THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 195878, January 10, 2018
MAGSAYSAY MITSUI OSK MARINE, INC., KOYO MARINE, CO. LTD., AND CONRADO DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, v. OLIVER G. BUENAVENTURA, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
MARTIRES, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the 18 March 2010 Decision1 and the 28 February 2011 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 109150 which reversed and set aside the 19 January 2009 Resolution3 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC affirmed the 30 May 2008 Decision[4 of the Labor Arbiter (LA).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit.
All other claims are likewise denied for want of any basis.9
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in its entirety.10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolutions dated January 19, 2009 and March 23, 2009 rendered by the NLRC are SET ASIDE. Private respondents are ORDERED to pay petitioner the following amounts:
1) Seventy-Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty US Dollars (US$78,750.00) as permanent and total disability benefits; 2) Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php30,000.00) as nominal damages; and 3) Attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.[12
I
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS, REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN AWARDING FULL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS TO THE RESPONDENT DESPITE THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT WAS DECLARED FIT TO WORK BY THE COMPANY-DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN. THE FINDINGS OF THE COMPANY-DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN SHOULD BE GIVEN WEIGHT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASES OF MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORP. ET AL. V. VELASQUEZ, (G.R. No. 179802, 14 NOVEMBER 2008) AND MARCIANO L. MASANGCAY V. TRANS-GLOBAL MARITIMIE AGENCY, INC. AND VENTONOR NAVIGATION, INC., (G.R. No. 172800, 17 OCTOBER 2008);13II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS, REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN CONSIDERING THAT MR. OLIVER BUENAVENTURA IS TOTALLY AND PERMANENTLY DISABLED BECAUSE HE WAS ALLEGEDLY SICK OR UNABLE TO WORK FOR MORE THAN 240 DAYS DESPITE THE FACT THAT (1) POEA CONTRACT MEASURES DISABILITY BENEFITS IN TERMS OF GRADING AND NOT BY DAYS; AND (2) RESPONDENT WAS DECLARED FIT TO WORK WITHIN 240 DAYS;14 ANDIII
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS, REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AWARDED NOMINAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES DESPITE ABSENCE OF BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF PETITIONERS IN DENYING RESPONDENT'S MONEY CLAIMS.15
The glaring disparity between the findings of the petitioners' designated physicians and Dr. Vicaldo calls for the intervention of a third independent doctor, agreed upon by petitioners and Simbajon. In this case, no such third-party physician was ever consulted to settle the conflicting findings of the first two sets of doctors. After being informed of Dr. Vicaldo's unfit-to-work findings, Simbajon proceeded to file his complaint for disability benefits with the LA. This move totally disregarded the mandated procedure under the POEA-SEC requiring the referral of the conflicting medical opinions to a third independent doctor for final determination. Dr. Vicaldo, too, is a medical practitioner not unknown to this Court, as he has issued certifications in several disability claims that proved unsuccessful.
In Philippine Hammonia, we have ruled that the duty to secure the opinion of a third doctor belongs to the employee asking for disability benefits. We explained:The filing of the complaint constituted a breach of Dumadag's contractual obligation to have the conflicting assessments of his disability referred to a third doctor for a binding opinion. The petitioners could not have possibly caused the non-referral to a third doctor because they were not aware that Dumadag secured separate independent opinions regarding his disability.
Similarly, we note that Simbajon was the only one who knew of the conflicting results between Dr. Vicaldo's findings with that of the petitioners' designated physicians. The petitioners had no reason to consider a third doctor because they were not aware that Simbajon secured a separate independent opinion regarding his disability. Thus, the obligation to comply with the requirement of securing the opinion of a neutral, third-party physician rested on Simbajon's shoulders. By failing to observe the required procedure under the POEA-SEC, he clearly violated its terms, i.e., the law between the parties. And without a binding third-party opinion, the fit-to-work certification of petitioners' designated physicians prevails over that of Dr. Vicaldo's unfit-to-return-to-work finding.
Lastly, we have observed that Dr. Vicaldo only examined Simbajon once. We take this is in comparison with the series of tests and treatments made by Magsaysay's designated physicians to Simbajon. Between the two, the latter's medical opinion deserves more credence for being more thorough and exhaustive.19
In the instant case, respondent did not seek the opinion of a third doctor. Based on jurisprudence, the findings of the company-designated physician prevail in cases where the seafarer did not observe the third-doctor referral provision in the POEA-SEC. However, if the findings of the company-designated physician are clearly biased in favor of the employer, then courts may give greater weight to the findings of the seafarer's personal physician. Clear bias on the part of the company-designated physician may be shown if there is no scientific relation between the diagnosis and the symptoms felt by the seafarer, or if the final assessment of the company-designated physician is not supported by the medical records of the seafarer.21
An analysis of the cited jurisprudence reveals that the first set of cases did not award permanent and total disability benefits to seafarers whose medical treatment lasted for more than 120 days, but not exceeding 240 days, because (1) the company-designated physician opined that the seafarer required further medical treatment or (2) the seafarer was uncooperative with the treatment. Hence, in those cases, despite exceeding 120 days, the seafarer was still not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits. In such instance, Rule X, Section 2 of the IRR gave the company-designated physician additional time, up to 240 days, to continue treatment and make an assessment on the disability of the seafarer.
The second set of cases, on the other hand, awarded permanent and total disability benefits to seafarers whose medical treatment lasted for more than 120 days, but not exceeding 240 days, because the company-designated physician did not give a justification for extending the period of diagnosis and treatment. Necessarily, there was no need anymore to extend the period because the disability suffered by the seafarer was permanent. In other words, there was no indication that further medical treatment, up to 240 days, would address his total disability.
If the treatment of 120 days is extended to 240 days, but still no medical assessment is given, the finding of permanent and total disability becomes conclusive.
The above-stated analysis indubitably gives life to the provisions of the law as enunciated by Vergara. Under this interpretation, both the 120-day period under Article 192 (2) of the Labor Code and the extended 240-day period under Rule X, Section 2 of its IRR are given full force and effect. This interpretation is also supported by the case of C.F Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Taok, 37 where the Court enumerated a seafarer's cause of action for total and permanent disability, to wit:
(a) The company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary total disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days; (b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification being issued by the company-designated physician;
x x x x
Certainly, the company-designated physician must perform some significant act before he can invoke the exceptional 240-day period under the IRR. It is only fitting that the company-designated physician must provide a sufficient justification to extend the original 120-day period. Otherwise, under the law, the seafarer must be granted the relief of permanent and total disability benefits due to such non-compliance.
On the contrary, if we completely ignore the general 120-day period under the Labor Code and POEA-Contract and apply the exceptional 240-day period under the IRR unconditionally, then the IRR becomes absolute and it will render the law forever inoperable. Such interpretation is contrary to the tenets of statutory construction.
Summation
In summary, if there is a claim for total and permanent disability benefits by a seafarer, the following rules (rules) shall govern:
- The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
- If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;
- If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and
- If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.
The Court is not unmindful of the declaration in INC Shipmanagement that "[t]he extent of his disability (whether total or partial) is determined, not by the number of days that he could not work, but by the disability grading the doctor recognizes based on his resulting incapacity to work and earn his wages." Indeed, the disability benefits granted to the seafarer are not entirely dependent on the number of treatment lapsed days. The treatment period can be extended to 240 days if the company-designated physician provided some sufficient justification. Equally eminent, however, is the Court's pronouncement in the more recent case of Carcedo that "[t]he determination of the fitness of a seafarer for sea duty is the province of the company-designated physician, subject to the periods prescribed by law."24 (emphases and italics in the original)
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 14-36.
2 Id. at 53-56.
3 Id. at 172-175; penned by Commissioner Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr., and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III.
4 Id. at 178-186; penned by LA Romelita N. Rioflorido
5 Id. at 15.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 15-16.
8 Id. at 16.
9 Id. at 186.
10 Id. at 175.
11 Id. at 176-177.
12 Id. at 35-36.
13Rollo, p. 68.
14 Id. at 82.
15 Id. at 88.
16INC Navigation Co. Philippines Incorporated v. Rosales, 744 Phil. 774, 786-787 (2014) citing Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag, 712 Phil 507, 520 (2013) further citing Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC.
17Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dorchester Marine Ltd., 712 Phil. 507, 520 (2014).
19 Id. at 842-844.
20 G.R. No. 208215, 19 April 2017.
21 Id.
22Nonay v. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc., G.R. No. 206758, 17 February 2016, 784 SCRA 292, 323.
23 765 Phil. 341 (2015).
24 Id. at 361-363.