlibraryHence, it ruled:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In view of the foregoing, the Court so holds that the appropriate amount of indemnity due to the [respondents] from the [petitioners] for the right of way granted to the latter shall be assessed at One Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Pesos (P1,620.00) per square meter of Road Lot 15 which consists of 264 square meters and the [petitioners] to contribute proportionately to the costs of the construction of the right of way on Road Lot 15 to be determined by both parties.Ruling of the Court of Appeals
SO ORDERED.14cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 1 June 2005 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72, is MODIFIED. Plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to pay defendant-appellant the proper amount of indemnity for the legal easement of right of way consisting of (1) the value of the road lots affected, which has an area of 23,500 square meters assessed at PI,620.00 per square meter and (2) the contribution to be made by plaintiffs-appellees in the maintenance of said road lots, to be determined by both parties.Petitioners moved for reconsideration.20 The CA, however, denied the same in its March 1, 2010 Resolution21 for having been filed out of time.
SO ORDERED.19cralawlawlibrary
This is an action brought by the plaintiffs-petitioners pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court against the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals which are both not in accord with law as will be shown in the discussion hereinafter.22 (Emphases supplied)The main issue then assigned for resolution is whether the CA was correct in ruling that the property subject of the right of way pertains not only to Road Lot 15 but to the whole stretch of road network commencing from Road Lot 15, then passing through Road Lots 3, 10, 6, 4, 2 and 1, all the way to Marcos Highway. The Court notes that this matter is a proper allegation found in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 4523 of the Rules of Court.
Plaintiffs-petitioners are left with no appeal, nor is there any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law after the respondent Court of Appeals incorrectly den[ied] their motion for reconsideration24 x x xThen in their Arguments/Discussion, petitioners alleged that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction not only in reversing a final ruling of the trial Court, but also on the award of indemnity x x x.25cralawlawlibrary
The Court of Appeals whimsically and capriciously reversed the final ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Antipolo City x x x.26 (Emphasis supplied)Furthermore, petitioners impleaded the appellate court as public respondent. These, on the other hand, are salient features of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court, or grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. This remedy can be availed of when "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."It likewise stated in Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Inc. (BAPCI) that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, is a mode of appeal available to a party desiring to raise only questions of law from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law.
xxx The general rule is that the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of judgment on the merits is appeal. Thus, the proper remedy for the petitioner should have been a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court since the decision sought to be reversed is that of the CA. The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort to certiorari, because one of the requisites for availment of the latter is precisely that there should be no appeal. The remedy of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court was still available to the petitioner.29cralawlawlibrary
Rule 45 is clear that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceeding involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.Sifting through the issues and other matters raised in the present petition, it becomes apparent that the crucial question calling for this Court's Resolution pertains to the CA's appreciation of the issue and evidence presented by the parties, and not the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the appellate court in rendering its Decision. Therefore, the issue in the present controversy clearly falls under the classification of errors of fact and law - questions which may be passed upon by this Court only via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Albeit it must be made clear that questions of fact may only be reviewed by this Court under exceptional circumstances like when the findings of facts of the CA are at variance with those of the trial court,31 as in this case.
Moreover, it is basic that one cannot avail of the remedy provided for under Rule 65 when an appeal is still available. x x x30cralawlawlibrary
The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order to promote their object of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding.Besides and as already mentioned, the conflicting findings of fact and conclusions arrived at by the RTC and CA,35 as well as the fact that this case has been awaiting resolution for close to three decades now, are ample reasons for this Court to rule on the issues raised herein without much resort to technicalities.
The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts in the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the cases before them. Liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on mere technicalities.34cralawlawlibrary
Whereas if [petitioners] would pass through the [respondent's] road lot particularly Lot 15 access to the Marcos Highway is readily available to [petitioners'] property. Only a fence [separates] the Filinvest Subdivision and the [petitioners'] property [which] could be removed x x x anytime.37cralawlawlibraryThey argue that the CA in effect improperly reversed and set aside the above final ruling of the RTC when it declared instead that the right of way is composed of the road network within respondent's subdivision.
While in the survey of the property of the [petitioners] it is shown that the distance from the subject lot to the Marcos Highway is approximately 2350 meters and the distance from Sumulong Highway to the subject lot is 1,400 meters, such short distance could not be used as absolute basis to deny the [petitioners] the relief prayed for.38cralawlawlibraryOn the other hand, the portion of the RTC Decision relied upon by petitioners can in no way be taken to mean that Road Lot 15 alone comprises the right of way granted. By its context, it was only intended to support the RTC's conclusion that the route within respondent's subdivision is the less prejudicial between the two considered routes because it would only take the removal of the fence therein for petitioners to have access to respondent's network of roads which, in turn, would make Marcos Highway accessible to them.
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made."A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings; (b) during the trial, either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. It is an established principle that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party himself and binds the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset it."41 Since petitioners already judicially admitted that the right of way affects a number of road lots, they cannot not now claim that it only comprises Road Lot 15. Their admission is binding on them.
In the case of a legal easement, Article 649 of the Civil Code prescribes the parameters by which the proper indemnity may be fixed. Since the intention of petitioners is to establish a permanent passage, the second paragraph of Article 649 of the Civil Code particularly applies:But since the metes and bounds of the property covered by the easement were not yet defined, the Court in Woodridge remanded the case to the trial court for the determination of the same and of the corresponding indemnity, hinting that the trial court may take into consideration the fact that the affected road lot is being used by the general public in mitigating the amount of damage that the servient estate is entitled to.
Art. 649 xxx
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate. xxx
On that basis, we further hold that the appellate court erred in arbitrarily awarding indemnity for the use of the road lot.
The Civil Code categorically provides for the measure by which the proper indemnity may be computed: value of the land occupied plus the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate. Settled is the rule in statutory construction that 'when the law is clear, the function of the courts is simple application.' Thus, to award indemnity using factors different from [those] given by the law is a complete disregard of these clear statutory provisions and is evidently arbitrary. This the Court cannot countenance. The Civil Code has clearly laid down the parameters and we cannot depart from them. Verba legis non est recedendum.42 (Emphases and italics in the original)
Art. 651. The width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time.According to Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, a noted civilist, it is the needs of the dominant tenement which determine the width of the passage.43
Endnotes:
* See Notice of Death of Client, Records, Vol. I, pp. 153-157.
** Per Special Order No. 1910 dated January 12, 2015.
1Rollo, pp. 8-17.
2 CA rollo, pp. 91-101; penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario L. Guarifia III and Jane Aurora C. Lantion.
3 Id. at 137-138.
4 Only petitioner Demetria de Guzman's name, also known as Demetria G. Cementina, appears in this petition. It was entitled "Demetria de Guzman, et. al. v. Court of Appeals and Filinvest Development Corp." A perusal of the records would, however, reveal the names of the other petitioners.
It must be noted that Demetria de Guzman has already died and is represented by her heir, daughter Olga C. Barbaso, who was the only one who executed and signed the Verification and Certification Against Forum-Shopping in this petition.
Although the certification against forum-shopping was not signed by all of herein petitioners, we shall allow the petition in accordance with our ruling in Heirs of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. v. Mingoa Sr., G.R. No. 146548, December 18, 2009, 608 SCRA 394, 406-407, where we held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryHere, all the petitioners are immediate relatives who share a common interest in the land sought to be reconveyed and a common cause of action raising the same arguments in support thereof. There was sufficient basis, therefore, for Domingo Hernandez, Jr. to speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners when he certified that they had not filed any action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Thus, the Verification/Certification that Hernandez Jr. executed constitutes substantial compliance under the Rules.This Court also accorded the same leniency in the earlier case of Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, 448 Phil. 302, 311 (2003), as the lone petitioner who executed the certification of non-forum shopping was a relative and co-owner of the other petitioners with whom he shares a common interest.
5 Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-5. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1236-A and raffled to Branch 72.
6 See RTC's April 30, 1993 Decision, id. at 97-101.
7 Id.; penned by Executive Judge Rogelio L. Angeles.
8Id. at 100.
9 Id. at 101.
10 Id. at 107-121; penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices Arturo B. Buena and Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (all of whom became members of this Court).
11 TSN of the Ocular Inspection on February 27, 2004, pp. 281-287.
12 Records, pp. 335-337.
13 Id. at 337
14 Id.
15 Article 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such encumbrance.
16 The easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts. Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
17 CA rollo, pp. 91-101.
18 545 Phil. 83, 91 (2007).
19 Id. at 100-101.
20 See Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation, id. at 102-108.
21Id. at 137-138.
22 Rollo, p. 12.
23 The issue on the total area of the subject property is actually a question of fact. However, questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 whenever the CA's factual findings are contrary to those of the trial court (Legal Heirs of the Late Edwin B. Deauna v. Fil-Star Maritime Corporation, G.R. No. 191563, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 284, 302).
24 Rollo, pp. 8-9.
25 Id. at 10.
26 Id. at 12.
27 618 Phil. 170 (2009).
28 562 Phil. 707, 718-719 (2007).
29 Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative Inc. (BAPCI) v. Obias, supra note 27 at 185.
30 Id. at 185-186.
31 As stated under footnote 21, citing Legal Heirs of the Late Edwin B. Deauna v. Fil-Star Maritime Corporation, at 302, questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 whenever the CA's factual findings are contrary to those of the trial court.
32 In Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative Inc. (BAPCI) v. Obias, supra note 27 at 186, we likewise considered the petition therein to have been filed under Rule 45 as it was filed on time pursuant to said rule, among other considerations.
Here, the Notice of Resolution of the CA, promulgated on March 1, 2010, was received by petitioners on March 4, 2010. They filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari in this Court on March 19, 2010, asking for an extension of thirty (30) days within which to file the petition. The motion was granted. Thus, petitioners had until April 18, 2010 to file their petition. However, since April 18, 2010 fell on a Sunday, petitioners had until April 19, 2010, the date of filing of herein petition, to file the same.
33 452 Phil. 665 (2003).
34 Id. at 673.
35 In Legal Heirs of the Late Edwin B. Deauna v. Fil-Star Maritime Corporation, supra note 21 at 302, we reiterated that Rule 45 deals with questions of law only. There are however, exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the CA's factual findings are contrary to those of the trial court. Here, as already mentioned, the conflicting findings of fact by the RTC and CA constrain us to rule on the questions of fact presented
36 CA rollo, p. 111.
37 Records, p. 99.
38 Id. at 100; emphasis supplied.
39See respondent's Formal Offer of Exhibits where the said scale map was denominated as Exhibit "2," id. at 220-222.
40 Id. at 240-242.
41Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation v. Central Colleges of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 180631-33, February 22, 2012,666 SCRA 540, 553.
42 Woodridge School, Inc. v. ARB Construction Co., Inc., supra note 18.
43 COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Book II, 1987 reprinting, p. 356.
44 Id. at 355.
45 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 655.