FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 215281, March 05, 2018
ROLANDO DE ROCA, Petitioner, v. EDUARDO C. DABUYAN, JENNIFER A. BRANZUELA, JENNYLYN A. RICARTE, AND HERMINIGILDO F. SABANATE, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the June 19, 2014 Decision2 and October 28, 2014 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing the Petition for Certiorari4 in CA-G.R. SP No. 127974 and denying herein petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,5 respectively.
Factual Antecedents
As found by the CA, the facts are as follows:
In 2012, private respondents filed a complaint6 for illegal dismissal against "RAF Mansion Hotel Old Management and New Management and Victoriano Ewayan." Later, private respondents amended the complaint and included petitioner Rolando De Roca as [co]-respondent. Summons was sent through registered mail to petitioner but it was returned.Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
Thereafter, a conference was set but only complainants attended. Thus, another summons was issued and personally served to petitioner by the bailiff of the NLRC as evidenced by the latter's return dated 14 March 2012. Despite service of summons, petitioner did not attend the subsequent hearings prompting the labor arbiter to direct private respondents to submit their position paper.
On 18 April 2012, private respondents submitted their position paper. On the same day, petitioner filed his motion to dismiss7 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He alleged that[,] while he [was] the owner of RAF Mansion Hotel building, the same [was being] leased by Victoriano Ewayan, the owner of Oceanics Travel and Tour Agency. Petitioner claims that Ewayan was the employer of private respondents, Consequently, he asserted that there was no employer-employee relationship between him and private respondents and the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction.
On 29 June 2012, the labor arbiter rendered a decision directing petitioner, among others, to pay backwages and other monetary award to private respondents. In said decision, the labor arbiter also denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. Petitioner received a copy of the decision on 3 August 2012.
On 4 September 2012, petitioner filed a petition8 for annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction before the NLRC. However, the petition was dismissed because it was also filed beyond the period allowed by the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. Petitioner sought reconsideration but the same was also denied.9
x x x [R]espondent Rolando De Roca surprisingly filed a "Motion to Dismiss" on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In substance, the motion is anchored on the alleged lack of employer-employee relationship between the parties thereto. In support thereof, respondent De Roca further alleged that it was rather the Oceanic Travel and Tour Agency and respondent Ewayan in whose favor respondent De Roca leased the subject Hotel, are the true employers of the complainants as evidenced by the Contract of Lease of Buildings (Annex "1" respondent's Motion to Dismiss).Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
Subsequent thereof [sic], complainants filed an Opposition with Motion to Implead (to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss), seeking, among others, that the corporation "Oceanic Travel and Tour Agency" be impleaded as additional respondent.
x x x x
Anent the Motion to Dismiss, Rule V, Sections 6 and 7 of the Revised 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure explicitly provide:'SECTION 6. MOTION TO DISMISS. - Before the date set for the mandatory conciliation and mediation conference, the respondent may file a motion to dismiss on grounds provided under Section 5, paragraph (a) hereof. Such motion shall be immediately resolve[d] by the Labor Arbiter through a written order. An order denying the motion to dismiss, or suspending its resolution until the final determination of the case, is not appealable.Clearly, respondent De Roca's Motion to Dismiss, having been filed long after the date set for the mandatory conference, should be dismissed on such ground being a prohibited pleading.
SECTION 7. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO FILE. - No motion to dismiss shall be allowed or entertained after the lapse of the period provided in Section 6 hereof.'
Corning now on [sic] the meat of the controversy, since respondents obviously failed to controvert the allegations by the complainants in their Position Papers accompanied with supporting evidence, We have no recourse but to accord them credence for being uncontradicted.
x x x x
Obviously, respondents had failed to discharge such burden.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgement is hereby rendered finding all the respondents liable for illegal dismissal.
Accordingly, all of them are hereby ordered to pay complainants their full backwages and other monetary claims computed from date of their dismissal up to the promulgation of this decision plus 10% of the total monetary award as attorney's fees.
x x x x
Lastly, the Motion to Dismiss is denied for being filed beyond the period allowed by the rules, thus, a prohibited pleading. Also, the Motion to implead Oceanic Travel and Tours Agency as additional respondent is denied for the same reason.
SO ORDERED.11
At the outset, We note that the issue raised by petitioner is imprecise because the NLRC did not rule on the propriety of finding petitioner liable to private respondents. It is obvious from the assailed resolution that the petition for annulment of judgment was denied because it was tiled after the lapse of the period presc1ibed under the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure and this is the issue that this Court will resolve.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the same via its October 28, 2014 Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition, which includes a prayer for injunctive relief against execution of the judgment pending appeal.
x x x x
Record shows that petitioner received the decision of the labor arbiter on 3 August 2012 but he filed his petition on 4 September 2012 or thirty-one days after such receipt. In this regard, the NLRC did not commit any error in denying the petition much more grave abuse of discretion. The rule is clear and the NLRC may not 'arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules which an precisely intended to assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor disputes.'
Similarly, the labor arbiter did not commit any grave abuse of discretion because he just observed the NLRC rules when he denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. x x x
In addition, We also cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion in the labor arbiter's resolution of the motion to dismiss in the decision itself. While this may seem peculiar, it must be emphasized that the motion to dismiss was filed at about the period when the case was about to be submitted for decision.
x x x x
In the case at bar, the inclusion of the denial of the motion to dismiss in the decision is not without justification. Petitioner not only failed to submit the motion to dismiss on time but also forfeited the right to submit his position paper because he did not attend the conference and subsequent hearings. Even if the labor arbiter denied the motion to dismiss in a separate order, petitioner would still be precluded from submitting a position paper where he can buttress his claim of lack of jurisdiction. The labor arbiter, therefore, could not be said to have committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss and in incorporating its order in the decision.
x x x x
As regards the claim of petitioner on the merits of his ground, We cannot consider his arguments and assume that his allegation of lack of employer-employment [sic] relationship between him and private respondents is true. First, he did not present any evidence to support his claim because he lost the opportunity to submit a position paper. Thus, his allegations will remain mere allegations.
Second, it would transgress fairness if his allegations in this petition should be given any attention because the private respondents never had the [opportunity to] present evidence to meet his claims. Private respondents' arguments were correctly centered on the provisions of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure because they were the bases for the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss and petition for annulment of judgment.
Furthermore, petitioner did not submit the position paper of private respondents where We can find their averments on the employment relationship between them and petitioner or lack thereof. This omission not only rendered useless the evaluation of the asseverations in the petition but also gave Us another reason to dismiss this petition under Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner is well-aware that this pleading is material to the resolution of his petition and in neglecting to attach the same to his petition, the same would warrant the dismissal of this petition.
Lastly, the ultimate aim of petitioner is for Us to review the findings of the labor arbiter on the employment relationship between him and the private respondents. 'The basic issue of whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case resolves itself into the question of whether an employer-employee relationship existed' between them. Thus, it is an issue which necessitates presentation of evidence on the part of petitioner and evaluation of the pieces of evidence of each party. Again, this is not proper in a petition for certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.13
Petitioner submits before this Honorable Court that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the findings of both the labor arbiter and the NLRC and in concluding that they did not abuse their discretion and acted beyond their jurisdiction when they asserted their authorities and found petitioner DE ROCA solidarily liable with EWAYAN/OCEANIC TRAVEL AND TOUR AGENCY to private respondents, despite the patent lack of employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and private respondents.17Petitioner's Arguments
There is unjust enrichment 'when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.' The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of another."In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around."25 In short, substantive law outweighs procedural technicalities as in this case.
The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another without just cause or consideration. x x x24
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the [r]ules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice. It bears stressing that the rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its operation.26Taking this to mind, the labor tribunals and the CA should have considered petitioner's repeated pleas to scrutinize the facts and particularly the lease agreement executed by him and Oceanic, which would naturally exculpate him from liability as this would prove the absence of an employment relation between him and respondents. Instead, the case was determined on pure technicality which in labor disputes, is not necessarily sanctioned - given that proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are non-litigious in nature where they are encouraged to avail of all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the case without regard to technicalities of law or procedure.27 Petitioner's motion to dismiss, though belated, should have been given due attention.
| |
(SGD) | |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO | |
Associate
Justice | |
Acting
Chairperson |
(SGD) | |
ANTONIO T. CARPIO | |
Acting Chief Justice30 |
Endnotes:
** Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2540 dated February 28, 2018.
1Rollo, pp. 3-27.
2 Id. at 29-34; penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and concurred in by Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Leoncia Real-Dimagiba.
3 Id. at 99; penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and concurred in by Associate Justices Amy C. Lazaro-Javier and Leoncia Real-Dimagiba.
4 Id. at 35-53.
5 Id. at 101-110.
6 Docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 02-02490-12.
7Rollo, pp. 85-90.
8 Id. at 59-68.
9 Id. at 29-30.
10 Id. at 91-97.
11 Id. at 92-97.
12 Id. at 54-58; penned by Presiding Commissioner Alex A, Lopez and concurred in by Commissioners Gregorio O. Bilog III and Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr.
13 Id. at 30-34.
14 Id. at 115-116, 127-128.
15 Id. at 129-130.
16 Id. at 168-169.
17 Id. at 8.
18 Id. at 160-166.
19 Id. at 141-157.
20 Id. at 79-82.
21 Id. at 83.
22 Id. at 84.
23 CIVIL CODE, Article 1311.
24Flores v. Spouses Lindo, J., 664 Phil. 210, 221 (2011).
257107 Islands Publishing, Inc. v. The House Printers Corporation, 771 Phil. 161, 168 (2015).
26Coronel v. Hon. Desierto, 448 Phil. 894, 903 (2003).
27 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, Rule V, Section 2, and Rule VII, Section 10, then in force.
RULE V, SECTION 2. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS. - The proceedings before the Labor Arbiter shall be non-litigious in nature. Subject to the requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law shall not strictly apply thereto. The Labor Arbiter may avail himself/herself of all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the controversy speedily, including ocular inspection and examination of well-informed persons.
RULE VII, SECTION 10. TECHNICAL RULES NOT BINDING. - The rules of procedure and evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.
28Saldana v. Court of Appeals, 268 Phil. 424, 432 (1990).
29Imperial v. Armes, G.R. Nos. 178842 & 195509, January 30, 2017.
30 Per Special Order No. 2539 dated February 28, 2018.