THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 196795, March 07, 2018
INTRAMUROS ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner, v. OFFSHORE CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
The sole issue in ejectment proceedings is determining which of the parties has the better right to physical possession of a piece of property. The defendant's claims and allegations in its answer or motion to dismiss do not oust a trial court's jurisdiction to resolve this issue.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 14, 2011 Decision2 of Branch 173, Regional Trial Court, Manila in Civil Case No. 10-124740. The Regional Trial Court affirmed in toto the October 19, 2010 Order3 of Branch 24, Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila in Civil Case No. 186955-CV, dismissing Intramuros Administration's (Intramuros) Complaint for Ejectment against Offshore Construction and Development Company (Offshore Construction) on the grounds of forum shopping and lack of jurisdiction.
In 1998, Intramuros leased certain real properties of the national government, which it administered to Offshore Construction. Three (3) properties were subjects of Contracts of Lease: Baluarte De San Andres, with an area of 2,793 sq. m.;4 Baluarte De San Francisco De Dilao, with an area of 1,880 sq. m.;5 and Revellin De Recoletos, with an area of 1,036 sq. m.6 All three (3) properties were leased for five (5) years, from September 1, 1998 to August 31, 2003. All their lease contracts also made reference to an August 20, 1998 memorandum of stipulations, which included a provision for lease renewals every five (5) years upon the parties' mutual agreement.7
Offshore Construction occupied and introduced improvements in the leased premises. However, Intramuros and the Department of Tourism halted the projects due to Offshore Construction's non-conformity with Presidential Decree No. 1616, which required 16th to 19th centuries' Philippine-Spanish architecture in the area.8 Consequently, Offshore Construction filed a complaint with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against Intramuros and the Department of Tourism before the Manila Regional Trial Court,9 which was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-91587.10
Eventually, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement on July 26, 1999,11which the Manila Regional Trial Court approved on February 8, 2000.12 In the Compromise Agreement, the parties affirmed the validity of the two (2) lease contracts but terminated the one over Revellin de Recoletos.[13 The Compromise Agreement retained the five (5)-year period of the existing lease contracts and stated the areas that may be occupied by Offshore Construction:
FROM:(1) Baluarte de San AndresTO:
(1) Only the stable house, the gun powder room and two (2) Chambers with comfort rooms, will be utilized for restaurants. All other structures built and introduced including trellises shall be transferred/relocated to: (a) Two (2) restaurants as Asean Garden. Each will have an aggregate area of two hundred square meters (200 sq. mtrs.); (b) One (1) kiosk at Puerta Isabel Garden fronting Terraza de la Reyna with an aggregate area of twenty (20) square meters; (c) Three (3) restaurants at the chambers of Puerta Isabel II with an aggregate area of 1,180.5 sq.m.; (d) One (1) restaurant at Fort Santiago American Barracks. Subject to IA Guidelines, the maximum floor area will be the perimeter walls of the old existing building;
FROM:(2) Baluarte De San Francisco DilaoTO:
(2) All seven (7) structures including the [Offshore Construction] Administration Building and Trellises shall be transferred [t]o Cuartel de Sta. Lucia, [O]therwise known as the PC Barracks[.]14
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. — A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
Section 2. Form and Contents. — The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (Emphasis supplied)
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the 'actual case' that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.74 (Citation omitted)
Nonetheless, a direct recourse to this Court can be taken for a review of the decisions, final orders or resolutions of the RTC, but only on questions of law. Under Section 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has the power to(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:....
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
This kind of direct appeal to this Court of RTC judgments, final orders or resolutions is provided for in Section 2(c) of Rule 41, which reads:SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. —....
(c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
Procedurally then, petitioners could have appealed the RTC Decision affirming the MTC (1) to this Court on questions oflaw only; or (2) if there are factual questions involved, to the CA — as they in fact did.78
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.85 (Citation omitted)
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. "Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon a claim asserted therein — a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Neither can the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses made by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant."93 (Citations omitted)
It has been jurisprudentially established that forum shopping exists when a party avails himself of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other courts.
The test to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Simply put, when litis pendentia or res judicata does not exist, neither can forum shopping exist.
The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. On the other hand, the elements of res judicata, also known as bar by prior judgment, are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.98 (Citation omitted)
2. Order [Department of Tourism], [Intramuros Administration] and [Anna Maria L. Harper] to perform their obligation under the "Memorandum of Agreement" dated 27 July 2004 by OFFSETTING the rentals in arrears from the expenses incurred by Offshore in the continuance of the Department of Tourism's WOW Philippines Project and to allow Offshore to recover their investment at Intramuros by respecting their lease over Puerta Isabel II, Asean Garden and Revellin de Recoletos[.]100
WHEREAS, [respondent] has been indebted to [petitioner] in the form of rental and utility consumption arrears for the occupancy of Puerta Isabel Chambers, Asean Gardens and Baluarte de San Andres (Stable House) in the amount of Six Million Seven Hundred Sixty[-]Two Thousand One Hundred Fifty[-]Three and 70/100 (P6,762,153.70) as of July 31, 2004 and as a way of settling said arrears, [respondent] had proposed to pay its obligations with [petitioner] as shown in the breakdown in "Annex A" hereof through [respondent's] assumption of [Department of Tourism's] monthly operational expenses for lights and sound equipment, electricity, and performers at the Baluarte Plano Luneta de Sta. Isabel in Intramuros, Manila[.][101
During our meeting last May 5, 2005 with Mr. Rico Cordova, it was reiterated that the subject of the [Memorandum of Agreement] for the lights and sound at Plano Luneta de Sta. Isabel was your accumulated account as of July 2004. Subsequent rentals have to be remitted to [Intramuros] as they become due and demandable. We have emphasized this concern in our letter of November 12, 2004.102
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that JUDGMENT be rendered ORDERING:
....
(2) DEFENDANT [OFFSHORE CONSTRUCTION] TO PAY ITS ARREARS OF THIRTEEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND, EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN PESOS AND FORTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (P13,448,867.45), PLUS INTEREST OF 1% PER MONTH AS STIPULATED IN THE LEASE CONTRACTS[.]104
A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiff's complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that if it is within the jurisdiction of the court, and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, it must be set up therein, and will be barred in the future if not set up.106 (Citation omitted)
16. In compliance with the Memorandum of Agreement, Offshore incurred expenses amounting to Seven Million Eight Hundred Twenty[-]Five Thousand Pesos (P7,825,000.00) by way of Expenses for Rentals of Lights & Sound System, Electrical Bill and Performers Fees. This amount is excluding the expenses incurred during the period Offshore supplied the Light & Sound System, as well as Performers, aforementioned started in October 2004. A copy of the Statement of Account is hereto appended as ANNEX "H" to "H-4";
17. Based on Offshore's records, upon re-computation of Actual Area used during all these period[s] from July 2001 to March 30, 2008, copy of Statement of Accounts has been sent to Intramuros Administration for reconciliation, Offshore's total obligation by way of back and current rentals up to March 30, 2008 is only in the amount of Six Million Four Hundred Three Thousand Three Hundred Sixty[-]Four Pesos (P6,403,364.00);
18. Obviously, when both accounts are offset, it will clearly show that [Intramuros] still owes Offshore the amount of One Million Four Hundred Twenty[-]One Thousand Six Hundred Thirty[-]Six Pesos (P1,421,636.00) as of March 2008;
19. Unfortunately, despite this glaring fact that [Intramuros] owes Offshore, Defendant [Anna Maria L.] Harper (who has already showed sour and adverse treatment of Offshore in the past), being the new Administrator of Intramuros Administration, sent a Letter dated 09 April 2008 demanding from Offshore to pay [Intramuros] alleged rentals in arrears in the amount of P12,478[,]461.74, within seven (7) days from receipt. A copy of the Letter is hereto attached and marked as Annex "I" to "I-1";
20. It can be deduced from the attachment to the aforementioned letter that [Intramuros] did not honor the obligations imposed in the Memorandum of Agreement because the monthly expenses incurred by Offshore for the payment of the Lights and Sound System, Electricity and Performers Fees for the continuance of the Department of Tourism WOW Project at Baluarte Plano, Luneta de Sta. Isabel which were duly furnished [Intramuros] in the amount of Seven Million Eight Hundred Twenty[-]Five Thousand Pesos (P7,825,000.00) as expressly agreed by [Department of Tourism], [Intramuros] and Offshore in the Memorandum of Agreement were NOT deducted from the rentals due[.] 107
26. [Offshore Construction] has not established its right, or the reality is, [Offshore Constructioin] has been delinquent in the payment of its financial obligations which are specifically provided in its contract with defendant [Intramuros], such as rental fees.
27. [Offshore Construction] has to pay rent for being still in possession of Puerta Isabel II and Asean Garden. Moreover, plaintiff has enjoyed the fruits of subleasing these premises for years and yet it has continuously failed to remit all rental fees and surcharges despite repeated demands from defendants. It bears stressing that as of December 31, 2009, [Offshore Construction's] arrears has already ballooned to thirteen million four hundred and forty[-]eight thousand eight hundred and sixty[-]seven pesos and forty[-]five centavos (P13,448,867.45).
28. Glaringly, [Offshore Construction] has been remiss in performing its obligations stated in the Lease Contracts (Annexes A to A-15; B to B-14 and C to C-14 of the Complaint), Compromise Agreement (Annexes E to E-17 of the Complaint) and Memorandum of Agreement (Annexes F to F-16 of the Complaint). [Intramuros and Anna Maria L. Harper] are therefore constrained to demand payment from [Offshore Construction] for the latter's failure or refusal to honor its just and valid obligations. Necessarily, [Intramuros and Anna Maria L. Harper] will not hesitate to seek legal remedies if [Offshore Construction] continues to be delinquent.
29. Essentially, [Offshore Construction] is protesting the computation of its arrears (P12,478,461.74) in the demand letter sent by Administrator [Anna Maria L.] Harper on April 9, 2008. [Offshore Construction] also asserts that it only owes defendant [Intramuros] six million four hundred three thousand and three hundred sixty[-]four pesos (P6,403,364.00).
30. [Offshore Construction] is misguided. The [Memorandum of Agreement] dated July 27, 2004 was executed because [Offshore Construction], at that time, had been indebted to defendant [Intramuros] in the form of rental and utility consumption arrears for the occupancy of Puerta Isabel Chambers, Asean Gardens and Baluarte de San Andres in the amount of six million seven hundred sixty[-]two thousand one hundred fifty[-]three and seventy centavos (P6,762,153.70)....
....
32. Even after July 27, 2004, and up to this time, [Offshore Construction] remained in possession of, used and/or subleased the subject premises. As such, [Offshore Construction] still has to pay rental fees, aside from the aforesaid arrears. The rental fees continued to pile up and triggered the imposition of surcharges as [Offshore Construction] again failed to remit payments thereon. This explains the demandable amount of P13,448,867.45 (Annex I to I1 of Complaint). [Offshore Construction] is therefore mistaken in believing that it only owes defendant [Intramuros] the arrears subject of the [Memorandum of Agreement] of July 27, 2004 and nothing more.108
The Estradas' first proffered defense derives from a literal construction of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which inter alia authorizes the institution of an unlawful detainer suit when "the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." They contend that since they did not acquire possession of the property in question "by virtue of any contract, express or implied" — they having been, to repeat, "allowed to live temporarily ... (therein) for free, out of ... (Cañiza's) kindness" — in no sense could there be an "expiration or termination of ... (their) right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." Nor would an action for forcible entry lie against them, since there is no claim that they had "deprived (Cañiza) of the possession of ... (her property) by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth."
The argument is arrant sophistry. Cañiza's act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Common sense, and the most rudimentary sense of fairness clearly require that act of liberality be implicitly, but no less certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on the Estradas of returning the house to Cañiza upon her demand. More than once has this Court adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. The situation is not much different from that of a tenant whose lease expires but who continues in occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in which case there is deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession as of the date of the demand to vacate. In other words, one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land or property the moment he is required to leave. Thus, in Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, where a company, having lawfully obtained possession of a plant upon its undertaking to buy the same, refused to return it after failing to fulfill its promise of payment despite demands, this Court held that "(a)fter demand and its repudiation, ... (its) continuing possession ... became illegal and the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the ... (plant's owner) was its proper remedy."126 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
This Court agrees with the defendant. The various contracts of lease between the parties notwithstanding, the existence of the other agreements involved herein cannot escape the scrutiny of this Court. Although couched in such words as "contracts of lease", the relationship between the parties has evolved into another kind – that of a concession agreement whereby defendant [Offshore Construction] undertook to develop several areas of the Intramuros District, defendant [Offshore Construction] actually commenced the development of the subject premises and incurred expenses for the said development, effectively making the relationship more than an ordinary lessor-lessee but one governed by concession whereby both parties undertook other obligations in addition to their basic obligations under the contracts of lease. Consensus facit legem (The parties make their own law by their agreement). It behooves this Court to respect the parties' contracts, including the memoranda of agreement that ensued after it....127
Article 1643. In the lease of things, one of the parties binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and for a period which may be definite or indefinite. However, no lease for more than ninety-nine years shall be valid.
- CONTRACT TERM. (Leased Period) This lease shall be for a period of FIVE YEARS (5 YRS) commencing from September 1, 1998 to August 31, 2003, renewable for another period of FIVE YEARS (5 YRS) under such terms and condition that may be mutually agreed upon in writing by the parties[.]129
Endnotes:
1 Rollo, pp. 15-69.
2 Id. at 70-73. The Decision was penned by Judge Armando A. Yanga.
3 Id. at 74-80. The Order was penned by Presiding Judge Jesusa S. Prado-Maningas.
4 Id. at 96-106.
5 Id. at 107-116.
6 Id. at 117-126.
7 Id. at 128, 132, and 136.
8 Id. at 22.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 147.
11 Id. at 139-146.
12 Id. at 147-152.
13 Id. at 142.
14 Id. at 141.
15 Id. at 24.
16 Id. at 25.
17 Id. at 161-167.
18 Id. at 178.
19 Id. at 81-95.
20 Id. at 27.
21 Id. at 180-183.
22 Id. at 180.
23 Id. at 181.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 74-80.
26 Id. at 76.
27 Id. at 78-79.
28 Id. at 76.
29 Id. at 285-286.
30 Id. at 76-77.
31 Id. at 77-78.
32 Id. at 79.
33 Id. at 70-73.
34 Id. at 2-7.
35 Id. at 15-69.
36 Id. at 32-37.
37 Id. at 37-52.
38 Id. at 33.
39 Id. at 34.
40 Id. at 35.
41 Id. at 37.
42 Id. at 39-40.
43 Id. at 41-42.
44 Id. at 45.
45 Id. at 43-44.
46 Id. at 45.
47 Id. at 52-54.
48 Id. at 569.
49 Id. at 577-586.
50 Id. at 577.
51 Id. at 578.
52 Id. at 581-582 and 584.
53 Id. at 587-588.
54 Id. at 599-610.
55 Id. at 604.
56 Id. at 605.
57 Id. at 612-613.
58 Id. at 619-662.
59 Id. at 677-696.
60 Id. at 685-686.
61 Id. at 686-688.
62 Id. at 688.
63 CIVIL CODE, art. 1670 states:Article 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary by either party has previously been given, it is understood that there is an implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original contract shall be revived.
64Rollo, p. 691.
65 CIVIL CODE, art. 1687 states:
Article 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month.
66Rollo, p. 693.
67Ronquillo, Jr. v. National Electrification Administration, G.R. No. 172593, April 20, 2016 < http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/april2016/172593.pdf > 10 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
68Philippine Migrants Watch, Inc. v. Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, 748 Phil. 349, 356 (2014) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
69Daswani v. Banco De Oro Universal Bank, 765 Phil. 88, 97 (2015) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
70Republic v. Malabanan, 646 Phil. 631, 637 (2010) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Third Division].
71Tan v. People, 430 Phil. 685, 693 (2002) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
72 Barcenas v. Spouses Tomas and Caliboso, 494 Phil. 565 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
73 751 Phil. 301 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc).
74 Id. at 329-330.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 331; See also Dy v. Hon. Bibat-Palamos, 717 Phil. 776 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
77 494 Phil. 565 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
78 Id. at 577.
79Rollo, p. 79.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82See Barrientos v. Rapal, 669 Phil. 438 (2011) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
83See Cruz v. Spouses Christensen, G.R. No. 205539. October 4, 2017 < http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/october2017/205539.pdf > [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
84Spouses Valdez v. Court of Appeals, 523 Phil. 39, 48 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division].
85Cabrera v. Getaruela, 604 Phil. 59, 66 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
86Rollo, p. 686.
87 Id. at 81.
88 Id. at 178.
89Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1107, 1117 (1997) [Per C.J. Narvasa, Third Division].
90Rollo, p. 79.
91Mendoza v. Germino, 650 Phil. 74, 84 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Third Division].
92 367 Phil. 438 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
93 Id. at 445.
94Yuki, Jr. v. Co, 621 Phil. 194, 205 (2009) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
95Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, 474 Phil. 557, 578 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
96Dy v. Mandy Commodities, Inc., 611 Phil. 74, 84 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
97 G.R. No. 228112, September 13, 2017, < http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/september2017/228112.pdf > [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
98 Id. at 5-6.
99Rollo, p. 225.
100 Id. at 227.
101 Id. at 161.
102 Id. at 168.
103 Id. at 532.
104 Id. at 342-343.
105 387 Phil. 621 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division).
106 Id. at 627.
107Rollo, pp. 224-225.
108 Id. at 519-522.
109See CIVIL CODE, art. 22 which states:
Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
110Rollo, pp. 285-291.
111 Id. at 304-318. See p. 305, which states in part:
During the consultation meetings, plaintiff's alleged members acknowledged and realized that as sublessees of [Offshore Construction], they cannot have any superior right over their sublessor. (Emphasis supplied)
112 Id. at 677-696. See p. 683, which states in part:
This case involves the same parties as Defendants ([Intramuros] and [Offshore Construction], the Plaintiff 4H being the Sub-Lessees of [Offshore Construction]) ... (Emphasis supplied)
113The Heirs of Eugenio Sevilla, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 283 Phil. 490, 499 (1992) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third Division].
114Guevara Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 243 Phil. 620, 624-625 (1988) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division].
115Spouses Morales v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 262, 272 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
116See Cathay Metal Corp. v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., 738 Phil. 37(2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
117Rollo, pp. 96-126.
118 Id. at 127-138.
119 Id. at 139.
120 Id. at 139 and 141.
121 Id. at 142.
122 Id. at 142.
123 Id. at 128, 132, and 136.
124 Id. at 688-689.
125 335 Phil. 1107 (1997) [Per C.J. Narvasa, Third Division].
126 Id. at 1115-1117.
127Rollo, p. 79.
128 CIVIL CODE, art. 1657(2) states:
Article 1657. The lessee is obliged:
....
(2) To use the thing leased as a diligent father of a family, devoting it to the use stipulated; and in the absence of stipulation, to that which may be inferred from the nature of the thing leased, according to the custom of the place[.]
129Rollo, pp. 128, 132, and 136.
130 Id. at 224 and 252.