SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 202967, August 05, 2015
ALICIA Y. LAUREL, SUBSTITUTED BY HER SOLE HEIR AND LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE JUAN MIGUEL Y. LAUREL, Petitioner, v. FERDINAND M. VARDELEON, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails: 1) the October 13, 2011 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the appeal in CA-G.R. CEB CV No. 01360 and affirming the October 12, 2005 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 6th Judicial Region, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 6 in Civil Case No. 7249; and 2) the CA's June 20, 2012 Resolution4 denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the herein assailed Decision.
Factual Antecedents
On July 23, 2004, petitioner Alicia Y. Laurel filed a Complaint5 for recovery of possession and ownership and/or quieting of title against respondent Ferdinand M. Vardeleon concerning a 20,306-square meter island in Caticlan, Malay, Aklan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 7249 and assigned to Branch 6 of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.
Respondent denied the material allegations in the complaint, claiming that he bought the island on April 9, 1973 from Avelina Casimero, and that petitioner was guilty of laches in filing her claim.6redarclaw
In a July 6, 2005 Pre-Trial Order,7 petitioner was scheduled to present her evidence on three separate dates: September 7, 2005; October 12, 2005; and November 23, 2005.
Previously, on August 1, 2005, respondent moved to correct the Pre-Trial Order, in order to reflect therein petitioner's supposed admission made during pre-trial that she knew of respondent's possession of the subject property since 1975.8 Petitioner opposed the same.9redarclaw
In an August 19, 2005 Order,10 the trial court denied respondent's motion to correct the Pre-Trial Order. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration11 but the trial court did not act on the motion.
On September 2, 2005, petitioner's counsel moved to reset the scheduled September 7, 2005 hearing to October 12, 2005 or any available date.12 The trial court, in a September 7, 2005 Order,13 granted the motion provided that petitioner defrays the transportation expenses as well as the appearance fee of respondent's counsel. Petitioner moved to reconsider,14 but the court failed to act on the same.
During the scheduled October 12, 2005 hearing, petitioner was present, together with substitute counsel Atty. Roy Villa and her first witness. Petitioner moved in open court to postpone trial on the ground that there are pending motions that have to be resolved, and that the substitute lawyer had yet to confer with the witness, since her true counsel, Atty. De la Vega - who originally interviewed the witness - was not present. This time, the trial court, in an Order15 of even date, denied: 1) petitioner's oral motion to postpone trial; 2) her motion for reconsideration of the trial court's September 7, 2005 Order directing her to defray respondent's counsel's transportation expenses and appearance fees; and 3) respondent's motion for reconsideration of the trial court's August 19, 2005 Order denying his motion to correct the Pre-Trial Order. It likewise dismissed Civil Case No. 7249 on the ground of failure to prosecute on petitioner's part, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.16 It decreed, thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Resolving the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the plaintiff, the same is hereby DENIED. The alleged illness of Atty. Maria Theresa Diaz-dela Vega which allegedly prevented [sic] from appearing at the initial trial is not supported by a medical certificate that is under oath. (Sec. 4, Rule 30, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
As regards the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the defendant, the same was just a rehash of the ground mentioned in their [sic] first motion which was amply discussed in the Order sought to be reconsidered. Said Motion for Reconsideration is also DENIED.
Called for trial, plaintiff is unable to present anew her evidence. She is asking for the postponement of the trial. It is significant to take note that when this case was set for trial on September 7, 2005, plaintiff failed to present evidence based on the alleged illness of her counsel. And today, plaintiff is not again ready to present evidence.
Defendant opposed the motion, and manifested that he is willing that the counterclaim be dismissed to facilitate the eventual dismissal of this case.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs verbal motion to postpone the trial is hereby DENIED and the case is DISMISSED for failure to prosecute. The counterclaim is also DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Open Court, Kalibo, Aklan.
October 12, 2005.
The fact that another trial date was left for her to present evidence cannot be made as a justification because for two settings, i.e., September 7, 2005 and October 12,2005, she admittedly failed to present evidence. As a matter of fact, on September 7, 2005, the Court was already inclined to dismiss the case for failure of the plaintiff to appear, especially that her motion to postpone the
hearing failed to comply with the 3-day period to file and serve the motion prior to the date of the hearing. The motion was filed two (2) days before the date of the hearing. Nonetheless, the Court had to bend the procedural rules by granting the motion and set the presentation of plaintiffs evidence on October 12,2005 as previously set during the trial. The reason therefor is just to allow the plaintiff to present her evidence and decide the case on the merits. Unfortunately, as earlier stated, plaintiff was again unable to present evidence.
Some pending incidents mentioned by the plaintiff is [sic] not a legal justification for her not to present evidence. The same were already resolved when the Court directed plaintiff to proceed with the presentation of her evidence. However, plaintiff refused to do so.
Hence, the dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute as mentioned at the outset.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.19
Appellant claims that it was her honest belief that during the hearing on October 12, 2005, the trial court would first hear and resolve appellee's motion for reconsideration from the Order denying his earlier motion to correct the pre-trial order. She was caught by surprise when the trial court outrightly denied appellee's motion for reconsideration and directed her to present her witness. Moreover, under the Pre-Trial Order, she still had another date to present her evidence, that is, on November 23, 2005.
We are not impressed with appellant's contentions.
Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, if, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence-in-chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by the court.
There is failure to prosecute when the plaintiff, being present, is not ready or is unwilling to proceed with the scheduled trial or when postponements in the past were due to the plaintiffs own making, intended to be dilatory or caused substantial prejudice on the part of the defendant.
Appellant could not pretend that she did not know that she would be presenting her evidence on October 12, 2005. Appellant was duly notified of the hearing dates. The Pre-Trial Order dated July 6, 2005 clearly stated that appellant was set to present her evidence on the following dates: September 7, 2005, October 12, 2005 and November 23, 2005 at 9:30 in the morning. When appellant's counsel filed a motion to reset the hearing, the trial court granted the same.
With due notice of the proceedings, appellant and her counsel were both well aware that they had to present their evidence on October 12, 2005. This was their chosen date, but instead of coming prepared, appellant moved for another postponement. Appellant's justification that her counsel was not yet able to talk to the witness is not a meritorious ground to defer the hearing of the case. In fact, under Sec. 3, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, a motion to postpone a trial on the ground of absence of evidence can be granted only upon affidavit showing the materiality or relevancy of such evidence and that due diligence had been utilized to procure it. There was no such affidavit in this case, nor was there any showing that due diligence had been exerted to procure the attendance of the intended witness.
The fact that the trial court no longer heard appellee's motion for reconsideration is of no moment. Appellant's complacent attitude and lack of preparedness [in pursuing] her case warrants its dismissal for failure to prosecute, xxx [A] plaintiff is duty-bound to prosecute his action with utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch in order to obtain the relief prayed for and, at the same time, minimize the clogging of court dockets. The expeditious disposition of cases is as much the duty of the plaintiff as the court's.
The trial court therefore did not err in issuing the assailed Order since it was only performing its duty in ensuring that litigations are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch. To allow appellant to postpone the case until such time that she is ready to present her evidence would only cause unreasonable delay and violate appellee's right to speedy trial.
Accordingly, We sustain the trial court's dismissal of appellant's complaint for failure to prosecute.
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DENIED. The Order dated October 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 7249 is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs on plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED.20
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT FOR SUPPOSED FAILURE TO PROSECUTE DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONER THROUGH HER COUNSEL HAD ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT A QUO AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A PENDING UNRESOLVED MOTION INVOLVING THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER.
BOTH THE COURT A QUO AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAVE CLEARLY DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.21
To constitute failure to prosecute, his non-appearance must be equated with unwillingness to proceed with the trial as when both plaintiff and counsel made: no appearance at all, or with the assumption that plaintiff has already lost interest in prosecuting his action, in the same way that should the ground for dismissal be delay, this delay or failure to proceed must be for an unreasonable length of time beyond the reasonable allowance which by judicial leniency
litigant is normally entitled.28
While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test of such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or a scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, x x x courts should decide to dispense rather than wield their authority to dismiss.29
... (T)rial courts have ... the duty to dispose of controversies after trial on the merits whenever possible. It is deemed an abuse of discretion for them, on their own motion, to enter a dismissal which is not warranted by the circumstances of the case' (Municipality of Dingras v. Bonoan, 85 Phil. 458-59 [1950]). While it is true that the dismissal of an action on grounds specified under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court is addressed to their discretion (Flores v. Phil. Alien Property Administrator, 107 Phil. 778 (I960]; Montelibano v. Benares, 103 Phil. 110 [1958]; Adorable v. Bonifacio, 105 Phil. 1269 [1959]; Inter-Island Gas Service, Inc. v. De la Gerna, L-17631, October 19, 1966, 18 SCRA 390), such discretion must be exercised soundly with a view to the circumstances surrounding each particular case (Vernus-Sanciangco v. Sanciangco, L-12619, April 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 1209). If facts obtain that serve as mitigating circumstances for the delay, the same should be considered and dismissal denied or set aside (Rudd v. Rogerson, 15 ALR 2d 672; Cervi v. Greenwood, 147 Colo 190, 362 P. 2d 1050 [1961]), especially where the suit appears to be meritorious and the plaintiff was not culpably negligent and no injury results to defendant (27 C.J.S. 235-36; 15 ALR 3rd 680). (Abinales vs. Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Br. 1, 70 SCRA 590, 595). (Emphasis supplied)
While it is discretionary on the trial court to dismiss cases, dismissals of actions should be made with care. The repressive or restraining effect of the rule amounting to adjudication upon the merits may cut short a case even before it is fully litigated; a ruling of dismissal may forever bar a litigant from pursuing judicial relief under the same cause of action. Hence, sound discretion demands vigilance in duly recognizing the circumstances surrounding the case to the end that technicality shall not prevail over substantial justice.
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 4-22.
2 Id. at 23-32; penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes.
3 Records, p. 182; penned by Judge Niovady M. Marin.
4Rollo, p. 33; penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos and Carmelita S. Manahan.
5 Records, pp. 2-7.
6 Id. at 34-38.
7 Id. at 108-109.
8 Id. at 119.
9 Id. at 122-128.
10 Id. at 129.
11 Id. at 158-164.
12 Id. at 142-146.
13 Id. at 148-149.
14 Id. at 168-172.
15 Id. at 182.
16 On Dismissal of Actions.
Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. - If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
17 Records, pp. 191-197.
18 Id. at 260-261.
19 Id.
20Rollo, pp. 27-31.
21 Id. at 9.
22 Id. at 132-145.
23 Citing Dy, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97130, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 468.
24 Records, pp. 108-109.
25 Citing Gapoy v. Judge Adil, 171 Phil. 652 (1978).
26Rollo, pp. 106-131.
27Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc. v. Magsalin, G.R. No. 170026, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 65, 81. Emphasis supplied.
28Gapoy v. Judge Adil, supra note 25 at 658. (Emphasis supplied)
29Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, 362 Phil. 362,369 (1999).
30 244 Phil. 479,481-482 (1988).
31Rollo, p. 14. In 2012, when she filed the instant Petition, petitioner was already eighty-nine (89).
32Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 396 Phil. 497, 505-506 (2000).
33 Supra note 27.
34Canson v. Justice Garchitorena, 370 Phil. 287, 303 (1999), citing Dysico v. Judge Dacumos, 330 Phil. 834 (1996); Re: Report on the Audit and Inventory of Cases in RTC, Branch 55, Alaminos, Pangasinan, 331 Phil. 43 (1996); Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Makati, 318 Phil. 5 (1995); Query of Judge Tenerife, 325 Phil. 464 (1996); Re: Report on the Audit and Inventory of Cases in MTCQ Br. 2, Batangas City, 318 Phil. 43 (1995); Bentulan v. Dumatol, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-999, June 15, 1994, 233 SCRA 168; Re: Letter of Mr. Octavio Kalalo, A.M. No. 93-7-1158-RTC, March 24, 1994, 231 SCRA 403; and Longboan v, Polig, Adm. [Matter] No. R-704-RTJ, June 14, 1990, 186 SCRA 557.