FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171303, January 20, 2016
ELIZABETH L. DIAZ, Petitioner, v. GEORGINA R. ENCANTO, ERNESTO G. TABUJARA, GEMINO H. ABAD AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, which seeks to reverse and set aside the April 28, 2005 Decision1 and January 20, 2006 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55165,3 which reversed the April 17, 1996 Decision4 and September 17, 1996 Order5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 71, Pasig City, in Civil Case No. 58397.
The undisputed facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Plaintiff-appellant [Elizabeth L. Diaz] has been in the service of [the University of the Philippines] U.P. since 1963. In 1987, she was an associate professor in the College of Mass Communication (CMC). During the second semester for Academic Year (AY) 1987-1988, she was a full time member of the faculty and taught 12 units on full load. After 2 to 3 weeks of teaching, she applied for sick leave effective November 23, 1987 until March 1, 1988. She returned on March 2, 1988 and submitted a Report for Duty Form.
On May 3, 1988, Diaz filed a letter-application directly with U.P.'s Office of the President (Abueva) for sabbatical leave with pay for one (1) year effective June 1988 to May 1989, for "rest, renewal and study." Cecilia Lazaro, Chair of the Broadcast Department, initially recommended to CMC Dean Encanto that Diaz's sabbatical application be granted. After they discussed the options available to the CMC, Lazaro, on May 10, 1988, recommended instead that Diaz be granted any leave of absence she may be qualified for. In her May 2, 1988 letter, Diaz indicated her unwillingness to teach. Considering the CMC's experience with Diaz who dropped her courses in the previous semester, Lazaro deleted Diaz's name in the final schedule of classes for the 1st semester of AY 1988-89 beginning June 6, 1988. Incidentally, Diaz received her salary for June 1988, indicating that her sabbatical might be approved.
Thereafter, Encanto referred Diaz's sabbatical application to the Secretary of U.P., recommending its denial. When requested by (Chancellor) Tabujara, Encanto transmitted to the former a Reference Slip together with her comments thereon. Meanwhile, Encanto requested Ermelina Kalagayan to hold Diaz's salary effective July 1, 1988 until further notice considering that her sabbatical application has not yet been approved and that she did not teach that semester. Consequently, Diaz's name was deleted in the payroll from September 1988 to January 1989.
On July 4, 1988, Tabujara recommended instead that Diaz be granted a leave without pay in order to enable the CMC to hire a substitute. The next day, the U.P.'s Secretary referred to Abad, Vice-President (VP) for Academic Affairs, the fact of denial of such sabbatical request, for his own comment/recommendation to the U.P. President. Meantime, Diaz confessed her problems to Abad. On July 8, 1988, Abad returned the Reference Slip indicating therein that Diaz had promised him earlier "to put down in writing, from her point of view, the historical backdrop as it were to the latest denial of her sabbatical leave." With comments, Abad then referred the matter to the U.P. President.
Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 42 issued by the U.P. President, the Academic Policy Coordinating Committee (APCC), on July 21, 1988, reviewed the case of Diaz. When reminded by Abad, Diaz again promised to give the background information.
On Diaz's request to teach for that semester, AY 1988-89, the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, Edgardo Pacheco, and the HRDO Director, Atty. Pio Frago, instructed Encanto that "Until Prof. Diaz officially reports for duty, accomplishes the Certificate of Report for Duty, and the Dean of CMC confirms her date of actual report for duty, she is considered absent without official leave (AWOL) for the University."
On November 8, 1988, Abad, then as OIC, issued a Memorandum to Diaz to confirm as valid Encanto's reason of shortage of teaching staff in denying her sabbatical. Later, he also informed Diaz of her lack of service during the first semester of AY 1988-89, hence, she is not entitled to be paid and asked her to clarify her status of being on leave without pay.
[While Diaz was able to teach during the second semester of AY 1988-89, she was not able to claim her salaries for her refusal to submit the Report for Duty Form.6 She received her salaries for June to July 15, 1989, but could no longer claim her salary after July 15, 1989, when Encanto reminded the University Cashier, in a letter dated July 26, 1989,7 that Diaz had to "accomplish the Report for Duty Form to entitle her to salaries and make official her return to the service of the University."8 Diaz's name was subsequently included in the payroll starting July 1990, when she submitted a Report for Duty after her return from compulsory summer leave.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x x x x
In the meantime, on January 3, 1989, Diaz filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB-00-89-0049), against Gemino H. Abad, Ernesto G. Tabujara and Georgina R. Encanto, all officials of the University of the Philippines, for the alleged violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, involving the legality of a Report for Duty Form as a prerequisite to the payment of her salary.
On May 4, 1989, the Ombudsman dismissed the said complaint and ruled, inter alia:Considering that Prof. Diaz was rightfully considered on leave without pay during the first semester of AY 1988-1989, to make official her return to the service of the University, it is advised that she accomplish the Report for Duty Form which will then be the basis to establish the date of her actual return to the service. However, if possible, the University authorities can perhaps dispense with the requirement and pay her salaries for actual services rendered from November 3, 1988.
Diaz's initial Petition for Certiorari in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 88834) assailing the above-quoted Ombudsman's ruling was subsequently dismissed. She filed another Petition (G.R. No. 89207) raising exactly the same issued found in G.R. No. 88834.
Meanwhile, on July 18, 1989, Diaz instituted a complaint against the U.P., Abueva, Encanto, Tabujara and Abad with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila praying that the latter be adjudged, jointly and severally to pay her damages. She claimed, among others, that [respondents] conspired together as joint tortfeasors, in not paying her salaries from July 1, 1988 in the first semester of academic year 1988-89, for the entire period when her sabbatical application was left unresolved, as well as the salaries she earned from teaching in the second semester from November 1988 to May 1989. She likewise claimed moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
On August 31, 1989, the Supreme Court En Banc dismissed Diaz's Petition in G.R. No. 89207, viz.:It is noted that the Ombudsman found no manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence on the part of the private respondents in denying the application for sabbatical leave of petitioner (Diaz) and in requiring her to fill up a Report for Duty Form as a requisite for her entitlement to salary.
To the petitioner's contentions, the Ombudsman observed, among others, the following: that, the denial of her sabbatical leave application was due to the exigencies of the service; that petitioner was not given a teaching assignment for the first semester of AY 1988-1989, because she did not want to teach then; that the delay in action on her leave application was due to petitioner's own fault for not following the usual procedures in the processing of her application; and that there is no malice on the part of the private respondents in requiring petitioner to accomplish the Report for Duty Form which is the basis of the date of her actual return to the service.10 (Citations omitted.)
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants:
1. Ordering defendants, except Abueva, to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P133,665.50 representing the total unpaid salaries from July 1, 1988 to May 31, 1989 and from July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990 to be covered by corresponding certificate of service, with legal rate of interest from the date of this Decision until its full payment.
2. Ordering defendants, except the University and Abueva, to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P300,000.00 as moral damages.
3. Ordering defendants, except the University and Abueva, to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P60,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. Ordering defendants, except the University and Abueva, to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the reduced amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees.
5. Costs of suit.
The counterclaims filed by defendant Tabujara are DISMISSED.11chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants:
1. Ordering defendants, except Abueva and Encanto, to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P133,665.50 representing the total unpaid salaries from July 1, 1988 to May 31, 1989 and from July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990 to be covered by corresponding certificate of service, with legal rate of interest from the date of this Decision until its full payment.
2. Ordering defendants, except the University, Abueva and Encanto, to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P300,000.00 as moral damages.
3. Ordering defendants, except the University, Abueva and Encanto, to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P60,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. Ordering defendants, except University, Abueva and Encanto, to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the reduced amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees.
5. Costs of suit.
The counterclaims filed by defendant Tabujara are DISMISSED.12chanrobleslaw
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING ITS ORIGINAL DECISION WITH REGARD TO PRINCIPAL DEFENDANT GEORGINA R. ENCANTO BY ABSOLVING HER OF LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT ELIZABETH L. DIAZ WITHOUT ALTERING IN ANY MATERIAL RESPECT WHATSOEVER THE FINDINGS OF FACT IN THE ORIGINAL DECISION SHOWING CLEARLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DEFENDANT ENCANTO FOR (I) THE WRONGFUL DISAPPROVAL OF PLAINTIFF'S SABBATICAL APPLICATION; (II) THE UNJUST DEPRIVATION OF SALARIES DUE THE PLAINTIFF FOR ALMOST ONE WHOLE SEMESTER DURING WHICH HER SABBATICAL APPLICATION REMAINED UNRESOLVED; AND (III) THE WRONGFUL WITHHOLDING OF PLAINTIFF'S EARNED SALARIES IN THE THREE SUCCEEDING SEMESTERS DURING WHICH THE PLAINTIFF TAUGHT WITHOUT BEING PAID.21chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a NEW JUDGMENT is RENDERED, as follows: (1) defendant-appellant University of the Philippines, through its appropriate officials, is DIRECTED to pay plaintiff-appellant Elizabeth Diaz the sum of Twenty-One Thousand, Eight Hundred Seventy-Nine and 64/100 (P21,879.64) as unpaid salaries and allowances, and (2) the sums awarded as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees are hereby DELETED. This is without prejudice to the enforcement of valid rules and regulations of the University of the Philippines pertaining to Diaz's employment status.22chanrobleslaw
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
WITHOUT DISTURBING THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT BASED ON OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE REVEALING THE COMMISSION BY RESPONDENTS OF THE TORTIOUS ACTS COMPLAINED OF BY PETITIONER IN DENYING HER SABBATICAL LEAVE, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN IGNORING THOSE FINDINGS AND ADOPTING AND TREATING AS VALID THE FLIMSY EXCUSES OF RESPONDENTS TO AVOID THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTS.SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THAT "THERE WAS JUDICIOUS EXERCISE" BY RESPONDENTS "OF THEIR DISCRETIONARY POWER WITH RESPECT TO THE DENIAL OF THE SUBJECT SABBATICAL LEAVE."THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN TREATING AS LAWFUL THE WITHHOLDING OF PETITIONER'S SALARIES, CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING, CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THAT PETITIONER "FAILED TO SHOW BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE THE NEGLIGENCE OF RESPONDENTS SO AS TO BE ENTITLED TO THE DAMAGES SOUGHT."FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CORRECTLY COMPUTING THE SUM OF PETITIONER'S UNPAID AND EARNED SALARIES, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING, CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THAT RESPONDENTS ENCANTO, TABUJARA AND ABAD ARE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE TO PETITIONER FOR ACTUAL, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS JOINT TORTFEASORS UNDER THE LAW.25chanrobleslaw
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is presumed. Thus, he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.33 (Citations omitted.)
ATTY. DIAZ: Now, did Prof. Diaz ask you to remove her from [the] schedule of classes? LAZARO: I did it. Q: Because you said you did it on your own? A: Yes. x x x x Q: She did not [ask] you? A: No.44
ATTY. GUNO: You mentioned a while ago that you deleted the name of Professor Diaz from this final schedule of classes. Why did you delete it? LAZARO: I presumed in good faith that based on the letter she sent which was routed to me where she stated she could no longer be efficient and effective as a teacher and she was suffering from fatigue and that she could no longer work under those circumstances, 1 felt, as a gesture of sympathy to her that this should be granted suggesting that she be given a leave of absence of whatever kind she was qualified for and based on my previous experience on the second semester where two to three weeks into the course she dropped her courses, I did not want that to happen again.[45] ATTY. GUNO: You also testified that because of the application for sabbatical leave and the reasons she gave in that letter, you deleted her name in the final list of class schedule for school year 1988-89 first semester? LAZARO: Yes. Q: Why did you delete her name, will you tell the Court? A: She had applied for sabbatical leave for the whole year of 1988-89 and based on the experience of her sick leave during the previous semester which was the second semester of the previous school year where three (3) weeks into classes she filed for a sick leave and did not teach, based on that experience, I did not include her name in the class list because the same thing could happen again.46
It is therefore clear that the acts sought to be enjoined [by Diaz] are in fact pursuant to the proper observance of administrative or internal rules of the University. This Court sympathizes with [Diaz] for not being able to receive her salaries after July 15, 1989. However, such predicament cannot be outrightly attributable to the defendants, as their withholding of her salaries appears to be in accordance with existing University regulations.
Apart from such reasons, this Court believes that petitioner Diaz failed to show why she should be spared from the Report for Duty requirement, which remains a standard practice even in other offices or institutions. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, one must show an unquestionable right and/or blatant violation of said right to be entitled to its issuance.48chanrobleslaw
Endnotes:
* Per Raffle dated January 18, 2016.
1Rollo, pp. 70-88; penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon with Associate Justices Mariano C. del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Regalado E. Maambong concurring.
2 Id. at 106-107.
3Entitled Elizabeth Diaz v. Georgina R. Encanto, Ernesto G. Tabujara, Gemino H. Abad, Jose V. Abueva and University of the Philippines.
4Rollo, pp. 109-167.
5 Id. at 168-170.
6 Id. at 124-125.
7 Exhibits of Defendants, Exh. 69, p. 2251.
8 Id.
9 Rollo, p. 73.
10 Id. at 71-75.
11 Id. at 166-167.
12 Id. at 169-170.
13 Id. at 169.
14 Records, pp. 2,575-2,576.
15 Id. at 2,361-2,362.
16 Id. at 2,577-2,576.
17 Id. at 2,580-2,581.
18 CA rollo, pp. 62-174.
19 Id. at 251-326.
20Rollo, p. 71.
21 CA rollo, pp. 421-422.
22Rollo, p. 87.
23 Id. at 81.
24 Id. at 84.
25 Id. at 21-22.
26McLeod v. National Labor Relations Commission, 541 Phil. 214, 242 (2007).
27Rollo, pp. 204; 239.
28Jarantilla, Jr. v. Jarantilla, 651 Phil. 13, 26 (2010).
29 Records, pp. 1-13.
30 Id. at 85.
31Barons Marketing Corp. v. Court of Appeals and Phelps Dodge Phils., Inc., 349 Phil. 769, 775 (1998),
32Dart Philippines, Inc. v. Calogcog, 613 Phil. 224, 234 (2009).
33 Id. at 235.
34 Records, pp. 1077-1083.
35 Implementation of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution and complementing Administrative Circular No. 1 of January 28, 1988 on Expeditious Disposition of Cases Pending in the Supreme Court; November 8, 1988.
36 Records, p. 177.
37 Id. at 175-179.
38 Rollo, pp. 80-81.
39 Id. at 164 and 169
40 Id. at 66.
41Barons Marketing Corp. v. Court of Appeals and Phelps Dodge Phils., Inc., supra note 31 at 778.
42Rollo, p. 81; Records, p. 178.
43 Id. at 32.
44 TSN, September 13, 1994, p. 31.
45TSN, August 24, 1994, pp. 35-36.
46 TSN, September 27, 1994, pp. 6-7.
47Rollo, pp. 46-47.
48 Records, p. 289.
49Dart Philippines, Inc. v. Calogcog, supra note 32 at 237.
50 Id. at 238.
51 G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439.