THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 197582, June 29, 2015
JULIE S. SUMBILLA, Petitioner, v. MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment finding accused Julie S. Sumbilla GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. For each count, she is sentenced to pay a fine of P80,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment.Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner opted to file a Motion for Reconsideration3 before the MeTC. The Motion was denied in the Order4 dated April 17, 2009 being a pleading barred under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. The MeTC further noted that the prohibited motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner will not suspend the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
She is likewise ORDERED to indemnify private complainant Matrix Finance Corporation the total amount of P40,002.00 plus 12% annual legal interest from September 21, 2002 until full payment.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.2 (Emphasis and underscoring added.)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON TECHNICALITY AND NOT EXERCISING ITS POSITIVE DUTY OF GIVING DUE IMPORTANCE ON THE SUBSTANTIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE A CLEAR PRESENCE OF SUCH VIOLATION OF LAW AS DEFINED BY PETITIONER IN HER PETITION WHICH COULD HAVE MERIT A FULL DECISION BY A HIGHER COURT.17Petitioner acknowledged18 the procedural lapse of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal before the CA. She also fully grasped19 the effects of her erroneous filing of the Motion for Reconsideration to challenge the MeTC Decision finding her guilty of six counts of violation of BP 22. Knowing that her conviction had already attained finality, petitioner seeks the relaxation of the rules of procedure so that the alleged erroneous penalty imposed by the MeTC can be modified to make it in accord with existing law and jurisprudence.
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.The court may thus impose any of the following alternative penalties against an accused found criminally liable for violating BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year; or (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, and shall in no case exceed P200,000.00; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment. The discretion to impose a single (imprisonment or fine) or conjunctive (fine and imprisonment) penalty pertains to the court.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 2. Construction. – These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryConsequently final and executory judgments were reversed when the interest of substantial justice is at stake and where special and compelling reasons called for such actions.26 In Barnes v. Judge Padilla,27 we declared as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.The judgment of conviction was already final in Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison28 when the Court corrected the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence imposed on the accused which exceeded the period of the imposable penalty. The correction was made in the interest of justice and only for the penalty imposed against petitioner to be in accordance with law and nothing else.29chanrobleslaw
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be final.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life and liberty of petitioner. If his penalty of imprisonment remains uncorrected, it would be not conformable with law and he would be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 40 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, which is outside the range of the penalty prescribed by law. Contrast this to the proper imposable penalty the minimum of which should only be within the range of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional, while the maximum should only be anywhere between 11 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor to 13 years of reclusion temporal. Substantial justice demands that we suspend our Rules in this case. “It is always within the power of the court to suspend its own [R]ules or except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require. x x x Indeed, when there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice.” Suspending the Rules is justified “where there exist strong compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof.” After all, the Court’s “primordial and most important duty is to render justice x x x.”34All the accused in Almuete v. People,35People v. Barro,36Estrada v. People,37 and Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison,38 failed to perfect their appeal on their respective judgments of conviction, but the Court corrected the penalties imposed, notwithstanding the finality of the decisions because they were outside the range of penalty prescribed by law. There is, thus, no reason to deprive the petitioner in the present case of the relief afforded the accused in the cited cases. Verily, a sentence which imposes upon the defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty in excess of the maximum which the court is authorized by law to impose for the offense for which the defendant was convicted, is void for want or excess of jurisdiction as to the excess.39chanrobleslaw
x x x queries have been made regarding the authority of Judges toIn like manner, the issue of whether BP 22 violates Section 20 of Article III of the Constitution which proscribes imprisonment as a punishment for not paying a debt was already settled in the negative in Lozano v. Martinez.44 Pertinent portions of the Decision in the Lozano case read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryconsidering that Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 adopted the rulings in Eduardo Vaca v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 131714, 16 November 1998, 298 SCRA 656) and Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000) as a policy of the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for violations of B.P. Blg. 22, without mentioning whether subsidiary imprisonment could be resorted to in case of the accused’s inability to pay the fine.
- Impose the penalty of imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; and
- Impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event that the accused, who is found guilty of violating the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22, is unable to pay the fine which he is sentenced to pay
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
It is, therefore, understood thatx x x x
- Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22;
x x x x43 (Italics in the original; emphasis added)
- Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.
Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? x x x
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
x x x x
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.45 (Emphasis added)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. In the interest of justice, the Decision dated January 14, 2009 of Branch 67, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 is MODIFIED.
Accused Julie S. Sumbilla is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is sentenced to pay a FINE of THIRTEEN THOUSAND AND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR PESOS (P13,334.00) for each count, and to indemnify private complainant Matrix Finance Corporation the total amount of P40,002.00 plus 6% interest per annum from September 21, 2002 until full payment.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Peralta,*(Acting Chairperson), Del Castillo,**Mendoza,*** and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
* Designated Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2071 dated June 23, 2015.
** Designated additional Member per Raffle dated May 13, 2015.
*** Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 2072-C dated June 23, 2015.
1Rollo, pp. 70-71. Penned by Judge Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag.
2 Id. at 71.
3 Id. at 72-76.
4 Id. at 82.
5 Id. at 89.
6 Id. at 90-101.
7 Id. at 103-108. Penned by Presiding Judge J. Cedrick O. Ruiz.
8 CA rollo, pp. 28-31.
9Rollo, p. 114.
10 CA rollo, pp. 7-18.
11Rollo, p. 49-A. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a Member of this Court) with Associate Justices Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now also a Member of this Court) and Elihu A. Ybañez concurring.
12 Id. at 64-66.
13 Id. at 50-57.
14 Id. at 3-4.
15 Id. at 7-24.
16 Id. at 115-116.
17 Id. at 14.
18 Id. at 17-18. Paragraphs 35 and 36 of the Petition.
19 Id. at 20. Paragraph 39 of the Petition.
20 359 Phil. 187 (1998).
21 455 Phil. 964, 978 (2003).
22Delfino, Sr. v. Anasao, G.R. No. 197486, September 10, 2014, p. 9; Escalante v. People, G.R. No. 192727, January 9, 2013, 688 SCRA 362, 375, citing FGU Insurance Corporation v. RTC of Makati City, Branch 66, et al., 659 Phil. 117, 123 (2011).
23City Government of Makati v. Odeña, G.R. No. 191661, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 460, 495, citing Bongcac v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 606 Phil. 48, 55 (2009).
24Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr., et al., 658 Phil. 156, 178 (2011), citing Destileria Limtuaco & Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 241 Phil. 753, 764 (1988).
25Hilario v. People, 574 Phil. 348, 362 (2008), citing Basco v. Court of Appeals, 392 Phil. 251, 266 (2000).
26 See Apo Fruits Corporation, et al. v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 647 Phil. 251, 288 (2010).
27 482 Phil. 903, 915 (2004). Citations omitted.
28 458 Phil. 561 (2003).
29 Id. at 568.
30 335 Phil. 440, 460 (1997).
31 392 Phil. 857, 876 (2000).
32 505 Phil. 339, 357-360 (2005).
33 G.R. No. 179611, March 12, 2013, 693 SCRA 167.
34 Id. at 185-186.
35 Supra note 33.
36 Supra note 31.
37 Supra note 32.
38 Supra note 28.
39Caluag v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 8, 14-15 (1948). See also Cruz v. Director of Prisons, 17 Phil. 269, 272-273 (1910).
40 Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 10159, provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryArt. 39. Subsidiary Penalty. – If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court, subject to the following rules:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary41 Supra note 20.
x x x x
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a light felony.
x x x x
42 This Circular was issued to implement the policy espoused in the case of Vaca v. Court of Appeals, supra note 20.
43Quoted in Jao Yu v. People, 481 Phil. 780, 788-789 (2004).
44 230 Phil. 406 (1986).
45 Id. at 421, 424.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary