THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 191079, March 02, 2016
JOEL CARDENAS, HEIR OF THE LATE ELINAIDA L. ALCANTARA, REPRESENTED BY ANTONIO IGNACIO, JR., Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES SIMPLICIA P. AGUILAR AND MAXIMO V. AGUILAR AND ATTY. NORMAN R. BUENO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the Orders1 dated 13 October 2009 and 18 January 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 198. In its assailed Orders the RTC directed the execution of its 27 February 2009 Decision.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby declares that the contract entered into by the late Elinaida Alcantara is AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE and NOT A SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE. Accordingly, the parties are hereby ordered, as follows:The period to file for a motion for reconsideration or for an appeal had lapsed but neither of the parties moved for the reconsideration of the decision nor appealed therefrom.
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySO ORDERED.
(1) the substituted plaintiff is ordered to pay defendants the principal loan of P3,000,000.00; and (2) upon payment, the defendants are ordered to release the mortgage constituted on the property and to deliver the original copy of the owner's duplicate title of the property to the plaintiff.
The Issues I.
WHETHER OR NOT A MOTION FOR EXECUTION CAN BE FILED BY A COUNSEL WHEN THE JUDGMENT OBLIGEES WERE ALREADY DEAD AND NEITHER WAS THERE AN EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR APPOINTED BY THE COURT NOR AN HEIR SUBSTITUTED AS A PARTY TO THE CASE TO AUTHORIZE THE COUNSEL TO MOVE FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT.II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN GRANT A MOTION FOR EXECUTION FILED BY A COUNSEL WHEN THE JUDGMENT OBLIGEES WERE ALREADY DEAD AND NEITHER WAS THERE AN EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR APPOINTED BY THE COURT NOR AN HEIR SUBSTITUTED AS A PARTY TO THE CASE.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.The purpose behind the rule on substitution is the protection of the right of every party to due process. It is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Non-compliance with the rule on substitution would render the proceedings and the judgment of the trial court infirm because the court acquires no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs on whom the trial and the judgment would be binding.13
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
We are not unaware of several cases where we have ruled that a party having died in an action that survives, the trial held by the court without appearance of the deceased's legal representative or substitution of heirs and the judgment rendered after such trial, are null and void because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs upon whom the trial and the judgment would be binding. This general rule notwithstanding, in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that formal substitution of heirs is not necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared, participated in the case and presented evidence in defense of deceased defendant. Attending the case at bench, after all, are these particular circumstances which negate petitioner's belated and seemingly ostensible claim of violation of her rights to due process. We should not lose sight of the principle underlying the general rule that formal substitution of heirs must be effectuated for them to be bound by a subsequent judgment. Such had been the general rule established not because the rule on substitution of heirs and that on appointment of a legal representative are jurisdictional requirements per se but because non-compliance therewith results in the undeniable violation of the right to due process of those who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, are substantially affected by the decision rendered therein. Viewing the rule on substitution of heirs in this light, the Court of Appeals, in the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, thus expounded:Similarly in this case, the RTC had priorly acquired jurisdiction over the person of de Comer after she was served with summons as a party-defendant to the case and she continuously appeared and participated therein up to this point. Such jurisdiction previously acquired achieved the purpose of a formal substitution.chanrobleslaw
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryAlthough the jurisprudential rule is that failure to make the substitution is a jurisdictional defect, it should be noted that the purpose of this procedural rule is to comply with due process requirements. The original party having died, he could not continue to defend himself in court despite the fact that the action survived him. For the case to continue, the real party in interest must be substituted for the deceased. The real party in interest is the one who would be affected by the judgment. It could be the administrator or executor or the heirs. In the instant case, the heirs are the proper substitutes. Substitution gives them the opportunity to continue the defense for the deceased. Substitution is important because such opportunity to defend is a requirement to comply with due process. Such substitution consists of making the proper changes in the caption of the case which may be called the formal aspect of it. Such substitution also includes the process of letting the substitutes know that they shall be bound by any judgment in the case and that they should therefore actively participate in the defense of the deceased. This part may be called the substantive aspect. This is the heart of the procedural rule because this substantive aspect is the one that truly embodies and gives effect to the purpose of the rule. It is this court's view that compliance with the substantive aspect of the rule despite failure to comply with the formal aspect may be considered substantial compliance. Such is the situation in the case at bench because the only inference that could be deduced from the following facts was that there was active participation of the heirs in the defense of the deceased after his death:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1. The original lawyer did not stop representing the deceased. It would be absurd to think that the lawyer would continue to represent somebody if nobody is paying him his fees. The lawyer continued to represent him in the litigation before the trial court which lasted for about two more years. A dead party cannot pay him any fee. With or without payment of fees, the fact remains that the said counsel was allowed by the petitioner who was well aware of the instant litigation to continue appearing as counsel until August 23, 1993 when the challenged decision was rendered;
2. After the death of the defendant, his wife, who is the petitioner in the instant case, even testified in the court and declared that her husband is already deceased. She knew therefore that there was a litigation against her husband and that somehow her interest and those of her children were involved;
3. This petition for annulment of judgment was filed only after the appeal was decided against the defendant on April 3, 1995, more than one and a half year (sic) after the decision was rendered (even if we were to give credence to petitioner's manifestation that she was not aware that an appeal had been made);
4. The Supreme Court has already established that there is such a thing as jurisdiction by estoppel. This principle was established even in cases where jurisdiction over the subject matter was being questioned. In the instant case, only jurisdiction over the person of the heirs is in issue. Jurisdiction over the person may be acquired by the court more easily than jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the person may be acquired by the simple appearance of the person in court as did herein petitioner appear;
5. The case cited by the herein petitioner (Ferreria et al. vs. Manuela Ibarra vda. de Gonzales, et al.) cannot be availed of to support the said petitioner's contention relative to nonacquisition of jurisdiction by the court. In that case, Manolita Gonzales was not served notice and, more importantly, she never appeared in court, unlike herein petitioner who appeared and even testified regarding the death of her husband.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 39-42; penned by Judge Erlinda Nicolas-Alvaro.
2 Id. at 71-72; records, Vol. 1, p. 10.
3 Id. at 68-70; id. at 7-9.
4 Id. at 80 marked as Annex "K"; id. Vol. 1, p. 12, marked as Annex "E".
5 Id. at 60-65.
6 Id. at 44-49.
7 Id. at 85-86.
8 Records, Vol. II, pp. 954-955.
9Rollo, pp. 87-90.
10 Id. at 41-42.
11 Id. at 22-23.
12 Id. at 58.
13Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Melicor, 495 Phil. 422, 438-439 (2005).
14 G.R. No. 121510, November 23, 1995, 250 SCRA 305, as cited in Sps. Berot v. Siapno, G.R. No. 188944, 9 July 2014, 729 SCRA 475, 488-491.
15 Id. at 308-310. (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)