SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 228945, March 14, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HESSON CALLAO Y MARCELINO AND JUNELLO AMAD, Accused,
HESSON CALLAO Y MARCELINO, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CAGUIOA, J.:
This is an Appeal1 under Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from the Decision2 dated August 31, 2016 (assailed Decision) of the Court of Appeals, Eighteenth (18th) Division (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 02007. The assailed Decision, affirmed with modification the Judgment3 dated January 26, 2015 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Bais City, Branch 45 (trial court), in Criminal Case No. 07-25-T, which found accused-appellant Hesson Callao y Marcelino (Hesson) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The accusatory portion of the Information4 reads:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 2006 in the Municipality [of] Tayasan, Negros Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of treachery, suddenly attack and strike the forehead of Fernando Adlawan with the use of an iron rod and thereafter, with the use of a knife, opened the stomach of the (sic) said Fernando Adlawan and took out his liver and throw (sic) it to the pig which ate it and proceeded to slice the flesh of the thigh of said victim and again throw (sic) the same to the pig which also ate it, which injuries caused the immediate death of victim Fernando Adlawan, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.5 (Italics in the original)On February 14, 2007, when this case was filed, Hesson and fellow accused Junello Amad (Junello) were at large causing the case to be sent to archives.6 On February 18, 2008, Hesson was arrested and the case was revived as to him.7 On March 17, 2008, upon arraignment, Hesson entered a plea of "not guilty."8
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds accused HESSON CALLAO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is accordingly sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the cost.Hesson appealed to the CA via Notice of Appeal.44 Hesson filed his Brief45 dated August 26, 2015, while the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Brief46 dated January 22, 2016. In a Resolution47 dated June 15, 2016, the CA considered Hesson to have waived his right to file a Reply Brief.48
Accused is also ordered to pay the amount of P15,000.00 as funeral expenses; P50,000.00 for loss of life and P50,000.00 [as] moral damages.
Considering that accused JUNELLO AMAD has remained at large[,] send this case as to him to the ARCHIVES and let there be issued an Alias Warrant of Arrest addressed to the Chief of Police, PNP, Tayasan, Negros Oriental; Provincial Director, PNP, Agan-an, Sibulan, Negros Oriental and to the Chief, NBI of Dumaguete, Bacolod, Cebu and Manila for the arrest of the said JUNELLO AMAD in the event he is sighted.
SO PROMULGATED in open Court this 26th day of January 2015 at Bais City, Philippines.43 (Italics in the original)
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated January 26, 2015 of Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Bais City in Crim. Case No. 07-25-T is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Civil indemnity and moral damages awarded to the heirs of Fernando Adlawan are INCREASED to P75,000.00 each. Exemplary damages are also AWARDED in the amount of P30,000.00. The grant of funeral expenses in the amount of P15,000.00 is RETAINED. The aggregate amount of the monetary awards stated herein shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until the same is fully paid.49 (Emphasis in the original)Hence, this Appeal.
The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused based solely on uncorroborated testimony of the witness;52
The trial court gravely erred in making a finding of conspiracy to commit murder without proving the elements thereof beyond reasonable doubt;53 and
The trial court inadvertently erred in failing to rule that the crime committed was not murder but an impossible crime.54
The Court has carefully and assiduously examined the testimony of Sario and has found no reason whatsoever to disturb the conclusion reached by the trial court that Sario's testimony was straightforward, guileless and very credible.
[Pros. Yuseff YC YbaƱez]55 Did you arrive at the house of Fernando? [Witness] Yes. Q When you arrived there, what happened then if any? A This Junello asked of a lighter from Fernando. Q Did this Fernando give the lighter to Junello? A Yes. Q After Fernando gave the lighter to Junello, what happened then? A This Junello struck with a piece of firewood. Q Where was Fernando hit? A (witness pointing at the nape). Q What happened to Fernando when he was hit at the nape? A After that he was hacked by Junello. Q And did you see where was Fernando hit when he was hacked by Junello? A At the side. Q What did Junello use in hacking Fernando? A Bolo. Q What happened to Fernando after he was hacked by Junello? A He was stabbed by Hesson. Q And who was stabbed by Hesson, Fernando or this Junello? A Fernando. Q And was Fernando hit by the stab of Hesson? A Yes. Q What was the position of Fernando when he was stabbed by Hesson? A He was lying on the ground faced (sic) up. Q How many times did Hesson stab Fernando? A Twice. Q And where was Fernando hit by the stab of Hesson? A On the chest. Q After that, what happened then, if any? A He took out the heart of Fernando. Q After taking out the heart of Fernando, what happened if any? A He also took the liver of Fernando. Q What did he do with the heart and the liver of Fernando? A He gave it to the pig. Q Did you know particularly who took the heart of Fernando? A It was Hesson. Q And what about the liver of Fernando, who took the liver of Fernando? A It was Junello. Court: Q What did Hesson use in getting the heart of Fernando? A Knife. Q How about Junello? A He was using a bolo. Q Where were you at that time? A I was opposite in their location. Q You were watching then when they were taking the internal organ? A Yes.56
xxx Thus, the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if found positive and credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a conviction especially when the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and had been delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward manner. Witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. Evidence is assessed in terms of quality and not quantity. Therefore, it is not uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a lone witness. For although the number of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number and conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible and positive testimony of a single witness. Corroborative evidence is deemed necessary "only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation had been inaccurate." xxx59 (Emphasis supplied)Moreover, the Certificate of Death of Fernando stating that he died of multiple stab wounds corroborates Sario's testimony.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, the presumption is that the witness was not moved by ill-will and was untainted by bias, and thus worthy of belief and credence.61
Q What about you and Sario, are you friends or acquaintance? A We are not friends. Q Before July 15, 2006 do you have any quarrel or misunderstanding with Sario Joaquin? A No. Q What about your family and the family of Sario? A None.60
We have held time and again that "the trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, sometimes even with finality." As We have reiterated in the recent People v. Combate, where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, then We do not disturb and interfere with its assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses. This is clearly because the judge in the trial court was the one who personally heard the accused and the witnesses, and observed their demeanor as well as the manner in which they testified during trial. Accordingly, the trial court, or more particularly, the RTC in this case, is in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial.Sixth, Hesson's defense of denial cannot prevail over Sario's positive identification of Hesson as one of the assailants. To be believed, denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability. Otherwise, it is purely self-serving and without merit. Greater weight is given to the categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witness than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime.65 In the instant case, Hesson failed to adduce evidence to support his denial and overcome the testimony of the prosecution witness. Denial, unsubstantiated by any credible evidence, deserves no weight in law.66
xxx To reiterate this time-honored doctrine and well-entrenched principle, We quote from People v. Robert Dinglasan, thus:
In the matter of credibility of witnesses, we reiterate the familiar and well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court should be respected. The judge a quo was in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them when they testified and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. It is doctrinally settled that the evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect, because it had the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the truth. This assessment is binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a clear showing that it was reached arbitrarily or that the trial court had plainly overlooked certain facts of substance or value that if considered might affect the result of the case. (Emphasis Ours)64 (Additional emphasis supplied)
ART. 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.67
x x x x
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to ineffectual means.
x x x x
ART. 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos. (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.To support his theory that what was committed was an impossible crime, Hesson cites the following testimony of Sario:
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. xxx
x x x x
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. xxx69 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court agrees with the CA and the People: the victim's fact of death before he was stabbed by Hesson was not sufficiently established by the defense. While Sario testified that he thought Fernando was already dead after he was hacked by Junello because the former was already lying on the ground motionless, this statement cannot sufficiently support the conclusion that, indeed, Fernando was already dead when Hesson stabbed him. Sario's opinion of Femando's death was arrived at by merely looking at the latter's body. No other act was done to ascertain this, such as checking of Fernando's pulse, heartbeat or breathing.
Q And it was followed by the stab using a bolo?70 A Yes. Q And he was hit at the side of the body? Q Yes. Q And you saw Fernando did not move anymore with that blow? A Not anymore. Q And you think that he is already dead? A Yes. Q About how many minutes when Hesson delivered the stabbing blow? A About five (5) minutes. Q So five minutes after he is motionless. You testified that Hesson stab (sic) Fernando and he was already dead when Flesson stabbed Fernando, right? A Yes.71
xxx First, Amad and Callao hatched the plan to kill Fernando in the flea market; thereafter, they went to Fernando's house in Colasisi. Amad pretended to borrow a lighter from Fernando who, after handing out a lighter, was unknowingly struck on the nape. Then, Amad hacked Fernando. After Fernando fell on the ground, Callao jumped in and stabbed Fernando's chest with a knife. Thereafter, Callao sliced open Fernando's chest and took out his heart. Amad then took his turn and sliced up Fernando's body to take out his liver. All these acts clearly reveal conspiracy. Amad and Callao committed what they agreed to do - to kill Fernando.75With conspiracy attending, collective liability attaches to the conspirators Hesson and Junello and the Court shall not speculate on the extent of their individual participation in the Murder. Hesson's defense of impossible crime is thus completely unavailing. As extensively explained by the Court in the landmark case of People v. Peralta76:
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held thatThe Court, therefore, sustains the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, that Hesson is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the killing of Fernando. Treachery was proven by the prosecution and the same qualifies the killing to Murder under Article 24878 of the RPC, the elements of which are: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide.". . . it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement. . . The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the . . . accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible. . ."Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime.77 (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)
Endnotes:
* Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2539 dated February 28, 2018.
1Rollo, pp. 16-18.
2 Id. at 4-15. Penned by Associate Justice Germano Francisco D. Legaspi with Executive Justice Gabriel T. Ingles and Associate Justice Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap concurring.
3 CA rollo, pp. 44-49. Penned by Executive Judge Candelario V. Gonzalez.
4 Records, pp. 2-3.
5 Id. at 2.
6 CA rollo, p. 44.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Spelled as "Remie" in some parts of the CA rollo.
10 CA rollo, pp. 45-46.
11 Id. at 45.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 TSN, May 5, 2009, p. 7.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 8.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 7-8.
20 Id. at 8-9.
21 Id. at 9.
22 Id.
23Rollo, p. 6.
24 Records, p. 10.
25 TSN, July 19, 2010, pp. 3-4.
26 Id. at 4-5.
27 Id. at 6.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 7.
30Rollo, p. 6.
31 CA rollo, p. 46.
32 Id.
33Rollo, p. 6.
34 TSN, July 19, 2010, p. 11.
35 Id. at 12.
36 Id. at 11-12.
37 Id. at 12.
38 Id. at 13.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 14.
41 Id. at 15.
42 CA rollo, p. 47.
43 Id. at 49.
44 Records, p. 77.
45 CA rollo, pp. 27-43.
46 Id. at 69-92.
47 Id. at 93.
48 Id. at 93-94.
49Rollo, p. 14.
50 Id. at 35-38.
51 Id. at 32-34.
52 CA rollo, p. 33.
53 Id. at 36.
54 Id. at 37.
55 Counsel for the Government. TSN, May 5, 2009, p. 1.
56 TSN, May 5, 2009, pp. 5-7.
57People v. Navarro, 357 Phil. 1010 (1998); People v. Pat Cruz, 348 Phil. 539, 547 (1998); People v. Hayahay, 345 Phil. 69, 81 (1997).
58 367 Phil. 29 (1999).
59 Id. at 45.
60 TSN, July 19, 2010, p. 16.
61People v. Jalbonian, 713 Phil. 93, 104 (2013), citing People v. Manulit, 649 Phil. 715, 726 (2010).
62 Id., citing People v. Agacer, 678 Phil. 704, 724 (2011).
63 660 Phil. 485 (2011).
64 Id. at 493-494, citing People v. Combate, 653 Phil. 487, 499 (2010); People v. Agudez, 472 Phil. 761, 776 (2004); and People v. Dinglasan, 334 Phil. 691, 704 (1997).
65People v. Diaz, 612 Phil. 692, 719 (2009).
66 Id. at 720.
67Jacinto v. People, 610 Phil. 100, 109 (2009); emphasis supplied.
68 289 Phil. 485(1992).
69 Id. at 490-491.
70 Referring to the alleged initial hacking by accused Junello.
71 TSN, May 5, 2009, p. 12.
72Quidet v. People, 632 Phil. 1, 11 (2010).
73People v. Jesalva, G.R. No. 227306, June 19, 2017, p. 4.
74People v. Campos, 668 Phil. 315, 330 (2011).
75Rollo, p. 13.
76 134 Phil. 703 (1968).
77 Id. at 718-719.
78 ART. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. (Emphasis supplied)
79People v. Dela Cruz, 626 Phil. 631, 639-640 (2010).
80 Art. 63 (2) of the RPC states that when the law prescribes 2 indivisible penalties, and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
81People v. Roxas, 780 Phil. 874, 887-888 (2016).