THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 163494, August 03, 2016
JESUSA T. DELA CRUZ Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, J.:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Jesusa T. Dela Cruz (petitioner) under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision2 dated November 13, 2003 and Resolution3 dated May 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26337. The CA affirmed the Decision4 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, on August 31, 2001, in Criminal Case No. 89-72064-86, convicting the petitioner for twenty-three (23) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
The 23 checks were still later dishonored by the drawee-bank FBTC for the reason "Account Closed". Tan informed the petitioner of the checks' dishonor through a demand letter,8 but the amounts thereof remained unsatisfied.9chanrobleslaw
Check No. Amount 078790 P 145,905.57 078791 145,905.57 078789 145,905.57 078788 145,905.58 078787 145,905.59 078786 145,905.59 078785 1,354,854.50 078784 337,380.50 078783 309,580.17 078782 411,800.15 078804 874,643.86 078803 129,448.30 078796 282,763.60 078802 129,448.36 078801 129,448.36 078800 129,448.38 078799 129,448.36 078798 129,448.36 078797 282,763.60 078795 282,763.61 078794 145,905.57 078793 145,905.57 078792 145,905.57 P 6,226,390.29
WHEREFORE, viewed from all the foregoing, the Court finds [the petitioner] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation[s] of [B.P.] Blg. 22 on twenty-three (23) counts, and hereby sentences her to suffer imprisonment of one (1) year in every case, and to indemnify [Tan] the amount equal to the collective face value of all the subject checks, and to pay the costs.Dissatisfied, the petitioner appealed to the CA, arguing, among other grounds, that she was not accorded an ample opportunity to dispute the charges against her. Contrary to the RTC's declaration, the petitioner denied any intention to waive her right to present evidence.15 In fact, she intended to present a certified public accountant to prove that she had overpayments with Tan, which then extinguished the obligations attached to the checks subject of the criminal cases.16chanrobleslaw
SO ORDERED.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appeal in the above-entitled case is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated August 31, 2001 in Criminal Case Nos. U-89-72064-86, of the [RTC], Branch 2 of Manila, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The petitioner prays for an acquittal or, in the alternative, a remand of the case to the RTC so that she may be allowed to present evidence for her defense. She also asks the Court to take into consideration the fact that she was acquitted by the CA in another set of B.P. Blg. 22 cases on the ground that she has overpaid Tan.20 Granting that the Court still declares her guilty of the offense, she asks for an imposition of fine in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment.21chanrobleslawI.
THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER HAD BEEN ACCORDED AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND TO PRESENT EVIDENCE.II.
THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION A PREVIOUS DECISION ISSUED BY ONE OF ITS DIVISIONS.III.
THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER RECEIVED A NOTICE OF DISHONOR OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
IV.
EVEN ASSUMING, WITHOUT CONCEDING, THAT THE PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22, THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING TO THE PETITIONER THE PROVISIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NUMBERS 12-2000 AND 13-2001.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner was not duly notified of the July 27, 2000 hearing because, one, the notice of said hearing was sent to her former address, and, two, the notice was sent on August 3, 2000, that is, one week after the scheduled date of hearing. Thus, petitioner's failure to appear at the July 27, 2000 hearing is justified by the absence of a valid service of notice of hearing to her.The OSG, nonetheless, argues that the petitioner's acquittal in another CA case failed to render applicable the rule on conclusiveness of judgment because there was no identity of subject matter and cause of action between the two sets of cases.25cralawred As regards the petitioner's alleged failure to receive a notice of dishonor, the OSG maintains that the defense should have been raised at the first instance before the RTC.26chanrobleslaw
Petitioner, who is out on bail on a personal undertaking, having posted a cash bond in lieu of a bail bond, is entitled to personal notice of every scheduled hearing, especially the hearing for her presentation of evidence. There must be clear and convincing proof that she, in fact, received the notice of hearing set on July 27, 2000 in order that the questioned Order of the trial court dated July 27, 2000 may be considered without constitutional infirmity. x x x.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On August 24, 1998, the cases were set for reception of defense evidence, but counsel arrived late causing the resetting to September 24, 1998.These were reiterated in the CA decision, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On November 5, 1998, on motion of the defense, on the ground [that] its witness was not available, the hearing was transferred to November 19, 1998. Due to the unavailability of the public prosecutor, hearing was reset to January 12, 1999.
On January 12, 1999, upon urgent motion filed by the defense on the alleged ground [that] defense counsel was suffering from emotional and psychological trauma, hearing was reset to February 9, 1999. Thereafter, hearing was postponed to February 23, 1999. With the commitment of defense counsel, Atty. Jerry D. Bañares, that he will rest his case at the next setting, hearing was reset to March 9, 1999.
On March 9, 1999, Atty. Bañares[,] instead of complying with his commitment, withdrew as counsel. Thereafter, a new counsel, [Atty. Leynes], entered his appearance, and filed an urgent motion for postponement.
On March 15, 1999, [Atty. Leynes,] instead of continuing with the presentation of defense evidence[,] opted to file a motion for voluntary inhibition and postponement. The motion was granted and the cases were re-raffled to Branch 2 on April 26, 1999.
Meanwhile, on March 12, 1999, [Tan] filed a motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
On April 20, 1999, [Atty. Leynes] filed a Motion to Declare the Entire Proceedings Null and Void.
On June 9, 1999, the Court, thru Judge Florante A. Cipres, jointly resolved the motions by granting the issuance of a writ of attachment and denying the motion to declare null and void the entire proceedings.
On July 24, 1999, Atty. Bernardo Fernandez entered his appearance as co-counsel, asking that he be served with copies of all the pleadings and other court processes.
After entering his appearance, Atty. Fernandez, on August 4, 1999, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying the Motion to Declare Null and Void the Entire Proceedings with [Atty. Leynes] as movant The motion was denied for lack of merit, with a copy thereof furnished [Atty. Leynes].
On January 25, 2000, reception of defense evidence was set. However, the [petitioner] and her counsel failed to appear compelling Judge Cipres to reset the hearing to March 24, 2000 and to April 6 and 13, 2000 at 8:30 a.m. and to issue a warrant of arrest for the apprehension of [the petitioner].
Unfortunately, Judge Cipres became indisposed and eventually retired. Thus, Judge Rebecca G. Salvador as Pairing Judge of Branch 2, took over.
Accordingly, the hearing for reception of evidence was again reset to July 27, August 17 and 24, 2000.
The Office of [Atty. Leynes] was notified of the hearing dates. Notices were received by one Edwin Gamba and Atty. Virgilio Leynes.
On July 27, 2000, defense counsel and the [petitioner] again failed to appear. Hence, Judge Salvador decreed that "the [petitioner] is considered to have waived presentation of evidence in her defense".
A copy of the Order was furnished the Office of [Atty. Leynes]. Same was received by Atty. Virgilio Leynes.
On September 5, 2000, Atty. Bernardo Fernandez[,] who claimed he did not receive any court [o]rder or process, filed a Motion for Reconsideration setting [the] same to September 8, 2000.
On September 8, 2000, Atty. Fernandez did not appear. Instead, it was Atty. Virgilio Leynes who showed up.
On March 5, 2001, this Court, thru Judge Leonardo P. Reyes, Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 2, denied the Motion for Reconsideration.34 (Emphasis ours)
After the prosecution rested its case on June 5, 1995, the presentation of the defense's evidence was set but was postponed and reset several times. Notably, the postponements were mostly at the instance of the defense. However, despite due notice and warrant of arrest, the [petitioner] and her counsel failed to appear on the scheduled dates for presentation of the defense's evidence. This prompted the court a quo to issue an order dated July 27, 2000, considering the [petitioner] to have waived her right to present evidence. Copy of the said order was sent to the Office of [Atty. Leynes] and the same was received by Atty. Virgilio Leynes, Jr., the [petitioner's] counsel of record.35 (Citations omitted)The records support the finding that the petitioner was duly notified of the scheduled hearings. Specifically for the July 27, 2000 hearing, notice was received by Atty. Leynes. Minutes of the hearing scheduled on May 23, 2000, indicating that the next hearing was reset to July 27, 2000, bore the signature of Atty. Leynes.36 A notice of hearing dated July 20, 2000 for the July 27, 2000 schedule also indicated receipt for Atty. Leynes by one Edwin Gamba on July 25, 2000.37 It was not the service to the petitioner that should determine the sufficiency of the notice because she was then represented by counsel, upon whom all court notices should be addressed and served.
Further, the Court held:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrarySEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.—The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.Based on this section, the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for its payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in this section cannot arise, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period.47 (Citations omitted)
Indeed, this requirement [on proof of receipt of notice of dishonor] cannot be taken lightly because Section 2 provides for an opportunity for the drawer to effect full payment of the amount appearing on the check, within five banking days from notice of dishonor. The absence of said notice therefore deprives an accused of an opportunity to preclude criminal prosecution. In other words, procedural due process demands that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. In the case at bar, appellant has a right to demand and the basic postulate of fairness requires — that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to aver prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.48 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)To support its finding that the petitioner knew of the insufficiency of her funds with the drawee bank, the RTC merely relied on the fact that replacement checks had been issued, in lieu of those that were originally issued to pay for the petitioner's obligation with Tan.49 The Court finds the conclusion misplaced, considering that the last batch of replacement checks, which eventually became the subject of these cases, were precisely intended to address and preclude any dishonor. Thus, the replacement checks dated March 30, 1987 were purposely drawn against a different checking account with FBTC, different from the old checks that were drawn against another drawee bank.
Similarly, in the instant case, the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the actual receipt by the petitioner of the demand letter sent by Tan. No witness testified to authenticate the registry return card and the signature appearing thereon. The return card provides that the letter was received by one Rolando Villanueva, without even further proof that the said person was the petitioner's duly authorized agent for the purpose of receiving the correspondence.The presumption arises when it is proved that the issuer had received this notice, and that within five banking days from its receipt, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment. The full payment of the amount appearing hi the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense. Accordingly, procedural due process requires that a notice of dishonor be sent to and received by the petitioner to afford the opportunity to aver prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.In this case, the prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand letter, together with the registry receipt and the return card, allegedly sent to petitioner. However, there was no attempt to authenticate or identify the signature on the registry return card. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letter, claimed to be a notice of dishonor. To be sure, the presentation of the registry card with an unauthentieated signature, does not meet the required proof beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner received such notice. It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the drawee of the check. The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check. The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P. Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice. Moreover, for notice by mail, it must appear that the same was served on the addressee or a duly authorized agent of the addressee. From the registry receipt alone, it is possible that petitioner or his authorized agent did receive the demand letter. Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. The consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives the accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. As there is insufficient proof that petitioner received the notice of dishonor, the presumption that he had knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot arise.54 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
x x x. [I]t is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the petitioner. It is also incumbent upon the prosecution to show "that the drawer of the check received the said notice because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check.["]
A review of the records shows that the prosecution did not prove that the petitioner received the notice of dishonor. Registry return cards must be authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of letters sent through registered mail.
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 20-41.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Sergio L. Pestaño concurring; id. at 45-54.
3 Id. at 56.
4 Rendered by Acting Presiding Judge Leonardo P. Reyes; id. at 141-168.
5 Records, Volume I, pp. 107-109.
6Rollo, pp. 45-46.
7 Records, Vol. I, pp. 252-274.
8 Records, Vol. II, pp. 422-423.
9Rollo, pp. 46-47.
10 Id. at 47-48.
11 Records, Vol. III, p. 159.
12Rollo, pp. 48-49.
13 Id. at 141-168.
14 Id. at 168.
15 Id. at 216-225.
16 Id. at 187-188.
17 Id. at 45-54.
18 Id. at 54.
19 Id. at 25.
20 Id. at 30.
21 Id. at 39.
22 Id. at 494-508.
23 Id. at 500.
24 Id. at 501-502.
25cralawred Id. at 503-505.
26 Id. at 505-506.
27 Id. at 410-434.
28Uyboco v. People, G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014, 744 SCRA 688, 692, citing Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp, Inc., 481 Phil. 550, 561 (2004).
29Medalla v. Laxa, 679 Phil. 457, 461 (2012).
30Treñas v. People, 680 Phil. 368, 378 (2012).
31Rosvee C. Celestial v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 214865, August 19, 2015; People v. Gabriel, 539 Phil. 252, 256-257 (2006).
32Rollo, p. 155.
33 Id. at 154-156.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 48-49.
36 Records, Vol. III, p. 156.
37 Id. at 157.
38 526 Phil. 115 (2006).
39 Id. at 128.
40Sevilla v. Judge Lindo, 657 Phil. 278, 286 (2011).
41 G.R. No. 182210, October 5, 2015.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44Resurrection v. People, G.R. No. 192866, July 9, 2014, 729 SCRA 508, 524.
45Campos v. People, G.R. No. 187401, September 17, 2014, 735 SCRA 373, 377.
46 451 Phil. 380 (2003).
47 Id. at 392-393.
48 Id. at 395.
49Rollo, p. 166.
50 Records, Vol. II, pp. 422-423.
51 Id. at 424.
52 Id.
53 656 Phil. 116 (2011).
54 Id. at 123-125.
55Moster v. People, 569 Phil. 616, 628 (2008).
56 Id.
57Lim v. Mindanao Wines & Liquor Galleria, 690 Phil. 206, 208 (2012); Alferez v. People, et al., supra note 53, at 125; Moster v. People, id.