THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 204288, November 08, 2017
DEMEX RATTANCRAFT, INC. AND NARCISO T. DELA MERCED, Petitioners, v. ROSALIO A. LERON, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
To justify the dismissal of an employee based on abandonment of work, there must be a showing of overt acts clearly evidencing the employee's intention to sever the employer employee relationship.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the February 9, 2012 Decision2 and October 25, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA GR. SP No. 109077. The assailed judgments reversed the Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission, which found that respondent Rosalio A. Leron's (Leron) dismissal was for a just cause.
In 1980, Leron was hired as a weaver by Demex Rattancraft, Inc. (Demex), a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing handcrafted rattan products for local sale and export.4 Narciso T. Dela Merced was Demex's president.5
Leron was paid on a piece-rate basis6 and his services were contracted through job orders.7 He worked from Monday to Saturday. However, there were times when he was required to work on Sundays.8 Leron received his wages at the end of every week but he never received standard benefits such as 13th month pay, service incentive leave, rest day pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay.9
Sometime in June 2006, Leron was dismissed by Demex's foreman, Marcelo Viray (Viray), and Demex's personnel manager, Nora Francisco (Francisco). Both accused him of instigating a campaign to remove Viray as the company's foreman.10 Before Leron was dismissed from service, he was given a memorandum stating that the dining chair he had previously weaved11 for export to Japan was rejected. For this reason, Demex expressed that it would no longer avail of his services.12
On June 28, 2006, Leron did not report for work.13 The next day, he filed a complaint against Demex for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of Quezon City. This case was docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-06-05490-06.14
Meanwhile, Demex construed Leron's failure to report to work as an absence without leave. On July 3, 2006, Demex sent Leron a notice requiring him to return to work on July 5, 2006. This was personally served to Leron by one (1) of his co-employees. On July 7, 2006, Demex sent another notice to Leron requiring him to report to work.15 Despite having received these two (2) notices, Leron did not resume his post. On July 12, 2006, Leron received a third notice from Demex informing him of its decision to terminate his services on the ground of abandonment.16
On August 3, 2006, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the illegal dismissal case without prejudice on the ground of improper venue.17 Leron refiled his complaint before the Labor Arbiter of San Fernando City, Pampanga. This case was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB III 09-10461-06.18
In his Decision19 dated July 30, 2007, Labor Arbiter Leandro M. Jose (Labor Arbiter Jose) dismissed the complaint holding that Leron's termination from employment was valid. However, Demex was ordered to pay 13th month pay amounting to P5,833.00.20
Leron appealed Labor Arbiter Jose's July 30, 2007 Decision before the National Labor Relations Commission. This was docketed as LAC No. 06-002057-08.21
On January 30, 2009, the National Labor Relations Commission rendered a Resolution22 affirming the Decision of Labor Arbiter Jose but awarded Leron P5,000.00 as nominal damages for Demex's non-compliance with procedural due process.23 The National Labor Relations Commission declared that Leron's absence was a valid ground to terminate him from employment.24 Leron moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied in the Resolution dated March 16, 2009.25
Leron filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court26 before the Court of Apfeals assailing the Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission.27
In its Decision28 dated February 9, 2012, the Court of Appeals found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission when it declared that Leron abandoned his work. According to the Court of Appeals, Demex failed to establish the elements constituting abandonment. There was no clear intention on the part of Leron to sever the employer-employee relationship because he filed an illegal dismissal case immediately after he was dismissed by Viray and Francisco. Aside from this, the Court of Appeals ascribed bad faith on Demex and held that its act of sending return-to-work notices was merely an afterthought.29
Accordingly, the assailed Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission were reversed and set aside. Demex was ordered to pay Leron accrued backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement due to the strained relations between the parties.30 The Court of Appeals also deleted the award of nominal damages. The dispositive portion of its Decision stated:
WHEREFORE, the petition is Granted. The assailed Resolutions, dated January 30, 2009 and March 16, 2009, of the Public Respondent National Labor Relations Commission, in NLRC LAC NO. 06-002057-08 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring Petitioner's dismissal illegal, thus:Demex moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied in the Resolution32 dated October 25, 2012.This case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of
- Private Respondent Demex is ordered to pay Petitioner backwages, separation pay and P5,833.00 as proportionate 13th month pay for the year 2006.
- The awarded nominal damages in the amount of P5,000.00 is deleted.
Petitioner's accrued backwages and separation pay.
SO ORDERED.31 (Emphasis in the original)
Article 297. Termination by Employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:Although abandonment of work is not expressly enumerated as a just cause under Article 297 of the Labor Code, jurisprudence has recognized it as a form of or akin to neglect of duty.48
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and (e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
In the instant case, we agree with the finding of the Labor Arbiter that the respondents were able to discharge their burden of proving the validity of the dismissal of the complainant. As borne by the records, the complainant stopped reporting for work beginning June 28, 200[6]. Although he claims that he was not allowed to work on that day, he admitted having received the notices sent by the respondents for him to go back to work. He also failed to justify or offer good reason for ignoring such return[-]to[-]work notices. Thus, the respondents promptly acted in considerinhim [Absent Without Leave], which is a just ground for his dismissal.54The National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that respondent's absence from work is a valid ground for his dismissal.
Furthennore, it must be stressed that abandonment of work does not per se sever the employer-employee relationship. It is merely a fonn of neglect of duty, which is in turn a just cause for tennination of employment. The operative act that will ultimately put an end to this relationship is the dismissal of the employee after complying with the procedure prescribed by law.66 (Emphasis supplied)The employer has the burden of proving that an employee's dismissal from service was for a just or authorized cause.67 Having failed to clearly establish that respondent abandoned his work, this Court denies the petition and affirms the Court of Appeals' finding that respondent was illegally dismissed from employment
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 7-29.
2 Id. at 30-40. The Decision was penned by then Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo F. Barza and Edwin D. Sorongon of the Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3 Id. at 41-42. The Re olution was penned by then Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo F. Barza and Edwin D. Sorongon of the Former Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4 Id. at 31.
5 Id. at 10.
6 Id. at 31.
7 Id. at 12.
8 Id. at 31.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 263.
13 Id. at 13.
14 Id. at 101-101-A.
15 Id. at 13-14.
16 Id. at 14.
17 Id. at 32.
18 Id. at 102-102-A.
19 Id. at 89-95.
20 Id. at 94-95.
21 Id. at 84.
22 Id. at 84-87. The attached Resolution is incomplete. The Resolution dated January 30, 2009 was penned by Commissioner Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III of the Third Division, National Labor Relations Commission.
23 Id. at 86.
24 Id. at 85-86.
25 Id. at 96-97. The Resolution was penned by Commissioner Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. and concurred in by Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III.
26 Id. at 30,
27 Id. at 15.
28 Id. at 30-40.
29 Id. at 35-38.
30 Id. at 38-39.
31 Id. at 39.
32 Id. at 41-42.
33 Id. at 7-29.
34 Id. at 209-213.
35 Id. at 215-221.
36 Id. at 222-222-A.
37 Id. at 224-241.
38 Id. at 246-262.
39 Id. at 227-236.
40 Id. at 232-235.
41 Id. at 256.
42 Id. at 253-257.
43 RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1.
44Pascual v. Burgos, G.R. No. 171722, January 11, 2016, 778 SCRA 189, 204 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
45 Id. at 206.
46 Id. at 204-205.
47 Id. at 205-206 citing Medina v. Asistio. Jr., 269 Phil. 225 (1990) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division].
48Stanley Fine Furniture v. Gallano, 748 Phil. 624, 638 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
49Flores v. Nuestro, 243 Phil. 712, 715 (1988) [Per J. Yap, Second Division] citing Capital Garment Corporation v. Ople, 202 Phil. 797 (1982) [Per J. De Castro, Second Division].
50Pare v. National Labor Relations Commission, 376 Phil. 288, 292 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
51 Id.
52Rollo, pp. 85-86.
53 Id. at 93-94. The Labor Arbiter Decision mentioned "July 7, 2008" but meant "July 7, 2006."
54 Id. at 85-86.
55Pare v. National Labor Relations Commission, 376 Phil. 288, 292 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
56Kams lntcmational, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 373 Phil. 950, 958 (1999) [Per J. Belosillo, Second Division] citing De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor, and/or Milagros Chuakay and William Go v. National Labor Relations Commission, 364 Phil. 91 (1999) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
57 Id.
58Rollo, pp. 227-236.
59 Id. at 13 and 31.
60 Id. at 17.
61 Id. at 13.
62 Id. at 32.
63 Id. at 226-228.
64King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac, 553 Phil. 108, 115-117 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Second Division].
65 373 Phil. 950 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
66 Id. at 959.
67See Polymedic General Hospital v. National Labor Relations Commission, 219 Phil. 385 (1985) [Per J. Relova, First Division]; Austria v. National Labor Relations Commission, 369 Phil. 557, 565 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].