EN BANC
G.R. No. 205813, January 10, 2018
ALFREDO F. LAYA, JR., Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK AND RICARDO A. BALBIDO, JR., Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
An employee in the private sector who did not expressly agree to the terms of an early retirement plan cannot be separated from the service before he reaches the age of 65 years. The employer who retires the employee prematurely is guilty of illegal dismissal, and is liable to pay his backwages and to reinstate him without loss of seniority and other benefits, unless the employee has meanwhile reached the mandatory retirement age under the Labor Code, in which case he is entitled to separation pay pursuant to the terms of the plan, with legal interest on the backwages and separation pay reckoned from the finality of the decision.
On 1 June 2001, petitioner Alfredo F. Laya, Jr. was hired by respondent Philippine Veterans Bank as its Chief Legal Counsel with a rank of Vice President. Among others, the terms and conditions of his appointment are as follows; (sic)According to the petitioner, he was made aware of the retirement plan of respondent Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) only after he had long been employed and was shown a photocopy of the Retirement Plan Rules and Regulations,3 but PVB's President Ricardo A. Balbido, Jr. had told him then that his request for extension of his service would be denied "to avoid precedence."4 He sought the reconsideration of the denial of the request for the extension of his retirement,5 but PVB certified his retirement from the service as of July 1, 2007 on March 6, 2008.6"3. As a Senior Officer of the Bank, you are entitled to the following executive ben[e]fits:On the other hand, private respondent has its Retirement Plan Rules and Regulations which provides among others, as follows:
- Car Plan limit of P700,000.00, without equity on your part; a gasoline subsidy of 300 liters per month and subject further to The Car Plan Policy of the Bank.
- Membership in a professional organization in relation to your profession and/or assigned functions in the Bank.
- Membership in the Provident Fund Program/Retirement Program.
- Entitlement to any and all other basic and fringe benefits enjoyed by the officers; core of the Bank relative to Insurance covers, Healthcare Insurance, vacation and sick leaves, among others."
On 14 June, 2007, petitioner was informed thru letter by the private respondent of his retirement effective on 1 July 2007.ARTICLE IV
RETIREMENT DATES
Section 1. Normal Retirement. The normal retirement date of a Member shall be the first day of the month coincident with or next following his attainment of age 60.
Section 2. Early Retirement. A Member may, with the approval of the Board of Directors, retire early on the first day of any month coincident with or following his attainment of age 50 and completion of at least 10 years of Credited Service.
Section 3. Late Retirement. A Member may, with the approval of the Board of Directors, extend his service beyond his normal retirement date but not beyond age 65. Such deferred retirement shall be on a case by case and yearly extension basis.
On 21 June 2007 petitioner wrote Col. Emmanuel V. De Ocampo, Chairman of respondent bank, requesting for an extension of his tenure for two (2) more years pursuant to the Bank's Retirement Plan (Late Retirement).
On 26 June 2008, private respondent issued a memorandum directing the petitioner to continue to discharge his official duties and functions as chief legal counsel pending his request. However on 18 July 2007, petitioner was informed thru its president Ricardo A Balbido Jr. that his request for an extension of tenure was denied.2
WHEREFORE, the charge of illegal dismissal and money claims raised by the complainant, together with the counterclaim raised by the respondents are DISMISSED for lack of merit but by reason of a flaw in the denial of complainant's application for term extension as discussed above, the respondent bank is hereby ordered to pay the complainant the amount of 200,000.00 by way of reasonable (sic) indemnity.After his motion for reconsideration was denied,10 the petitioner appealed to the NLRC.11
Ricardo Balbido, Jr., is hereby dropped as party respondent.
SO ORDERED.9
WHEREFORE, premises considered the appeal of the complainant is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The appeal of respondents is GRANTED. The Decision below is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, deleting the award of indemnity to complainant.The petitioner assailed the ruling to the CA through certiorari.
SO ORDERED.13
Firstly, the mischief which the constitutional provision seeks to prevent, i.e., giving certain individuals, families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens, will not be present insofar as the Bank is concerned. As this Honorable Court observed in Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-NUBE vs. Philippine Veterans Bank -Through its comment, the OSG presents an opinion favorable to the position of the petitioner, opining upon the authority of Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit43 and Article 44 of the Civil Code44 that PVB is a public corporation created in the public interest, and a government instrumentality with juridical personality;45 hence, the law governing the petitioner's compulsory retirement age was Republic Act No. 8291, and the compulsory retirement age for him should be 65 years.46These stockholdings (of the veterans, widows, orphans or compulsory heirs) do not enjoy any special immunity over and above shares of stock in any other corporation, which are always subject to the vicissitudes of business. Their value may appreciate or decline or the stocks may become worthless altogether. Like any other property, they do not have a fixed but a fluctuating price. Certainly, the mere acceptance of these shares of stock by the petitioners did not create any legal assurance from the Government that their original value would be preserved and that the owners could not be deprived of such property under any circumstance no matter how justified.Secondly, the obvious legislative intent is "to give meaning and realization to the constitutional mandate to provide immediate and adequate care, benefits and other forms of assistance to war veterans and veterans of military campaigns, their surviving spouses and orphans" Article XVI, Section 7 of the Constitution states:Section 7. The State shall provide immediate and adequate care, benefits and other forms of assistance to war veterans and veterans of military campaigns, their surviving spouses and orphans. Funds shall be provided therefor and due consideration shall be given them in the disposition of agricultural lands of the public domain and, in appropriate cases, in the utilization of natural resources.The creation of Veterans Bank through Republic Act Nos. 3518 and 7169 should therefore be taken in conjunction and harmonized with Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution. The predilection of the said Republic Acts towards the welfare of the veterans, their widows, orphans or compulsory heirs is supported by no less than a constitutional provision. That Republic Act Nos. 3518 and 7169 do not fall within the proscription against the creation of private corporations is readily apparent from the fact that in both laws, the intendment of the legislature is that Veterans Bank will eventually be operated, managed and exist under the general laws, i.e., Corporation Code and General Banking Act. The mere circumstance that the charter was granted directly by Congress does not signify that only Congress can modify or abrogate it by another enactment.
Thirdly, the following mandate of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7169 had been accomplished:"The operations and changes in the capital structure of the Veterans Bank, as well as other amendments to its articles of incorporation and by-laws as prescribed under Republic Act No. 3518, shall be in accordance with the Corporation Code, the General Banking Act, and other related laws."Pursuant hereto, the Bank had registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under its certificate of incorporation/registration number 24681. It has its articles of incorporation and by-laws separate and distinct from the provisions of Republic Act Nos. 3518 and 7169. The manner by which the Bank's Board of Directors is to be organized and the Officers to be elected or appointed are stated in the by-laws. The latest Definitive Information Sheet of the Bank indicates that as of April 30, 2014, the total number of shareholders of record (common and preferred) is 383,852. There had been 25,303,869 common shares and 3,611,556 preferred shares issued, none of which belong to the government. It is thus operating under and by virtue of the Corporation Code and the General Banking Act.42
At the outset, the Court emphasizes that second and subsequent motions for reconsideration are, as a general rule, prohibited. Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides that "[n]o second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained." The rule rests on the basic tenet of immutability of judgments. "At some point, a decision becomes final and executory and, consequently, all litigations must come to an end."In short, the Court may entertain second and subsequent motions for reconsideration when the assailed decision is legally erroneous, patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. Under these circumstances, even final and executory judgments may be set aside because of the existence of compelling reasons.
The general rule, however, against second and subsequent motions for reconsideration admits of settled exceptions. For one, the present Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, particularly Section 3, Rule 15 thereof, provides:Sec. 3. Second motion for reconsideration. - The Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice" when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court's declaration.In a line of cases, the Court has then entertained and granted second motions for reconsideration "in the higher interest of substantial justice," as allowed under the Internal Rules when the assailed decision is "legally erroneous," "patently unjust" and "potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties." In Tirazona v. Philippine EDS Techno-Service, Inc. (PET, Inc.), we also explained that a second motion for reconsideration may be allowed in instances of "extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express leave shall have been obtained." In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines we allowed a second motion for reconsideration as the issue involved therein was a matter of public interest, as it pertained to the proper application of a basic constitutionally guaranteed right in the government's implementation of its agrarian reform program. In San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, the Court set aside the decisions of the LA and the NLRC that favored claimants-security guards upon the Court's review of San Miguel Corporation's second motion for reconsideration. In Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., the Court en banc reversed on a third motion for reconsideration the ruling of the Court's Division on therein private respondents' claim for wages and monetary benefits.
x x x x
It is also recognized that in some instances, the prudent action towards a just resolution of a case is for the Court to suspend rules of procedure, for "the power of this Court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the purposes of justice require it, cannot be questioned." In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, the Court, thus, explained:[T]he rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this liberality. This power to suspend or even disregard the rules can be so pervasive and encompassing so as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are now compelled to do in this case x x x.Consistent with the foregoing precepts, the Court has then reconsidered even decisions that have attained finality, finding it more appropriate to lift entries of judgments already made in these cases. In Navarro v. Executive Secretary, we reiterated the pronouncement in De Guzman that the power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared final. The Court then recalled in Navarro an entry of judgment after it had determined the validity and constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9355, explaining that:
x x x x
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the situation." x x x.Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall of entries of judgment in light of attendant extraordinary circumstances. The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared final. In this case, the compelling concern is not only to afford the movants-intervenors the right to be heard since they would be adversely affected by the judgment in this case despite not being original parties thereto, but also to arrive at the correct interpretation of the provisions of the [Local Government Code (LGC)] with respect to the creation of local government units. x x x.In Muñoz v. CA, the Court resolved to recall an entry of judgment to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This justification was likewise applied in Tan Tiac Chiang v. Hon. Cosico, wherein the Court held that:The recall of entries of judgments, albeit rare, is not a novelty. In Muñoz v. CA, where the case was elevated to this Court and a first and second motion for reconsideration had been denied with finality, the Court, in the interest of substantial justice, recalled the Entry of Judgment as well as the letter of transmittal of the records to the Court of Appeals.In Barnes v. Judge Padilla, we ruled:[A] final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. (Citations omitted; underscoring supplied)49
Coming now to the ownership of the Bank, we find it is not a government bank, as claimed by the petitioners. The fact is that under Section 3(b) of its charter, while 51% of the capital stock of the Bank was initially fully subscribed by the Republic of the Philippines for and in behalf of the veterans, their widows, orphans or compulsory heirs, the corresponding shares of stock were to be turned over within 5 years from the organization by the Bank to the said beneficiaries who would thereafter have the right to vote such common shares. The balance of about 49% was to be divided into preferred shares which would be opened for subscription by any recognized veteran, widow, orphans or compulsory heirs of said veteran at the rate of one preferred share per veteran, on the condition that in case of failure of any particular veteran to subscribe for any preferred share of stock so offered to him within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of notice, said share of stock shall be available for subscription to other veterans in accordance with such rules or regulations as may be promulgated by the Board of Directors. Moreover, under Sec. 6(a), the affairs of the Bank are managed by a board of directors composed of eleven members, three of whom are ex officio members, with the other eight being elected annually by the stockholders in the manner prescribed by the Corporation Law. Significantly, Sec. 28 also provides as follows:Anent whether PVB was a government or a private entity, therefore, we declare that it is the latter. The foregoing jurisprudential pronouncement remains to be good law, and should be doctrinal and controlling.Sec. 28. Articles of incorporation. - This Act, upon its approval, shall be deemed and accepted to all legal intents and purposes as the statutory articles of incorporation or Charter of the Philippine Veterans' Bank; and that, notwithstanding the provisions of any existing law to the contrary, said Bank shall be deemed registered and duly authorized to do business and operate as a commercial bank as of the date of approval of this Act.This point is important because the Constitution provides in its Article IX-B, Section 2(1) that "the Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters." As the Bank is not owned or controlled by the Government although it does have an original charter in the form of R.A. No. 3518, it clearly does not fall under the Civil Service and should be regarded as an ordinary commercial corporation. Section 28 of the said law so provides. The consequence is that the relations of the Bank with its employees should be governed by the labor laws, under which in fact they have already been paid some of their claims.53 (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Section 8. Transitory Provisions. - Without requiring new capital infusion either from the Government or from outside investigators, the Filipino veterans of World War II who are real owners-stockholders of the Veterans Bank shall cause the said bank to have at least Seven hundred fifty million pesos (P750,000,000.00) in total unimpaired capital accom1ts prior to reopening pursuant to this Act as a commercial bank.With the Government having no more stake in PVB, there is no justification for the insistence of the petitioner that PVB "is a public corporation masquerading as a private corporation."58
It is hereby provided that the Board of Trustees of the Veterans of World War II (BTVWW II) created under Republic Act No. 3518 is hereby designated as trustee of all issued but undelivered shares of stock.
In St. Martin Funeral Home[s] v. NLRC, it was held that the special civil action of certiorari is the mode of judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC either by this Court and the Court of Appeals, although the latter court is the appropriate forum for seeking the relief desired "in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts" and that, in the exercise of its power, the Court of Appeals can review the factual findings or the legal conclusions of the NLRC. The contrary rule in Jamer was thus overruled.62There is now no dispute that the CA can make a determination whether the factual findings by the NLRC or the Labor Arbiter were based on the evidence and in accord with pertinent laws and jurisprudence.
While administrative findings of fact are accorded great respect, and even finality when supported by substantial evidence, nevertheless, when it can be shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, this Court had not hesitated to reverse their factual findings. Factual findings of administrative agencies are not infallible and will be set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness.64The review of the findings of the CA becomes more compelling herein, inasmuch as it appears that the CA did not appreciate the fact that the retirement plan was not the sole prerogative of the employer, and that the petitioner was automatically made a member of the plan. Upon reviewing the resolution by the NLRC, the CA simply concluded that the petitioner's acceptance of the employment offer had carried with it his acquiescence, which implied his knowledge of the plan, thus:
This Court finds petitioner's argument to be misplaced. It must be stressed that when petitioner was appointed as Chief Legal Officer on 01 June 2001 among the terms and conditions of his employment is the membership in the Provident Fund Program/Retirement Program. Worthy to note that when petitioner accepted his appointment as Chief Legal Officer, he likewise signified his conformity with the provisions of the Retirement Program considering that the same has already been in existence and effective since 1 January 1996, i.e. prior to his appointment. As such, this Court is not convinced that petitioner was not aware of the private respondent's retirement program.65The retirement of employees in the private sector is governed by Article 287 of the Labor Code:66
Art. 287. Retirement. Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.Under the provision, the employers and employees may agree to fix the retirement age for the latter, and to embody their agreement in either their collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) or their employment contracts. Retirement plans allowing employers to retire employees who have not yet reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years are not per se repugnant to the constitutional guaranty of security of tenure, provided that the retirement benefits are not lower than those prescribed by law.67
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: Provided, however, That an employee's retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those provided therein.
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay x x x x.
3. As a Senior Officer of the Bank, you are entitled to the following executive benefits:Obviously, the mere mention of the retirement plan in the letter of appointment did not sufficiently inform the petitioner of the contents or details of the retirement program. To construe from the petitioner's acceptance of his appointment that he had acquiesced to be retired earlier than the compulsory age of 65 years would, therefore, not be warranted. This is because retirement should be the result of the bilateral act of both the employer and the employee based on their voluntary agreement that the employee agrees to sever his employment upon reaching a certain age.69
- Car Plan limit of P700,000.00, without equity on your part; a gasoline subsidy of 300 liters per month and subject further to The Car Plan Policy of the Bank.
- Membership in a professional organization in relation to your profession and/or assigned functions in the Bank.
- Membership in the Provident Fund Program/Retirement Program.
- Entitlement to any and all other basic and fringe benefits enjoyed by the officers; core of the Bank relative to Insurance covers, Healthcare Insurance, vacation and sick leaves, among others.68
Acceptance by the employees of an early retirement age option must be explicit, voluntary, free, and uncompelled. While an employer may unilaterally retire an employee earlier than the legally permissible ages under the Labor Code, this prerogative must be exercised pursuant to a mutually instituted early retirement plan. In other words, only the implementation and execution of the option may be unilateral, but not the adoption and institution of the retirement plan containing such option. For the option to be valid, the retirement plan containing it must be voluntarily assented to by the employees or at least by a majority of them through a bargaining representative.72 (Bold emphasis supplied)Furthermore, the petitioner's membership in the retirement plan could not be justifiably attributed to his signing of the letter of appointment that only listed the minimum benefits provided to PVB's employees. Indeed, in Cercado, we have declared that the employee's consent to the retirement plan that came into being two years after the hiring could not be inferred from her signature on the personnel action forms accepting the terms of her job description, and compliance with the company policies, rules and regulations, to wit:
We also cannot subscribe to respondent's submission that petitioner's consent to the retirement plan may be inferred from her signature in the personnel action forms containing the phrase: "Employee hereby expressly acknowledges receipt of and undertakes to abide by tile provisions of his/her Job Description, Company Code of Conduct and such other policies, guidelines, rules and regulations the company may prescribe."A perusal of PVB's retirement plan shows that under its Article III all the regular employees of PVB were automatically admitted into membership, thus:
It should be noted that the personnel action forms relate to the increase in petitioner's salary at various periodic intervals. To conclude that her acceptance of the salary increases was also, simultaneously, a concurrence to the retirement plan would be tantamount to compelling her to agree to the latter. Moreover, voluntary and equivocal acceptance by an employee of an early retirement age option in a retirement plan necessarily connotes that her consent specifically refers to the plan or that she has at least read the same when she affixed her conformity thereto.73
Having thus automatically become a member of the retirement plan through his acceptance of employment as Chief Legal Officer of PVB,75 the petitioner could not withdraw from the plan except upon his termination from employment.ARTICLE III
MEMBERSHIP IN THE PLAN
Section 1. Eligibility at Effective Date. Any Employee of the Bank as of January 1, 1996 shall automatically be a Member of the Plan as of such date.
Section 2. Eligibility after Effective Date. Any person who becomes an Employee after January 1, 1996 shall automatically become a Member of the Plan on the date he becomes a regular permanent Employee, provided he is less than 55 years old as of such date.
Section 3. Continuation/Termination of Membership. Membership in the Plan shall be concurrent with employment with the Bank, and shall cease automatically upon termination of the Member's service with the Bank for any reason whatsoever.74 (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Article 279. Security of tenure. - In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.Considering that the petitioner's reinstatement is no longer feasible because of his having meanwhile reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years by June 11, 2012, he should be granted separation pay. In this regard, retirement benefits and separation pay are not mutually exclusive.84 The basis for computing the separation pay should accord with Section 4,85 Article III of PVB's retirement plan. Hence, his full backwages should be computed from July 18, 2007 - the date when he was illegally dismissed - until his compulsory retirement age of 65 years on June 11, 2012. Such backwages shall all be subject to legal interest of 12% per annum from July 18, 2007 until June 30, 2013, and then to legal interest of 6% interest per annum from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction, conformably with Nacar v. Gallery Frames.86
| Very truly yours, |
(SGD) | |
FELIPA G. BORLONGAN-ANAMA | |
Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
* No part due to his prior participation as the Solicitor General.
1Rollo, pp. 34-48; penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba, and concurred in by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario.
2 Id. at 35-37.
3 Id. at 7.
4 Id. at 8.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 10.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 37.
9 Id. at 40.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 42-43.
14 Supra note 1.
15 Id. at 45.
16 Id. at 45-46.
17 Id. at 46.
18 Id. at 46-47.
19 Id. at 51-52.
20 Id. at 56.
21 Id. at 57-66.
22 Id. at 57.
23 Id. at 57-58.
24 Id. at 106.
25 Id. at 126.
26 Id. at 108-124.
27 Id. at 110-111.
28 Id. at 111.
29 Id. at 152.
30 Id. at 154-A.
31 Id. at 233.
32 Section 3.Second Motion for Reconsideration. - The Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice" when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court's declaration. x x x
33Rollo, pp. 232-233.
34 Id. at 238-239.
35 Id. at 242.
36 Id. at 243.
37 Id. at 245.
38 Id. at 247-248.
39 Id. at 248-249.
40 Id. at 249.
41 Id. at 250.
42 Id. at 251-252.
43 G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011, 651 SCRA 146, 188.
44 Article 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member. (35a).
45Rollo, p. 276.
46 Id. at 290-293.
47 Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court.
48 G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117 & G.R. Nos. 186984-85 (Resolution), October 17, 2013, 707 SCRA 646.
49 Id. at 664-668.
50Jaculbe vs. Silliman University, G.R. No. 156934, March 16, 2007, 518 SCRA 445, 452.
51Cercado v. Uniprom, Inc., G.R. No. 188154, October 13, 2010, 633 SCRA 281, 290.
52 G.R. No. 67125, 82337, August 24, 1990, 189 SCRA 14.
53 Id. at 29-30.
54An Act to Rehabilitate the Philippine Veterans Bank Created Under Republic Act No. 3518, Providing the Mechanisms Therefor, And For Other Purposes.
55An Act Creating the Philippine Veterans Bank, And For Other Purposes.
56 Section 3 of R.A. No. 7169 states:Section 3. Operations and Changes in the Capital Structure of the Veterans Bank and other Amendments. - The operations and changes in the capital structure of the Veterans Bank, as well as other amendments to its articles of incorporation and by-laws as prescribed under Republic Act No. 3518, shall be in accordance with the Corporation Code, the General Banking Act, and other related laws.57 Sec. 4, R.A. No. 7169.
58Rollo, p. 27.
59 G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, 295 SCRA 494.
60 Id. at 509.
61Agustilo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142875, September 7, 2001, 364 SCRA 740.
62 Id. at 747.
63 G.R. No. 121439, January 25, 2000, 323 SCRA 258.
64 Id. at 270.
65Rollo, pp. 45-46.
66 Now Article 302, pursuant to Republic Act No. 10151 (See DOLE Department Advisory No. 01, series of 2015).
67Obusan v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 181178, July 26, 2010, 625 SCRA 542, 553.
68Rollo, p. 35.
69Robina Farms Cebu v. Villa, G.R. No. 175869, April 18, 2016; Paz v. Northern Tobacco Redrying, Co., Inc., G.R. No. 199554, February 18, 2015, 751 SCRA 99, 114.
70Cercado v. Uniprom, Inc., G.R. No. 188154, October 13, 2010, 633 SCRA 281, 289.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 290.
73 Id. at 290-291.
74 CA rollo, p. 122.
75 The appointment letter pertinently reads:Dear Atty. Laya,76 Section 3, Article I.
This is to inform your appointment as Chief Legal Officer with a rank of Vice President effective 01 June 2001 under the following terms and conditions:
1. Your appointment is on a regular status x x x:
x x x x
(CA Rollo, p. 160; bold emphasis supplied)
77 Section 1, Article I.
78 CA rollo, p. 129.
79Capili v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 120802, June 17, 1997, 273 SCRA 576, 588.
80Obusan v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 181178, July 26, 2010, 625 SCRA 542, 554.
81Jaculbe v. Silliman University, G.R. No. 156934, March 16, 2007, 518 SCRA 445, 450.
82Paz v. Northern Tobacco Redrying, Co., Inc., G.R. No. 199554, February 18, 2015, 751 SCRA 99, 115.
83 Now Article 294 pursuant to Republic Act No. 10151 (See DOLE Department Advisory No. 01, series of 2015).
84Goodyear Philippines, Inc. v. Angus, G.R. No. 185449, November 12, 2014, 740 SCRA 24, 38.
85 Section 4. Involuntary Separation Benefit. Any Member who is involuntarily separated from service by the Bank for any cause not due to his own fault, misconduct, negligence, or fraud, shall be entitled to receive a separation benefit computed in accordance with the retirement benefit formula described in Section 1 of this Article or the applicable termination benefit under existing laws whichever is greater. (CA Rollo, p. 124)
86 G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439, 457-458.
CARPIO, J.:
But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right. There must be proof of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The Court indulges every reasonable presumption against any waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.4 (Emphasis supplied)There is no showing here that petitioner has an actual intention to waive his constitutional right to security of tenure. Such intention to waive a fundamental constitutional right cannot be presumed but must be actually shown and established. The bar against any implied waiver is very high because this Court "indulges [in] every reasonable presumption against any waiver of fundamental constitutional rights." PVB has failed to surmount that high bar.
Endnotes:
1City Service Corp. Workers Union v. City Service Corporation, 220 Phil. 239, 242 (1985).
2 Id.
3People v. Espinosa, 456 Phil. 507, 518 (2003), citing People v. Nicandro, 225 Phil. 248 (1986), further citing People v. Caguioa, 184 Phil. 1 (1980); Chavez v. CA, 133 Phil. 661 (1968); Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 (1949).
4Lui v. Spouses Matillano, 413 Phil. 483, 512-513 (2004); Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 (1938); People v. Compacion, 414 Phil. 68 (2001).
5Abbott Laboratories, Philippines v. Alcaraz, 714 Phil. 510, 532-533, 534 (2013), citing Robinsons Galleria/Robinsons Supermarket Corporation v. Ranchez, 655 Phil. 133, 142 (2011).
LEONEN, J.:
[B]y accepting the employment offer of BDO, Sagaysay was deemed to have assented to all existing rules, regulations and policy of the bank, including the retirement plan. Likewise, he consented to the CBA between BDO and the National Union of Bank Employees Banco De Oro Chapter. Section 2 of Article XVII of the CBA provides that "[t]he Bank shall continue to grant retirement/gratuity pay . . . ." Notably, both the retirement plan and the CBA recognize that the bank has a continued and existing practice of granting the retirement pay to its employees.Petitioner Laya is not a weaker party that can claim ignorance of the implications of- what he is signing or agreeing to. As a lawyer, he is considered to be knowledgeable of the legal effects and ramifications of what he is signing or agreeing to.32 This is further emphasized by the position he was employed for: as Chief Legal Counsel. He was hired based on his legal prowess. In addition, as Chief Legal Counsel with a Vice President rank, the information regarding the retirement of employees was at his disposal; he cannot claim that the Retirement Plan Rules and Regulations were belatedly shown to him, and that its provisions should not apply to him. In all his years as an employee of Respondent Philippine Veterans Bank, he did not contest the provisions of the Retirement Plan Rules and Regulations, despite his knowledge that he was a member the Bank's retirement program.
Third, on June 1, 2009, BDO issued a memorandum regarding the implementation of its retirement program, reiterating that the normal retirement date was the first day of the month following the employee's sixtieth (60th) birthday. Similar to the case of Obusan, the memorandum was addressed to all employees and officers. By that time, Sagaysay was already an employee and he did not deny being informed of such memorandum.
For four years, from the time he was employed until his retirement, and having actual knowledge of the BDO retirement plan, Sagaysay had every opportunity to question the same, if indeed he knew it would not be beneficial to him. Yet, he did not express his dissent. As observed in Obusan, "[t]his deafening silence eloquently speaks of [his] lack of disagreement with its provisions."
Lastly, perhaps the most telling detail indicative of Sagaysay's assent to the retirement plan was his e-mails to the bank, dated July 27, 2010 and August 19, 2010. In these communications, albeit having been informed of his upcoming retirement, Sagaysay never opposed the company's compulsory age of retirement. In fact, he recognized that "the time has come that BDO Retirement Program will be implemented to those reaching the age of sixty (60)."
Glaringly, he even requested that his services be extended, at least until May 16, 2011, so that he could render five (5) years of service. Sagaysay's request reflects the late retirement option where an employee may be allowed by the bank to continue to work on a yearly extension basis beyond his normal retirement date. The late retirement option is embodied in the same retirement plan, of which, ironically, he claimed to be unaware. With such inconsistent stance, the Court can only conclude that Sagaysay was indeed notified and had accepted the provisions of the retirement plan. It was only when his request for late retirement was denied that he suddenly became oblivious to the said plan.31 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Endnotes:
1 Adm. Matter No. 10-4-20-SC, Rule 15, sec. 3.
2Rollo, p. 126.
3 Id. at 135-151.
4Ponencia, p. 12.
5 Id.
6 658 Phil. 156 (2011) [Per J, Carpio Morales, En Banc].
7 662 Phil. 572 (2011) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
8 663 Phil. 546 (2011) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc].
9 719 Phil. 680 (2013) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
10Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo, 403 Phil. 498, 511 (2000) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division]; Johnson & Johnson (Phils.) Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 856, 871-872 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Nunal v. Court of Appeals, 293 Phil. 28, 34-35 (1993) [Per J. Campos, Jr., Second Division]; Manning International Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 272-A Phil. 114, 120 (1991) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].
11Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo, 403 Phil. 498, 511 (2000) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
12De Leon v. Public Estates Authority, 640 Phil. 594, 611 (2010) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division]; Bongcac v. Sandiganbayan, 606 Phil. 48, 55-56 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
13 RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1.
14See Rules of Court. Rule 42, sec. 2:
Section 2. Form and Contents. — The petition shall . . . set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal[.] (Emphasis supplied)
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 43, sec. 3:
Section 3. Where to Appeal. — An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. (Emphasis supplied)
15See Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 171 (1996) [Per J. Romero, Second Division]. Adm. Matter No. Rule 3, sec. 2.
16Co v. Vargas, 676 Phil. 463, 471 (2011) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division], citing Development Bank of the Philippines v. Traders Royal Bank, 642 Phil. 547 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division], enumerated the exceptions:
[T]he Court enumerated the exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Court: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
17See Stamford Marketing Corp. et al. v. Josephine Julian, et al., 468 Phil. 34 (2004) [Per J. Quisimbing, Second Division]; Abalos v. Philex Mining Corporation, 441 Phil. 386 (2002) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
18Robb v. People, 68 Phil. 320, 326 (1939) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
19Matibag v. Benipayo, 429 Phil. 554, 578 (2002) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc], citing JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY 858 (1996), and People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) [Per J. Laurel, First Division].
20 Id.
21Ponencia, p. 20.
22 LABOR CODE, art. 287 provides:
Article 287. Retirement. Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: Provided, however, That an employee's retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those provided therein.
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term 'one-half (1/2) month salary' shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.
Retail, service and agricultural establishments or operations employing not more than ten (10) employees or workers are exempted from the coverage of this provision.
Violation of this provision is hereby declared unlawful and subject to the penal provisions under Article 288 of this Code.
23 Section 1 of the Retirement Plan Rules and Regulations provide that: "Section 1. Normal Retirement. The normal retirement date of a Member shall be the first day of the month coincident with or next following his attainment of age 60."
24 Section 3 of the Retirement Plan Rules and Regulations provide that: "Section 3. Late Retirement. A Member may, with the approval of the Board of Directors, extend his service beyond his normal retirement date but not beyond age 65. Such deferred retirement shall be on a case by case and yearly extension basis."
25Ponencia, p. 19.
26See Serra v. Court of Appeals, 299 Phil. 63 (1994) [Per J. Nocon, Second Division].
27Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 588, 598 (1996) [Per J. Francisco, Third Division].
28Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc. v. Sagaysay, 769 Phil. 897, 910-911 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
29 647 Phil. 603 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
30 769 Phil. 897 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
31 Id. at 910-911.
32See Saludo v. Security Bank Corporation, 647 Phil. 569 (2010) [Per J. Perez, First Division].