THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 203943, August 30, 2017
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION/EDUARDO MANESE AND PRINCESS CRUISE LINES, LTD., Petitioners, v. CYNTHIA DE JESUS, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
A conditional settlement of a judgment award may be treated as a compromise agreement and a judgment on the merits of the case if it turns out to be highly prejudicial to one of the parties.
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, Eduardo Manese,2 and Princess Cruise Lines, Limited petitioners) assailing the August 17, 2012 Decision3 and October 19, 2012 Resolution 4 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 119393. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision upheld the November 24, 2010 Decision5 and February 28, 2011 Resolution6 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR LAC No. 08-000481-09 (NLRC NCR No. (M) 09-13352-08).
On February 28, 2006, Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (Magsaysay), the local manning agent of Princess Cruise Lines, Limited, hired Bernardine De Jesus (Bernardine) as an Accommodation Supervisor for the cruise ship Regal Princess. Based on the contract of employment7 that he signed, Bernardine was to receive a basic monthly wage of US$388.00 for a period of 10 months.
On March 9, 2006, Bernardine boarded Regal Princess and he eventually disembarked 10 months later, or on January 16, 2007, after his contract of employment ended.8
Bernardine was soon diagnosed with Aortic Aneurysm and on March 15, 2007, he had a coronary angiography. On March 21, 2007, he underwent a Left Axillofemoral Bypass.9 He died on March 26, 2007.10
On September 24, 2008, respondent Cynthia De Jesus (Cynthia), Bernardine's widow, filed a complaint11 against Magsaysay for "payment of death benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance, damages, and attorney's fees."12 Cynthia and Magsaysay were unable to amicably settle the case; hence, they were directed to submit their respective position papers.13
On June 30, 2009, the Labor Arbiter granted Cynthia's complaint and directed Magsaysay to pay her claims for death benefits, additional benefits, burial expenses, and attorney's fees.14
The Labor Arbiter ruled that it was highly improbable that Bernardine developed a cardio-vascular disease which would lead to his death merely two (2) months after his repatriation.15
The Labor Arbiter held that Cynthia sufficiently established that her husband suffered chest pains while he was still aboard the Regal Princess. She claimed that he had reported his condition but he was not provided with medical attention. Furthermore, he had also asked for medical attention upon his repatriation, but his request was once again denied.16 The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter Decision read:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding respondents liable to pay, jointly and severally, complainant's claims for death benefits under the POEA Standard Employment Contract, amounting to US$50,000.00 and additional benefits amounting to US$21,000.00 for complainant's three (3) minor children, in Philippine currency at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment; US$1,000,00 representing burial expenses; and attorney's fees often percent (10%) of the total monetary award.On November 24, 2010, the National Labor Relations Commission18 denied Magsaysay's appeal.
All other claims are denied.
SO ORDERED.17
In such case, even if the seaman died after the term of the contract, his beneficiaries are entitled to death compensation and benefits. Thus, [w]here a seaman contracts an illness during the term of his employment and such illness causes the death of the seaman even after the term of his contract, the beneficiaries of the seaman are entitled, as a matter of right, to death compensation and benefits.21As for Bernardine's failure to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination, the National Labor Relations Commission remarked that this Court had already ruled that it could be dispensed with. Furthermore, the National Labor Relations Commission pointed out that the failure to undergo a post employment medical examination within three (3) days from repatriation leads to the forfeiture of medical benefits and sickness allowance, not death benefits.22 The dispositive portion of the National Labor Relations Commission Decision read:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the labor arbiter a quo dated June 30, 2009 rendered in NLRC NCR Case No. (M) 09-13352-08 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.On May 13, 2011, Magsaysay filed a Petition for Certiorari24 before the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.23 (Emphasis in the original)
The petitioners merely told him to take a rest and after that, he will be re-deployed again. Seaman De Jesus could not have immediately filed a disability claim (as suggested by petitioners) because he was not yet examined by a doctor due to the refusal of petitioners to provide postĀ-employment medical attention. He was also hoping that his condition would improve after taking a rest, as suggested by petitioners.On August 12, 2013, this Court required petitioners to reply to the Comment.47
However, his condition did not improve until he suffered aortic aneurism on March 14, 2007.46 (Emphasis in the original)
Simply put, the execution of the final and executory decision or resolution of the NLRC shall proceed despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari, unless it is restrained by the proper court. In the present case, petitioners already paid Villamater's widow, Sonia, the amount of [P]3,649,800.00, representing the total and permanent disability award plus attorney's fees, pursuant to the Writ of Execution issued by the Labor Arbiter. Thereafter, an Order was issued declaring the case as "closed and terminated." However, although there was no motion for reconsideration of this last Order, Sonia was, nonetheless, estopped from claiming that the controversy had already reached its end with the issuance of the Order closing and terminating the case. This is because the Acknowledgment Receipt she signed when she received petitioners' payment was without prejudice to the final outcome of the petition for certiorari pending before the CA.56Respondent, in turn, cites Career Philippines Ship Management Inc. v. Madjus57 to substantiate her claim that the Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment Award was akin to an amicable settlement, rendering the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals moot and academic. Career Philippines stated:
As for the "Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment," the Court holds that it is valid, hence, the "conditional" settlement of the judgment award insofar as it operates as a final satisfaction thereof to render the case moot and academic.Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Legaspi59 clarified that this Court ruled against the employer in Career Philippines not because the parties entered into a conditional settlement but because the conditional satisfaction of judgment was "highly prejudicial to the employee."60
....
Finally, the Affidavit of Claimant attached to the "Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment" states:....In effect, while petitioner had the luxury of having other remedies available to it such as its petition for certiorari pending before the appellate court, and an eventual appeal to this Court, respondent, on the other hand, could no longer pursue other claims, including for interests that may accrue during the pendency of the case.58 (Emphasis in the original)
5. That I understand that the payment of the judgment award of US$66,000.00 or its peso equivalent of PhP2,932,974.00 includes all my past, present and future expenses and claims, and all kinds of benefits due to me under the POEA employment contract and all collective bargaining agreements and all labor laws and regulations, civil law or any other law whatsoever and all damages, pains and sufferings in connection with my claim.
6. That I have no further claims whatsoever in any theory of law against the Owners of MV "Tama Star" because of the payment made to me. That I certify and warrant that I will not file any complaint or prosecute any suit of action in the Philippines, Panama, Japan or any country against the shipowners and/or released parties herein after receiving the payment of US$66,000.00 or its peso equivalent of PhP2,932,974.00 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The agreement stated that the payment of the monetary award was without prejudice to the right of the employer to file a petition for certiorari and appeal, while the employee agreed that she would no longer file any complaint or prosecute any suit of action against the employer after receiving the payment.61Equitable considerations were the underlying basis for the ruling in Career Philippines62 and this was accentuated in Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Pelagio,63 which summarized the ruling in Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Legaspi as follows:
Ultimately, in Philippine Transmarine, the Court ruled that since the agreement in that case was fair to the parties in that it provided available remedies to both parties, the certiorari petition was not rendered moot despite the employer's satisfaction of the judgment award, as the respondent had obliged himself to return the payment if the petition would be granted.64In the instant case, the parties entered into a compromise agreement when they executed a Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment Award.65
I, CYNTHIA P. DE JESUS, with residence at 157 Isarog St., La Lorna, Quezon City, Philippines, after being duly sworn, depose and say:This prohibition on the part of respondent to pursue any of the available legal remedies should the Court of Appeals or this Court reverse the judgment award of the labor tribunals or prosecute any other suit or action in another country puts the seafarer's beneficiaries at a grave disadvantage. Thus, Career Philippines is applicable and the Court of Appeals did not err in treating the conditional settlement as an amicable settlement, effectively rendering the Petition for Certiorari moot and academic.
....
[7.] That I understand that the payment of the judgment award of US$79,200.00 or its peso equivalent plus of Php3,370,514.40 includes all my past, present and future expenses and claims, and all kinds of benefits due to me under the POEA employment contract and all collective bargaining agreements and all labor laws and regulations, civil law or any other law whatsoever and all damages, pains and sufferings in connection with my claim;
[8.] That I have no further claims whatsoever in any theory of law against the Owners of "REGAL PRINCESS" because of the payment made to me. That I certify and warrant that I will not file any complaint or prosecute any suit or action in the Philippines, United States of America, Liberia, Kuwait, Panama, United Kingdom or any other country against the shipowners and/or the released parties herein after receiving the payment of US$79,200.00 or its peso equivalent of Php3,370,514.40[.]72 (Emphasis supplied)
As a rule, we only examine questions of law in a Rule 45 petition. Thus, "we do not re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of the [National Labor Relations Commission], an administrative body that has expertise in its specialized field." Similarly, we do not replace our "own judgment for that of tribunal in determining where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible." The factual findings of the National Labor Relations Commission, when confirmed by the Court of Appeals, we usually "conclusive on this Court."74This Court sees no reason to depart from this rule.
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. -However, Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC acknowledges the possibility of "compensation for the death of the seafarer occurring after the employment contract on account of a work-related illness"75 as long as the following conditions are met
A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH
- In case of work-related, death of the seafarer, during the term of his contract the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
....
- The other liabilities of the employer when the .seafarer dies as a result of work-related injury or illness during the term of employment are as follows:
- The employer shall pay the deceased's beneficiary all outstanding obligations due the seafarer under this Contract.
- The employer shall transport the remains and personal effects of the seafarer to the Philippines at employer's expense except if the death occurred in a port where local government laws or regulations do not permit the transport of such remains. In case death occurs at sea, the disposition of the remains shall be handled or dealt with in accordance with the master's best judgment. In all cases, the employer/master shall communicate with the manning agency to advise for disposition of seafarer's remains.
- The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippines [sic] currency equivalent to the amount of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
(1) The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;Furthermore, a cardio-vascular disease may be considered occupational under Section 32-A (11) if any of the established conditions are met:
(2) The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
(3) The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it;
(4) There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.76
The following diseases are considered as occupational when contracted under working conditions involving the risks described herein:In fulfilling these requisites, respondent must present no less than substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as "such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."78
....
11. Cardio-Vascular Diseases. Any of the following conditions must be met:
- If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must e proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature of his work.
- The train of work that brings about an acute attack must be sufficient severity and must be followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship.
- If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship.77
Complaint has clearly established that her husband's condition was suffered while he was on board the vessel and during the term of his employment contract with the respondent. Strict roles of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability benefits. Against the self-serving denials of the respondents, complainant has shown that her husband, prior to his death, suffered chest pains while on board and reported his condition but he was not allowed to seek medical attention. When he was repatriated, he asked the respondents anew for medical check up but his request was again denied. Having substantially established that the causative circumstances leading to her husband's death had transpired during his employment. We find that complainant is entitled to the death compensation and other benefits under the POEA Standard Contract. Probability and not the ultimate degree of certainty is the test of proof in compensation proceedings[.]79While the National Labor Relations Commission opined:
Evidently, the disease which led to the death of Bernardine de Jesus is work related, and in this regard, We believe that complainantĀ-appellee presented sufficient evidence to show the nature of the maritime employment of her late husband, as well as the disease he suffered from and its causal relationship to his maritime employment.80The findings of the labor tribunals correspond with the unassailed fact that Bernardine died from a cardio-vascular disease merely two (2) month after his repatriation. This Court concurs with the Labor Arbiter's observation that it was improbable for Bernardine to have developed and died from a cardio-vascular disease within the two (2) short months following his repatriation:
Seaman de Jesus died just over two (2) months from his repatriation. It is quite improbable for him to develop cardio-vascular disease which caused his death during that short span of time. Medical studies cited on record recognize the fact that it is medically impossible to acquire cardiovascular illnesses merely days or weeks prior to one's death ...Being factual in nature, this Court sees no reason to disturb the findings of the labor tribunals as it has usually given deference to the findings of fact of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise in their specific jurisdiction. Their factual findh1gs are generally binding upon this Court, absent a showing a grave abuse of discretion.82
It is therefore evident that the illness which caused Seaman de Jesus' death occurred during the term of his employment contract, though it may not have fully manifested at once. The fact that the seaman's work exposed him to different climates and unpredictable weather also helped trigger the onset of his disease. There is therefore a reasonable connection between the conditions of employment and work actually performed by the deceased seafarer and his illness.81
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 24-62.
2 Id. at 484. Eduardo Manese was Magsaysay Maritime Corporation's employee.
3 Id. at 64-76. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and concurred in by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda of the First Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4 Id. at 21-22. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and concurred in by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda. of the First Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
5 Id. at 122-135.
6 Id. at 145-146.
7 Id. at 170.
8 Id. at 65.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 210.
11 Id. at 149-151.
12 Id. at 151.
13 Id. at 65.
14 Id. at 136-143. The Decision docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. (M) NCR-09-13352-08 was penned by Labor Arbiter Madjayran H. Ajan.
15 Id. at 140.
16 Id. at 141.
17 Id. at 142-143.
18 Id. at 122-135. The Decision docketed as NLRC NCR LAC No. 08-000481-09 (NLRC NCR No. (M) 09-13352-08) was penned by Commissioner Romeo L. Go and concurred in by Commissioner Perlita B. Velasco. Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles took no part.
19 Id. at 130.
20 Id. at 131-132.
21 Id. at 132.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 132-133.
24 Id. at 80-121.
25 Id. at 400-408.
26 Id. at 408-A.
27 Id. at 64-76.
28 Id. at 75.
29 Id. at 21-22.
30 Id. at 427-450.
31 Id. at 24-62.
32 628 Phil. 81 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
33Rollo, pp. 35 and 766.
34 Id. at 36 and 766-767.
35 Id. at 40-41 and 769-771.
36 Id. at 4l and 771.
37 Id. at 43 and 772-773.
38 Id. 44-45 and 773-774.
39 Id. at 47-54 and 777-784.
40 Id. at 556-557.
41 Id. at 561-608.
42 650 Phil. 157 (2010) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
43Rollo, pp. 572-581 and 714-720.
44 Id. at 584-585 and 725-727.
45 Id. at 585-588 and 727-730.
46 Id. at 598-599 and 741.
47 Id. at 610.
48 Id. at 616-635.
49 Id. at 616-617.
50 Id. at 617-620.
51 Id. at 620-623, 626-631.
52 Id. at 706-749.
53 Id. at 757-789.
54 Id. at 704-705.
55 628 Phil. 81 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
56 Id. at 94.
57 650 Phil. 157 (2010) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
58 Id. at 163-165.
59 710 Phil. 838 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division).
60 Id. at 847.
61 Id. at 847-848.
62Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc. v. Picar, 155 Phil. 901, 907 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
63 766 Phil. 504 (2015) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].
64 Id. at 515.
65Rollo, pp. 400-404.
66Gadrinab v. Salamanca, 736 Phil. 279, 290 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
67Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Pelagio, 766 Phil. 504, 512 (2015) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division] (citing Morla v. Belmonte, 678 Phil. 102, 116-117 (2011) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division]).
68Rollo, pp. 400-404.
69 Id. at 401-402.
70 Id. at 405.
71 Id. at 407-408.
72 Id. at 408.
73G.R. No. 204262, June 7, 2017, [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
74 Id. citing Career Philippine Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Serna, 700 Phil. 1, 9-10 (2012) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
75See Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. v. Salazar, 716 Phil. 693, 705 (2013) [Per Sereno, C.J., First Division].
76 POEA Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels (2000), sec. 32-A.
77 POEA Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels (2000), sec. 32-A (11).
78Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 342 Phil. 352, 365 (1997) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third Division].
79Rollo, pp. 141-142.
80 Id. at 131.
81 Id. at 140-141.
82Maya Farms Employees Organization v. National Labor Relations Commission, 309 Phil. 465, 470 (1994) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].