THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS, Accused-Appellants.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
Appellants Vergel Ancajas and Allain Ancajas are before us seeking a review of the Decision1 dated April 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Cebu City, issued in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 00857.
On October 19, 1998, appellants were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Bogo, Cebu City with the crime of Rape under the following Information,2 the accusatory portion of which states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on the 16th day of July 1998, between the hours of 8:00 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at the house of the victim at Taytayan, Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, confederating and conspiring with one another, with deliberate intent, by means of force and violence by boxing her on the stomach thereby rendering her unconscious, with intimidation and lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge with AAA,3 while she was in a state of unconsciousness.On their arraignment on February 23, 1999, appellants pleaded NOT GUILTY5 to the crime charged.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Vergel Ancajas and Allain Ancajas are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.The RTC ratiocinated that the elements of the crime of rape were duly proven by the prosecution and the fact of rape had been corroborated in its material details by the medical findings of Dr. Jabat. It found that AAA had positively identified appellants whom she was familiar with being her neighbors and childhood friends.
Further, each accused is hereby ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Pursuant to Circular No. 4-92, as amended by Circular No. 63-97 of the Court Administrator, the Jail Warden of the Cebu Provincial Detention and Rehabilitation Center (CPDRC), Cebu City, is hereby directed to immediately transfer the two (2) accused to the custody of the National Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Jail Warden, CPDRC for his information, guidance and compliance.
SO ORDERED.34ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 266-A- Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed: 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:The prosecution must prove that (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant; and, (2) that the same was accomplished under any of the above-enumerated circumstances. Inasmuch as the crime of rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is usually only the victim who can testily with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse.39 Therefore, in a prosecution for rape, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single and most important issue to deal with. Thus, if the victim's testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis of this testimony; otherwise, the accused should be acquitted of the crime.40
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;cralawlawlibrary
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;cralawlawlibrary
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Progress Report on Rape Alarm (Entry Nr. 98-257). As per sworn statement of offended party AAA that the alleged suspects were Allain Ancajas and Vergel Ancajas and she refused (sic) the other suspects.55ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryThe inclusion of the two additional names was cured by the sworn statement of AAA and her categorical declaration56 in open, court that appellants were the perpetrators of the crime charged and no other. It is well entrenched that entries in a police blotter, although regularly done in the course of the performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries, for these are often incomplete and inaccurate. These, therefore, should not be given undue significance or probative value as to the facts stated therein.57
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344] allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryHence, RA No. 9344 should be considered in determining the imposable penalty on appellant Allain even if the crime was committed seven years earlier. Section 6 of RA No. 9344 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.In Madali, et al. v. People,61 we held that discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.
A child above fifteen (15) yours but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.Notwithstanding, the RTC did not apply the law saying that the benefits of a suspended sentence shall not apply to appellant Allain because he is convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua making reference to Section 32, A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC,65 Rule, on Juveniles in Conflict with the law.
Upon suspension of sentence and alter considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The above-quoted (Section 38 of RA No. 9344) provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.In fact, the Court En Bane promulgated on November 24, 2009, the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law, which echoed such legislative intent.68
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned from the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent portion of which is quoted below:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryIf a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the child's restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. x x x67ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. — If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.The RTC did not suspend the sentence of appellant Allain pursuant to Section 38 of RA No. 9344. Appellant is now 34 years old, thus, Section 40 is also no longer applicable. Nonetheless, we have extended the application of RA No. 9344 beyond the age of 21 years old to give meaning to the legislative intent of the said law.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. Section 40 of the law and Section 48 of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old.Thus, appellant Allain shall be confined in an agricultural camp or other training facility pursuant to Section 51 of RA No. 9344.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia, the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to effect appellant's confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility.70ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Endnotes:
* Also spelled as "Alain" in his birth certificate.
** Designated Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Raffle dated September 10, 2014.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, with Associate Justices Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. and Gabriel T. Ingles, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-15.
2 Records, p. 1.
3 In consonance with our decision in People v. Cabalquinto, September 19, 2006, we withheld the real name of the rape victim and instead a fictitious initials is used to represent her.
4 Records, p. 1; Docketed as Criminal Case No. B-00457.
5Id. at 9.
6 TSN, March 23, 1999, p. 8.
7Id. at 7.
8Id. at 9.
9Id.
10Id. at 10.
11Id.
12Id. at 13-14.
13Id. at 14.
14Id. at 15-16.
15Id. at 17-18.
16Id. at 16.
17Id. at 26.
18Id. at 18.
19Id. at 19; TSN, November 11, 1999, p. 6.
20 TSN, March 23, 1999, p. 27.
21Id.
22 Records, p. 7.
23 TSN, January 25, 2000, p. 13.
24 Id.
25 TSN, August 17, 2005, pp. 24-26.
26 TSN, August 24, 2005, pp. 3-7.
27Id. at 7-9.
28Id. at 8; TSN, August 17, 2005, p. 10.
29 TSN, August 17, 2005, p. 11.
30 TSN, March 14, 2003, pp. 9-29.
31 TSN, September 26, 2003, p. 8.
32 TSN, March 8, 2006, p. 6; Exhibit "2".
33 Per Executive Presiding Judge Antonio D. Marigomen. CA rollo, pp. 68-96.
34Id. at 96.
35 Records, p. 251.
36Rollo, p. 19.
37Id. at 25; 35-37.
38 The applicable law when the crime was committed was RA 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22, 1097. The new provisions on Rape are found in Arts. 266-A to 266-D of the Revised Penal Code.
39People v. Cias, 665 Phil. 470, 481 (2011).
40Id., citing People v. Lazaro, 613 Phil. 200, 207 (2009).
41People of the Philippines v. Bobby Belgar, G.R. No. 182794, September 8, 2014.
42Id., citing People v. Tabarangao, 363 Phil. 248, 261 (1999); People v. Abiera, G.R. No. 93947, May 21, 1993, 222 SCRA 378, 384; People v. Ulili, G.R. No. 103403, August 24, 1993, 225 SCRA 594, 606; People v. Santiago, 274 Phil. 847, 859 (1991).
43 Rules of Court, Rule 133, Sec. 4.
44People v. Evangelio, et al., 672 Phil. 229, 243 (2011), citing Diega v. Court of Appeals, 629 Phil. 385, 396 (2010).
45People v. Batula, G.R. No. 181699, November 28, 2012, 686 SCRA 576, 586.
46Id., citing People v. Belen, 432 Phil. 881, 893 (2002).
47 TSN, March 23, 1999, p. 11.
48People v. Baun, 584 Phil. 560, 574 (2008).
49People v. Evangelio, supra note 44, at 246, citing Co v. The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, 549 Phil. 783, 805 (2007).
50People v. Rebutar; 181 Phil. 35, 43 (1979).
51People v. Milra, 385 Phil. 515, 536 (2000), citing People v. Silvestre, G.R. No. 109142, May 29, 1995, 244 SCRA 479, citing People v. Penillos, G.R. No. 65673, January 30, 1992, 205 SCRA 546; People v. Martinado, G.R. No. 92020, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 712. See People v. Buka, 205 SCRA 557 (1992); People v. Devaras, G.R. No. 48009, February 3, 1992, 205 SCRA 676; People v. Casinillo, G.R. No. 97441, September 11, 1992, 213 SCRA 777; People v. Florida, G.R. No. 90254, September 24, 1992, 214 SCRA 227.
52People v. Marquez, 400 Phil. 1313, 1328 (2000), citing People v. De Labajan, 375 Phil. 1022, 1032 (1999), citing People v. Navales, G.R. No. 112977, January 23, 1997, 266 SCRA 569, see also People v. Javier, G.R. No. 84449, March 4, 1997, 269 SCRA 181 (1997); People v. Amaca, 277 SCRA 215 (1997) and People v. Midlimod, 283 SCRA 395 (1997).
53People v. Islabra, G.R. Nos. 152586-87, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 547, 559, citing People v. Santos, G.R. Nos. 138308-10, September 26, 2001, 366 SCRA 52, 59.
54Id., citing People v. Iluis, 447 Phil. 517, 528 (2003).
55 Records, p. 155.
56 TSN, March 23, 1999, pp. 7-20.
57Beltran, Jr., et al. v. Court of Appeals, 662 Phil. 296, 311 (2011).
58People v. Lucero, 659 Phil. 518, 539 (2011).
59 Records, p. 154.
60 615 Phil. 97, 128 (2009).
61 612 Phil. 582, 606 (2009).
62 Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penally composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the court shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.
63People v. Mercado, 445 Phil. 813, 827 (2003).
64People v. Chun, 479 Phil. 53, 71 (2004).
65 Sec. 32. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders. - The sentence shall be suspended without need of application by the juvenile in conflict with the law. The court shall set the case for disposition conference within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of sentence which shall be attended by the social worker of the Family Court, the juvenile, and his parents or guardian ad litem. It shall proceed to issue any or a combination of the following disposition measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the juvenile; care, guidance, and supervision orders; Drug and alcohol treatment; Participation in group counseling and similar activities; Coinmitment to the Youth Rehabilitation Center of the DSWD or other centers for juvenile in conflict with the law authorized by the Secretary of DSWD.
x x x x
The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time of promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or over. (Emphasis supplied)
66Supra note 60.
67People v. Sarcia, supra at 128-129 (Citations omitted).
68 Section 48. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders. - If the child is found guilty of the offense charged, the court, instead of executing the judgment of conviction, shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application. Suspension of sentence can be availed of even if the child is already eighteen years (18) of age or more but not above twenty-one (21) years old, at the time of the pronouncement of guilt, without prejudice to the child's availing of other benefits such as probation, if qualified, or adjustment of penalty, in the interest of justice.
The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a child in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, but shall nonetheless apply to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment pursuant to the provisions of Rep. Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty and in lieu thereof, reclusion perpetua, and after application of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. (Emphasis supplied)
69 661 Phil. 224 (2011).
70People v. Jacinto, supra at 256-257. (Citations omitted)
71People v. Delfin, G.R. No. 190349, December 10, 2014, citing People v. Bayrante, G.R. No. 188978, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 446.
72Id.
73Nacar v. Gallery Frames and/or Felipe Bordey, Jr., G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439, 459.