SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 226590, April 23, 2018
SHIRLEY T. LIM, MARY T. LIMLEON AND JIMMY T. LIM, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision2 dated April 22, 2016 and Resolution3 dated August 17, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 37336. The CA affirmed with modification the Decision4 dated November 27, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 14-305915, which in turn, affirmed the Decision5 dated April 29, 2014 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC).
These decisions found petitioners Shirley T. Lim (Shirley), Mary T. Lim-Leon (Mary), and Jimmy T. Lim (Jimmy) (collectively referred to as the petitioners) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of a public document, punishable under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
That sometime in March 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, being then private individuals, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously forge and falsify, or cause to be forged and falsified a Secretary's Certificate and Board Resolution No. 2000-001 dated February 25, 2000, purportedly executed by SHIRLEY LIM, MARY LIM LEON. JIMMY LIM, QUINTIN C. LIM and HENRY LIM. involving the disposal of a property measuring FIFTY[-]SIX SQUARE METERS and SEVENTY SQUARE DECIMETERS (56.70) located at P. Samonte Street, Pasay City. Metro Manila covered by (TCT) No. 129824, duly notarized by a Notary Public and therefore a public document, by feigning, imitating and counter-feiting (sic) or causing to be feigned, imitated and counterfeited the signature of QUINTIN C. LIM, appearing on the lower middle portion of the said Secretary's Certificate find Board Resolution No. 2000-001, thereby making it appear as it did appear that the said QUINTIN C. LIM had participated and intervened in the preparation and signing of the said document, when in truth and in fact, as the herein accused well knew, such was not the case in that the said QUINTIN C. LIM did not sign the said document, much less did he authorize the accused, or anybody else to sign his name or affix his signature thereon because the said QUINTIN C. LIM had died on September 16, 1996; that once the said Secretary's Certificate and Board Resolution No. 2000-001 has been forged and falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused succeeded in transferring the said property to SPOUSES EMERSON and DORRIS LIM LEE by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 142595, to the damage and prejudice of LUCY LIM and/or public interests.During trial, the prosecution presented Lucy and another sibling of the petitioners, Charlie C. Lim (Charlie), to prove the charge against them.14 The Records Officer of the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City also testified for the prosecution, stating that TCT No. 129824 was cancelled by virtue of: (a) the Secretary's Certificate dated February 29, 2000 showing Board Resolution 2000-001; and (b) the Deed of Absolute Sale between Pentel and the Spouses Lee. Pentel's title was cancelled on March 29, 2000, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 142595 was issued in the name of the Spouses Lee.15
Contrary to law.13
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court, finding the guilt of the accused SHIRLEY LIM, MARY LIM, and JIMMY LIM for the crime charged to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, and there being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances to affect their penal liability, hereby imposes and sentences the accused SHIRLEY LIM, MARY LIM, and JIMMY LIM an indeterminate penalty of IMPRISONMENT from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum with all the accessory penalties of the law, and a fine of Php 3,000.00 and to pay the costs.On May 7, 2014, the petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal from the MeTC's Decision dated April 29, 2014.20
With respect to the accused DORRIS LIM LEE and EMERSON LEE, the court, finding the guilt of the accused for the crime charged not having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, hereby ACQUITS the said accused DORRIS LIM LEE and EMERSON LEE.
No pronouncement on the civil liability for failure of the prosecution to prove that the acts complained of, from which civil liability might arise, exist.
SO ORDERED.19
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the Decision dated April 29, 2014 issued by the court a quo is AFFIRMED in toto.The petitioners, thus, filed their motion for reconsideration on January 5, 2015, and argued that the evidence of their guilt rests only on circumstantial evidence. According to the petitioners, there was no direct evidence that they falsified the signature of Quintin on Board Resolution 2000-001, which was embodied in the Secretary's Certificate dated February 29, 2000.23 Both the private prosecutor and the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila opposed the petitioners' motion.24
SO ORDERED.22
WHEREFORE, we DENY the appeal. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the petitioners Shirley Lim, Mary Lim and Jimmy Lim are sentenced to a penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum.The CA found that the petitioners clearly conspired with each other in making it appear that Quintin participated in Pentel's Board Meeting, as embodied in the Secretary's Certificate dated February 29, 2000 containing Board Resolution 2000-001. It further stated that the petitioners cannot feign ignorance of the death of Quintin, especially since he was their father.34
IT IS SO ORDERED.33
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. - The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:To be clear, Quintin was indisputably dead by the time Board Resolution 2000-001 was passed with his participation on February 25, 2000. For this reason, Pentel's Corporate Secretary, in conspiracy with the other petitioners, falsified a public document by certifying under oath that Quintin was present during this board meeting and making it appear that he signed the resolution contained in the Secretary's Certificate, when in truth and in fact, he could not, as he was already dead at the time of its execution. This is the main act of falsification committed by the petitioners, especially Shirley, who was the Corporate Secretary at that time. The fact that Quintin's signature appeared on the Secretary's Certificate corroborates this charge.
x x x x
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
x x x x
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. - The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; x x x
x x x x (Emphasis Ours)
A case in point is People v. Moran, 44 Phil., 387. In that case, the accused was charged with a violation of the election law. He was found guilty and convicted and the judgment was affirmed, with slight modification, by the Supreme Court. Pending reconsideration of the decision, the accused moved to dismiss the case setting up the plea of prescription. After the Attorney General was given an oppm1unity to answer the motion, and the parties had submitted memoranda in support of their respective contentions, the court ruled that the crime had already prescribed holding that this defense can not (sic) de deemed waived even if the case had been decided by the lower com1and was pending appeal in the Supreme Court. The philosophy behind this ruling was aptly stated as follows: "Although the general rule is that the defense of prescription is not available unless expressly set up in the lower court, as in that case it is presumed to have been waived and cannot be taken advantage of thereafter, yet this rule is not always of absolute application in criminal cases, such as that in which prescription of the crime is expressly provided by law, for the State not having then the right to prosecute, or continue prosecuting, nor to punish, or continue punishing, the offense, or to continue holding the defendant subject to its action through the imposition of the penalty, the court must so declare." And elaborating on this proposition, the Court went on to state as follows:This doctrine was affirmed in the more recent case of Syhunliong v. Rivera,45 where the defense of prescription was raised only in the comment to the petition filed before the Court. Despite this belated objection, the Court upheld the right of the accused to invoke the prescription of the crime at any stage of the proceeding.46As prescription of the crime is the loss by the State of the right to prosecute and punish the same, it is absolutely indisputable that from the moment the State has lost or waived such right, the defendant may, at any stage of the proceeding, demand and ask that the same be finally dismissed and he be acquitted from the complaint, and such petition is proper and effective even if the court taking cognizance of the case has already rendered judgment and said judgment is merely in suspense, pending the resolution of a motion for a reconsideration and new trial, and this is the more so since in such a case there is not yet any final and irrevocable judgment.The ruling above adverted to squarely applies to the present case. Here, the rule provides that the plea of prescription should be set up before arraignment, or before the accused pleads to the charge, as otherwise the defense would be deemed waived; but, as was well said in the Moran case, this rule is not of absolute application, especially when it conflicts with a substantive provision of the law, such as that which refers to prescription of crimes. Since, under the Constitution, the Supreme Court has only the power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law, and cannot cover substantive rights (section 13, article VIII, of the Constitution), the rule we are considering cannot be interpreted or given such scope or extent that would come into conflict or defeat an express provision of our substantive law. One of such provisions is article 89 of the [RPC] which provides that the prescription of crime has the effect of totally extinguishing the criminal liability. And so we hold that the ruling laid down in the Moran case still holds good even if it were laid down before the adoption of the present Rules of Court.44
I, SHIRLEY LIM, of legal age, Filipino and with business address at Taft Office Center Bldg., 1986 Taft Avenue, Pasay City, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law depose and state:Since the above-quoted Secretary's Certificate dated February 29, 2000 was notarized, it is considered a public document pursuant to Section 19(b), Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence:
- That am the Corporate Secretary of PENTEL MERCHANDISING CO., INC., a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with SEC Registration No. 54070 and with principal office at same as above;
- That at a special meeting of the Board of Directors of the corporation held on February 25, 2000 at its principal office, the following resolutions were unanimously approved by the directors present, to wit:
RESOLUTION 2000-001
"RESOLVED, that the corporation PENTEL MERCHANDISING CO., INC., by virtue of a special meeting held today (February 25, 2000) unanimously approved Resolution 2000-001, stating among others to wit:APPROVED AND SIGNED by the undersigned Members of the Board of Directors, this 25th day of February 2000 at the City of Pasay, Philippines
- That, the corporation decided to dispose its real property (a residential townhouse) located at P. Samonte Street, Pasay City, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. - 129824, at the soonest possible time;
- That, the corporation's Board of Directors hereby appointed and empowered MR. JIMMY LIM, the corporation's President to transact, sign, deal and accept payment for and on behalf of the corporation with regard to the aforementioned properties;
- That, all transactions being done by said MR. JIMMY LIM, with regard to the disposal of the aforesaid properties will be honored by the corporation."
(Signature) (Signature) MARY LIM LEON SHIRLEY LIM (Signature) (Signature) (Signature) JIMMY LIM QUINTIN C. LIM HENRY LIM
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby set my hand this 29th day of February 2000.
(Signature) SHIRLEY LIM Corporate Secretary48
(Emphasis Ours)
Sec. 19. Classes of Documents. - For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.Further, as this involves the crime of falsification of a public document, the imposable penalty under the RPC is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00.49 This falls within the purview of a correctional penalty,50 which prescribes in ten (10) years.51
Public documents are:
x x x x
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
x x x x
All other writings are private. (Emphasis Ours)
The rule is well-established that registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains [Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915); Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380; Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Pauli, et al., G.R. No. L-38303, May 30, 1988, 161 SCRA 634; See also Sec. 52, Pres. Decree No. 1529 (1978)].Significantly, Section 51 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides that the act of registration with the Register of Deeds is considered the operative act to convey or affect the land "insofar as third persons are concerned." Thus, if the transaction is not registered with the Register of Deeds, only the parties are bound by the contract and innocent third persons are not affected. Section 52 of the same law further states:
x x x x
The practical factor of securing for civil suits the best evidence that can be obtained is also a major consideration in criminal trials. However, the law on prescription of crimes rests on a more fundamental principle. Being more than a statute of repose, it is an act of grace whereby the state, after the lapse of a certain period of time, surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute the criminal act. While the law on prescription of civil suits is interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between two contending parties, the law on prescription of crimes is an act of amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender [People v. Moran, supra, at p. 405]. Hence, in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is most favorable to the accused is to be adopted [People v. Moran, supra; People v. Parel, 44 Phil. 437 (1923); People v. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. 725 (1956)]. The application of the rule on constructive notice in the construction of Art. 91 of the (RPC] would most certainly be favorable to the accused since the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier, i.e., from the time the notarized deed of sale was recorded in the Registry of Deeds. In the instant case, the notarized deed of sale was registered on May 26, 1961. The criminal informations for falsification of a public document having been filed only on October 18, 1984, or more than ten (10) years from May 26, 1961, the crime for which the accused was charged has prescribed. The [CA], therefore, committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's order quashing the two informations on the ground of prescription.55 (Emphasis Ours)
Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering. (Emphasis Ours)For voluntary transactions such as sale, registration is commenced upon the owner's presentation of the duplicate certificate to the Register of Deeds, together with the voluntary instrument.56 The Register of Deeds then registers the instrument in the primary entry book, and makes a corresponding memorandum on the owner's duplicate and original certificate.57If the property belongs to a corporation, such as the subject property, the voluntary instrument should be accompanied by a secretary's certificate showing the board of directors' resolution for the approval of the sale of the corporation's property.58
When a conveyance has been properly recorded, such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrefutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption may not be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption may not be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains, any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts that the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.75 (Emphasis Ours)As an essential part of the public record, and as an indispensable element to the sale of Pentel's subject property, the constructive notice rule may be appropriately applied to the falsified Secretary's Certificate dated February 29, 2000.
Art. 91. Computation prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.It is well-settled that the filing of the complaint in the fiscal's office interrupts the prescriptive period.78 Unfortunately, the records of this case do not show the date when Lucy's Affidavit of Complaint was filed. This Court notes, however, that the Affidavit of Complaint was executed on September 21, 2010, or more than ten (10) years from the time that prescription commenced to run on March 29, 2000. Considering that Lucy's complaint could not have been tiled earlier than its date of execution, prescription already set in by March 29, 2010, or approximately five (5) months before the execution of the complaint on September 21, 2010.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago. (Emphasis Ours)
Endnotes:
* Designated as Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2539 dated February 28, 2018.
1Rollo, pp. 15-56.
2 Id. at 288-300.
3 Id. at 315-316.
4 Id. at 212-217.
5 Id. at 172-178.
6 Id. at 77 and 108.
7 Id. at 66.
8 Id. at 318-319.
9 Id. at 60.
10 Id. at 169.
11 Id. at 318.
12 Id. at 58.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 74-141.
15 Id. at 143-148.
16 Id. at 174.
17 Id. at 172.
18 Id. at 177.
19 Id. at 178.
20 Id. at 180-182.
21 Id. at 213.
22 Id. at 217.
23 Id. at 219-225.
24 Id. at 229-236.
25 Id. at 238.
26 Id. at 240-255.
27 Id. at 258.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 260-268.
30 Id. at 271-272.
31 Id. at 274-285.
32 Id. at 288.
33 Id. at 299-300.
34 Id. at 293-298.
35 Id. at 302-308.
36 Id. at 315-316.
37 Id. at 46.
38 Id. at 37-45.
39 Id. at 58.
40 Id. at 48.
41 RULES OF COURT, Rule 117, Section 1.
42 REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 89(5).
43 95 Phil. 462 (1954).
44 Id. at 464-466.
45 735 Phil. 349 (2014).
46See also Recebido v. People, 400 Phil. 752, 758-759 (2000).
47Rollo, p. 58.
48 Id. at 60.
49 REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 172; See also Republic Act No. 10951. Section 26 in relation to REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 21.
50 REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 25.
51 Id. at Article 90.
52 Id. at Article 91.
53Cabral v. Hon. Puno, etc., et al., 162 Phil. 814, 820-821 (1976); People v. Hon. Villalon, 270 Phil. 637, 647 (1990).
54 256 Phil. 1015 (1989).
55 Id. at 1022.
56Presidential Decree No. 1529 (1978), Sections 53 and 57.
57Autocorp Group and Autographics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 481 Phil. 298, 310 (2004).
58See Ampil v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., 715 Phil. 733, 766 (2013), citing <http://nreaphilippines.com/question-on-philippine-real-estate/land-registration-procedure> visited last July 21, 2013. (Emphasis Ours)
59 CORPORATION CODE, Section 23; See also Swedish Match Phils., Inc. v. The Treasurer of the City of Manila, 713 Phil. 240, 247 (2013).
60 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 1874, cited in Litonjua, Jr. v. Eternit Corporation, 523 Phil. 588, 608-609 (2006).
61 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 1358.
62Rollo, p. 60.
63 Id. at 169-170.
64 Id. at 64.
65 Id. at 174.
66People v. Reyes, supra note 54, at 1022-1023.
67 Id.
68 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 1874; See also CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 1878(5) and (12).
69Bautista-Spille v. NICORP Management and Dev't. Corp., et al., 771 Phil. 492, 501-502 (2015); Spouses Alcantara, et al. v. Nido, 632 Phil. 343, 352 (2010).
70Bautista-Spille v. NICORP Management and Development Corporation, et al., id. at 502, citing Veloso v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 398, 405 (1996); CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 1877.
71Presidential Decree No. 1529, Section 10.
72See Ampil v. Ombudsman, supra note 58.
73 Id.
74 618 Phil. 136 (2009).
75 Id. at 150.
76 270 Phil. 637 (1990); see also People v. Sandiganbayan, 286 Phil. 347 (1992).
77People v. Villalon, id. at 645-646.
78Francisco, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 207 Phil. 471, 477 (1983); People v. Bautista, 550 Phil. 835, 839 (2007).