SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 201264, January 11, 2016
FLORANTE VITUG, Petitioner, v. EVANGELINE A. ABUDA, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Parties who have validly executed a contract and have availed themselves of its benefits may not, to escape their contractual obligations, invoke irregularities in its execution to seek its invalidation.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Court of Appeals' October 26, 2011 Decision and its March 8, 2012 Resolution. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's December 19, 2008 Decision upholding the validity of the mortgage contract executed by petitioner Florante Vitug (Vitug) and respondent Evangeline A. Abuda (Abuda).
On March 17, 1997, Abuda loaned P250,000.00 to Vitug and his wife, Narcisa Vitug.1 As security for the loan, Vitug mortgaged to Abuda his property in Tondo Foreshore along R-10, Block A-50-3, Del Pan to Kagitingan Streets, Tondo, Manila.2 The property was then subject of a conditional Contract to Sell between the National Housing Authority and Vitug. Pertinent portions of the mortgage deed reads
That, Mortgagor, is the owner, holder of a Conditional Contract to Sell of the National Housing Authority (NHA) over a piece of property located at the Tondo Foreshore along R-10, Block "A-50-3, Delpan to Kagitingan Streets in the district of Tondo, Manila;
That, with the full consent of wife Narcisa Vitug, hereby mortgage to Evangeline A. Abuda, with full consent of husband Paulino Abuda, said property for TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (P250,000.00), in hand paid by Mortgagee and in hand received to full satisfaction by Mortgagor, for SIX MONTHS (6) within which to pay back the full amount plus TEN PERCENT (10%) agreed interest per month counted from the date stated hereon;
That, upon consummation and completion of the sale by the NHA of said property, the title-award thereof, shall be received by the Mortgagee by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney, executed by Mortgagor in her favor, authorizing Mortgagee to expedite, follow-up, cause the release and to received [sic] and take possession of the title award of the said property from the NHA, until the mortgage amount is fully paid for and settled[.]3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
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WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs [sic] and against the defendant
1. Ordering the defendant to pay unto the court and/or to the judgment debtor within the reglementary period of Ninety (90) days the principal sum of P600,000.00 with interest at 5% per month from May 31, 2002 to actual date of payment plus P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
2. Upon default of the defendant to fully pay the aforesaid sums, the subject mortgaged property shall be sold at public auction to pay off the mortgage debt and its accumulated interest plus attorney's fees, expenses and costs; and
3. After the confirmation of the sale, ordering the defendant and all persons claiming rights under her [sic] to immediately vacate the subject premises.
SO ORDERED.12cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the RTC dated December 19, 2008 in Civil Case No. 03-108470 in favor of the appellee and against the appellant is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that an interest rate of 1% per month or 12% per annum shall be applied to the principal loan of P600,000.00, computed from the date of judicial demand, i.e., November 21, 2003; and 12% interest per annum on the amount due from the date of the finality of the Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
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(1) The Mortgage Contract must provide that"In the event of foreclosure, the NHA shall be notified of the date, time and place of the auction sale so that it can participate in the foreclosure sale of the property."(2) The mortgage contract must be submitted to NHA for verification and final approval[.]43
Thus, according to petitioner, there was neither written consent nor approval by the National Housing Authority of the mortgage contracts.44cralawlawlibrary
20. Similarly, defendant has constituted their family home over said mortgage property and should that property be sold, defendant and his family will be left with no place to reside with [sic] within Metro Manila, hence, for humanitarian reason[s], the defendant prayed that he be given ample time within which to settle his obligation with the plaintiff;
21. Lastly, the Memorandum of Encumbrances contained at the back of defendant's title prohibits her from selling, encumbering, mortgaging, leasing, sub-leasing or in any manner altering or disposing the lot or right thereon, in whole or in part within the period often (10) years from the time of issuance of said title without first obtaining the consent of the NHA. As reflected in the title, the same was issued on 25 June 1997 hence, the mortgage executed even prior to the issuance of said title should be declared void.45ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
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The defendant further stated that he is willing to pay the obligation is unconscionable. Further, the said property constituted their family home. The defendant claimed that Memorandum of Encumbrance prohibits her from selling, encumbering, mortgaging, leasing, subleasing or in any manner altering or disposing the lot or right thereon in whole or in part within ten (10) years from the time of issuance of the said title without obtaining the consent of the NHA.
. . . The court opines that the defendant has failed to raise a legitimate and lawful ground in order to bar the herein plaintiff from asserting its lawful right under the law.
The contention of the defendant that the subject mortgaged property is their family home is irrelevant as the debt secured by mortgages on the premises before or after the constitution of the family home does not exempt the same from execution (Rule 106 of the Rules of Court).50cralawlawlibrary
Art. 2085. The following requisites are essential to contracts of pledge and mortgage
(1) That they be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation;
(2) That the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged;
(3) That the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free disposal of their property, and in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose.
. . . .
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Entry No. 4519/V-013/T-234246 -RESTRICTION-that the Vendee shall not sell, encumber, mortgage, lease, sub-let or in any manner, alter or dispose the lot or right therein at any time, in whole or in part without obtaining the written consent of the Vendor. Other restrictions set forth in Doc. No. 287; Page No. 59; Book No. 250; SERIES of 1997 of Notary Public for Quezon City, Liberty S. Perez.
Date of instrument - June 24, 1997
Date of inscription- June 25, 1997- 11:39 a.m.57ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
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It follows that on the assumption that the mortgage to appellee Salud and the foreclosure sale violated the condition in the Sarmiento contract, only the PHHC was entitled to invoke the condition aforementioned, and not the Sarmientos. The validity or invalidity of the sheriffs foreclosure sale to appellant Salud thus depended exclusively on the PHHC; the latter could attack the sale as violative of its right of exclusive reacquisition; but it (PHHC) also could waive the condition and treat the sale as good, in which event, the sale can not be assailed [for] breach of the condition aforestated. Since it does not appear anywhere in the record that the PHHC treated the mortgage and foreclosure sale as an infringement of the condition, the validity of the mortgage, with all its consequences, including its foreclosure and sale thereat, can not be an issue between the parties to the present case. In the last analysis, the appellant, as purchaser at the foreclosure sale, should be regarded as the owner of the lot, subject only to the right of PHHC to have his acquisition of the land set aside if it so desires.81cralawlawlibrary
25 November 1997
MR. FLORANTE VITUG
901 Del Pan Street
Tondo, ManilaPERMIT TO MORTGAGE
Dear Mr. Vitug,
Please be informed that your request dated 20 November 1997 for permission to mortgage Commercial Lot 5, Block 1, Super Block 3, Area I, Tondo Foreshore Estate Management Project covered by TCT No. 234246 is hereby GRANTED subject to the following terms and conditions
1. The Mortgage Contract must provide that
"In the event of foreclosure, the NHA shall be notified of the date, time and place of the auction sale so that it can participate in the foreclosure sale of the property."
2. The mortgage contract must be submitted to NHA for verification and final approval; and
3. This permit shall be good only for a period of ninety (90) days from date of receipt hereof.Very truly yours,cralawlawlibrary
(Signed)
Mariano M. Pineda
General Manager82
It is the essence of this Contract, that if and should the Mortgagor fails to comply and pay the principal obligations hereon within the period of the Contract, the Mortgage shall be foreclosed according to law and in which case the NHA shall be duly notified of the matter.
That this mortgage contract shall be submitted to the NHA for verifixation [sic] and final approval in accordance with NHA permit to mortgage the property.83(Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary
Art. 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted. Moreover, the provisions of the Penal Code relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a crime shall be applicable to the things or the price of the contract.
This rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is guilty; but the innocent one may claim what he has given, and shall not be bound to comply with his promise.
Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's undertaking;
(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he has given by reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised him. The other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of what he has given without any obligation to comply his promise.cralawlawlibrary
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution[.]cralawlawlibrary
Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.cralawlawlibrary
The imposition of an unconscionable rate of interest on a money debt, even if knowingly and voluntarily assumed, is immoral and unjust. It is tantamount to a repugnant spoliation and an iniquitous deprivation of property, repulsive to the common sense of man. It has no support in law, in principles of justice, or in the human conscience nor is there any reason whatsoever which may justify such imposition as righteous and as one that may be sustained within the sphere of public or private morals.111cralawlawlibrary
Noteworthy is the fact that in Medel, the defendant-spouses were never able to pay their indebtedness from the very beginning and when their obligations ballooned into a staggering sum, the creditors filed a collection case against them. In this case, there was no urgency of the need for money on the part of Jocelyn, the debtor, which compelled her to enter into said loan transactions. She used the money from the loans to make advance payments for prospective clients of educational plans offered by her employer. In this way, her sales production would increase, thereby entitling her to 50% rebate on her sales. This is the reason why she did not mind the 6% to 7% monthly interest. Notably too, a business transaction of this nature between Jocelyn and Marilou continued for more than five years. Jocelyn religiously paid the agreed amount of interest until she ordered for stop payment on some of the checks issued to Marilou. The checks were in fact sufficiently funded when she ordered the stop payment and then filed a case questioning the imposition of a 6% to 7% interest rate for being allegedly iniquitous or unconscionable and, hence, contrary to morals.
It was clearly shown that before Jocelyn availed of said loans, she knew fully well that the same carried with it an interest rate of 6% to 7% per month, yet she did not complain. In fact, when she availed of said loans, an advance interest of 6% to 7% was already deducted from the loan amount, yet she never uttered a word of protest.
After years of benefiting from the proceeds of the loans bearing an interest rate of 6% to 7% per month and paying for the same, Jocelyn cannot now go to court to have the said interest rate annulled on the ground that it is excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, exorbitant, and absolutely revolting to the conscience of man. "This is so because among the maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity, and (2) he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue."
We are convinced that Jocelyn did not come to court for equitable relief with equity or with clean hands. It is patently clear from the above summary of the facts that the conduct of Jocelyn can by no means be characterized as nobly fair, just, and reasonable. This Court likewise notes certain acts of Jocelyn before filing the case with the RTC. In September 1998, she requested Marilou not to deposit her checks as she can cover the checks only the following month. On the next month, Jocelyn again requested for another extension of one month. It turned out that she was only sweet-talking Marilou into believing that she had no money at that time. But as testified by Serapio Romarate, an employee of the Bank of Commerce where Jocelyn is one of their clients, there was an available balance of P276,203.03 in the latter's account and yet she ordered for the stop payments of the seven checks which can actually be covered by the available funds in said account. She then caught Marilou by surprise when she surreptitiously filed a case for declaration of nullity of the document and for damages.117 (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)cralawlawlibrary
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as followsAnd, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1, 2013, shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed therein.119cralawlawlibrary
- When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
- When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest
shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.- When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
Endnotes
1Rollo, p. 27.
2 Id.
3 Id. at 27-28.
4 Id. at 29.
5 Id. at 27. The Regional Trial Court Decision dated December 19, 2008 was penned by Judge Zenaida R. Daguna.
6 Id. at 28.
7 CA rollo, p. 128.
8Rollo, p. 28.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 27.
13 Id. at 28.
14 Id. at 29.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 26-34. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Marlene B. Gonzales-Sison and concurred in by Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam and Edwin D. Sorongon of the Special Tenth Division, Court of Appeals Manila.
17 Id. at 33.
18 Id. at 29-30.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 30.
22 Id. at 31.
23 Id. at 33.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 65.
27 Id. at 65-66.
28 Id. at 66.
29 Id. at 15
30 Id. at 16.
31 Id. at 17.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 17-18. The Restriction reads: "Entry No. 4519/V-103/T-234246 -RESTRICTION-that the Vendee shall not sell, encumber, mortgage, lease, sub-let or in any manner, alter or dispose the lot or right therein at any time, in whole or in part without obtaining the written consent of the Vendor. Other restrictions set forth in Doc. No. 287; Page No. 59; Book No. 250; SERIES of 1997 of Notary Public for Quezon City, Liberty S. Perez.
Date of instrument - June 24, 1997
Date of inscription-June 25, 1997- 11:39 a.m.34 Id. at 17.EXPEDITO A. JAVIER
Register of Deeds"
35 Id. at 17-18.
36 Id. at 18.
37 Id. at 17.
38 Id. at 91.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 92.
41 Id. at 143.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 96.
44 Id. at 97.
45 Id. at 97-98.
46 See Del Rosario v. Bonga, 402 Phil. 949 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division], citing Keng Hua v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 925 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 340 Phil. 634 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Remman Enterprises, Inc., v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1150 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
1997 RULES OF CIV. PROC, Rule 44, sec. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. Whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues framed by the parties.
47 See Del Rosario v. Bonga, 402 Phil. 949 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
48 RTC rollo, pp. 15-19.
49 Id. at 76-79.
50 Id. at 158.
51 Civil Code, art. 2085.
52 Civil Code, art. 2085.
53Rollo, p. 30.
54 See Ramos, Sr. v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc., 238 Phil. 689 (1987) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division].
55 See Ramos, Sr. v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc., 238 Phil. 689 (1987) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division]. See also Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 318 (1998) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division] and Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Sarabia Manor Hotel, G.R. No. 175844, July 29, 2013, 702 SCRA 432, 444 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division]: "(a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both parties; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record."
56 CIVIL CODE, art. 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it. See also Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She, 129 Phil. 526 (1967) [Per J. Castro, En Banc].
57 Regional Trial Court Rollo, Exch. "F-l", p. 123-124.
58See Municipality of Camiling v. Lopez, 99 Phil. 187, 189-191 (1956) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc]. See also Sarmiento v. Salud, 150-A Phil. 566 (1972) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, First Division]; Flora v. Prado, 465 Phil. 334 (2004) [Per Ynares-Santiago, J., First Division].
59 99 Phil. 187 (1956) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].
60 73 Phil. 586 (1942) [Per J. Bocobo, En Banc].
61Municipality of Camiling v. Lopez, 99 Phil. 187, 188 (1956) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].
62 Id at 189. This provision has been reproduced in our current Civil Code, thus
Article 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
63 Id.
64Municipality of Camiling v. Lopez, 99 Phil. 187, 188 (1956) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].
65 Id.
66 Id. at 190.
67 150-A Phil. 566 (1972) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, Second Division].
68 Id. at 568.
69 Id.
70See Municipality of Camiling v. Lopez, 99 Phil. 187, 189-191 (1956) [Per J. Labrador, En Bane].
71 Civil Code, art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur . . . .
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
72 CIVIL CODE, art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
73 CIVIL CODE, art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
74 CIVIL CODE, art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
75Municipality of Camiling v. Lopez, 99 Phil. 187, 189-191 (1956) [Per J. Labrador, Second Division]; Sarmiento v. Salud, 150-A Phil. 566 (1972) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, Second Division]. See also San Agustin v. Court of Appeals, 422 Phil., 686 (2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Flora v. Prado, 465 Phil. 334 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
76Municipality of Camiling v. Lopez, 99 Phil. 187, 189-191 (1956) [Per J. Labrador, Second Division].
77Sarmiento v. Salud, 150-A Phil. 566 (1972) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, Second Division].
78 See Sarmiento v. Salud, 150-A Phil. 566 (1972) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, Second Division].
79Lalicon and Lalicon v. National Housing Authority, 669 Phil. 231 (2011) [Per J. Abad, Third Division].
80See Sarmiento v. Salud, 150-A Phil. 566 (1972) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, Second Division].
81 Id. at 568-569.
82 RTC rollo, p. 122. "Exh E", November 25, 1997.
83 Id. at 5.
84 CIVIL CODE, art. 1397. The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; nor can those who exerted intimidation, violence, or undue influence or employed fraud, or caused mistake base their actions upon these flaws of the contract.
85Sarmiento v. Salud, 150-A Phil. 566 (1972) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, Second Division]. See also Toledo v. Hyden, 652 Phil. 70 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].
86Bough and Bough v. Cantiveros and Hanopol, 40 Phil. 210 (1919) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
87Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 492, 514-516 [Per J. Carpio, First Division]; Top-Weld Manufacturing Inc. v. ECED, S.A., et al., 222 Phil. 424 (1985) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., First Division].
88 See Liguez v. Court of Appeals, 102 Phil. 577, 581 (1957) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, First Division].
89 7 Phil. 156(1906) [Per J. Willard, Second Division].
90 Id. at 157-158.
91 40 Phil. 210 (1919) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
92 102 Phil. 577 (1957) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, First Division].
93 Id.
94 606 Phil. 427 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
95 Id. at 437.
96 Id.
97 See Pilipinas Hino, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 393 Phil. 1 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division], citing Mencliola v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 1156 (1996) [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr., First Division]. See also Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil. 827, 831 (1953) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc].
98 129 Phil. 526 (1967) [Per J. Castro, En Banc].
99 Id.
100Sarmiento v. Salud, 150-A Phil. 566 (1972) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, Second Division].
101 See also Del Rosario v. Bonga, 402 Phil. 949 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
102Rollo, V. 19.
CIVIL CODE, art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to labourers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
103Rollo, p. 20.
104 See Toledo v. Hyden, 652 Phil. 70 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division], citing Central Bank Circular No. 905 s. 1982; Almeda v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 309 (1996) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].
105 Cf. the definition of fair market value: "that sum of money which a person desirous, but is not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received for such property." In Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 777 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Bane], citing JM Tuazon & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413 [Per J. Fernando, Second Division],
106Bough and Bough v. Cantiveros and Hanopol, 40 Phil. 210 (1919) [Per J. Malcolm, En Bane].
107 Castro v. Tan, 620 Phil. 239 (2009) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division]. See also Svendsen v. People, 570 Phil. 243 (2008) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Second Division], citing Solangon v. Salazar, 412 Phil. 816, 822 (2001) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division]; Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, 449 Phil. 419 (2003) [Per J. Puno, Third Division].
108Svendsen v. People, 412 Phil. 816, 822 (2001) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division]; Almeda v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 309, 319 (1996) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].
109Menchavez v. Bermudez, G.R. No. 185368, October 11, 2012, 684 SCRA 168 [Per J. Velasco, Third Division].
110 620 Phil. 239 (2009) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
111 Id. at 242-243.
112Menchavez v. Bermudez, G.R. No. 185368, October 11, 2012, 684 SCRA 168, 178-179 [Per J. Velasco, Third Division].
113 359 Phil. 820 (1998) [Per J. Pardo, Third Division].
114 Id.
115Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, 449 Phil. 419 (2003) [Per J. Puno, Third Division]; Castro v. Tan, 620 Phil. 239 (2009) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division]; Menchavez v. Bermudez, G.R. No. 185368, October 11, 2012, 684 SCRA 168 [Per J. Velasco, Third Division]; Svendsen v. People, 412 Phil. 816 (2001) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].
116 652 Phil. 70 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].
117 Id. at 79-81.
118 G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
119 Id. at 457-458.