FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 198485, June 05, 2017
MARUBENI PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Marubeni Philippines Corporation (Marubeni), assailing the Decision2 dated March 23, 2011 and Resolution3 dated August 31, 2011 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc in CTA EB Case No. 557. The CTA En Banc affirmed with modification the CTA Second Division's Decision4 dated June 2, 2009 in C.T.A. Case No. 6469. The CTA Second Division dismissed Marubeni's claim for refund and/or issuance of a tax credit certificate (TCC) for having been filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period. The CTA En Banc, on the other hand, dismissed Marubeni's claim for refund and/or issuance of a TCC because it was premature.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and accordingly, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.12
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the former Second Division of this Court in CTA Case No. 6469 dated June 2, 2009 and its Resolution dated October 20, 2009 are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the dismissal of the Petition for Review is on the ground for having been prematurely filed. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.19
When Mindanao II and Mindanao I filed their respective administrative and judicial claims in 2005, neither Atlas nor Mirant has been promulgated. Atlas was promulgated on 8 June 2007, while Mirant was promulgated on 12 September 2008. It is therefore misleading to state that Atlas was the controlling doctrine at the time of filing of the claims. The 1997 Tax Code, which took effect on 1 January 1998, was the applicable law at the time of filing of the claims in issue. x x x27 (Emphasis in the original)
San Roque cannot also claim [to] being misled, misguided or confused by the Atlas doctrine because San Roque filed its petition for review with the CTA more than four years before Atlas was promulgated. The Atlas doctrine did not exist at the time San Roque failed to comply with the 120-day period. Thus, San Roque cannot invoke the Atlas doctrine as an excuse for its failure to wait for the 120-day period to lapse. In any event, the Atlas doctrine merely stated that the two-year prescriptive period should be counted from the date of payment of the output VAT, not from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales involving the input VAT were made. The Atlas doctrine does not interpret, expressly or impliedly, the 120+30 day periods.29 (Emphasis in original.)
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. – Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax: x x x
x x x x
(C) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. – In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsection (A) hereof.
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)
In determining whether the claims for the second, third and fourth quarters of 2003 have been properly appealed, we still see no need to refer to either Atlas or Mirant, or even to Section 229 of the 1997 Tax Code. The second paragraph of Section 112 (C) of the 1997 Tax Code is clear: "In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals."
The mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120+30 day periods was explained in San Roque:At the time San Roque filed its petition for review with the CTA, the 120+30 day mandatory periods were already in the law. Section 112(C) expressly grants the Commissioner 120 days within which to decide the taxpayer's claim. The law is clear, plain, and unequivocal: "x x x the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents." Following the verba legis doctrine, this law must be applied exactly as worded since it is clear, plain, and unequivocal. The taxpayer cannot simply file a petition with the CTA without waiting for the Commissioner's decision within the 120-day mandatory and jurisdictional period. The CTA will have no jurisdiction because there will be no "decision" or "deemed a denial" decision of the Commissioner for the CTA to review. In San Roque's case, it filed its petition with the CTA a mere 13 days after it filed its administrative claim with the Commissioner. Indisputably, San Roque knowingly violated the mandatory 120-day period, and it cannot blame anyone but itself.
Section 112(C) also expressly grants the taxpayer a 30-day period to appeal to the CTA the decision or inaction of the Commissioner, thus:
x x x the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)
This law is clear, plain, and unequivocal. Following the well-settled verba legis doctrine, this law should be applied exactly as worded since it is clear, plain, and unequivocal. As this law states, the taxpayer may, if he wishes, appeal the decision of the Commissioner to the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the Commissioner's decision, or if the Commissioner does not act on the taxpayer's claim within the 120-day period, the taxpayer may appeal to the CTA within 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day period.
x x x x
Section 112(A) and (C) must be interpreted according to its clear, plain, and unequivocal language. The taxpayer can file his administrative claim for refund or credit at anytime within the two-year prescriptive period. If he files his claim on the last day of the two-year prescriptive period, his claim is still filed on time. The Commissioner will have 120 days from such filing to decide the claim. If the Commissioner decides the claim on the 120th day, or does not decide it on that day, the taxpayer still has 30 days to file his judicial claim with the CTA. This is not only the plain meaning but also the only logical interpretation of Section 112(A) and (C). (Emphases in the original; citations omitted)31
To repeat, a claim for tax refund or credit, like a claim for tax exemption, is construed strictly against the taxpayer. One of the conditions for a judicial claim of refund or credit under the VAT System is compliance with the 120+30 day mandatory and jurisdictional periods. Thus, strict compliance with the 120+30 day periods is necessary for such a claim to prosper, whether before, during, or after the effectivity of the Atlas doctrine, except for the period from the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on 10 December 2003 to 6 October 2010 when the Aichi doctrine was adopted, which again reinstated the 120+30 day periods as mandatory and jurisdictional.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Considering further that the 30-day period to appeal to the CTA is dependent on the 120-day period, both periods are hereby rendered jurisdictional. Failure to observe 120 days prior to the filing of a judicial claim is not a mere non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, but is likewise considered jurisdictional. The period of 120 days is a prerequisite for the commencement of the 30-day period to appeal to the CTA. In both instances, whether the CIR renders a decision (which must be made within 120 days) or there was inaction, the period of 120 days is material.36
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 10-51.
2 Id. at 57-92. Penned by Associate Justice Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla with Associate Justices Juanito C. Castañeda, Jr., Erlinda P. Uy, Caesar A. Casanova, Olga Palanca-Enriquez, and Esperanza R. Fabon-Victorino, concurring; Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta, concurring and dissenting; and Associate Justices Lovell R. Bautista and Amelia R. Cotangco-Manalastas, dissenting.
3 Id. at 114-127. Penned by Associate Justice Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla with Associate Justices Juanito C. Castañeda, Jr., Erlinda P. Uy, Caesar A. Casanova, and Olga Palanca-Enriquez, concurring; Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta, Associate Justices Esperanza R. Fabon-Victorino, and Amelia R. Cotangco-Manalastas, concurring and dissenting; and Associate Justice Lovell R. Bautista, dissenting.
4 Id. at 135-151. Penned by Associate Justice Olga Palanca-Enriquez, with Associate Justices Juanito C. Castañeda, Jr. and Erlinda P. Uy concurring.
5 Id. at 137.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 138-139.
8 Id. at 150.
9 Id. at 141.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 142.
12 Id. at 151.
13 586 Phil. 712 (2008).
14Rollo, pp. 148-150.
15 Id. at 150.
16 Id. at 153-161.
17 551 Phil. 519 (2007).
18Rollo, p. 64.
19 Id. at 91.
20 Id. at 85.
21 646 Phil. 710 (2010).
22Rollo, pp. 85-87.
23 Id. at 22.
24 Id. at 28-30.
25 See id. at 49.
26 706 Phil. 48 (2013).
27 Id. at 74.
28 703 Phil. 310 (2013).
29 Id. at 357-358.
29-a As amended by R.A. No. 9337.
30 Supra note 28.
31 Supra note 26, at 78-81.
32 Supra note 28, at 371.
33 See rollo, pp. 30-32, 225-227.
34 Id. at 31.
35 720 Phil. 782 (2013).
36 Id. at 794.
37 Id. at 790.
38 See id. at 795.