THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 213225, April 04, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RENANTE COMPRADO FBRONOLA, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
MARTIRES, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 19 May 2014, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01156 which affirmed the Decision2 dated 18 April 2013, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Misamis Oriental (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2011-671 finding Renante Comprado y Bronola (accused-appellant) guilty of illegal possession of marijuana.
That on July 15, 2011, at more or less eleven o'clock in the evening, along the national highway, Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drugs, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally have in his possession, control and custody 3,200 grams of dried fruiting tops of suspected marijuana, which substance, after qualitative examination conducted by the Regional Crime Laboratory, Office No. 10, Cagayan de Oro City, tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug, with the said accused, knowing the substance to be a dangerous drug.3Upon his arraignment on 8 August 2011, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused RENANTE COMPRADO y BRONOLA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime defined and penalized under Section 11, [7], Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as charged in the Information, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT, and to pay the Fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos [P500,000.00], without subsidiary penalty in case of nonpayment of fine.Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed before the CA.
Let the penalty imposed on the accused be a lesson and an example to all who have criminal propensity, inclination and proclivity to commit the same forbidden acts, that crime does not pay, and that the pecuniary gain and benefit which one can derive from possessing drugs, or other illegal substance, or from committing any other acts penalized under Republic Act 9165, cannot compensate for the penalty which one will suffer if ever he is prosecuted and penalized to the full extent of the law.11
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Judgment dated 18 April 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 2011-671 is hereby affirmed in toto.12Hence, this appeal.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
x x x x
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled [to] the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk" it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk," A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.17 (emphases supplied and citations omitted)
The circumstances of this case are analogous to People v. Aruta. In that case, an informant told the police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus. At the bus terminal, the police officers prepared themselves. The informant pointed at a woman crossing the street and identified her as "Aling Rosa." The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged that she allowed them to look inside her bag. The bag contained marijuana leaves.The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case is not sufficient to incite a genuine reason that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on accused-appellant. An examination of the records reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that he had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. P/Insp. Orate testified as follows:
In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal. There were no suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta's arrest and the subsequent search and seizure. It was only the informant that prompted the police to apprehend her. The evidence obtained was not admissible because of the illegal search. Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.
Aruta is almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the police's informant, who informed the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
The facts in Aruta are also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin. Here, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing drugs. The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat. Like in the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin's bag and found bundles of what turned out to be marijuana leaves. The court declared that the search and seizure was illegal. Aminnudin was acquitted.
x x x x
People v. Chua also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the police had been receiving information that the accused was distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles City." One night, the police received information that this drug dealer would be dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout. A car "arrived and parked" at the hotel. The informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel was dealing drugs. The man alighted from his car. He was carrying a juice box. The police immediately apprehended him and discovered live ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice box he was holding.
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chua's situation when the police apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no valid 'stop-and-frisk'."25 (citations omitted)
In his dissent from Esquillo v. People,27 Justice Lucas P. Bersamin emphasizes that there should be "presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity from which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." This principle was subsequently recognized in the recent cases of Cogaed28 and Sanchez v. People29 In the case at bar, accused-appellant was just a passenger carrying his bag. There is nothing suspicious much less criminal in said act. Moreover, such circumstance, by itself, could not have led the arresting officers to believe that accused-appellant was in possession of marijuana.
[Prosecutor Vicente]: Q: On that date Mr. Witness, at about 6:30 in the evening, what happened, if any? A: At about 6:30 in the evening, I received an information from our Confidential Informant reporting that an alleged courier of marijuana were sighted in their place, Sir. x x x x [Court]: Q: Aside from the sighting of this alleged courier of marijuana, what else was relayed to you if there were anything else? A: Our Confidential Informant told me that two persons, a male and a female were having in their possession a black pack containing marijuana, Sir. x x x x [Prosecutor Vicente:] Q: And then, after you received the information through your cellphone, what happened next, Mr. Witness? A: So, I prepared a team to conduct an entrapment operation in order to intercept these two persons, Sir. Q: You said that the Informant informed you that the subject was still in Cabanglasan? A: Yes, Sir. Q: How did you entrap the subject when he was still in Cabanglasan? A: I am planning to conduct a check point because according to my Confidential
Informant the subject person is from Gingoog City, Sir. Q: According to the information, how will he go here? A: He will be travelling by bus, Sir. Q: What bus? A: Bachelor, Sir. Q: And then, what happened next Mr. Witness? A: At about 9:30 in the evening my Confidential Informant again called and informed me that the subject person is now boarding a bus going to Cagayan de Oro City, Sir. Q: What did he say about the bus, if he said anything, Mr. Witness? A: My agent was able to identify the body number of the bus, Bus No. 2646. Q: Bearing Plate No.? A: Bearing Plate No. KVP 988, Sir. Q: What was he bringing at that time, according to the information? A: According to my agent, these two persons were bringing along with them a back pack color black violet with markings LOWE ALPINE. Q: Then, what happened next, Mr. Witness? A: We set up a check point in front of our police station and we waited for the bus to come over, Sir. x x x x Q: About 11 o'clock in the evening, what happened, Mr. Witness? A: When we sighted the bus we flagged down the bus. Q: After you flagged down the bus, what happened next? A: We went on board the said bus, Sir. x x x x Q: What happened next? A: We went to the back of the bus and I saw a man carrying a back pack, a black violet which was described by the Confidential Informant, the back pack which was placed on his lap. x x x x Q: After you saw them, what happened next? A: We were able to identify the back pack and the description of the courier, so, we asked him to please open the back pack. x x x x Q: What happened next? A: When he opened the back pack, we found marijuana leaves, the back pack containing cellophane which the cellophane containing marijuana leaves.26
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (]) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.31 On the other hand, the elements of an arrest effected in hot pursuit under paragraph (b) of Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.32
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains [an] item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.33The search in this case, however, could not be classified as a search of a moving vehicle. In this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a specific person. Further, in search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally used as a means to transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that the information relayed to the police officers was that a passenger of that particular bus was carrying marijuana such that when the police officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of the person matching the description given by their informant and not the cargo or contents of the said bus. Moreover, in this case, it just so happened that the alleged drug courier was a bus passenger. To extend to such breadth the scope of searches on moving vehicles would open the floodgates to unbridled warrantless searches which can be conducted by the mere expedient of waiting for the target person to ride a motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the route of that vehicle, and then stopping such vehicle when it arrives at the checkpoint in order to search the target person.
| Very truly yours, |
(SGD) | |
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN | |
Division Clerk of Court |
"WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 19 May 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01156 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-Appellant Renante Comprado y Bronola is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from detention unless he is detained for any other lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.NOW, THEREFORE, You are hereby ordered to immediately release RENANTE COMPRADO Y BRONOLA unless there are other lawful causes for which he should be further detained, and to return this Order with the certificate of your proceedings within five (5) days from notice hereof.
SO ORDERED."
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 3-15.
2 Records, pp. 117-123; penned by Presiding Judge Arthur L. Abundiente.
3 Id. at 3.
4 TSN, 2 April 2012, pp. 5-9.
5 Id. at 9-11.
6 TSN, 23 February 2012, p. 7.
7 TSN, 16 January 2012, p. 13.
8 TSN, 23 February 2012, p. 13.
9 Records, pp. 14-15.
10 Id. (no proper pagination); Judicial Affidavit of Accused-Appellant.
11 Id. at 122.
12Rollo, p. 14.
13 1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 2.
14People v. Nuevas, 545 Phil. 356, 369 (2007).
15 Id. at 370.
16 347 Phil. 462 (1997).
17 Id. at 480-482.
18 266 Phil. 306 (1990).
19 345 Phil. 632 (1997).
20 330 Phil. 811 (1996).
21Posadas v. CA, supra note 18 at 307-308.
22Manalili v. CA, supra note 19 at 638.
23People v. Solayao, supra note 20 at 814-815.
24 740 Phil. 212, 220-222 (2014).
25 Id. at 235-237.
26 TSN, 2 April 2012, pp. 5-10; testimony of P/Insp. Orate.
27 643 Phil. 577, 606 (2010).
28People v. Cogaed, supra note 24 at 233.
29 747 Phil. 552, 573 (2014).
30People v. Nuevas, supra note 14 at 371.
31People v. Pavia, 750 Phil. 871 (2015).
32Pestilos v. Generoso, 746 Phil. 301, 321 (2014).
33People v. Libnao, 443 Phil. 506, 515-516 (2003).
34 1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 3(2).
35Comerciante v. People, 764 Phil. 627, 633-634 (2015).
36People v. Racho, 640 Phil. 669, 681 (2010).