SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 209969, September 27, 2017
JOSE SANICO AND VICENTE CASTRO, Petitioners, v. WERHERLINA P. COLIPANO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners Jose Sanico (Sanico) and Vicente Castro (Castro), assailing the Decision2 dated September 30, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 01889. The CA affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated October 27, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Danao City (RTC) which found Sanico and Castro liable for breach of' contract of carriage and awarded actual and compensatory damages for loss of income in favor of respondent Werherlina P. Colipano (Colipano). The CA reduced the compensatory damages that the RTC awarded.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the defendants LIABLE for breach of contract of carriage and are solidarily liable to pay plaintiff:Only Sanico and Castro appealed to the CA, which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:No costs.
- Actual damages in the amount of P2,098.80; and
- Compensatory damages for loss of income in the amount of P360,000.00.
SO ORDERED.16
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated October 27, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Danao City, in Civil Case No. DNA-418, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award for compensatory damages for loss of income in paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the RTC's decision, is reduced to P200,000.00.Without moving for the reconsideration of the CA Decision, Sanico and Castro filed this petition before the Court assailing the CA Decision.
SO ORDERED.17
Issues
- Whether the CA erred in finding that Sanico and Castro breached the contract of carriage with Colipano;
- Whether the Affidavit of Desistance and Release of Claim is binding on Colipano; and
- Whether the CA erred in the amount of damages awarded.
The complaint against Caccam was therefore properly dismissed. He was not a party to the contract; he was a mere employee of the BAL. The parties to that contract are Juana Soberano, the passenger, and the MRR and its subsidiary, the BAL, the bus owner and operator, respectively; and consequent to the inability of the defendant companies to carry Juana Soberano and her baggage arid personal effects securely and safely to her destination as imposed by law (art. 1733, in relation to arts. 1736 and 1755, N.C.C.), their liability to her becomes direct and immediate.19Since Castro was not a party to the contract of carriage, Colipano had no cause of action against him and the pomplaint against him should be dismissed. Although he was driving the jeepney, he was a mere employee of Sanico, who was the operator and owner of the jeepney. The obligation to carry Colipano safely to her destination was with Sanico. In fact, the elements of a contract of carriage existeid between Colipano and Sanico: consent, as shown when Castro, as employee of Sanico, accepted Colipano as a passenger when he allowed Colipano to board the jeepney, and as to Colipano, when she boarded the jeepney; cause or consideration, when Colipano, for her part, paid her fare; and, object, the transportation of Colipano from the place of departure to the place of destination.20
ART. 1733. Common carriers, fijpm the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bbund to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.This extraordinary diligence, following Article 1755 of the Civil Code, means that common carriers have the obligation to carry passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735 and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in Articles 1755 and 1756.
For the driver, Vicente Castro, to allow a seat extension made of an empty case of beer clearly indicates lack of prudence. Permitting Werherlina to occupy an improvised seat in the rear portion of the jeepney, with a child on her lap to boot, exposed her and her child in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. The use of an improvised seat extension is undeniable, in view of the testimony of plaintiffs witness, which is consistent with Werherlina's testimonial assertion. Werherlina and her witness's testimony were accorded belief by the RTC. Factual findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons, because the trial court ip in a better position to examine the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.25The CA also correctly held that the!defense of engine failure, instead of exonerating Sanico, only aggravated his already precarious position.26 The engine failure "hinted lack of regular check and maintenance to ensure that the engine is at its best, considering that the jeepney regularly passes through a mountainous area."27 This failure to ensure that the jeepney can safely transport passengers through its route which required navigation through a mountainous area is proof of fault on Sanico's part. In the face of such evidence, there is no question as to Sanico's fault or negligence.
ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.In Magat v. Medialdea,28 the Court ruled: "The phrase 'in any manner contravene the tenor' of the obligation includes any illicit act or omission which impairs the strict and faithful fulfillment of the obligation and every kind of defective performance."29 There is no question here that making Colipano sit on the empty beer case was a clear showing of how Sanico contravened the tenor of his obligation to safely transport Colipano from the place of departure to the place of destination as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, and with due regard for all the circumstances.
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.The only defenses available to common carriers are (1) proof that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Article 1756,31 and (2) following Article 1174 of the Civil Code, proof that the injury or death was brought about by an event which "could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable," or a fortuitous event.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Finally, We sustain the RTC's finding that the affidavit of desistance and release of claim, offered by defendants-appellants, are not binding on Werherlina, quoting with approval its reflection on the matter, saying:The Court finds no reason to depart from these findings of the CA and the RTC.xxx this Court finds that the Affidavit of Desistance and Release of Claim is not binding on plaintiff in the absence of proof that the contents thereof were sufficiently explained to her. It is clear from the plaintiffs circumstances that she is not able to understand English, more so stipulations stated in the said Affidavit and Release. It is understandable that in her pressing need, the plaintiff may have been easily convinced to sign the document with the promise that she will be compensated for her injuries.35
(1) that the person making the waiver possesses the right, (2) that he has the capacity and power to dispose of the right, (3) that the waiver must be clear and unequivocal although it may be made expressly or impliedly, and (4) that the waiver is not contrary to law, public policy, public order, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.36While the first two requirements can be said to exist in this case, the third and fourth requirements are, however, lacking.
It is a well-established rule that factual fill dings by the CA are conclusive on the parties and are not reviewable byj this Court. They are entitled to great weight and respect, even finality, especially when, as in this case, the CA affirmed the factual findings arrived at by the trial court.39Although there are exceptions to this rule,40 the exceptions are absent here.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy.43"[P]ublic policy refers to the aims of the state to promote the social and general well-being of the inhabitants."44 The Civil Code requires extraordinary diligence from common carriers because the nature of their business requires the public to put their safety and lives in the hands of these common carriers. The State imposes this extraordinary diligence to promote the well-being of the public who avail themselves of the services of common carriers. Thus, in instances of injury or death, a waiver of the right to claim damages is strictly construed against the common carrier so as not to dilute or weaken the public policy behind the required standard of extraordinary diligence.
[T]his Court can only award actual damages in the amount that is duly supported by receipts, that is, P2,098.80 mid not P7,277.80 as prayed for by plaintiff as there is no basis for the amount prayed for. However, considering that plaintiff has suffered the loss of one leg which has caused her to be limited in her movement thus resulting in loss of livelihood, she is entitled to compensatory damages for lost income at the rate of P12,000.00/year for thirty years in the amount of P360,000.00.49The CA, on the other hand, modified the award of the RTC by reducing the compensatory damages from P360,000.00 to P200,000.00, thus:
By virtue of their negligence, defendants-appellants are liable to pay Werheiiina compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity. In arriving at the proper amount, the Supremip Court has consistently used the following formula:Sanico argues that Colipano failed to present documentary evidence to support her age and her income, so that her testimony is self-serving and that there was no basis for the award of compensatory damages in her favor.51 Sanico is gravely mistaken.Net Earning CapacityBased on the stated formula, the damages due to Werherlina for loss of earning capacity is:=Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income - Living Expenses (50% of gross annual income)]where life expectancy=2/3 (80 - the age of the deceased).Net Earning CapacityThe award of the sum of P200,000.00 as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity is in order, notwithstanding the objections of defendants-appellants with respect to lack of evidence on Werherlina's age and annual income.50=[2/3 x (80-30)] x (P12,000.00 x (50%)=(2/3 x 50) x P6,000.00=33.33 x P6,000.00=P200,000.00
"Self-serving evidence" is not to be taken literally to mean any evidence that serves its proponent's interest. The term, if used with any legal sense, refers only to acts or declarations made by a party in his own interest at some place and time out of court, and it does not include testimony that he gives as a witness in court. Evidence of this sort is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is, lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party and on the consideration that its admission would open the door to fraud and fabrication. In contrast, a party's testimony in court is sworn and subject to cross-examination by the other party, and therefore, not susceptible to an objection on the ground that it is self-serving.53Colipano was subjected to cross-examination and both the RTC and CA believed her testimony on her age and annual income. In fact, as these are questions of facts, these findings of the RTC and CA are likewise binding on the Court.54
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.55The CA applied the correct formula for computing the loss of Colipano's earning capacity:
Net earning capacity = Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income - Living Expenses (50% of gross annual income)], where life expectancy = 2/3 (80-the age of the deceased).56However, the CA erred when it used Colipano's age at the time she testified as basis for computing the loss of earning capacity.57 The loss of earning capacity commenced when Colipano's leg was crushed on December 25, 1993. Given that Colipano was 30 years old when she testified on October 14, 1997, she was roughly 27 years old on December 25, 1993 when the injury was sustained. Following the foregoing formula, the net earning capacity of Colipano is P212,000.00.58
Endnotes:
** Per Special Order No. 2487 dated September 19, 2017.
1Rollo, pp. 13-122 (inclusive of Annexes).
2 Id. at 37-49. Penned by Associate Justice Pamela Ann Abella Maxino, with Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy concurring.
3 Id. at 50-56. Penned by Presiding Judge Sylva G. Aguirre-Paderanga.
4 Id. at 57-63 (inclusive of Annexes).
5 Id. at 57.
6 Id. at 50, 58.
7 Id. at 58.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 59.
11 See id. at 64, 66.
12 Id. at 66.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 66-67.
15 Id. at 67.
16 Id. at 56.
17 Id. at 48-49.
18 124 Phil. 1330 (1966).
19 Id. at 1336.
20 See Peralta de Guerrero v. Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc., 106 Phil. 485, 487 (1959).
21 CIVIL CODE, Art. 1756.
22 388 Phil. 146 (2000).
23 Id. at 149, 153.
24 Id. at 153.
25Rollo, p. 45.
26 See id.
27 Id.
28 206 Phil. 341 (1983).
29 Id. at 349, citing Arriela v. National Rice and Corn Corp., 119 Phil. 339, 347 (1964).
30Rollo, pp. 25-26.
31 CIVIL CODE, Art. 1756.
32 See rollo, p. 52.
33 Id. at 67.
34 Id. at 55.
[35 Id. at 47-48.
36 Eduardo P. Caguioa, COMMENTS AND CASES ON CIVIL LAW CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. 1 (1967 3rd Ed.), p. 13.
37 See British Airways v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 379, 390 (1998), citing Meneses v. Court of Appeals, 316 Phil. 210, 222 (1995).
38 682 Phil. 343 (2012).
39 Id. at 353, citing Cebu Shipyard & Eng'g Works, Inc. v. William Lines, Inc., 366 Phil. 439, 451 (1999), further citing Meneses v. Court of Appeals, supra note 37; Tay Chun Suy v. Court of Appeals, 299 Phil. 162, 168 (1994); First Philippine International Bank v. CA, 322 Phil. 280, 319. and 335-337 (1996); Fortune Motors (Phils.) Corp. v. CA, 335 Phil. 315, 330 (1997).
40 See Medina v. Asistio, Jr., 269 Phil. 225, 232 (1990).
41 280 Phil. 137 (1991).
42Rollo, p. 48.
43 Supra note 41, at 144-145; italics in original, emphasis supplied.
44 Caguioa, supra note 36, at 14.
45 See rollo, pp. 47-48, 55.
46 Id.
47 CIVIL CODE, Art. 1409 (1).
48 Id.
49Rollo, pp. 55-56.
50 Id. at 45-46.
51 Id. at 20-23.
52 533 Phil. 57 (2006).
53 Id. at 68; emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted.
54Philippine National Railways Corp. v. Vizcara, supra note 38, at 353.
55Serra v. Mumar, 684 Phil. 363, 374 (2012); citations omitted.
56Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corp. v. Borja, 432 Phil. 913, 924 (2002).
57 See rollo, p. 46.
58 Computed as follows:
Net Earning Capacity =Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income - Living Expenses (50% of gross annual incoriie)], where life expectancy = 2/3 (80 - the age of the deceased) =[2/3 x (80 - 27)] x (P12,000.00 x 50%) =(2/3 x 53) x P6,000.00 =35.33 x P6,000.00 =P212,000.00
59 Actual or Compensatory Damages, Arts. 2199 to 2215.
60 304 Phil. 236 (1994).
61 Id. at 253; italics in original.
62 Id. at 254.
63 716 Phil. 267 (2013).