FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 196258, September 28, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BONIFACIO DANDANON Y ILIGAN A.K.A. "BONING," Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For Our review is the Decision1 dated December 20, 2010 of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00611-MIN, affirming with modification the Judgment2 dated February 28, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 11737, which found accused-appellant Bonifacio Dandanon y Iligan a.k.a. "Boning" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
On May 2, 2006, an Information3 was filed with the RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch 2 charging accused-appellant and two other unidentified men with murder allegedly committed thus:
The undersigned accuses BONIFACIO DANDANON Y ILIGAN a.k.a. "Boning." RICHARD DOE and JOHN DOE of the crime of Murder, committed as follows:During his arraignment on June 21, 2006, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged against him.4 Trial ensued thereafter.That at more or less 4:30 P.M. of April 7, 2006 along the National Highway, Dumalagan, Butuan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot (sic) one Godofredo R. Paceño, Jr. with the use of an unknown caliber firearm hitting the latter on his head, which caused his instantaneous death.CONTRARY TO LAW: (Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659)
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds accused BONIFACIO DANDANON Y ILIGAN, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of MURDER defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim:Accused-appellant appealed the foregoing RTC judgment before the Court of Appeals, based on the following assignment of errors:a) Loss of Earning Capacity in the sum of P3,200,319.40;Accused Bonifacio Dandanon y Iligan in the service of his sentence shall be credited in his favor the period of his preventive imprisonment that he has already undergone under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code and R.A. No. 6127 and shall serve his sentence at Davao Prison and Penal Farm, Panabo City, Philippines.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
b) Moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00;
c) Exemplary damages in the sum of P25,000; and
d) Cost.
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESSES CREDIBLE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.In its Decision dated December 20, 2010, the Court of Appeals gave scant consideration to accused-appellant's arguments on the alleged irregularities in the police investigation and out-of-court identification by witnesses of accused-appellant, and the inconsistencies in the sworn statements of the prosecution witnesses. The Court of Appeals ruled that accused-appellant failed to prove ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses in identifying him as the one who killed Paceño; and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. The appellate court also found no merit in accused-appellant's contention that his non-flight signified his innocence. Concluding that accused-appellant's identity and involvement in the crime were established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, the Court of Appeals decreed:
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE ACCUSED (sic) IRON CLAD DEFENSE OF ALIBI.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE IRREGULARITIES IN THE PRIOR INVESTIGATION AND THE OUT OF COURT IDENTIFICATION PROCEEDINGS SMACKED OF THE ELEMENTS OF A SET UP THAT LED TO THE PROSECUTION AND CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Butuan City, in Criminal'Case No. 11737 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. He is sentenced to imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the following sums: P50,000.00, as moral damages; P30,000.00, as exemplary damages; and P50,000.00 civil indemnity.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryHence, the instant appeal.
Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court. As a general rule, on the question whether to believe the version of the prosecution or that of the defense, the trial court's choice is generally viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to conclude so, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the witness stand as they gave their testimonies. The trial court is, thus, in the best position to weigh conflicting testimonies and to discern if the witnesses were telling the truth.Both the trial and appellate courts were convinced that the evidence for the prosecution established accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. We see no cogent reason to disturb such finding.
Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:The essential elements of murder are the following: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the accused killed him; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.17 All elements are extant herein.1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
As for Ruales, she testified:
Q: And you made mentioned (sic) that after Pros. Paceño stepped on board a multicab, another passenger hurried in going on board also you made mention of that? A: Yes, sir. Q: And when he managed to on board (sic) that vehicle, where did he position himself inside? A: He sat in front of Fiscal Paceño. xxxx Q: When your vehicle reached Dumalagan because you said it was going to Nasipit, what happened if any? A: [Accused-appellant] shot Pros. Paceño. Q: How many times? A: Two (2) times. xxxx Q: What was the position of [accused-appellant] now when you said he changed seat in relation to Pros. Paceño? A: [Accused-appellant] seated in front of Pros. Paceño. Q: How about you, where were you positioned inside the multicab? A: I was also seated in front of [accused-appellant], sir. Q: Now, if this person whom you said that (sic) Pros. Paceño two times in the afternoon of April 7, 2006 while the vehicle you were on board on was in Dumalagan. If this person is present in the courtroom today, would you be able to point him? A: Yes, sir. Q: Please point at him? A: (the witness did so). Witness was pointing to a person seated on the first bench o[f] the courtroom wearing a yellow t-shirt and the person has a towel and when as to (sic) his name, he answered that he is Bonifacio Dandanon. Q: Are you sure that the man you pointed out is the one who shot Pros. Paceño two times? A: Yes, sir.19
As to the admissibility of-the out-of-court identification of accused-appellant made by Zaldivar and Ruales, we apply the totality-of-circumstances test, discussed in People v. Rivera21 as follows:
Q: When this public utility vehicle was in front of the GSIS building, where was your position inside that vehicle as passenger? A: Left side of the vehicle. Q: How about the man you identified as Fiscal Paceño, where did he position himself as passenger inside that same vehicle? A: Also on the right side, sir. Q: How about the other person whom you said came on board the vehicle just a few meters from where Fiscal Paceño came on board? A: He was seated beside me on the left side of the vehicle, sir. Q: What else did you notice of this passenger whom you said just seated beside you? A: I observed him to be feeling uneasy and he was also always coughing that time. Q: What happened when this public utility vehicle reached Dumalagan, Butuan City? A: The person who sat beside me shot Fiscal Paceño. Q: What part of the body of Fiscal Paceño did that person shoot? A: He was shot on his face, sir. Q: How many times? A: Twice. Q: If this person whom you said shot Fiscal Paceño twice on the head while inside a moving public utility vehicle is in court today, can you point at him? A: Yes, sir. Q: Please do. A: (Make it of record that the witness is pointing to a person seated on the second row of the spectator's bench when asked of his name, answered that he is Bonifacio Dandanon). Q: If you can remember, Miss Witness, can you tell the Honorable Court the color of clothes of the person who shot Fiscal Paceño? A: Yes, he was wearing orange T-shirt at that time.20
We explained the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such identification in People v. Teehankee, Jr., viz.:Based on the totality-of-circumstances test, the out-of-court identification of accused-appellant by Zaldivar and Ruales was properly admitted and considered by the trial court as evidence. The shooting incident happened at 4:00 in the afternoon of April 7, 2006 when it would have been still bright enough for Zaldivar and Ruales to clearly see their surroundings. Zaldivar was sitting across accused-appellant while Ruales was sitting right beside accused-appellant, and within the close confines of the multicab, both witnesses had the opportunity to have a good look at accused-appellant's face. The minor inconsistencies in the description of the killer, i.e., his complexion, physique, and other physical attributes, given by Zaldivar and Ruales bolster, rather than destroy, said witnesses' credibility, and further negate accused-appellant's claim that the witnesses were rehearsed, coached, or guided. Moreover, accused-appellant failed to present credible evidence that the out-of-court identification process was manipulated by the police or that the police improperly suggested to the witnesses that accused-appellant was the person they suspected responsible for Paceño's killing.Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. . . In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. (Citation omitted.)
Even assuming arguendo that the appellant Alfonso Rivera's out-of-court identification was tainted with irregularity, his subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have attended it. Without hesitation, the two prosecution witnesses, Renato Losaria and Juanito Baylon identified the appellant as one of the assailants. In People v. Timon, the accused were identified through a show-up. The accused assailed the process of identification because no other suspect was presented in a police line-up; We ruled that a police line-up is not essential in identification and upheld the identification of the accused through a show-up. We also held that even assuming arguendo that the out-of-court identification was defective, the defect was cured by the subsequent positive identification in court for the "inadmissibility of a police line-up identification x x x should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification." (Citations omitted.)Still, accused-appellant attempts to capitalize on an error purportedly committed by the RTC in its Judgment dated February 28, 2008 in including Quiban, the driver, as among the witnesses who identified accused-appellant as Paceño's killer. The RTC stated in its Judgment that:
Prosecution witnesses Joanne Ruales, Gretchen Zaldivar and Arturo Quiban positively identified herein accused as the assailant of the victim, Prosecutor Pacefio, pertinent questions and answers of said witnesses Joanne Ruales and Gretchen Zaldivar during the trial hereunder quoted[.]23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryAccused-appellant asserts that Quiban was not able to positively identify him as Quiban could not remember the face of Paceño's killer.
Quiban's testimony corroborated material portions in Ruales's testimony, particularly, that a person wearing an orange shirt and maong pants boarded the multicab somewhere in front of the GSIS Building, that such person was still in the multicab at the time of the shooting, and that said person immediately alighted from the multicab after one of the passengers was shot. We bear in mind that Ruales testified that accused-appellant was wearing an orange shirt and maong pants when he shot Pacefio inside the multicab on April 7, 2006. Assuming that the RTC did err in including Quiban among the witnesses who were able to identify accused-appellant as Pacefio's killer, it would be too trivial to warrant a reversal of the judgment of conviction rendered by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals against accused-appellant. Even if we were to disregard Quiban's testimony, there would still remain the testimonies of Zaldivar and Ruales which categorically identified accused-appellant as Pacefio's killer and were quoted by the RTC in its Decision.
Q: My question awhile ago, whether there were some other passengers other than Fiscal Pacefio who also step[ped] on board your vehicle in front of the GSIS? A: Yes, sir. Q: Can you describe this person, can you perhaps describe also his clothing, Mr. Witness? A: He was wearing an orange T-shirt and maong pants, medium to large built. I cannot remember his face, only his built. x x x x Q: You said that you heard two gun shoots (sic) and you said you saw Fiscal Pacefio, one of your passengers on the afternoon of that day fell down, how about the other passenger whom you said [was] wearing orange T-shirt and wearing maong pants, what can you say about it since he was also one of your passengers just as Fiscal Pacefio was your passenger? A: I saw the person wearing orange T-shirt and maong pants step down from my vehicle and he was the only one who wore orange T-shirt and maong pants. Q: Where did he go after the shooting, the two gun shoots (sic) that you heard? A: He step[ped] down in Dumalagan and heeded (sic) for Butuan City.24
As we have held in People vs. Omar, non-flight may not be construed as an indication of innocence. There is no law or dictum holding that non-flight of an accused is conclusive proof of innocence. In the more recent case of People vs. Delmo, the appellants therein claimed that none of them fled despite opportunities to do so which should be credited to them as an indication of their innocence. To this contention we held that "[w]hile it is true that we have ruled that flight is evidence of guilt, there is no law or dictum holding that staying put is proof of innocence, for the Court is not blind to the cunning ways of a wolf which, after a kill, may feign innocence and choose not to flee." (Citations omitted.)Being guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murder of Paceño, qualified by treachery, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, accused-appellant was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
The RTC simply fixed the living expenses for Paceño's heirs at P180,000.00, but we re-compute strictly using the foregoing formula:
Net Earning Capacity = remaining life expectancy x Gross Annual - Living Expenses [2/3 (80 - age at death)] Income (GAI) (50% of GAI)36
Civil indemnity is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof other than the fact of the commission of murder or homicide;37 while moral damages is awarded for the mental anguish suffered by the heirs of the deceased.38 Following the latest jurisprudence,39 we increase the amounts awarded for civil indemnity and moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, while sustaining the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
Net earning capacity = [2/3 (80-55)] x (P372,096.00) - [P372,096.00 x 50%] = [2/3(25)] x (P372,096.00) - (P186,048.00) = 16.67 x P186,048.00 = P3,101,420.16
Endnotes:
* Additional member per Special Order No. 2188 dated September 16, 2015.
1Rollo, pp. 2-21; penned by Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela with Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Leoncia R. Dimagiba concurring.
2 Records, pp. 527-546: penned by Judge Emmanuel E. Escatron.
3 Id. at
4 Id. at 52.
5 As gathered from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses: Gretchen Zaldivar, Joanne Ruales, Helen Monterde, Arturo Quiban, Daniel Deloso, and Aida Paceño.
6 Records, p. 28. Certificate of Death.
7 Id. at 546.
8 CA rollo, p. 11.
9Rollo, p. 20.
10 Id. at 26-27.
11 Id. at 32-33.
12 CA rollo, pp. 112-126.
13Rollo, pp. 35-54.
14 CA rollo, pp. 10-23.
15 Records, pp. 448-459.
16 641 Phil. 624, 632-633 (2010).
17People v. Obosa, 429 Phil. 522, 537 (2002).
18 Records, p. 18.
19 TSN, October 26,2006, pp. 5-6.
20 TSN, October 30, 2006, pp. 8-9.
21 458 Phil. 856, 875-876 (2003).
22 Id. at 876-877.
23 Records, p. 539.
24 TSN, December 8, 2006, pp. 7, 10.
25 TSN, November 17, 2006, pp. 6-7.
26People v. Mondijar, 440 Phil. 889, 900 (2002).
27 Art. 246. Parricide. — Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. (Revised Penal Code.)
28 Art. 255. Infanticide. - The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for murder in Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less than three days of age. (Revised Penal Code.)
29People v. Sara, 463 Phil. 94, 111 (2003); Velasco v. People, 518 Phil. 780, 794 (2006).
30People v. Castillo, 339 Phil. 230 (1997); People v. Babera, 388 Phil. 44 (2000); People v. Limio, 473 Phil. 659 (2004).
31http://www.distancesfrom.com/ph/distance-from-SIBAGAT-to-Butuan-Agusan-del-Sur/DistanceHistory/2194267.aspx. last visited September 24, 2015.
32See People v. Galvez, 407 Phil. 541 (2001); People v. Rubares, 422 Phil. 550 (2001); People v. Marquez, 430 Phil. 382 (2002).
33 477 Phil. 694, 712 (2004).
34People v. Almacin, 363 Phil. 18, 31 (1999).
35 443 Phil. 67, 89-90 (2003).
36People v. Sumalinog, Jr., 466 Phil. 637, 659 (2004).
37People v. Abatayo, 477 Phil. 668, 692 (2004).
38 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 2206(3).
39People v. Las Piñas, G.R. No. 191723, July 23, 2014, 730 SCRA 571, 602.