THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 191370-71, August 10, 2015
RODOLFO BASILONIA, LEODEGARIO CATALAN AND JOHN BASILONIA, Petitioners, v. HON. DELANO F. VLLLARUZ, ACTING IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ROXAS CITY, BRANCH 16, AND DIXON ROBLETE, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
The lone issue for resolution in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order is the applicability of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules in criminal cases. Specifically, does a trial court have jurisdiction to grant a motion for execution which was filed almost twenty (20) years after the date of entry of judgment? In his Orders dated December 3, 20091 and January 4, 2010,2 respondent Judge Delano F. Vi11aruz of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Roxas City, Branch 16, held in the affirmative.3 We sustain in part.
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing considerations, this court finds the [accused] Rodolfo Basilonia, Leodegario Catalan, and John "Jojo" Basilonia, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, as principals in Criminal Case No. 1773 for the murder of Atty. Isagani Roblete on September 15, 1983 in Roxas City, Philippines, defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, and sentences the said [accused] to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 12 years, 1 month and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 20 years, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and the accessory penalties thereto; to pay and [indemnify], jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased Atty. Isagani Roblete the sum of 1!32,100.00 representing funeral expenses, tomb, burial, and expenses for wake; the sum of 1!30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Atty. Isagani Roblete; the amount of lost income cannot be determined as the net income of the deceased cannot be ascertained; and to pay the costs of suit. [Accused] Vicente Catalan and Jory Catalan are ACQUITTED for lack of evidence.
In Criminal Case No. 1775 for Frustrated Murder, this court finds the accused John "Jojo" Basilonia GUlLTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Frustrated Homicide, as principal, committed against the person of Rene Gonzales on September 15, 1983, defined under Article 249, in relation to Articles 6 and 50 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences the said accused to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision [correccional] as minimum, to 6 years, and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum; and to pay the costs. [Accused] Rodolfo Basilonia, Leodegario Catalan, Vicente Catalan and Jory Catalan are ACQUITTED for lack of evidence.
In Criminal Case No. 1774 for Illegal Possession of Firearm, all [accused] are ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.5
ARTICLE 92. When and How Penalties Prescribe. - The penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.
ARTICLE 93. Computation of the Prescription of Penalties.- The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.
ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. - The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. However, if such evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum period.A dig into legal history confirms the views just expressed. The Penal Code of Spain of 1870 in its Article 134 - from whence Articles 92 and 93 of the present Revised Penal Code originated- reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. This must be so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, * * *" Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking."
"El tiempo de la prescripcion empieza a contarse desde el dia en que ha tenido Iugar la notificacion personal de la sentencia firme al reo: el Codigo de 1850 no expresaba que la notificacion hubiese de ser personal, pues en su art. 126 se consigna que el termino de Ia prescripcion se cuenta desde que se notifique la sentencia, causa de la ejecutoria en que se imponga le pena respectiva. Luego ausente el reo, ya no podra prescribir hoy Ia pena, pues que Ia notificacion personal no puede ser sup/ida por Ia notificacion hecha en estrados. Dada la imprescindible necesidad del requisito de la notificacion personal, es obvio que en las penas que consisten en privacion de libertad solo podra existir Ia prescripcion quebrantando el reo Ia condena, pues que si no se hallare ya preso preventivamente, debera siempre procederse a su encerrarniento en el acto de serle notificada personalmente la sentencia."We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.20
Under Article 112 of the RPC, civil liability established in Articles 100,25 101,26 102,27 and 10328 of the Code shall be extinguished in the same manner as other obligations, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Law. Since the Civil Code is the governing law, the provisions of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Section 6, Rule 39 thereof, is applicable. It states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. (6a)
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules must be read in conjunction with
Articles 1144 (3) and 1152 of the Civil Code, which provide:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x x
(3) Upon a judgment
Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became final.
An action for revival of judgment is not intended to reopen any issue affecting the merits of the case or the propriety or correctness of the first judgment.30 The purpose is not to re-examine and re-try issues already decided but to revive the judgment; its cause of action is the judgment itself and not the merits of the original action.31 However, being a mere right of action, the judgment sought to be revived is subject to defenses and counterclaims like matters of jurisdiction and those arising after the finality of the first judgment or which may have arisen subsequent to the date it became effective such as prescription, payment, or counterclaims arising out of transactions not connected with the former controversy.32redarclaw
Once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution the issuance of which is the trial court's ministerial duty, compellable by mandamus.33 Yet, a writ issued after the expiration of the period is null and void.34 The limitation that a judgment be enforced by execution within the stated period, otherwise it loses efficacy, goes to the very jurisdiction of the court. Failure to object to a writ issued after such period does not validate it, for the reason that jurisdiction of courts is solely conferred by law and not by express or implied will of the parties.35redarclaw
Nonetheless, jurisprudence is replete with a number of exceptions wherein the Court, on meritorious grounds, allowed execution of judgment despite non-observance of the time bar. In Lancita, et al. v. Magbanua, et al.36 it was held:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In computing the time limited for suing out an execution, although there is authority to the contrary, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias. x x x.37
Litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back and relax, and await the outcome of their case. They should give the necessary assistance to their counsel, for at stake is their interest in the case. While lawyers are expected to exercise a reasonable degree of diligence and competence in handling cases for their clients, the realities of law practice as well as certain fortuitous events sometimes make it almost physically impossible for lawyers to be immediately updated on a particular client's case.44
Endnotes:
* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, per Special Order No. 2112 dated July 16, 2015.
1Rollo, p. 73.
2 Id. at 78-79.
3 The case was raffled to RTC Branch 16 after the presiding judges of RTC Branches 18 and 15 voluntarily inhibited themselves (Rollo, pp. 71-72).
4 Penned by Presiding Judge Jonas A. Abellar of Roxas City, RTC, Br. 18 (Id. at 23-49).
5Rollo, pp. 48-49.
6 Id. at 50, 83, 147.
7 Id. at 54, 83, 147.
8 Id. at 54, 73, 84, 147.
9 Id. at 55-56.
10 Id. at 51-52.
11 Id. at 148.
12 Id. at 59, 61-70, 148.
13 Id. at 59-60.
14 Id. at 74-77.
15 Id at 80-81.
16 Id. at 82-86.
17 Approved on December 8, 1930 and took effect on January 1, 1932. (See Atty. Risos-Vidal v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015; Lozano v. Han. Martinez, 230 Phil. 406, 415 [1986]; and People v. Hernandez et al., 99 Phil. 515, 548 [ 1956]).
18 92 Phil. 310 (1952).
19 125 Phil. 966 (1967).
20Tanega v. Masakayan, et al., supra, at 968-971.
21 442 Phil. 442 (2002).
22 490 Phil. 49 (2005).
23 RPC, ART. 100.
24Budlong v. Hon. Apalisok, et al. 207 Phil. 804, 8II ( I983).
25 ARTICLE 100. Civil Liability of Person Guilty of Felony. - Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
26 ARTICLE 101. Rules Regarding Civil Liability in Certain Cases. - The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules: First. 1n cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
27 ARTICLE 102. Subsidiary Civil Liability of Innkeepers, Tavernkeepers and Proprietors of Establishments. - In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarity liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
28 ARTICLE 103. Subsidiary Civil Liability of Other Persons. -The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
29Olongapo City v. Subic Water and Sewerage Co., Inc., G.R. No. 171626, August 6, 2014, 732 SCRA 132, 147. (Emphasis in the original)
30Philippine Reconstruction Corporation, Inc. v. Aparente, 150-A Phil. 570, 575 (1972).
31Enriquez v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 630, 637 (2001) and Caiña v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114393, December 15, 1994, 239 SCRA 252, 262.
32Enriquez v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 636; Caiña v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 262; and Philippine Reconstruction Corporation, Inc. v. Aparente, supra note 30.
33Sps. 0 and Cheng v. Sps. Javier and Dailisan, 609 Phil. 434, 442-443 (2009).
34 Olongapo City v. Subic Water and Sewerage Co., Inc., supra note 29, at 148; Barrera v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 559, 568-569 (2001); and Ramos v. Hon. Garciano, etc. et al., 137 Phil. 814, 819 (1969).
35Ramos v. Hon. Garciano, etc. et al., supra, at 819.
36 117 Phil. 39 (1963).
37Lancita. et al. v. Magbanua, et al. supra, at 44-45. See also Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 159508, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 237, 254; Spouses Topacio v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 157644, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 50, Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc. v. Han. Pfagata et al., 588 Phil. 464, 488 (2008); Yau v. Silverio, Sr., 567 Phil. 493, 502 (2008); Francisco Motors Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 535 Phil. 736, 751 (2006); De La Rosa v. Fernandez, 254 Phil. 373,378 (1989); Provincial Gov't ofSorsogon v. Vda. de Villaroya, et al., 237 Phil. 280,288 (1987); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 221 Phil. 685, 693 (1985); and Ramos v. Hon. Garciano, etc. et al., 137 Phil. 814, 819-820 (1969).
38Lumakin v. Davao Medical Center, G.R. No. 190808, February 17, 2014 (2nd Div. Resolution); California Bus Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 584 Phil. 385 (2008); Yau v. Silverio, Sr., supra; Francisco Motors Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra; Salientes v. lAC, 316 Phil. 197 (1995); Villaruel v. Court of Appeals, 254 Phil. 305 (1989); and Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra.
39National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v. National Labor Relations Commission, 327 Phil. 653 (1996); and Torralba v. Judge De Los Angeles, 185 Phil. 40 (1980).
40Rubio v. Alabata, G.R. No. 203947, February 26, 2014, 717 SCRA 554.
41Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc. v. Hon. Plagata et al., 588 Phil. 464 (2008).
42 Olongapo City v. Subic Water and Sewerage Co., Inc., supra note 34, at 148-149; Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc. v. Hon. Plagata et al., supra note 37, at 488; Yau v. Silverio, Sr., supra note 37, at 503; and Francisco Motors Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 37, at 753.
43 See Villeza v. German Management and Services. Inc., et al., 641 Phil. 544 (2010) and Macias v. Lim, 474 Phil. 765 (2004).
44Sps. O and Cheng v. Sps. Javier and Dailisan, supra note 33, at 443-444.
45 See Estayo v. De Guzman, 104 Phil. 1038, 1041 (1958).
46Villeza v. German Management and Services, Inc., et al., supra note 43, at 552; Bausa, et al. v. Heirs of Juan Dina, et al., 585 Phil. 526, 534 (2008); California Bus Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra note 38, at 398; Francisco Motors Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 38, at 752; and Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 38, at 693.
47Macias v. Lim, supra note 43, at 789.