SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 205963-64, July 07, 2016
AMANDO A. INOCENTES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. ROLAND B. JURADO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRPERSON, SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION, HON. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, AS COMPLAINANT; AND HON. FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA, OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG), IN ITS CAPACITY AS COUNSEL FOR THE PEOPLE, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Petition1 filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court by petitioner Amando A. Inocentes (Inocentes), assailing the Resolutions dated February 8, 20132 and October 24, 20123 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0127-0128 entitled People of the Philippines v. Amando A. Inocentes, et. al.
That on or about October 2001 or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, in Tarlac City, Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Amando A. Inocentes, Celestino Cabalitasan, Ma. Victoria Leonardo and Jerry Balagtas, all public officers, being the Branch Manager, Division Chief III, Property Appraiser III, and Senior General Insurance Specialist, respectively, of the Government Service Insurance System, Tarlac City Field Office, committing the crime herein charged in relation to and in taking advantage of their official functions, conspiring and confederating with Jose De Guzman, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally [gave] undue preference, benefit or advantage to accused Jose De Guzman by processing and approving the housing loans of Four Hundred Ninety-One (491) borrowers of [Jose De Guzman] 's housing project under the GSIS Bahay Ko Program, with a total amount of loans amounting to Two Hundred Forty-One Million Fifty-Three Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (Php241,053,600.00), knowing fully well that the said borrowers/grantees were not qualified and were not under the territorial jurisdiction of the Tarlac City Field Office, thereby giving said borrowers/grantees unwarranted benefit and causing damage and prejudice to the government and to public interest in the aforesaid amount.and
CONTRARY TO LAW.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[...] processing, approving and granting loans under the GSIS Bahay Ko Program to Fifty-Three (53) borrowers of [Jose De Guzman]'s land development project known as Teresa Homes amounting to Fifty-Two Million and One Hundred Seven Thousand Pesos (Php52,107,000.00), despite the knowledge of the fact that the lots covered were intended for commercial purposes and by causing the over-appraisal in the amount of Thirty-Three Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-Eight Pesos and Thirty-Six Centavos (Php33,242,848.36) of the land and buildings offered as collaterals, thus causing undue injury to the Government.On May 10, 2012, the Sandiganbayan issued a minute resolution finding probable cause and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest against all the accused.7 To avoid incarceration, Inocentes immediately posted hail.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information.With these guidelines in mind, Inocentes' challenge with respect to the informations filed against him necessarily fails as he could gather that he is one of those GSIS officials who conspired in approving the anomalous transactions. Accordingly, the informations filed against Inocentes in this case are valid because they adequately provide the material allegations to apprise him of the nature and cause of the charge.x x x x x x x x x
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime. The liabilities of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of all. In People v. Quitlong, we ruled how conspiracy as the mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the information, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryA conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.x x x x x x x x x
Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word, "conspire," or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.17 [italics supplied]
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.Under this ruling, we made it clear that the judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor's determination of probable cause; rather, he makes a determination of probable cause independently of the prosecutor's finding.26 Despite the fact that courts should avoid reviewing an executive determination of probable cause, we are not completely powerless to review this matter under our expanded judicial power under the Constitution.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
Corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so, the judge in turn should not override the public prosecutors' determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient. It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and that courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the person charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor.
Thus, absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or that the prosecutor committed manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, a judge's determination of probable cause is limited only to the judicial kind or for the purpose of deciding whether the arrest warrants should be issued against the accused. [Emphasis supplied; citations omitted]
On this score, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. [...]Therefore, at this point, we no longer find it necessary to dwell on whether there was grave abuse on the part of the Sandiganbayan in finding the existence of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. Had Inocentes brought this matter before he posted bail or without voluntarily surrendering himself, the outcome could have been different. But, for now, whether the findings of probable cause was tainted with grave abuse of discretion - thereby making the warrant of arrest void - does not matter anymore as even without the warrant the Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction over the person of Inocentes.
By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption from the effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court. While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim has been negated when he himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing of various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs.29 [omission and emphasis ours]
All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as in all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial.30 In this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action of all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.31chanrobleslaw
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.33 [emphasis ours]The Sandiganbayan insists that the delay in this case is justifiable because the informations were initially filed before the RTC in Tarlac City. However, after going over the records of the case, we find that the period of time in between the incidents that could have contributed to the delay were unreasonable, oppressive, and vexatious.
Records show that they could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because they were unaware that the investigation against them was still ongoing. They were only informed of the March 27, 2003 resolution and information against them only after the lapse of six (6) long years, or when they received a copy of the latter after its filing with the SB on June 19, 2009. In this regard, they could have reasonably assumed that the proceedings against them have already been terminated. This serves as a plausible reason as to why petitioners never followed up on the case altogether. Instructive on this point is the Court's observation in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryPlainly, the delay of at least seven (7) years before the informations were filed skews the fairness which the right to speedy disposition of cases seeks to maintain. Undoubtedly, the delay in the resolution of this case prejudiced Inocentes since the defense witnesses he would present would be unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past.Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because they were completely unaware that the investigation against them was still ongoing. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not file counter-affidavits which is the proper procedure to follow in a preliminary investigation. After giving their explanation and after four long years of being in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the charges against them had already been dismissed.Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it was not the petitioners' duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it. As pronounced in the case of Barker v. Wingo:
On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible, special or even novel reason which could justify the four-year delay in terminating its investigation. Its excuse for the delay - the many layers of review that the case had to undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it had to entail - has lost its novelty and is no longer appealing, as was the invocation in the Tatad case. The incident before us does not involve complicated factual and legal issues, specially (sic) in view of the fact that the subject computerization contract had been mutually cancelled by the parties thereto even before the Anti-Graft League filed its complaint.
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryA defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial: the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Endnotes:
1 For Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. Rollo, pp. 3-23.
2 Id. at 26-34; penned by Associate Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang, and concurred in by Associate Justice Roland B. Jurado and Associate Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo.
3 Id. at 36-57.
4 Otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
5Rollo, pp. 60-62.
6 Id. at 63-65.
7 Id. at 59.
8 Id. at 68-81.
9 An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
10 Otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
11Reyes v. Belisario, G.R, No. 154652, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 31, 45.
12 Ibid.
13 Id. at 46-47.
14People v. Romualdez, 581 Phil. 462, 479 (2008).
15Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan, 600 Phil. 475, 493 (2009).
16 427 Phil. 820 (2002). See also Enrile v. People, G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015.
17 Id. at 859-862.
18 P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 8249, Section 4 (1 )(g).
19Inding v. Sandiganbayan, 478 Phil. 506, 507 (2004).
20People v. Sandiganbayan, 613 Phil. 407, 409 (2009).
21Alzaga v. Sandiganbayan, 536 Phil. 726, 731 (2006).
22Supra, note 15.
23 G.R. No. 158187, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA 187, 192-193.
24Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014, sc.judiciary.gov.ph.
25cralawred 607 Phil. 754, 755 (2009).
26supra note 24.
27 See People v. Go, G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014, sc.judiciary.gov.ph.
28 G.R. No. 134307, December 21, 1998, 300 SCRA 367.
29 Id. at 387.
30Roquero v. Chancellor of UP-Manila, G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 723; Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 314 Phil. 413, 446-447 (1999).
31 Ibid.
32 G.R. Nos. 72335-39, March 21, 1988, 159 SCRA 70.
33 Id. at 82-83.
34Anchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, G R. No. 122728, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 301, 302.
35 G.R. No. 191411, July 15, 2013, 701 SCRA 188, 197-199.