FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 195003, June 07, 2017
CITY OF BATANGAS, REPRESENTED BY HON. SEVERINA VILMA ABAYA,1 IN HER CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR OF BATANGAS, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND SHELL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION B.V., Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CAGUIOA, J.:
The policy of ensuring the autonomy of local governments was not intended to create an imperium in imperio and install intra-sovereign political subdivisions independent of the sovereign state.2 As agents of the state, local governments should bear in mind that the police power devolved to them by law must be, at all times, exercised in a manner consistent with the will of their principal.
SECTION 3. - MANDATORY REQUIREMENT FOR THE APPROVAL OF HEAVY INDUSTRIES ALONG THE BATANGAS CITY PORTION OF BATANGAS BAY AND OTHER AREAS. - In addition to the requirements provided by laws and ordinances, the City Government shall not grant permit or clearance or its approval for any project or program involving the construction or establishment of heavy industries along the Batangas City portion of the Batangas Bay and other areas delineated as Heavy Industrial Zone without the required DESALINATION PLANT for use of sea water instead of underground fresh water for cooling system and industrial purposes.The Assailed Ordinance was approved by the city mayor on June 7, 2001.
SECTION 4. - GRACE PERIOD PROVIDED FOR HEAVY INDUSTRIES. - All heavy industries already established or approved by the City Government prior to the enactment of this Ordinance, including those to be established, are granted a period of five (5) years, counted from the date of approval of this Ordinance, to install [a] desalination plant.
SECTION 5. - AUTHORITY TO GRANT EXEMPTION FROM THE CONSTRUCTION OF DESALINATION PLANT. - The City Mayor with the concurrence of the Sangguniang Panlungsod may grant exemption for a given period to an industry from installation or construction of DESALINATION PLANT on the basis of the following conditions:
5.1. The exemption will not adversely affect the environment, public health, public safety and the welfare of the people, more particularly, the local aquifers, as shown by a comprehensive ground water assessment or comprehensive hydrological study conducted by the industry and presented by the industry applying for exemption. 5.2. The industry or proposed project will support economic-based activities and provide livelihood, employment, vital community services and facilities while at the same time posing no adverse effect on the community. 5.3. A public hearing is conducted. 5.4. Such other reasonable conditions which the City Mayor may require with the concurrence of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
x x x x
SECTION 7. PENAL CLAUSE. - Any person who shall authorize the start of the construction, development or operation of any project considered as heavy industry without the approval of the government authorities herein mentioned shall suffer an imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of P5,000.00.
If the violator is a juridical person or association, the penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, President, project manager and/or persons directly in charge of the construction, development and operation of the project.
SECTION 8. POWER OF THE CITY MAYOR TO ISSUE A CEASE AND DESIST ORDER. - The City Mayor, upon knowledge of the violation of this ordinance shall issue a cease and desist order for the stoppage of the construction, development or operation of the project or industry and shall exercise all powers necessary to give effect to the said order.
SECTION 9. ADMINISTRATIVE FINE. - An administrative fine/penalty of P5,000.00 per day of violation of this ordinance shall be imposed upon the owner, President, project manager, and/or persons directly in charge of the construction, development and operation of the project or industry.16
It is evident that from foregoing factual milieu and parameters, the questioned ordinance is INVALID, as it is hereby declared INVALID, in its entirety for want of necessity and for not conducting prior public hearing, and for violating the due process clause of the Constitution with respect to its (sic) Sec. 8, City Ordinance No.3, [s]. 2001.The RTC gave credence to the testimony of PSPC's witness Engineer Joeffrey Caranto (Engineer Caranto) who conducted a hydrogeology study on the Tabangao-Malitam watershed from which PSPC sources fresh ground water.38 The RTC summarized the findings of said study in this wise:
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.37
The RTC also noted that the Sangguniang Panlungsod failed to consult the NWRB before enacting the Assailed Ordinance, thereby encroaching upon its authority.40
- A water balance x x x calculation of the Tabangao-Malitam groundwater system shows that the natural recharge (replenishment) rate far exceeds the current demand for water in the area. Hence, there is no threat of depletion of the groundwater resource[s] in the Tabangao-Malitam [w]atershed that purportedly may result from PSPC's deep well pumping.
- Water levels in the PSPC wells have not lowered significantly over the last three (3) decades, indicating that there is no substantial diminution of the supply of groundwater.
- Among the four PSPC wells, only one [1] well shows very slightly elevated levels of chloride at 300 milligrams per liter which however is very low compared to seawater (which measures 20,000 milligrams of chloride per liter). The chloride levels in the other nearby PSPC wells are all within drinking water standards and have not increased in the last four (4) decades of usage. This indicates that salt water intrusion is not occurring in the PSPC wells.39 (Emphasis supplied)
City Ordinance No. 3, S. 2001 contravenes Presidential Decree No. 1067, better known as "The Water Code of the Philippines" as it is an encroachment into the authority of the [NWRB]. The use of water resources is under the regulatory power of the national government. This is explicit from the provisions of the Water Code which states that -Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod filed a Motion for Reconsideration53 (MR) dated June 21, 2010, which the CA Tenth Division subsequently denied through the Assailed Resolution. The CA Tenth Division found that the MR merely reiterated the arguments relied upon in the appeal, which were already passed upon in the Assailed Decision.54"The utilization, explo[i]tation, development, conservation and protection of water resources shall be subject to the control and regulation of the government through the [NWRB]".Although respondents-appellants insist that the city ordinance is not an absolute prohibition but merely a regulation on the use of fresh groundwater for cooling systems and industrial purposes the argument cannot justify the attempt to usurp the NWRB's power to regulate and control water resources. Moreover, not only does the city ordinance prohibit or regulate the use of fresh groundwater in disregard of previously granted water permits from the NWRB but also directs the installation of desalination plants for purposes of utilizing sea water, without the requisite water permit from the NWRB.
x x x The police power of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is subordinate to the constitutional limitations that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. Without the concurrence of these two requisites, the ordinance will not muster the test of a valid police measure and should be struck down. The trial court aptly examined the city ordinance against the requirement of reasonable necessity and correctly concluded that the subject ordinance failed to prove that it was reasonably necessary to prohibit heavy industries from using ground water and requiring them instead to construct desalination plants. There must be a reasonable relation between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment. Arbitrary invasion of personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be allowed even under the guise of protecting public interest. It has not been sufficiently demonstrated that there exists no other means less intrusive of private rights that would equally be effective for the accomplishment of the same purpose.
With the foregoing premises considered, there is no more necessity to address the other errors raised in the instant appeal.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 29 June 2007 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 84, in SP Civil Case No. 7924, declaring invalid City Ordinance No. 3, S. 2001 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.52 (Emphasis supplied)
1. After diligent and careful review [of] the Petition for Review submitted by the undersigned, it was found out that there was an error which was inadvertently committed in the first paragraph of the fifth (5th) page of the Petition;Considering the nature of the issues involved in the present Petition, and the lack of any evidence showing that Batangas City's error resulted from anything more than inadvertence, the Court resolves to permit the amendment of the Petition in the interest of substantial justice.
2. The first paragraph on page 5 of the Petition for Review on Certiorari x x x;
x x x x
Should be amended to appear as:"On June 13, 2007, herein Petitioner City Government of Batangas received the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 84 of Batangas City ruling in favor of Respondents, [PSPC] and Intervenor [SPEX] x x x. Petitioner filed its Notice of Appeal x x x on 26 July 2007. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals and the Tenth Division rendered the 25 May 2010 favoring [PSPC] and SPEX x x x. The City Government of Batangas filed a Motion for Reconsideration x x x. The motion was denied by the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated 30 December 2010 x x x. Hence, now this Petition."69 (Emphasis omitted)
In De la Cruz vs. Paraz, we laid the general rule "that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State."In this Petition, the Court is called upon to determine whether the control and regulation of the use of water may be made subject of a city ordinance under the regime of the Water Code - a national statute governing the same subject matter.
x x x x
In this regard, it is appropriate to stress that where the state legislature has made provision for the regulation of conduct, it has manifested its intention that the subject matter shall be fully covered by the statute, and that a municipality, under its general powers, cannot regulate the same conduct. In Keller vs. State, it was held that: "Where there is no express power in the charter of a municipality authorizing it to adopt ordinances regulating certain matters which are specifically covered by a general statute, a municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to regulate the subject which is completely covered by a general statute of the legislature, may be rendered invalid. x x x Where the subject is o(statewide concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the State." A reason advanced for this view is that such ordinances are in excess of the powers granted to the municipal corporation.
Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations shall be exercised by the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in .violation of the said law.
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid. The principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state. In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law. x x x77 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To prohibit an act or to compel something to be done, there must be a shown reason for the same. The purpose must also be cogent to the means adopted by the law to attain it. In this case, as seen in the "whereas clause," the purpose of the ordinance is to protect the environment and prevent ecological imbalance, especially the drying up of the aquifers of Batangas City. In effect, the drying up of aquifers is being blamed on the establishments and industries such as petitioners-appellees here. It would have been acceptable had there been a specific study or findings that the local government conducted (sic) and not just its reliance on the complaints of some constituents who merely made its conclusion that the drying up of wells or its salination was due to the "heavy industries" use of groundwater.While the Joint Decision resolves the JG Summit and First Gas appeals, these cases, pertain to the same appeal filed by Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod from the Decision of the RTC nullifying the Assailed Ordinance. As aptly put by the CA in the present case:
In addition, if appellants were convinced that those industries adversely affect the environment and specifically the water resource in Batangas City, there would be no exemptions, as provided in Section 5 of the Ordinance, as it would negate the purpose of the law.
It thus becomes apparent that the ordinance was come up with in an arbitrary manner, if not based purely on emotive or flawed premises. There was no scientific standard or any acceptable standard at all that the ordinance was based on. x x x85
The factual antecedents and legal issues in the present CA-G.R. CV No. 90373 are identical to those of CA-G.R. CV Nos. 90324 and 90365. The assignment of errors in the present appeal are but a restatement of the errors raised in the two consolidated appeals cases, which errors have already been exhaustively passed upon by the Court's Fourth Division in its Joint Decision dated May 28, 2009, weighing pieces of evidence that are now the very same pieces of evidence presented for consideration in this appeal. x x x86 (Emphasis supplied)This Court, not being a trier of facts, accords the highest degree of respect to the findings of fact of the trial court, especially where, as here, they have been affirmed by the CA; accordingly, these findings will not be disturbed. To be sure, such findings are binding and conclusive upon this Court,87 and it is not the Court's function in a petition for review on certiorari to examine, evaluate or weigh anew the probative value of the evidence presented before the trial court.88 While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the Court finds that none is present in this case.
Endnotes:
1 Referred to as Vilma Severina A. Dimacuha elsewhere in the records.
2Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 482 Phil. 544, 571 (2004).
3Rollo, pp. 3-21.
4 Id. at 315-333. Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, with Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Manuel M. Barrios concurring.
5 Id. at 335-336.
6 Id. at 64-90. Penned by Presiding Judge Paterno V. Tac-an.
7 Entitled "AN ACT REQUIRING ALL ESTABLISHED HEAVY INDUSTRIES AND THOSE TO BE ESTABLISHED ALONG THE BATANGAS CITY PORTION OF THE BATANGAS BAY AND OTHER AREAS DECLARED AS HEAVY INDUSTRIAL ZONE TO CONSTRUCT DESALINATION PLANT AND PROHIBITING THE USE OF EXPLOITATION OF UNDERGROUND FRESH WATER FOR COOLING SYSTEM AND INDUSTRIAL PURPOSES," rollo, pp. 24-26.
8Rollo, pp. 89-90.
9 RA 5495, Sec. 3.
10Rollo, pp. 139-140.
11 Id. at 141.
12 Id. at 191.
13 Id. at 193.
14 Id. at 194-196.
15 Batangas City Ordinance No. 3, s. 2001, Sec. 3; id. at 25.
16Rollo, pp. 25-26.
17 Id. at 318-319.
18 Id. at 136-183, 315, 319.
19 Id. at 190-227.
20 Id. at 93.
21 Id. at 93, 96.
22 Id. at 138.
23 Id. at 149.
24 Id. at 138.
25 Id. at 149.
26 Id. at 139, 150.
27 Id. at 150, 178.
28 Id. at 190-191.
29 Id. at 229.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 230.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 265-266.
35 Id. at 30-31.
36 Supra note 6.
37 Id. at 89-90.
38 Id. at 72, 88.
39 Id. at 73.
40 Id. at 89; Presidential Decree No. 424, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1067 and Executive Order No. 124-A, series of 1987.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 30-31, 92-93.
43 Id. at 84-85.
44 Id. at 101-102.
45 Id. at 30-59. Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. concurring.
46 Id. at 30-31, 58-59.
47 Id. at 325.
48 The Joint Memorandum does not form part of the records of the case.
49Rollo, p. 325.
50 Id. at 325-326.
51 Id. at 326.
52 Id. at 330-332.
53 Id. at 111-132.
54 Id. at 335-336.
55 Id. at 3.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 19-20. There being no indication that the Petition was likewise filed on behalf of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, Batangas City was deemed as sole petitioner hereunder.
58 Id. at 304-307.
59 Id. at 340-343.
60 Id. at 353-391.
61 Id. at 499-501.
62 Id. at 500.
63 Id. at 505-513.
64 Id. at 13.
65 Id. at 14.
66 Id. at 7-12.
67 Id. at 16.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 505-506.
70Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., 568 Phil. 658, 699-700 (2008).
71Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 385 Phil. 956, 968 (2000).
72 Id. at 968-969.
73 Section 16 of the LGC provides:
SEC. 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
74 Supra note 71, at 969.
75 See Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 2, at 562.
76 See id. at 562-563.
77 Id. at 563-564.
78 WATER CODE, Article 2 (c).
79 On July 22, 1987, the National Water Resources Council was renamed and reorganized as the NWRB by virtue of Executive Order No. 124-A.
80 WATER CODE, Article 13.
81 The relevant provisions of the Water Code governing the grant, suspension, modification, cancellation and revocation of water permits provide:
Article 28. Water permits shall continue to be valid as long as water is beneficially used; however, it maybe suspended on the grounds of non-compliance with approved plans and specifications or schedules of water distribution; use of water for a purpose other than that for which it was granted; non-payment of water charges; wastage; failure to keep records of water diversion, when required; and violation of any term or condition of any permit or of rules and regulations promulgated by the [NWRB].
x x x x
Article 29. Water permits may be revoked after due notice and hearing on grounds of non-use; gross violation of the conditions imposed in the permit; unauthorized sale of water; willful failure or refusal to comply with rules and regulations or any lawful order; pollution, public nuisance or acts detrimental to public health and safety; when the appropriator is found to be disqualified under the law to exploit and develop natural resources of the Philippines; when, in the case of irrigation, the land is converted to non-agricultural purposes; and other similar grounds.
Article 30. All water permits are subject to modification or cancellation by the [NWRB], after due notice and hearing, in favor of a project of greater beneficial use or for multi-purpose development, and a water permittee who suffers thereby shall be duly compensated by the entity or person in whose favor the cancellation was made. (Emphasis supplied)
82 WATER CODE, Article 30.
83Rollo, p. 24.
84 Id. at 25-26.
85 Id. at 51-52.
86 Id. at 326.
87Bulos, Jr. v. Yasuma, 554 Phil. 591, 601 (2007).
88 Id.
89 127 Phil. 306 (1967).
90 Id. at 315.
91Rollo, p. 73.