SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 197297, August 02, 2017
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES DANILO GO AND AMORLINA GO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
Public land remains inalienable unless it is shown to have been reclassified and alienated to a private person.1
This resolves a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals Decision dated January 21, 2011 and Resolution dated June 6, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 93000, which affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities dated December 12, 2008 issuing the Decree of Registration for Lot No. 4699-B of Subdivision Plan Csd-04-022290-D in favor of the Spouses Danilo and Amorlina Go.
On August 26, 2006, respondents Spouses Danilo and Amorlina Go (the Spouses Go) applied for the registration and confirmation of title over Cadastral Lot No. 4699-B (Lot No. 4699-B), a parcel of land in Barangay Balagtas, Batangas City covering an area of 1,000 square meters.2
The Spouses Go registered Lot No. 4699-B in their names for taxation purposes. They had paid the real property taxes, including the arrears, from 1997 to 2006, as shown in Tax Declaration No. 026-04167.3 They had also established a funeral parlor, San Sebastian Funeral Homes, on the lot.4 According to them, there were no other claimants over the property.5
The Spouses Go claimed to be in an open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and actual possession of the property for seven (7) years since they bought it.6 They also tacked their possession through that of their predecessors-in-interest, as follows:
Sometime in 1945,7 Anselmo de Torres (Anselmo) came to know that his parents, Sergia Almero and Andres de Torres (the Spouses de Torres),8 owned Lot No. 4699,9 a bigger property where Lot No. 4699-B came from. According to Anselmo, the Spouses de Torres paid the real property taxes during their lifetime and planted bananas, mangoes, calamansi, and rice on this lot.10 His mother, Sergia Almero (Sergia), allegedly inherited Lot No. 4699 from her parents, Celodonio and Eufemia Almero (the Spouses Almero).11
In the 1960s, Anselmo and his siblings inherited Lot No. 4699 from their parents upon their deaths.12
One of Anselmo's sisters, Cristina Almero de Torres Corlit (Cristina), then built a residential house on Lot No. 4699-B,13 declaring this parcel of land under her name for tax purposes, as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 026-03492.14 Meanwhile, Anselmo and his other siblings built their homes on another portion of Lot No. 4699.15 Anselmo, who was then 28 years old, started living in the eastern portion from 1966.16
On January 26, 2000, the Spouses Go bought Lot No. 4699-B from the previous owners, siblings Anselmo, Bernardo Almero de Torres, Leonila Almero de Torres Morada, and Cristina, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.17
On August 26, 2006, the Spouses Go (respondents) applied for the registration and confirmation of title of Lot No. 4699-B.18 They attached the Report dated January 31, 2007 of Special Land Investigator I Ben Hur Hernandez (Hernandez) and the Certification dated January 29, 2008 of Forester I Loida Maglinao (Maglinao) of the Batangas City Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Calamba, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon (CALABARZON) Region of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).19
Hernandez's January 31, 2007 Report and Maglinao's January 29, 2008 Certification stated that the property was located in an alienable and disposable zone20 since March 26, 1928, under Project No. 13, Land Classification Map No. 718.21 No patent or decree was previously issued over the property.22
On November 3, 2006, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) opposed respondents' application for registration for the following reasons: 1) Lot No. 4699-B was part of the public domain; 2) neither the Spouses Go nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the property since June 12, 1945 or even before then; 3) the tax declaration and payment were not competent or sufficient proof of ownership, especially considering that these were relatively recent.23
Anselmo and his siblings had no proof of their inheritance. He claimed that the office having custody of the documentary proof of their inheritance was burned24 and they no longer had the original copy of the documents.25
In the Decision26 dated December 12, 2008, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities confirmed the title of the lot in the name of the Spouses Go. The dispositive portion read:
Considering that the applicants have duly established essential facts in support of the application, the Court hereby confirms title to Lot 4699-B, Cad 264 Batangas Cadastre covered in approved plan Csd-04-22290-D, containing an area of ONE THOUSAND (1,000) SQUARE METERS situated at Barangay Balagtas, Batangas City in the name of Spouses Danilo Go and Amorlina A. Go, of legal age, Filipino and residents of San Jose Subdivision, Barangay San Sebastian, Lipa City.Petitioner appealed directly to the Court of Appeals. In the Decision28 dated January 21, 2011, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal:
Once the Decision becomes final, let the corresponding Decree of Registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.27
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision, dated December 12, 2008, of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Pallocan West, Batangas City in Land Registration Case No. 2006-162, is AFFIRMED.Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration,30 which was denied on June 6, 2011.31
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.29
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance [Regional Trial Court] of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:Commonwealth Act No. 141 is a special law that applies to agricultural lands of the public domain, not to forests, mineral lands, and national parks.53 The requisite period of possession and occupation is different from that of land classification.
....(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
[T]he applicant's imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.58In Malabanan, the Court En Banc affirmed that June 12, 1945 is the "reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation" and not of the land classification as alienable and disposable:
[T]he choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.Thus, the land may be declared alienable and disposable at any time, not necessarily before June 12, 1945. The moment that the land is declared alienable and disposable, an applicant may then initiate the proceedings for the judicial confirmation of title.
[A]n examination of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier.59 (Emphasis supplied)
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 does not vest or create a title to a public land that has already existed or has been vested under Commonwealth Act No. 141.63 The procedure of titling under Presidential Decree No. 1529 "simply recognizes and documents ownership and provides for the consequences of issuing paper titles."64
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
It is unascertainable whether the 1945 tax declaration was issued on, before or after 12 June 1945. Tax declarations are issued any time of the year. A tax declaration issued in 1945 may have been issued in December 1945. Unless the date and month of issuance in 1945 is stated, compliance with the reckoning date in [Commonwealth Act No.] 141 cannot be established.76 (Emphasis in the original)
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated . . .Thus, an applicant has the burden of proving that the public land has been classified as alienable and disposable.78 To do this, the applicant must show a positive act from the government declassifying the land from the public domain79 and converting it into an alienable and disposable land.80 "[T]he exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department."81 In Victoria v. Republic:82
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses [to] which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands . . . (Emphasis supplied)
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification must show that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable[.]83 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)Section X(1)84 of the DENR Administrative Order No. 1998-24 and Section IX(1)85 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-11 affirm that the DENR Secretary is the approving authority for "[l]and classification and release of lands of the public domain as alienable and disposable." Section 4.6 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2007-20 defines land classification as follows:
Land classification is the process of demarcating, segregating, delimiting and establishing the best category, kind, and uses of public lands. Article XII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines provides that lands of the public domain are to be classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.These provisions, read with Victoria v. Republic86 establish the rule that before an inalienable land of the public domain becomes private land, the DENR Secretary must first approve the land classification into an agricultural land and release it as alienable and disposable.87 The DENR Secretary's official acts "may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy."88
[I]t has been repeatedly ruled that certifications issued by the CENRO, or specialists of the DENR, as well as Survey Plans prepared by the DENR containing annotations that the subject lots are alienable, do not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the property sought to be registered belongs to the inalienable public domain. Rather, this Court stressed the importance of proving alienability by presenting a copy of the original classification of the land approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.93 (Emphasis supplied)Here, in its Decision94 dated December 12, 2008, the Court of Appeals concluded that the January 29, 2008 CENRO Certification, which stated that Lot No. 4699-B was within alienable and disposable zone, was conclusive proof that this land applied for registration was alienable. This Court disagrees.
[I]t is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.98Republic v. Hanover99 ruled that a CENRO certification does not constitute incontrovertible proof that a piece of land is alienable and disposable. This is because "the CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring the alienability and disposability of public lands."100Republic v. Vda. De Joson explained:101
This doctrine unavoidably means that the mere certification issued by the CENRO or PENRO did not suffice to support the application for registration, because the applicant must also submit a copy of the original classification of the land as alienable and disposable as approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.102
Endnotes:
1Republic v. Vega, 654 Phi). 511, 520 (2011) [Per J. Sereno, Third Division].
2Rollo, p. 32, Court of Appeals Decision.
3 Id. at 34, Court of Appeals Decision.
4 Id. at 56, RTC Decision.
5 Id. at 57.
6 Id. at 56.
7 Id. at 39. The records state that Anselmo was born on April 21, 1938 and he was seven (7) years old when he allegedly learned his parents' ownership of the land.
8 Id. at 32, Court of Appeals Decision.
9 Id. at 39. See rollo, pp. 54 and 56. Lot No. 4699 was a 3,994-square-meter parcel of land that was subdivided into small areas under Subdivision Plan Csd-04-022290-D.
10 Id. at 39.
11 Id. at 32.
12 Id. at 57, RTC Decision.
13 Id. at 56-57, RTC Decision.
14 Id. at 34, Court of Appeals Decision.
15 Id. at 56-57, RTC Decision.
16 Id. at 57.
17 Id. at 15,32.
18 Id. at 32, Court of Appeals Decision.
19 Id. at 57-58, RTC Decision.
20 Id. at 57.
21 Id. at 74.
22 Id. at 57, RTC Decision.
23 Id. at 36-37. Court of Appeals Decision.
24 Id. at 32. See rollo, p. 56, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities cites a Certification dated March 31, 2008 of the Office of the City Assessor of Batangas City purportedly showing that the office was burned on an unstated date.
25 Id. at 56, RTC Decision.
26 Id. at 54-59. The Decision, docketed as LRC Case No. 2006-162, was penned by Judge Eleuterio L. Bathan of Branch 2, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Pallocan West, Batangas City.
27 Id. at 58-59.
28 Id. at 31-49. The Decision, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 93000, was penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Franchito N. Diamante of the Special Thirteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
29 Id. at 48.
30 Id. at 60-65.
31 Id. at 50-53. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Franchito N. Diamante of the Former Special Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.
32 Id. at 10-30, Petition for Review.
33 Id. at 20-21.
34 Id. at 21.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 22.
37 Id. at 70.
38 Id. at 72-73.
39 Id. at 74.
40 Id. at 76.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 82.
43 Id. at 83-86.
44 Id. at 87.
45 Id. at 89.
46 Id. at 95.
47 Id. at 96-97.
48 The Public Land Act (1936).
49See Com. Act No. 141, sec. 48.
50Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, 717 Phil. 141, 164 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
51See Republic v. Court of Appeals, 489 Phil. 405, 417 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. This Court has explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date on June 12, 1945.
52 Pres. Decree No. 1073, sec. 4 provides:
Section 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
53 In Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, 717 Phil. 141, 164(2013) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc]. Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 166.
57 717 Phil. 141 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
58 Id. at 166.
59 Id. at 165.
60 Com. Act No. 141, sec. 48(b).
61 Com. Act No. 141, sec. 11 provides:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
62 Property Registration Decree (1978).
63Development Bank of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, 387 Phil. 283, 296 (2000) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]); Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, 717 Phil. 141, 207 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc]; Republic v. Bautista Jr., G.R. No. 166890, June 28, 2016 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurispradence/2016/june2016/166890.pdf 5 [Per J. Bersamin, First Division]).
64 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, 1X1 Phil. 141, 207 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
65Republic v. Lualhati, G.R. No. 183511, March 25, 2015, 757 Phil. 119, 129 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]; La Tondeña, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 194617, August 5, 2015, 765 SCRA 265, 283 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
66 Id. at 56, RTC Decision.
67 Id. at 56-57.
68 Id. at 57.
69 Id. at 32, Court of Appeals Decision.
70Republic v. Gielczyk, 720 Phil. 385, 397 (2013) [Per J. Reyes, First Division].
71Rollo, p. 39, CA Decision.
72Republic v. Manna Properties Inc., 490 Phil. 654, 667-668 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
73 Id. at 668.
74 Id.
75 490 Phil. 654 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
76 Id. at 668.
77Republic v. Lualhati, 757 Phil. 119, 129 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
78 Republic v. Lualhati, 757 Phil. 119 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
79 Victoria v. Republic, 666 Phil. 519, 525 (2011) [Per J. Abad, Second Division].
80Ituralde v. Falcasantos, 361 Phil. 245, 250 (1999) [Per J. Pardo. First Division]; La Tondeña, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 194617, August 5, 2015, 765 SCRA 265, 285 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
81Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, 717 Phil. 141, 162 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
82 666 Phil. 519 (2031) [Per J. Abad, Second Division].
83 Id. at 525.
84 DENR Adm. Order No. 1998-24.
85 Dated February 8, 2000, at 72.
86 666 Phil. 519 (2011) [Per J. Abad, Second Division].
87Republic v. Sese, 735 Phil. 108, 121 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
88Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 578 Phil. 441, 453 (2008) [Per J. Carpio, First Division]; see RULES OF COURT, Rules 132, sec. 19(a).
89Republic v. Sese, 735 Phil. 108, 121 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
90Republic v. Hanover Worldwide Trading Corp., 636 Phil. 739, 752 (2010) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
91Republic v. Local Superior of the Institute of the Sisters of the Sacred Heart of Jesus of Ragusa, G.R. No. 185603, February 10, 2016, 783 SCRA 501, 514 [Per J. Reyes, Third Division].
92 757 Phil. 119 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
93 Id. at 131.
94Rollo, pp. 54-59.
95Republic v. Lualhati, 757 Phil. 119, 132 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
96See Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 578 Phil. 441, 453 (2008) [Per J. Carpio, First Division], Republic v. Hanover Worldwide Trading Corp., 636 Phil. 739, 752 (2010) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division], Republic v. Sese, 735 Phil. 108, 121 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division], Republic v. Vda. de Joson, 728 Phil. 550, 562 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division], Republic v. Lualhati, 757 Phil. 119, 130-131 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division], Republic v. Local Superior of the Institute of the Sisters of the Sacred Heart of Jesus of Ragusa, G.R. No. 185603, February 10, 2016, 783 SCRA 501, 514 [Per J, Reyes, Third Division]; Republic v. Vega, 654 Phil. 511 (2011) [Per J. Sereno, Third Division].
97 578 Phil. 441 (2008) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
98 Id. at 452-453.
99 636 Phil. 739 (2010) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
100 Id. at 752.
101Republic v. Vda. de Joson, 728 Phil. 550 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
102 Id. at 562.
103 Id.
104Rollo, p. 70.
105 Id. at 82.
106 Id. at 89.
107 Id. at 96.
108 Id. at 21.
109Republic v. Gomez, 682 Phil. 631, 637 (2012) [Per J. Sereno, Second Division].
110Republic v. Local Superior of the Institute of the Sisters of the Sacred Heart of Jesus of Ragusa, G.R. No. 185603, February 10, 2016, 783 SCRA 501, 514 [Per J. Reyes, Third Division].
111Republic v. Vega, 654 Phil. 511, 521 (2011) [Per J. Sereno, Third Division].