FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 188638, December 09, 2015
PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC. AND NORTHERN MARINE MANAGEMENT, Petitioners, v. JOSELITO A. CRISTINO, DECEASED AND REPRESENTED BY HIS WIFE SUSAN B. BERDOS, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
The Court is confronted once more with a dispute concerning a seafarer's entitlement to compensation and benefits for illness. The regulation is in the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers (Contract).1
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari2 are the Court of Appeals Decision3 dated February 27, 2009 and its July 10, 2009 Resolution4 in CA-G.R. SP No. 106430, which affirmed in toto the July 28, 2008 Decision5 and the September 30, 2008 Resolution6 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC granted the respondent's claim for compensation and benefits for illness, effectively overturning the prior Decision7 dated November 13, 2007 of the Labor Arbiter.
Cristino also cited his additional functions which included the following:
- Proficiency in the repair, installation and maintenance of machinery, piping and other steelwork;
- To be capable of working without the direct supervision of an officer;
- Operating machine shop equipment and to disassemble, overhaul and reinstall bearings, to repack glands and valves;
- Effecting piping repairs on deck, for domestic services and in cargo tanks;
- Maintaining the engine workshop and will keep a written inventory of stores and tools, advising the Second Engineer of any shortage. He will maintain all power tools and record the use of stores;
- Sounding tanks, void spaces and cofferdams;
- He is to be qualified to form part of an engine room watch if so assigned within the vessel's safe manning certificate[.]30
Cristino contended that a "Job Order" was given to him daily, assigning him to do various tasks ranging from "cleaning and repairing of pipes, ladders, antenna, hose, etc." and "painting of the deck."32 These assignments necessitated Cristino to work under the scorching heat of the sun mixed with the warm sea breeze which he claimed added to his physical deterioration.33 Cristino pointed out that for the past 15 years that he had been working for the petitioners, he passed all the comprehensive medical, physical, psychological, and dental examinations required of him, and that it was during his employment with them that signs and symptoms of his illness became apparent.34In case of a Deck Fitter, he is to work under the direction of the Chief Officer.31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
- Strict observance of all safety regulations;
- Reporting any feature which appears adverse to the safety of operations;
- Knowledge, of the location and use of all fire fighting and life saving equipment;
- Attending boat and fire drills and other safety training as required by the Master;
- Maintaining a high standard of hygiene in person and throughout the accommodation and machinery spaces[.]
In a nutshell, the core issue to be resolved is whether the Court of Appeals is correct in finding Cristino's illness as work-related and, therefore, compensable, pursuant to the POEA Contract.
- The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error in ruling that [p]etitioners failed to prove through substantial evidence that [r]espondent's skin cancer was not work-related.
- The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error in ruling that a seafarer unable to work for more than 120 days is deemed permanently and totally disabled and entitled to maximum disability benefits under the POEA Contract.
- The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the award of sickness allowance to [r]espondent.
- The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the award of attorney's fees.
- The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not commanding [r]espondent's wife Susan Berdos to return the sum paid to her by [p]etitioners.53
Clearly, this case falls under one of these exceptions as the findings of the Labor Arbiter differed from those of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. As such, this Court is justified in resolving the factual questions presented in this petition for review.
- [W]hen the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
- when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
- when there is grave abuse of discretion;
- when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
- when the findings of fact are conflicting;
- when in making its findings[,] the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
- when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court;
- when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
- when the facts set forth in the petition[,] as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs[,] are not disputed by the respondent;'
- when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; [and]
- when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.57
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITSSection 32-A of the same Contract names certain occupational diseases and the basic conditions that must be met in order for the resulting disability or death to be compensable. A perusal of said provision would show that malignant melanoma is not one of those expressly identified in the list of occupational diseases. Nevertheless, it can be inferred from Section 20-B(4) that the enumeration in Section 32-A is by no means exclusive. The seafarer even enjoys a presumption of compensability for unlisted illnesses in case of failure of the employer to present adequate evidence to the contrary. As no third doctor, whose assessment was supposed to be final, had been jointly appointed by the petitioners and the respondent as provided in Section 20-B(3), there is no other recourse for the Court but to reexamine the merits of the medical evaluations respectively presented by the parties' doctors60 vis-a-vis Cristino's work and his illness.x x x x x x x x x
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.
- The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during the time he is on board the vessel;
- If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical and hospital treatment as well as board and lodging until the seafarer is declared fit to work or to be repatriated.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
- Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company- designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
- Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work related.
- Upon sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment, the employer shall bear the full cost of repatriation in the event the seafarer is declared (1) fit for repatriation; or (2) fit to work but the employer is unable to find employment for the seafarer on board his former vessel or another vessel of the employer despite earnest efforts.
- In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.59
x x x. It is well to point out that among private respondent's daily tasks as a fitter is to clean and repair among others, pipes, ladders, antenna, hose and to paint the deck, for which exposure to sunlight could not be avoided. Hence, the nature of his work may have caused or at least contributed to his illness.68ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryIt has been repeatedly emphasized that for illness to be compensable, the nature of employment need not be the lone reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer.69 Just a reasonable connection, and not absolute certainty, between the danger of contracting the illness and its aggravation resulting from the working conditions is enough to sustain its compensability.70 In the words of the Court:
x x x. It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits provided therefor. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease x x x.71ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryThe Court went on to say that:
It is indeed safe to presume that, at the very least, the nature of Faustino Inductivo's employment had contributed to the aggravation of his illness - if indeed it was pre-existing at the time of his employment - and therefore it is but just that he be duly compensated for it.72ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryIn the instant case, it bears stressing that Cristino was deployed and had loyally worked for the petitioners under several management contracts for a period of 15 years.73 All this time, Cristino occupied the position of a fitter. Apparently, Cristino's job encompassed a wide range of duties and seemingly dependent on the immediate needs of the vessel wherein deck work appeared to be an integral part thereof. As such, the performance of some tasks naturally entailed inevitable sun exposure which could have caused his getting afflicted with malignant melanoma or, at the very least, added to his worsening health condition.
The bottomline is this: the certification of the company-designated physician would defeat respondent's claim while the opinion of the independent physicians would uphold such claim. In such a situation, we adopt the findings favorable to respondent.79ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryIt is for this very reason that the seafarer is given the freedom of choosing his own doctor80 and why the Court is not precluded from awarding disability benefits on the basis of the medical opinion of the seafarer's physician.81
(a) The company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary total disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days;Guided by the above-cited Court ruling, it can be deduced that Cristino already had a cause of action when he commenced the suit for permanent disability benefits against the petitioners on May 15, 2007, which was well within the 120-day period reckoned from the time he had his post-employment medical examination with the petitioners' designated physician. For one, Cristino was previously declared unfit for sea service.91 Second, even without this express declaration, the petitioners are deemed to have acknowledged the permanent disability of Cristino when they stopped paying his sickness allowance way before the expiration of the 120-day period.92 Third, the petitioners' physicians intimated in their medical opinion the seriousness of treatments Cristino was scheduled to receive, thus, reflecting their conviction of Cristino's inability to carry out his customary work.
(b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification being issued by the company-designated physician;
(c) The company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day period, as the case may be, but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion;
(d) The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently disabled but other doctors who he consulted, on his own and jointly with his employer, believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as well;
(e) The company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is a dispute on the disability grading;
(f) The company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-related under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work;
(g) The company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits; and
(h) The company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of said periods.90ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Endnotes:
* Designated as Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe per Raffle
dated June 8, 2015.
1 The 2000 POEA Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean-Going Vessels is controlling in this case as the employment contract between the parties was entered into on May 30, 2006.
2Rollo, pp. 23-58.
3 Id. at 62-70; penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario L. Guarina III and Marlene Gonzales-Sison.
4 Id. at 72.
5 Id. at 118-123; penned by Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III, and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier.
6 Id. at 125-126; Commissioner Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. also signified his concurrence in dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
7 Id. at 219-224; penned by Labor Arbiter Daisy G. Cauton-Barcelona.
8 Id. at 177; Cristino's Position Paper.
9 Id. at 152.
10 Id; Terms and Conditions stipulated in the May 30, 2006 Contract of Employment.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 192; this fit-for-employment clearance was reflected in the Medical Examination Records of Cristino dated June 19, 2006 issued by PDSCI.
13 Id. at 157. Cristino's passport indicates that he embarked on July 6, 2006, while petitioners' Position Paper states that Cristino boarded the vessel on July 7, 2006; id. at 132.
14 Supra note 8 at 179.
15 Id. at 158.
16 Id. at 161.
17 Id. at 162.
18 Supra note 8 at 180.
19 Id.
20 Supra note 3, at 63; rollo at 159.
21 Id. at 159.
22 Supra note 18.
23 Id. at 184.
24Rollo, p. 160.
25 Id.
26 Supra note 5 at 119.
27Rollo, p. 227; Cristino's Memorandum of Appeal.
28 Id. at 167.
29 Id.
30 Supra note 8 at 178-179.
31 Id. at 179.
32 Id. at 182.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 181-182.
35 Id. at 184.
36 Id. at 136; Petitioners' Position Paper.
37 Id. at 207; Petitioners' Rejoinder.
38 Supra note 36.
39 Id. at 143.
40 Id. at 137.
41 Supra note 7.
42 Id. at 224.
43Rollo, p. 264; per Death Certificate of Cristino.
44 Id. at 261.
45 Supra note 5.
46 Id.
47 Supra note 6.
48 Supra note 3.
49 Id. at 68.
50 Id. at 69.
51Rollo, p. 391; Petitioners' Motion to Amend Prayer in the Petition.
52 Supra note 4.
53 Supra note 2, at 31-32.
54 Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
55Heirs of Pacencia Racaza v. Abay-Abay, G.R. No. 198402, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 622, 627.
56Merck Sharp and Dohme (Phils.), et al. v. Robles, et al., 620 Phil. 505, 512 (2009).
57Co v. Vargas, G.R. No. 195167, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 451, 459-460.
58 Supra note 9.
59 Supra note 1.
60Ison v. Crewserve, Inc., G.R. No. 173951, April 16, 2012, 669 SCRA 481, 494.
61Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) v. Zaldarriaga, 635 Phil. 361, 368 (2010).
62Cootauco v. MMS Phil. Maritime Services, Inc., et al., 629 Phil. 506, 521 (2010).
63 Anthony S. Fauci, M.D., Eugene Braunwald, M.D., Dennis L. Kasper, M.D., Stephen L. Hauser, M.D., Dan L. Longo, M.D., J. Larry Jameson, M.D., PhD, and Joseph Loscalzo, M.D., PhD, Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2008), p. 541.
64 Ramzi S. Cotran, M.D., Vinay Kumar, M.D, F.R.C.Path., and Tucker Collins, M.D., Ph.D., Robbins Pathologic Basis of Disease (Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company, 1999), p. 1177.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1178.
67 Supra note 62 at 542.
68 Supra note 3 at 68.
69Magsaysay Maritime Services v. Laurel, G.R. No. 195518, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 225, 242.
70Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130772, November 19, 1999, 318 SCRA 623, 632.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 189-190; based on the Certificate of Sea Service dated March 20, 2007 issued by Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.
74 611 Phil. 291 (2009).
75 Supra notes 24 and 28.
76 Supra note 25.
77 Supra note 69.
78 603 Phil. 309 (2009).
79 Id. at 320.
80Abante v. KJGS Fleet Management Manila and/or Guy Domingo A. Macapayag, et al., 622 Phil. 761, 769 (2009).
81Nazareno v. Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc., G.R. No. 168703, February 26, 2013, 691 SCRA 630.
82 588 Phil. 895 (2008).
83 Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code is relevant in this case, which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x x x x x x 84 Section 2, Rule X of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book IV of the Labor Code provides:
(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent: (1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided for in the Rules[.]Sec. 2. Period of entitlement. - (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System.85 B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS86Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., et al., supra note 82, at 912.x x x x x x x x x
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 913.
89 G.R. No. 193679, July 18, 2012, 677 SCRA 296, 315.
90 Id. at 315.
91Rollo, p. 184.
92 Supra note 36 at 133.
93 G.R. No. 84777, January 30, 1992, 205 SCRA 598.
94 Id. at 601-602.
95 Supra note 43. In the respondent's Motion for Substitution dated April 21, 2008, it was indicated that Cristino died on March 27, 2008.
96 Supra note 8 at 184.