THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 235937-40, July 23, 2018
JOHANNE EDWARD B. LABAY, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO JR., J.:
This Office had exerted diligent efforts to serve on Labay copies of the 1 September 2015 Order directing him to submit his counter-affidavit and the 10 May 2016 Resolution finding him probably guilty of the charges. The same were sent to his office and at his last known address and were returned unserved because he was no longer employed in that office, or was unknown at the given address. There was sufficient compliance with due process.Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner Labay filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order dated 25 November 2016) and Deferment of Filing of Information with Reiterative Request for Copies of Complaint-Affidavit and Supporting Documents dated January 30, 2017.16 Petitioner essentially reiterated his arguments in his first omnibus motion, but added that the filing of the said omnibus motion did not cure the defects in the Ombudsman's failure to observe due process.17
The filing by Labay of the Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation on 16 November 2016 cured whatever defect in the observance of due process. Denial of due process cannot he success. fully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, this Office, through the undersigned, DENIES respondents Marc Douglas C. Cagas IV's Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 August 2016; Maria Rosalinda M. Lacsamana's Motion for Reconsideration dated 08 August 2016; Consuela Lilian R. Espiritu's Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 August 2016; Marivic V. Jover's Motion for Reconsideration dated 13 September 2016; and Johanne Edward B. Labay's Motion for Reinvestigation and Deferment of Filing of Information with Request for Copies of Complaint-Affidavits and Supporting Documents dated 16 November 2016.
All indictments against them, as originally embodied in the Resolution dated 10 May 2016, STAND.
SO ORDERED.15 (Emphasis in the original)
WHEREFORE, the Court -Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration23 dated August 3, 2017. However, this was denied for lack of merit and for being pro forma in the second assailed Resolution dated October 19, 2017.24
(1) DECLARES the existence of probable cause in these cases. Accordingly, let warrants of arrest be issued against all the accused except for accused Marc Douglas Chan Cagas IV who had already posted bail; (2) NOTES the Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause With Entry of Appearance dated April 4, 2017, filed by accused Marc Douglas Chan Cagas IV; and the Motion To Set Aside No Bail Recommendation in Crim Case No. SB-17-CRM-0644 for Malversation Through Falsification and To Fix the Amount of Bail in Crim Case No. SB-17-CRM-0644 for Malversation Through Falsification filed by accused Johanne Edward B. Labay; and (3) DENIES the Motion For Reinvestigation and To Defer the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest filed by accused Johanne Edward B. Labay for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.22
Section 3. Preliminary investigation; who may conduct. Preliminary Investigation may be conducted by any of the following:Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure also provides similar guidelines in the conduct of preliminary investigation, to wit:
1) Ombudsman Investigators;
2) Special Prosecuting Officers;
3) Deputized Prosecutors;
4) Investigating Officials authorized by law to conduct preliminary investigations or
5) Lawyers in the government service, so designated by the Ombudsman.
Section 4. Procedure - The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following provisions:
a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaints.
b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondents to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof of service thereof on the complainant. The complainant may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of the counter-affidavits.
c) If the respondent does not file a counter-affidavit, the investigating officer may consider the comment filed by him, if any, as his answer to the complaint. In any event, the respondent shall have access to the evidence on record.
d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Neither may a motion for a bill of particulars be entertained. If respondents desire any matter in the complainant's affidavit to be clarified, the particularization thereof may be done at the time of clarificatory questioning in the manner provided in paragraph (f) of this section.
e) If the respondents cannot be served with the order mentioned in paragraph 6 hereof, or having been served, does not comply therewith, the complaint shall be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence on the record.
f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting evidences, there are facts material to the case which the investigating officer may need to be clarified on, he may conduct a clarificatory hearing during which the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine the witness being questioned. Where the appearance of the parties or witnesses is impracticable, the clarificatory questioning may be conducted in writing, whereby the questions desired to be asked by the investigating officer or a party shall be reduced into writing and served on the witness concerned who shall be required to answer the same in writing and under oath.
g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall forward the records of the case together with his resolution to the designated authorities for their appropriate action thereon.
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written authority or approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases.
Section 3. Procedure. - The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:It is clear from the foregoing that an accused in a criminal case has the right to be informed of the charges against him,34 to submit a counter affidavit, and to have access to and examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.35
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents.
The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.
Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination, copying, or photographing at the expense of there questing party.
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.
(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but without th. right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.
The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-affidavits and other documents or from the expiration of the period for their submission. It shall be terminated within five (5) days.
(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial. (3a)
The Court finds accused Labay's motion for reinvestigation bereft of merit.We disagree.
The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard in support of his case. What the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard. When the party seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and to air his side, but it was by his own fault or choice that he squandered these chances, then his cry for due process must fail.
Admittedly, there is no showing that accused Labay was served a copy of the order requiring him to file his counter-affidavit. The record shows, however, that on October 4, 2016, accused Labay wrote the Office of the Ombudsman requesting information on case numbers and titles of the cases it referred to in its press release where his name appears. In reply to the said letter, the Office of the Ombudsman confirmed that accused Labay is a respondent in two (2) cases and furnished him copies of the Resolutions dated May 10, 2016 and June 3, 2016. It also reminded accused Labay that he has five (5) days from notice within which to file a motion for reconsideration.
Thus, on November 16, 2016, accused Labay filed a Motion for Reinvestigation and Deferment of Filing of Information with Request for Copies of Complaint-Affidavits and Supporting Documents assailing the Office of the Ombudsman's Resolution dated May 10, 2016, finding probably cause to indict him. The said motion was denied by the Office of the Ombudsman in its Order dated November 25, 2016 upon the following ratiocination:
x x x x
Thereafter, accused Labay filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Deferment of Filing of Information assailing the above order. In denying the said motion, the Office of the Ombudsman pointed out that while accused Labay asserted that he did not commit the crimes imputed to him and that he did not participate in any conspiracy in the commission of the crimes, he prayed that the Office of the Ombudsman conduct a reinvestigation, furnish him a copy of the complaint, allow him to gather evidence and submit counter-affidavit. Further, the Office of the Ombudsman held that when accused Labay filed his second motion, he already exhausted his remedy under Section 7(a), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which allows the filing of only one (1) motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation.
The above circumstances unerringly show that accused Labay was accorded due process by filing two (2) motions before the Office of the Ombudsman.
20. By Joint Order dated 01 September 2015, the Office of the Ombudsman directed therein respondents (including Labay) to file their respective counter-affidavits.As pointed out by petitioner, the Ombudsman only tried to effect service of the order to file his counter affidavit on petitioner on one instance, albeit to two different addresses. However, this service failed since petitioner was no longer employed at his former office at NAPC, as confirmed by the letter sent by the NAPC Secretary and Lead Convenor, and since he was no longer residing at the residential address where the order was sent.
21. Despite earnest efforts, copies of the Joint Order could not be served in the last known or given addresses of Cunanan, Semillano, Carrasco, Reyes, and herein petitioner Labay, after they have been noted to be unknown in said addresses, or had moved out and left no forwarding address.51 (emphasis in the original)
We have judiciously studied the case records and we find that the preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioners has been conducted not in the manner laid down in Administrative Order No. 07.While the Duterte case is not on all fours with the case before Us, We find that the Ombudsman's failure to furnish petitioner Labay with copies of the complaint affidavit and its supporting documents despite the latter's numerous attempts and requests to secure the same is more severe as it gravely endangers petitioner's right to liberty through no fault of his own. Undeniably, petitioner Labay's receipt of the May 10, 2016 Resolution is not equivalent to receipt of the complaint affidavit and its supporting documents.
In the 12 November 1991 Order of Graft Investigator Manriquez, petitioners were merely directed to submit a point-by-point comment under oath on the allegations in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 and SAR No. 91-05. The said order was not accompanied by a single affidavit of any person charging petitioners of any offense as required by law. They were just required to comment upon the allegations in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City which had earlier been dismissed and on the COA Special Audit Report. Petitioners had no inkling that they were being subjected to a preliminary investigation as in fact there was no indication in the order that a preliminary investigation was being conducted. If Graft Investigator Manriquez had intended merely to adopt the allegations of the plaintiffs in the civil case or the Special Audit Report (whose recommendation for the cancellation of the contract in question had been complied with) as his basis for criminal prosecution, then the procedure was plainly anomalous and highly irregular. As a consequence, petitioners constitutional right to due process was violated. (citations omitted)
| Very truly yours, |
(SGD) | |
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN | |
Division Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 68-78. Penned by Presiding Justice/Chairperson Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang and concurred in by Associate Justices Sarah Jane T. Fernandez and Bernelito R. Fernandez.
2 Id. at 80-89.
3 Id. at 99.
4 Id. at 100-101; 106-107.
5 Id. at 109.
6 Id. at 208.
7 Id. at 208-210.
8 Id. at 98-140. Prepared by Graft Investigation & Prosecution Officer III Leilani P. TagulaoMarquez reviewed by Acting Director Ruth Laura A. Mella, recommended for approval by Graft Investigation & Prosecution Officer IV M.A. Chnstian Uy. and approved by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales.
9 Id. at 7.
10 Id. at 91.
11 Id. at 95-96.
12 Id. at 142-156.
13 Id. at 152-155.
14 Id. at 158-178.
15 Id. at 173-174.
16 Id. at 179-200.
17 Id. at 191-196.
18 Id. at 202-214.
19 Id. at 9.
20 Id. at 9-10.
21 Id. at 10.
22 Id. at 255-288.
23 Id. at 61-62.
24 Id. at 80-89.
25 Id. at 294.
26 Entry of Appearance with Comment and Motion to Dissolve the TRO Issued on 21 March 2018 dated April 17, 2018.
27Rollo, pp. 14-16.
28 Id. at 17-20.
29Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez v. The Honorable Sandiganhayan (First Division) and The People of the Philippines represented by Special Prosecution Officer II Evelyn Tagoba Lucero, G.R. No. 143618-41, July 30, 2002.
30 The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 112, Section 1.
31Rolito Go y Tambunting v. The Court of Appeals, The Hon Benjamin V. Pelayo, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 101837. Februarv 11, 1992.
32Reynolan T Sales v. Sandiganbayan (4th Division), Ombudsman, People of the Philippines and Thelma Benemerito, G.R. No. 143802, November 16, 2001.
33 Administrative Order No. 07. Rule II, Section 1.
34 The 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article III, Section 14.
35Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, Field Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman, National Bureau of Investigation and Atty. Levito D. Baligod, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015.
36Rollo, p. 99.
37 Id. at 109.
38 Id. at 208.
39 Id. at 208-210.
40 Id. at 7.
41 Id. at 91.
42 Id. at 95-96.
43 Id. at 142-156.
44 Id. at 152-155.
45 Id. at 173-174.
46 Id. at 191-196.
47 Id. at 202-214.
48 Id. at 9.
49 Id. at 9-10.
50 Id. at 10.
51 Id. at 11.
52Antonio Lejano v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 176389, December 14, 2010. citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
53 G.R. No. 130191, April 27, 1998.DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I dissent. This case should have been elevated to the Court En Banc as it is contrary to the doctrine established in De Lima v. Reyes,1Pemberton v. De Lima,2Napoles v. De Lima,3 and Cambe v. Office of the Ombudsman.4
Petitioner was not deprived of due process in the preliminary investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman. Not having been deprived of due process, there is no reason for the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the complaint against him. In any case, the filing of the Information with the Sandiganbayan already vests the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction to determine the existence of probable cause. The issuance of a warrant of arrest already renders moot any irregularities that may have occurred during the preliminary investigation.I
This Court should not confuse the constitutional rights accorded to an accused in a criminal prosecution and the rights accorded to a respondent in a preliminary investigation. Due process in a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right but merely a statutory privilege. In Lozada v. Hernandez:5It has been said time and again that a preliminary investigation is not properly a trial or any part thereof but is merely preparatory thereto, its only purpose being to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty thereof. The right to such investigation is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution. At most, it is statutory. And rights conferred upon accused persons to participate in preliminary investigations concerning themselves depend upon the provisions of law by which such rights are specifically secured, rather than upon the phrase "due process of law."6The rules governing the procedure for the conduct of a preliminary investigation are those outlined in Rule 112, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, which are reproduced in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman:7The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure state that the investigating prosecutor, in proceeding with the investigation, shall "issue a subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents."8 This is mandatory. However, the Rules of Procedure do not state that the subpoena must be sent to respondent repeatedly until respondent submits a counter-affidavit. They only mandate that the investigating prosecutor must issue a subpoena to the respondent to file his or her counter-affidavit. Thus, Rule 112, Section 3(d) of the Rules of Court provides:RULE 112
Preliminary Investigation
....
Section 3. Procedure. - The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents.
The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.
Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination, copying, or photographing at the expense of the requesting party.
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.
(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.
The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-affidavits and other documents or from the expiration of the period for their submission. It shall be terminated within five (5) days.
(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)In this case, petitioner was sent copies of the Joint Order dated September 1, 2015, where the Ombudsman directed respondents to file their respective counter-affidavits, at two (2) of his addresses on record.9 The Ombudsman has already complied with what was required by the Rules of Court.
This case cannot be similar to that in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan.10 In Duterte, petitioners were merely ordered to comment on the complaints against them. They were not specifically ordered to file their respective counter-affidavits. Thus, they had reasonable ground to believe that a preliminary investigation had been conducted against them:In the 12 November 1991 Order of Graft Investigator Manriquez, petitioners were merely directed to submit a point-by-point comment under oath on the allegations in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 and on SAR No. 91-05. The said order was not accompanied by a single affidavit of any person charging petitioners of any offense as required by law. They were just required to comment upon the allegations in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City which had earlier been dismissed and on the COA Special Audit Report. Petitioners had no inkling that they were being subjected to a preliminary investigation as in fact there was no indication in the order that a preliminary investigation was being conducted. If Graft Investigator Manriquez had intended merely to adopt the allegations of the plaintiffs in the civil case or the Special Audit Report (whose recommendation for the cancellation of the contract in question had been complied with) as his bases for criminal prosecution, then the procedure was plainly anomalous and highly irregular. As a consequence, petitioners' constitutional right to due process was violated.11 (Citation omitted)What this Court emphasized in Duterte was the egregious failure of the Office of the Ombudsman to follow its own rules of procedure. In this instance, Administrative Order No. 7 mandates the Office of the Ombudsman to issue a subpoena for respondents to file their respective counter-affidavits. The Ombudsman, in this case, has already complied with this mandate.
It must likewise be emphasized that while the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge petitioner even before he was aware of the investigation against him, this finding of probable cause was not yet final. There was no information yet against petitioner filed with any court.
According to the facts in the ponencia, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution dated May 10, 2016 finding probable cause to charge petitioner with conspiracy in the commission of two (2) counts of Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, one (1) count of Malversation of Public Funds and one (1) count of Malversation thru Falsification.12 Petitioner alleged that he was made aware of this only in October 2016. Upon a letter request to the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman, on October 10. 2016, furnished petitioner with a copy of the May 10, 2016 Resolution.13
However, instead of merely furnishing petitioner with a copy of the Resolution finding probable cause, the Ombudsman allowed petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution within five (5) days from receipt. In other words, the Ombudsman gave petitioner the opportunity to overturn her finding of probable cause by giving him time to submit his counter-affidavit and any other controverting evidence he might have.
Petitioner was in an even better position than his co-respondents to refute the charges against him since he would have already been made aware, through the May 10, 2016 Resolution, of the specific evidence the Ombudsman found to have been convincing enough to find probable cause. He would have known exactly what evidence he needed to submit to controvert the findings against him, instead of merely guessing what the Ombudsman might find convincing, as he would have done during the preliminary investigation. Instead of taking this opportunity, petitioner instead filed an Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation and Deferment of Filing of Information with Request for Copies of Complaint-Affidavit and Supporting Documents.14 Thus, in denying this Motion, the Ombudsman stated:The filing by Labay of the Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation on 16 November 2016 cured whatever defect in the observance of due process. Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.15This Court has stated that "the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of."16 Petitioner was granted an opportunity to be heard. Thus, he was not denied the right to due process.II
Even assuming that there were irregularities in the conduct of the preliminary investigation, any petition filed to question these irregularities would already be rendered moot once the court issues a warrant of arrest against the accused.
There are two (2) stages in the determination of probable cause. The first stage is the executive determination of probable cause, which is done by the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation. The second stage is the judicial determination of probable cause. Once information has been submitted to the court, the court acquires full jurisdiction over the case.17 Therefore, any question must be addressed to its sound discretion. In Crespo v. Mogul:18The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.19The court's finding of probable cause is arrived at independent of the prosecutor's findings. Thus, any perceived irregularity in the conduct of the preliminary investigation does not affect the court's acquisition of jurisdiction. In People v. Narca:20It must be emphasized that the preliminary investigation is not the venue for the full exercise of the rights of the parties. This is why preliminary investigation is not considered as a part of trial but merely preparatory thereto and that the records therein shall not form part of the records of the case in court. Parties may submit affidavits but have no right to examine witnesses though they can propound questions through the investigating office. In fact, a preliminary investigation may even be conducted ex parte in certain cases. Moreover, in Section 1 of Rule 112, the purpose of a preliminary investigation is only to determine a well grounded belief if a crime was "probably" committed by an accused. In any case, the invalidity or absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of the court which may have taken cognizance of the information nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.21 (Emphasis supplied)In this case, Informations were already filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan. In its July 10, 2017 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan found the existence of probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest against him.22The Sandiganbayan, independent of the findings of the Ombudsman in the preliminary investigation, found that based on the records, there was probable cause to arrest petitioner. Thus, any question on the conduct of the preliminary investigation was already rendered moot by the July 10, 2017 Resolution.
Thus, in De Lima v. Reyes,23 this Court dismissed a Petition for Review on Certiorari questioning the Secretary of Justice's finding of probable cause against the accused for being moot:Here, the trial court has already determined, independently of any finding or recommendation by the First Panel or the Second Panel, that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against respondent. Probable cause has been judicially determined. Jurisdiction over the case, therefore, has transferred to the trial court. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary investigation in any other venue has been rendered moot by the issuance of the warrant of arrest and the conduct of arraignment.The same ruling was applied in Pemberton v. De Lima,25Napoles v. De Lima,26 and Cambe v. Office of the Ombudsman.27 There are no special circumstances in this case to re-visit this Court's ruling in these cases.
The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed before them when the trial court issued its warrant of arrest. Since the trial court has already acquired jurisdiction over the case and the existence of probable cause has been judicially determined, a petition for certiorari questioning the conduct of the preliminary investigation ceases to be the "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy" provided by law. Since this Petition for Review is an appeal from a moot Petition for Certiorari, it must also be rendered moot.
The prudent course of action at this stage would be to proceed to trial. Respondent, however, is not without remedies. He may still file any appropriate action before the trial court or question any alleged irregularity in the preliminary investigation during pre-trial.24 (Emphasis supplied)
Even assuming further that the irregularities were enough to warrant a reinvestigation, it was within the Sandiganbayan's discretion to order its conduct. In Baltazar v. Ombudsman,28 this Court emphasized that "courts are given wide latitude to accord the accused ample opportunity to present controverting evidence even before trial as demanded by due process."29
Here, if indeed the Sandiganbayan found that petitioner was deprived of due process, it would have ordered a reinvestigation. However, the Sandiganbayan found that due process had already been accorded to petitioner but that petitioner squandered the opportunities given to submit his defense:The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard in support of his case. What the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard. When the party seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and to air his side, but it was by his own fault or choice that he squandered these chances, then his cry for due process must fail.30The right to due process applies equally to the State and to the defense. In People v. Court of Appeals and Jonathan Cerbo:31The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an "oppressive" exercise of government prosecutorial powers do need to be protected when circumstances so require. But just as we recognize this need, we also acknowledge that the State must likewise be accorded due process. Thus, when there is no showing of nefarious irregularity or manifest error in the performance of a public prosecutor's duties, courts ought to refrain from interfering with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.32A defect in procedure is not automatically assumed as a deprivation of what is at most a statutory right. Irregularities in the executive determination of probable cause do not necessarily affect the judicial determination of probable cause. Once the Sandiganbayan has determined that there is probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest, any question as to the conduct of the preliminary investigation is already moot.
Accordingly, I vote to DENY the Petition for Certiorari. The Sandiganbayan should proceed with the resolution of Criminal Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-0642 to 0643 and Criminal Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-0644 to 0645 with due and deliberate dispatch.Endnotes:
1 776 Phil. 623 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
2 784 Phil. 918 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
3 790 Phil. 161 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
4 G.R. Nos. 212014-15, December 6, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/december2016/212014-15.pdf> (Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
5 92 Phil. 1051 (1953) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
6 Id. at 1053, citing U.S. v. Yu Tuico, 34 Phil. 209 (1916) [Per J. Moreland, Second Division]; People v. Badilla, 48 Phil. 718 (1926) [Per J. Ostrand, En Banc]; II MORAN, RULES OF COURT 673 (1952); and U.S. v. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil. 122 (1910) [Per J. Trent, En Banc].
7 Adm. O. No. 7 (1990).
8 REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 112, sec. 3(b).
9Ponencia, p. 2.
10 352 Phil. 557 (1998) [Per J. Kapunan, Third Division].
11 Id. at 573.
12Ponencia, p. 2.
13 Id. at 3.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 4.
16Resurreccion v. People, 738 Phil. 704 (2014) [Per J. Brion, Second Division] citing Ray Peter O. Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), 721 Phil. 34 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
17See People v. Castillo and Mejia, 607 Phil. 754 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
18 235 Phil. 465 (1987) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].
19 Id. at 476.
20 341 Phil. 696 (1997) [Per J. Francisco, Third Division].
21 Id. at 705, citing Lozada v. Hernandez, 92 Phil. 1051 (1953) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc]; RULES OF COURT, Rule 112, sec. 8; RULES OF COURT, Rule 112, sec. 3(e); RULES OF COURT, Rule 112, sec. 3(d); Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 315 Phil. 657 (1995) [Per J. Quiason, First Division]; Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 306 Phil. 567 (I983) [Per J. Escolin, En Banc]; Webb v. De Leon, 317 Phil. 758 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division]; Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 313 Phil. 870 (1995) [Per C.J. Narvasa, En Banc]; and People v. Gomez, 202 Phil. 395 (1982) [Per J. Relova, First Division].
22Ponencia, p. 5.
23 776 Phil. 623 (2016) (Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
24 Id. at 652-653, citing RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec 1.
25 784 Phil. 918 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
26 790 Phil. 161 (20 16) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
27 G.R. Nos. 212014-15, December 6,2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/december2016/212014-15.pdf> [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
28 539 Phil. 131 (2006) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
29 Id. at 144.
30Ponencia, p. 13, the Sandiganbayan July 10, 2017 Resolution.
31 361 Phil. 401 (1999) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
32People v. Court of Appeals and Jonathan Cerbo, 361 Phil. 401 (1999) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].