THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 195905, July 04, 2018
THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO REPRESENTED BY MAURICIO G. DOMOGAN, CITY MAYOR, CITY BUILDINGS AND ARCHITECTURE OFFICE REPRESENTED BY OSCAR FLORES, AND PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY DIVISION REPRESENTED BY FERNANDO MOYAEN AND CITY DEMOLITION TEAM REPRESENTED BY NAZITA BAÑEZ, Petitioners, v. ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, REGIONAL HEARING OFFICER-NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES-CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, MAGDALENA GUMANGAN, MARION T. POOL, LOURDES C. HERMOGENO, JOSEPH LEGASPI, JOSEPH BASATAN, MARCELINO BASATAN, JOSEPHINE LEGASPI, LANSIGAN BAWAS, ALEXANDER AMPAGUEY, JULIO DALUYEN, SR., CONCEPCION PADANG AND CARMEN PANAYO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MARTIRES, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the 5 August 2010 Decision1 and 31 January 2011 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 110598.
The present controversy stemmed from the various orders issued by the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples-Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR) in NCIP Case Nos. 29-CAR-09 and 31-CAR-09.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSSED. The assailed issuances STAND. Costs against Petitioners.10Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its assailed 31 January 2011 resolution.
ISSUES I.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR BEING PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE; ANDII.
WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
In this case, respondent was charged with indirect contempt for issuing the subject orders enjoining the implementation of demolition orders against illegal structures constructed on a portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City.As a general rule, the Court no longer entertains petitions which have been rendered moot. After all, the decision would have no practical value. Nevertheless, there are exceptions where the Court resolves moot and academic cases, viz: (a) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar, and the public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.14
x x x x
The said orders clearly contravene our ruling in G.R. No. 180206 that those owners of houses and structures covered by the demolition orders issued by petitioner are not entitled to the injunctive relief previously granted by respondent.
x x x x
As mentioned earlier, the Court while recognizing that the NCIP is empowered to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction, nevertheless ruled that petitioners in the injunction case seeking to restrain the implementation of the subject demolition order are not entitled to such relief. Petitioner City Government of Baguio in issuing the demolition advices are simply enforcing the previous demolition orders against the same occupants or claimants or their agents and successors-in-interest, only to be thwarted anew by the injunctive orders and, writs issued by respondent. Despite the Court's pronouncements in G.R. No. 180206 that no such clear legal right exists in favor of those occupants or claimants to restrain the enforcement of the demolition orders issued by petitioner, and hence there remains no legal impediment to bar their implementation, respondent still issued the temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction. x x x
x x x x
WHEREFORE, the petition for contempt is GRANTED. The assailed Temporary Restraining Order dated July 27, 2009, Order dated July 31, 2009, and Writ of Preliminary Injunction in NCIP Case No. 31-CAR-09, and Temporary Restraining Order dated July 27, 2009, Order dated July 31, 2009 and Writ of Preliminary Injunction in NCIP Case No. 29-CAR-09 are hereby all LIFTED and SET ASIDE.13
The Court finds that exceptions exist to warrant petitioners' direct resort to a petition for certiorari before the CA notwithstanding its lack of a motion for reconsideration filed before the NCIP. First, the issues had been duly raised before the NCIP especially considering that petitioner had presented similar arguments or opposition from the TRO initially issued by the NCIP until the grant of the writ of preliminary injunction. Second, there is urgency in the petition because petitioners seek to implement its demolition orders with the goal of preserving the Busol Forest Reserve, Baguio's primary forest and watershed. It cannot be gainsaid that any delay may greatly prejudice the government as the Busol Forest Reserve may be further compromised. Third, the preservation of the Busol Forest Reserve involves public interest as it would have a significant impact on the water supply for the City of Baguio.
- Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
- Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
- Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or the petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is perishable;
- Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
- Where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
- Where, in a criminal case, a relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
- Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
- Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
- Where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.19
It is settled that a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued only to prevent grave and irreparable injury, that is, injury that is actual, substantial and demonstrable. Here, there is no irreparable injury as understood in law. Rather, the damages alleged by the petitioner, namely, immense loss in profit and possible damage claims from clients and the cost of the billboard which is a considerable amount of money is easily quantifiable, and certainly does not fall within the concept of irreparable damage or injury as described in Social Security Commission v. Bayona:More importantly, their continued occupation absent any clear legal right cannot be countenanced because of the threat it poses to the Busol Water Reserve. In Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary,30 the Court emphasized the importance of preserving watersheds, to wit:Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of injunction where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. An irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement. An irreparable injury to authorize an injunction consists of a serious charge of, or is destructive to, the property it affects, either physically or in the character in which it has been held and enjoined, or when the property has some peculiar quality or use, so that its pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the owner of the loss thereof.29 (emphasis omitted)
This brings us to the second self-evident point. Water is life, and must be saved at all costs. In Collado v. Court of Appeals, we had occasion to reaffirm our previous discussion in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, on the primordial importance of watershed areas, thus: The most important product of a watershed is water, which is one of the most important human necessities. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flash floods that not only damage property but also cause[s] loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered now.31 (emphasis and underlining supplied)While the Court does not discount the possible loss private respondents may suffer should their land claims be recognized with finality, still it bears re.iterating that they failed to show that they are entitled to an injunctive relief. In summary, private respondents do not have a clear and unmistakable legal right because their land claims are still pending recognition and any loss or injury they may suffer can be compensable by damages. To add, their occupation of the Busol Water Reserve poses a continuing threat of damaging the preservation or viability of the watershed. Any danger to the sustainability of the Busol Water Reserve affects not only individuals or families inside the watershed but also the entire community relying on it as a source of a basic human necessity-water. Furthermore, unlike the injury private respondents may suffer, any damage to the Busol Water Reserve is irreversible and may not only affect the present generation but also those to come.
The foregoing provision indeed states that Baguio City is governed by its own charter. Its exemption from the IPRA, however, cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law concedes the validity of prior land rights recognized or acquired through any process before its effectivity. The IPRA demands that the city's charter respect the validity of these recognize-land rights and titles.In City Government of Baguio, it was recognized that the NCIP is empowered to issue TROs and writs of injunction. Nevertheless, the said case ruled that therein respondents were not entitled to an injunctive relief because they failed to prove their definite right over the properties they claimed. The circumstances in City Government of Baguio and the present case are similar. In both cases, the claimants principally rely on Proclamation No. 15 as basis for their ancestral land claims in the Busol Forest Reserve. Unfortunately, it was ruled that the said proclamation is not a definitive recognition of their ancestral land claims as it only identifies their predecessors-in-interest as claimants.
The crucial question to be asked then is whether private respondents' ancestral land claim was indeed recognized by Proclamation No. 15, in which case, their right thereto may be protected by an injunctive writ. After all, before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners must show that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which injunction is directed are violative of said right.
Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private respondents ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families, the predecessor-in-interest of private respondents, as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same.
x x x x
The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the Court as inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals. The declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as such precludes its conversion into private property. Relatedly, the courts are not endowed with jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest lands.34
Lastly, however, this Court ruled that although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction, it was not convinced that private respondents were entitled to the relief granted by the Commission. Proclamation No. 15 does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private respondents' ancestral land claim, as it merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation, but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same. Since it is required before the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction that claimants show the existence of a right to be protected, this Court, in G.R. No. 180206, ultimately granted the petition of the City Government of Baguio and set aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued therein.Like the private respondents in City Government of Baguio and in Baguio Regreening, herein claimants principally rely on Proclamation No. 15 as basis for their ancestral land claims in the Busol Forest Reserve. Thus, the Court is constrained to similarly rule that the injunctive relief issued in the present case are without basis because the applicants failed to establish a clear and legal right. After all, it has been settled that Proclamation No. 15 is not a definite recognition or their ancestral land claims.
In the case at bar, petitioners and private respondents present the very same arguments and counter-arguments with respect to the writ of injunction, against fencing of the Busol Watershed Reservation. The same legal issues are thus being litigated in G.R. No. 180206 and in the case at bar, except that different writs of injunction are being assailed. In both cases, petitioners claim (1) that Atty. Masweng is prohibited from issuing temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction against government infrastructure projects; (2) that Baguio City is beyond the ambit of the IPRA; and (3) that private respondents have not shown a clear right to be protected. Private respondents, on the other hand, presented the same allegations in their Petition for Injunction, particularly the alleged recognition made under Proclamation No. 15 in favor of their ancestors. While res judicata does not apply on account of the different subject matters of the case at bar and G.R. No. 180206 (they assail different writs of injunction, albeit issued by the same hearing officer), we are constrained by the principle of stare decisis to grant the instant petition.38
Very truly yours, |
(SGD) |
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN |
Division Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 60-80.
2 Id. at 81-82.
3 CA rollo, pp. 517-527.
4 Id. at 76-83.
5 Id. at 430-432.
6Rollo, pp. 107-108.
7 Id. at 105-106.
8 Id. at 129-130.
9 CA rollo, pp. 3-26.
10Rollo, pp. 48-49.
11Gunsi, Sr. v. Commission on Elections, 599 Phil. 229 (2009).
12 727 Phil. 540 (2014).
13 Id. at 549-555.
14Timbol v. Commission on Elections, 754 Phil. 578, 585 (2015) citing ARARO Party-List v. Commission on Elections, 723 Phil. 160, 184 (2013).
15 Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 1.
16Bergonia v. CA, 680 Phil. 334, 339 (2012).
17Castro v. Guevarra, 686 Phil. 1125, 1137 (2012).
18 682 Phil. 186 (2012).
19 Id. at 194.
20Cruz v. Caraos, 550 Phil. 98, 107 (2007).
21Heirs of Sotto v. Palicte, 726 Phil. 651, 654 (2014).
22Republic of the Philippines v. Yu, 519 Phil. 391, 396 (2006).
23 Rules of Court, Rule 58, Section 1.
24China Banking Corporation v. Ciriaco, 690 Phil. 480, 486 (2012).
25Lukang v. Pagbilao Development Corporation, 728 Phil. 608, 617-618 (2014).
26Transfield Philippines, Inc. v. Luzon Hydro Corporation, 485 Phil. 699, 726 (2004).
27The City Mayor of Baguio v. Masweng, 625 Phil. 179, 183 (2010).
28 620 Phil. 205 (2009).
29 Id. at 219.
30 513 Phil. 557 (2005).
31 Id. at 582-583.
32 Article 8 of the Civil Code.
33 597 Phil. 668 (2009).
34 Id. at 678-679.
35Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, 689 Phil. 603 (2012).
36 Id. 613.
37The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v. Masweng, 705 Phil. 103 (2013).
38 Id. at 117-118.