SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 175760, February 17, 2016
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SOGOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
For a judicial confirmation of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the land subject of the application needs only to be alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant's possession and occupation of the land dates back to June 12, 1945, or earlier.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to annul and set aside the Decision2 dated August 25, 2005 and Resolution3 dated November 7, 2006 of the Court of Appeals Cebu City in CA-G.R. CV No. 72389.4 The Court of Appeals affirmed5 the Decision dated May 10, 2001 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Catmon-Carmen-Sogod, Cebu, which granted respondent Sogod Development Corporation's (Sogod) application for original registration of title over Lot No. 2533, Cadastre 827-D, situated in Tabunok, Sogod, Cebu.6
On December 9, 1999, Sogod filed an application for registration and confirmation of land title over Lot No. 2533, Cad. 827-D with an area of 23,896 square meters and situated in Brgy. Tabunok, Municipality of Sogod, Province of Cebu.7 The case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. 016-SO.8
Sogod claimed that it purchased the land "from Catalina Rivera per deed of absolute sale dated Oct[ober] 28, 1996[.]"9 It also averred that "by itself and through its predecessors-in-interest[,] [it had] been in open, continuous, exclusive[,] and notorious possession and occupation of [the land] since June 12, 1945[.]"10
On February 11, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General moved to dismiss the Petition11 on the ground that Sogod was disqualified from applying for original registration of title to alienable lands pursuant to Article XII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.12
The trial court issued an Order dated June 15, 2000 pronouncing a "general default against all persons except against the Solicitor General[.]"13
On September 19, 2000, the Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VII, Banilad, Mandaue City filed an Opposition on the ground that the land was previously forest land and "was certified and released as alienable and disposable only on January 17, 1986."14 Thus, it could not be registered without violating Section 48, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 6940.15
Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Sogod also presented witnesses Celedonio Campos, Jr., Bonifacia Sugarol, and Ranito Quadra to prove its ownership and possession of the land.16 According to their testimonies, the land "was originally in the possession of Ignacia Rivera, the mother of Catalina."17 "Catalina inherited this land from her mother[.]"18 On October 28, 1996, Catalina sold the land to Sogod.19 "A tax clearance dated July 30, 1999 was issued by the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, certifying that all taxes over the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 043-6156 had been paid."20 "Thereafter, Tax Declaration No. 11096 A was issued in the name of [Sogod]."21
The Office of the Solicitor General did not present any controverting evidence.22
On May 10, 2001, the trial court rendered the Decision23 granting the application.24 The Decision stated, in part:
The facts presented show that the applicant corporation and its predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and undisturbed possession of the land, subject of this application for registration of title for not less than fifty (50) years or since time immemorial. The state did not present evidence to controvert these facts.
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing undisputed facts which are supported by oral and documentary evidence, the court finds and so holds that the applicant, Sogod Development Corporation represented by Celedonio Campos, Jr. has a registrable title to the land sought to be registered, hereby confirming the same and ordering its registration under Act 494, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529 over Lot 2533, Cad 827-D, situated in Tabunok, Sogod, Cebu, Island of Cebu, Philippines, as described in Plan As-07-001393, and strictly in line with its Technical Description, upon the finality of this decision.25ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) Sogod failed to prove its open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945 or earlier;27cralawred
(2) The tax declarations presented by Sogod "are of recent vintage"28 and are "not accompanied by proof of actual possession . . . since June 12, 1945 [;]"29
(3) The land was only declared alienable and disposable on January 17, 1986, pursuant to Forestry Administrative Order No. 4- 1611,30 "making it impossible for [Sogod] and its predecessors- in-interest to have possessed the land in concept of an owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier[;]"31 and
(4) "Article XII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution disqualifies private corporations from applying for original registration of title to alienable lands."32ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ALLOWED THE TITLING OF LOT NO. 2533 DESPITE RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO SHOW THAT IT AND ITS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION OF ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN UNDER A BONAFIDE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP SINCE JUNE 12, 1945 OR PRIOR THERETO.II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION, GRANTING RESPONDENT'S APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF LOT NO. 2533 IN VIEW OF THE OPPOSITION DATED SEPTEMBER 13, 2000 OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR) STATING THAT SAID PROPERTY WAS ONLY DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ON JANUARY 17, 1986.III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE SINCE ARTICLE XII, SECTION 3 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION DISQUALIFIES PRIVATE CORPORATIONS FROM APPLYING FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF ALIENABLE LANDS.IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DATED AUGUST 2, 2001, GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE OF THE RESPONDENT ON THE BASES OF TAX DECLARATIONS WHICH ARE OF RECENT VINTAGE.39ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary. . . .
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 14. Who May Apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant's imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it. Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period. In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. It is for this reason that the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.74 (Citations omitted)
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner's position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.78ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[T]he correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
. . . .
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved [a] situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Court's interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.82ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Although adverse, open, continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner is a conclusion of law to be determined by courts, it has more to do with a person's belief in good faith that he or she has just title to the property that he or she is occupying. It is unrelated to the declaration that land is alienable or disposable. A possessor or occupant of property may, therefore, be a possessor in the concept of an owner prior to the determination that the property is alienable and disposable agricultural land. His or her rights, however, are still to be determined under the law.85
The applicant also presented a representative from the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Sogod in the person Ranito Quadra relative to the tax declaration history of Lot 2533. The oldest tax declaration on file in the said government office was TD 04024 (marked and submitted as Exh. "CC") for the year 1945. In the said tax declaration, a notation was placed in the entry -I (a) Land (Agricultural/Mineral)
ASSESSOR'S FINDINGS
Kind Area Class Unit Value Market Value Cornland 4.0000 3a P800.00 Maguey 2.0000 1a 120.00 Pasture 4.0169 120.50 Total 10.0169 P1040.50
As can be gleaned from the face of this evidence, the land was already devoted to the planting of corn, maguey and the rest was pastureland. Also, i[t] appears that TD 04024 cancelled the previous tax declaration with number TD 1417. A testimony was also adduced by the same witness that the previous tax declarations covering the property cannot be produced anymore because all of their records prior to the Second World War were destroyed.
Analyzing the above-quoted testimony as well as the documentary evidence submitted, it can be clearly surmised that the land was devoted to agriculture in 1945 and even prior to that year. Based on human experience, the area planted with corn and maguey is a considerable tract of land that it presupposes that the land ceased to be a forest land. Such that, even if the land was declared to be alienable and disposable only in the year 1986, the actual use of Catalina Rivera of this tract of land was already agriculture.90 (Citations omitted)
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 102-147. The Petition was filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2 Id. at 150-160. The Decision was penned by Senior Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos and concurred in by Executive Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and Junior Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. of the Eighteenth Division.
3 Id. at 174. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos (Chair) and concurred in by Associate Justices Agustin S. Dizon and Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla of the Twentieth Division.
4 Id. at 102-103.
5 Id. at 160, Court of Appeals Decision.
6 Id. at 150.
7 Id. at 150-151.
8 Id. at 107, Petition for Review on Certiorari.
9 Id. at 151, Court of Appeals Decision.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 109, Petition for Review on Certiorari.
13 Id. at 151, Court of Appeals Decision.
14 Id. at 152.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 105-106 and 114-115, Petition for Review on Certiorari.
17 Id. at 114.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 114-115.
21 Id. at 115.
22 Id. at 152, Court of Appeals Decision.
23 Id. The Decision was penned by Judge Manuel D. Patalinghug.
24 Id.cralawred
25 Id.
26 Id.cralawred
27 Id. at 153.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 155.
31 Id. at 153.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 160.
34 Id. at 159.
35 Id. at 158-159.
36 Id. at 159.
37 Id. at 161-172.
38 Id. at 174.
39 Id. at 116-117, Petition for Review on Certiorari.cralawred
40 Id. at 192-194.
41 Id. at 204-211.
42 Id. at 219, Supreme Court Resolution.
43 Id. at 245-259.
44 Id. at 326-342.
45 Id. at 248, Republic's Memorandum.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 249.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 251.
51 Id. at 253.
52 605 Phil. 244 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
53Rollo, p. 255, Republic's Memorandum.
54 Id. at 256.
55 Id.
56 The land area should be 23,896 square meters.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 257.
60 Id. at 329, Sogod Development Corporation's Memorandum.
61 Id. at 329-330.
62 Id. at 335.
63 489 Phil. 405 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
64Rollo, p. 332, Sogod Development Corporation's Memorandum.
65 Id. at 335.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 339.
68 Id. at 336-337.
69 Id. at 338.
70 Com. Act No. 141 (1936), sec. 48(b) has been amended by Pres. Decree No. 1073 (1977), sec. 4.
71 G.R. No. 179987, September 3, 2013, 704 SCRA 561 [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
72 Id. at 581.
73 Id. at 581-582.
74 Id. at 580-582.
75 489 Phil. 405 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
76 Id. at 414.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 585 Phil. 404 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
80 Id. at 415.
81 498 Phil. 227 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
82Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 605 Phil. 244, 269-271 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
83Rollo, p. 253, Republic's Memorandum.
84 G.R. No. 180086, July 2, 2014, 728 SCRA 602 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
85 Id. at 614.
86 Rollo, pp. 338-339, Sogod Development Corporation's Memorandum.
87 Id. at 114-115, Petition for Review on Certiorari.
88Republic v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 238, 248 (1996) [Per J. Torres, Jr., Second Division].
89Rollo, pp. 157, Court of Appeals Decision, and 337, Sogod Development Corporation's Memorandum.
90 Id. at 157-158, Court of Appeals Decision.