EN BANC
[G.R. No. 46570. April 21, 1939. ]
JOSE D. VILLENA, Petitioner, v. THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, Respondent.
Vicente del Rosario for Petitioner.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta for Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR; EXECUTIVE SUPERVISION OVER THE ADMINISTRATION OF PROVINCES, MUNICIPALITIES, CHARTERED CITIES AND OTHER LOCAL POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS. — Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code speaks of direct control, direction, and supervision over bureaus and offices under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, but this section should be interpreted in relation to section 8G Or the same Code which grants to the Department of the Interior "executive supervision over the administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and other local political subdivisions."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; INVESTIGATION OF CHARGES; MEANING OF THE WORD "SUPERVISION." — In the case of Planas v. Gil (37 Off. Gaz., 1228) this court observed that "Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation." The principle there enunciated is applicable with equal force to the present case. The Secretary of the Interior is invested with, authority to order the investigation of the charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUSPENSION BY THE SECRETARY. — As regards the challenged power of the Secretary of the Interior to decree the suspension of the herein petitioner pending an administrative investigation or the charges against him, the question, it may be admitted, is not free from difficulties. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by section 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides that "The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES. — The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by section 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessary exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance, counsel for the petitioner admitted in the oral argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Codes to be exercised conformably to law.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official, it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — It may be argued with some degree of plausibility that, if the Secretary of the Interior is, as we have hereinabove concluded, empowered to investigate the charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose. preventive suspension may be a means by which to carry into effect a fair and impartial investigation. This is a point, however, which, for the reason hereinafter indicated the court does not have to decide.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under the circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain prerogative acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES. — With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President’s bosom confidence" and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing, "are subject to the direction of the President."
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECRETARIES OF DEPARTMENT. — Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a department is, and must be, the President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority" (Myers v. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21 at 30; 272 U. S., 52" at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160). Secretaries of departments, of course, exercise certain powers under the law but the law cannot impair or in any way affect the constitutional power of control and direction of the President. As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain matters, but this is by mere concession of the Executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular field.
11. ID.; ID. : ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — If the President, then, is the authority in the executive Department, he assumes the corresponding responsibility. The head of a department is a man of his confidence; he contrast and directs his acts; he appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the executive, not any of his secretaries. It .s therefore logical that he, the President, should be answerable for the acts of administration of the entire Executive Department before his own conscience no less than before that undefined power of public opinion which, in the language of Daniel Webster, is the last repository of popular government. These are the necessary corollaries of the American presidential type of government, and if there is any defect, it is attributable to the system itself. We cannot modify the system unless we modify the Constitution, and we cannot modify the Constitution by any subtle process of judicial interpretation or construction.
2. ID.; ID.; INVESTIGATION OF CHARGES; MEANING OF THE WORD "SUPERVISION." — In the case of Planas v. Gil (37 Off. Gaz., 1228) this court observed that "Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation." The principle there enunciated is applicable with equal force to the present case. The Secretary of the Interior is invested with, authority to order the investigation of the charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUSPENSION BY THE SECRETARY. — As regards the challenged power of the Secretary of the Interior to decree the suspension of the herein petitioner pending an administrative investigation or the charges against him, the question, it may be admitted, is not free from difficulties. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by section 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides that "The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES. — The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by section 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessary exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance, counsel for the petitioner admitted in the oral argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Codes to be exercised conformably to law.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official, it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — It may be argued with some degree of plausibility that, if the Secretary of the Interior is, as we have hereinabove concluded, empowered to investigate the charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose. preventive suspension may be a means by which to carry into effect a fair and impartial investigation. This is a point, however, which, for the reason hereinafter indicated the court does not have to decide.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under the circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain prerogative acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES. — With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President’s bosom confidence" and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing, "are subject to the direction of the President."
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECRETARIES OF DEPARTMENT. — Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a department is, and must be, the President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority" (Myers v. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21 at 30; 272 U. S., 52" at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160). Secretaries of departments, of course, exercise certain powers under the law but the law cannot impair or in any way affect the constitutional power of control and direction of the President. As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain matters, but this is by mere concession of the Executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular field.
11. ID.; ID. : ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — If the President, then, is the authority in the executive Department, he assumes the corresponding responsibility. The head of a department is a man of his confidence; he contrast and directs his acts; he appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the executive, not any of his secretaries. It .s therefore logical that he, the President, should be answerable for the acts of administration of the entire Executive Department before his own conscience no less than before that undefined power of public opinion which, in the language of Daniel Webster, is the last repository of popular government. These are the necessary corollaries of the American presidential type of government, and if there is any defect, it is attributable to the system itself. We cannot modify the system unless we modify the Constitution, and we cannot modify the Constitution by any subtle process of judicial interpretation or construction.
D E C I S I O N
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Secretary of the Interior to restrain him and his agents from proceeding with the investigation of the herein petitioner, Jose D. Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal, which was scheduled to take place on March 28, 1939, until this case is finally determined by this court. The respondent was required to answer, but the petition for preliminary injunction was denied.
It appears that the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior, conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the petitioner, as a result of which the latter was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized practice of the law profession. The respondent, therefore, on February 8, 1939, recommended to the President of the Philippines the suspension of the petitioner to prevent possible coercion of witnesses, which recommendation was granted, according to the answer of the Solicitor-General of March 20, 1939, verbally by the President on the same day. The Secretary of the Interior suspended the petitioner from office on February 9, 1939, and then and thereafter wired the Provincial Governor of Rizal with instruction that the petitioner be advised accordingly. On February 13, 1939, the respondent wrote the petitioner a letter, specifying the many charges against him and notifying him of the designation of Emiliano Anonas as special investigator to investigate the charges. The special investigator forthwith notified the petitioner that the formal investigation would be commenced on February 17, 1939, at 9 a. m., but due to several incidents and postponements, the same had to be set definitely for March 28, 1939. Hence, the petition for preliminary injunction referred to in the beginning of this opinion.
The petitioner contends in his petition:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) That the Secretary of the Interior has no jurisdiction or authority to suspend and much less to prefer by himself administrative charges against the petitioner and decide also by himself the merits of the charges as the power to suspend municipal elective officials and to try and punish them for misconduct in office or dereliction of duty is lodged in some other agencies of the government;
"(2) That the acts of the respondent in suspending the petitioner from office and in preferring by himself charges against him and in designating a special investigator to hear the charges specified in Exhibit A are null and void for the following reasons:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) Because the Secretary of the Interior, by suspending the petitioner, has exercised control over local governments when that power has been taken away from the President of the Philippines by the Constitution for the to abrogate and the power to abrogate means the power to power to control has been interpreted to include the power usurp and the power to usurp necessarily includes the power to destroy:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(b) Because even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in section 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that power under existing law, in accordance with section 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials while section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law;
"(c) Because the respondent Secretary of the Interior is exercising an arbitrary power by converting himself into a complainant and at the same time judge of the charges he has preferred against the petitioner;
"(d) Because the action of the respondent Secretary of the Interior is not based on any sworn statement of any private person or citizen of this government when section 2188 of the Administrative Code requires the complaint against elective municipal officials to be under oath in order to merit consideration by the authorities."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner prays this Honorable Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) To issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondent restraining him, his agents, attorneys and all persons acting by virtue of his authority from further proceeding against the petitioner until this case is finally determined by this court;
"(b) To declare, after the hearing of this petition, that the respondent is without authority or jurisdiction to suspend the petitioner from the office of mayor of Makati and to order his immediate reinstatement in office;
"(c) To declare that the respondent has no authority to prefer charges against the petitioner and to investigate those charges for to grant him that power the respondent world be acting as prosecutor and judge of the case of his own creation."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor-General contends in his answer:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That section 79 (C) in relation with section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code expressly empowers the respondent as Secretary of the Interior to "order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department" and in connection therewith to ’designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigation’; (Par. 4.)
"2. That although section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, invoked by the petitioner, empowers the provincial governor to ’receive and investigate complaints made tender oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office’, said section does not preclude the respondent as Secretary of the Interior from exercising the power vested in him by section 79 (C) in relation with section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code; and that, moreover, said section 2188 must be read in relation with section 37 of Act No. 4007, known as the Reorganization Law of 1932; (Par. 4 [b].)
"3. That at the commencement of the investigation the petitioner did not question the power or jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior to investigate the administrative charges against him but merely contended that the filing of said charges was not in accordance with law for the lesson that they did not bear the oaths of the complainants; (Par. 5.)
"4. That the authority of a department head to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person under his department necessarily carries with it by implication the authority to take such measures as he may deem necessary to accomplish the purpose of the investigation, such as by suspending the officer under investigation to present coercion of witnesses; and that, furthermore, the suspension from office of the herein petitioner by the respondent was authorized by the Chief Executive, who is empowered by section 64 (B) of the Administrative Code to remove officials from office; (Par. 7.)
"5. That the petition does not allege facts and circumstances that would warrant the granting of the writ of preliminary injunction under section 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure; (Par. 8.)
"6. That it is a well-settled rule ’that courts of equity have no power to restrain public officers by injunction from performing any official act which they are by law required to perform, or acts which are not in excess of the authority and discretion reposed in them.’ (Par. 9.)"
The issues presented in this case may be reduced to an inquiry into the legal authority of the Secretary of the Interior (a) to order an investigation, by a special investigator appointed by him, of the charges of corruption and irregularity brought to his attention against the mayor of the municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, who is the petitioner herein, and (b) to decree the suspension of ,he said mayor pending the investigation of the charges.
Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Department Head shall have direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and may, any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, repeal or modify the decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus or offices when advisable in the public interest.
"The Department Head may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations, and such committee, official, or person may summon, witness by subp
It appears that the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior, conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the petitioner, as a result of which the latter was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized practice of the law profession. The respondent, therefore, on February 8, 1939, recommended to the President of the Philippines the suspension of the petitioner to prevent possible coercion of witnesses, which recommendation was granted, according to the answer of the Solicitor-General of March 20, 1939, verbally by the President on the same day. The Secretary of the Interior suspended the petitioner from office on February 9, 1939, and then and thereafter wired the Provincial Governor of Rizal with instruction that the petitioner be advised accordingly. On February 13, 1939, the respondent wrote the petitioner a letter, specifying the many charges against him and notifying him of the designation of Emiliano Anonas as special investigator to investigate the charges. The special investigator forthwith notified the petitioner that the formal investigation would be commenced on February 17, 1939, at 9 a. m., but due to several incidents and postponements, the same had to be set definitely for March 28, 1939. Hence, the petition for preliminary injunction referred to in the beginning of this opinion.
The petitioner contends in his petition:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) That the Secretary of the Interior has no jurisdiction or authority to suspend and much less to prefer by himself administrative charges against the petitioner and decide also by himself the merits of the charges as the power to suspend municipal elective officials and to try and punish them for misconduct in office or dereliction of duty is lodged in some other agencies of the government;
"(2) That the acts of the respondent in suspending the petitioner from office and in preferring by himself charges against him and in designating a special investigator to hear the charges specified in Exhibit A are null and void for the following reasons:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) Because the Secretary of the Interior, by suspending the petitioner, has exercised control over local governments when that power has been taken away from the President of the Philippines by the Constitution for the to abrogate and the power to abrogate means the power to power to control has been interpreted to include the power usurp and the power to usurp necessarily includes the power to destroy:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(b) Because even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in section 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that power under existing law, in accordance with section 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials while section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law;
"(c) Because the respondent Secretary of the Interior is exercising an arbitrary power by converting himself into a complainant and at the same time judge of the charges he has preferred against the petitioner;
"(d) Because the action of the respondent Secretary of the Interior is not based on any sworn statement of any private person or citizen of this government when section 2188 of the Administrative Code requires the complaint against elective municipal officials to be under oath in order to merit consideration by the authorities."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner prays this Honorable Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) To issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondent restraining him, his agents, attorneys and all persons acting by virtue of his authority from further proceeding against the petitioner until this case is finally determined by this court;
"(b) To declare, after the hearing of this petition, that the respondent is without authority or jurisdiction to suspend the petitioner from the office of mayor of Makati and to order his immediate reinstatement in office;
"(c) To declare that the respondent has no authority to prefer charges against the petitioner and to investigate those charges for to grant him that power the respondent world be acting as prosecutor and judge of the case of his own creation."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor-General contends in his answer:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That section 79 (C) in relation with section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code expressly empowers the respondent as Secretary of the Interior to "order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department" and in connection therewith to ’designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigation’; (Par. 4.)
"2. That although section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, invoked by the petitioner, empowers the provincial governor to ’receive and investigate complaints made tender oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office’, said section does not preclude the respondent as Secretary of the Interior from exercising the power vested in him by section 79 (C) in relation with section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code; and that, moreover, said section 2188 must be read in relation with section 37 of Act No. 4007, known as the Reorganization Law of 1932; (Par. 4 [b].)
"3. That at the commencement of the investigation the petitioner did not question the power or jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior to investigate the administrative charges against him but merely contended that the filing of said charges was not in accordance with law for the lesson that they did not bear the oaths of the complainants; (Par. 5.)
"4. That the authority of a department head to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person under his department necessarily carries with it by implication the authority to take such measures as he may deem necessary to accomplish the purpose of the investigation, such as by suspending the officer under investigation to present coercion of witnesses; and that, furthermore, the suspension from office of the herein petitioner by the respondent was authorized by the Chief Executive, who is empowered by section 64 (B) of the Administrative Code to remove officials from office; (Par. 7.)
"5. That the petition does not allege facts and circumstances that would warrant the granting of the writ of preliminary injunction under section 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure; (Par. 8.)
"6. That it is a well-settled rule ’that courts of equity have no power to restrain public officers by injunction from performing any official act which they are by law required to perform, or acts which are not in excess of the authority and discretion reposed in them.’ (Par. 9.)"
The issues presented in this case may be reduced to an inquiry into the legal authority of the Secretary of the Interior (a) to order an investigation, by a special investigator appointed by him, of the charges of corruption and irregularity brought to his attention against the mayor of the municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, who is the petitioner herein, and (b) to decree the suspension of ,he said mayor pending the investigation of the charges.
Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Department Head shall have direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and may, any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, repeal or modify the decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus or offices when advisable in the public interest.
"The Department Head may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations, and such committee, official, or person may summon, witness by subp
