THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198954, February 22, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODRIGO MACASPAC Y ISIP, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
When the victim was alerted to the impending lethal attack due to the preceding heated argument between him and the accused, with the latter even uttering threats against the former, treachery cannot be appreciated as an attendant circumstance. When the resolve to commit the crime was immediately followed its execution, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. Hence, the crime is homicide, not murder.
That on or about the 7th day of July 1988, at Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any justifiable cause, with deliberate intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with kitchen knife on the vital part of his body one ROBERT JEBULAN PELAEZ, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries, which injuries directly caused the victim's death.The case was archived for more than 15 years because Macaspac had gone into hiding and remained at large until his arrest on July 28, 2004. Upon his arraignment on August 31, 2004, he pleaded not guilty to the foregoing information.4
Contrary to law.3
Atty. SanchezHowever, Macaspac later on claimed that Jebulan had been stabbed by accident when he fell on the knife. Macaspac denied being the person with whom Jebulan had the argument, which he insisted had been between Barcomo and one Danny. According to him, he tried to pacify their argument, but his effort angered Jebulan, who drew out the knife and tried to stab him. He fortunately evaded the stab thrust of Jebulan, whom he struck with wooden chair to defend himself The blow caused Jebulan to fall on the knife, puncturing his chest.9
Q And it was alleged here in the information that on July 7, 1988 at around o'clock in the evening, in the City of Caloocan you stabbed the victim Robert Julian (Jebulan). What can you say about this?
A We scuffled for possession for sharp instrument and when I was able to grab that sharp instrument, was able to stab Roberto Jebulan, sir.8
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the killing of Robert Jebulan is qualified by treachery. In the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged, and hereby sentences him to suffer the imprisonment of reclusion perpertua.On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but modified the civil liability by imposing civil indemnity of P50,000.00, exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and temperate damages of P25,000.00, decreeing:
The accused is ordered to indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.11
WHEREFORE, the appealed 19 February 2008 Decision of Branch 129 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that appellant, aside from the moral damages awarded by the trial court in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Robert Jebulan, the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages.Macaspac is now before the Court arguing that the CA erred in affirming his conviction for murder on the ground that the Prosecution did not establish his guilt for murder beyond reasonable doubt.13
SO ORDERED.12
ACP AzarconMacaspac's initial claim that he and Jebulan had scuffled for the possession of the knife, and that he had stabbed Jebulan only after grabbing the knife from the latter became incompatible with his subsequent statement of only striking Jebulan with the wooden chair, causing the latter to fall on the knife. The incompatibility, let alone the implausibility of the recantation, manifested the lack of credibility of Macaspac as witness.
x x x
Q How could you (appellant) hit him (Jebulan) at his back when you were facing him?
A When picked up the chair, when was about to hit him with the chair, Obet turned his back to ran (sic) from me, sir.
Q To ran (sic) away from you?
A Yes, sir, because he saw me, was already holding the chair, sir. (Emphasis supplied)
Self-defense, requires three (3) elements, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
From the above-quoted testimony of appellant, it is clear that even before he stabbed Jebulan, the latter was already running away from him. Hence, granting that Jebulan was initially the aggressor, appellant's testimony shows that said unlawful aggression already ceased when appellant stabbed him. Clearly, appellant's act of stabbing said victim would no longer be justified as an act of self-defense.16
x x x The qualifying circumstance of premeditation can be satisfactorily established only if it could be proved that the defendant had ample and sufficient time to allow his conscience to overcome the determination of his will, if he had so desired, after meditation and reflection, following his plan to commit the crime. (United States v. Abaigar, Phil., 417; United States v. Gil, 13 Phil., 530.) In other words, the qualifying circumstance of premeditation can be taken into account only when there had been cold and deep meditation, and tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal act. (United States v. Cunanan, 37 Phil. 777.) But when the determination to commit the crime was immediately followed 1Jy execution, the circumstance of premeditation cannot be legally considered. (United States v. Blanco, 18 Phil. 206.) x x x (Bold underscoring is supplied for emphasis)Without the Prosecution having sufficiently proved the attendance of either treachery or evident premeditation, Macaspac was guilty only of homicide for the killing of Jebulan. The penalty for homicide, based on Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion temporal. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,25 the court, in imposing prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, is mandated to prescribe an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. In the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the imposab1e penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years, eight months, and one day to 17 years and four months. This is pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.26 It is such period that the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence is reckoned from. On the other hand, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence is taken from the degree next lower to reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor. Accordingly, Macaspac shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal.
Endnotes:
** In lieu of Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, who inhibited due to prior participation as the Solicitor General, per the raffle of February 20, 2017.
*** Designated as additional Member of the Third Division per Special Order No. 2417 dated January 4, 2017.
1Rollo, pp. 2-14; penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario with Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid (retired) and Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser concurring.
2 CA rollo, pp. 21-36; penned by Presiding Judge Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre.
3Rollo, p. 3.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 3-4.
6 Id. at 4.
7 Id. at 5.
8 Id. at 8, citing TSN, 24 July 2007, p. 5.
9 Id. at 5, citing TSN, 24 July 2007, pp. 8-14 and pp. 17-19.
10 CA rollo. pp.21-36.
11 Id. at 35.
12 Supra note 1, at 13.
13Rollo, p. 29.
14People v. Pili, G.R. No. 124739, April 15, 1998, 289 SCRA 118, 131.
15Rollo, p. 8.
16 Id. at 9-10.
17 Supra note 2, at 35.
18 Supra note 1, at 11.
19 Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code.
20People v. Flores, G.R. No. 37497, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA 91, 97.
21People v. Sarabia, G.R. No. 106102, October 29, 1999, 317 SCRA 684, 694.
22People v. Torpio, G.R. No. 138984, June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA 9, 15; People v. Delos Reyes, G.R. No. 140680, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 166, 178; People v. Factao, G.R. No. 125966, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 38, 57; People v. Catbagan, G.R. Nos. 149430-32, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 535, 565; People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 153591, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 583, 588; People v. Montejo, No. L-68857, November 21, 1988, 67 SCRA 506, 513; People v. Diva, G.R. No. L-22946, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 332, 340; People v. Ardisa, No. L-29351, January 23, 1974, 55 SCRA 245, 259.
23People v. Tagana, G.R. No. 133023, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 620, 634; People v. Borbon, G.R. No. 143085, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 178, 189; People v. Factao, G.R. No. 25966, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 38, 57; Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Ed., Vol. I, p. 352, citing People v. Durante, 53 Phil. 363 (1929); and People v. Camo, 91 Phil. 240 (1952).
24 76 Phil. 473, 479 (1946).
25 Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225)
26 Article 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. - In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the court shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
1. When there arc neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.
x x x x
27People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016.
28 Id.
29 See Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439, 459.