THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 206725, July 11, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ESMAEL GERVERO, FLORENCIO ARBOLONIO, DANILO CASTIGADOR, CELSO SOLOMON AND EDUARDO BAÑES, Accused.
ESMAEL GERVERO (DECEASED), DANILO CASTIGADOR, CELSO SOLOMON AND EDUARDO BAÑES, Accused-Appellants.
MARTIRES, J.:
This is an appeal from the 31 March 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00674 which affirmed with modification the 6 March 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Iloilo City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 37792, finding Esmael Gervero, Florencio Arbolonio, Celso Solomon, Danilo Castigador, and Eduardo Bañes (the accused) guilty of murder.3
That on or about the 25th day of November, 1991, in the Municipality of Lemery, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, armed with firearms, they were then provided, through treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, shoot and hit HERNANDO VILLEGAS, JOSE VILLEGAS and BENITO BASUG, JR. with said firearms inflicting upon said Hernando Villegas, Jose Villegas and Benito Basug, Jr. numerous gunshot wounds on different parts of their bodies which caused their deaths immediately thereafter.Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the remaining five (5) accused ESMAEL GERVERO, FLORENCIO ARBOLONIO, CELSO SOLOMON, DANILO CASTIGADOR and EDUARDO BAÑES GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences each of them as follows:Aggrieved, the accused elevated its appeal before the CA.Each of the accused are likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Hernando Villegas, Jose Villegas and Benito Basug, Jr. the following:
- The penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the death of Hernando Villegas;
- The penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the death of Jose Villegas; and
- The penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the death of Benito Basug, Jr.
SO ORDERED.12
- P15,000.00 as temperate damages;
- P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
- P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
- P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
- To pay the costs.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the assailed Decision of 06 March 2006 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 29, in Criminal Case No. 37792 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION only insofar as the amount of damages as follows:Hence, this appeal by Esmael Gervero (deceased), Danilo Castigador, Celso Solomon, and Eduardo Bañes (accused-appellants).
"Each of the accused [is] likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Hernando Villegas, Jose Villegas, and Benito Basug, Jr. the following:
1. P25,000.00 as temperate damages;
2. P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
3. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. P75,000.00 as moral damages; and
5. To pay the costs."
SO ORDERED.13
Accused-appellants assert that the patrol and combat operation they conducted on 25 November 1991, was authorized by their commanding officer Senior Inspector Baldevinos; that the year 1991 was a time of political instability as the then administration had to deal with an invigorated communist insurgency; that when they went their way to confront their enemies, they needed the mindset of men with resolve; thus, when they confronted three non-uniformed armed men who fired at them, they were acting in good faith; that there was no treachery because they were justified by the circumstances of place and time to introduce the element of surprise; and that they reported the encounter to the barangay captain of Barangay Milan and to the Lemery Police Station at their own volition, when during such time they could have already fled if indeed they had acted in malice and bad faith.14ISSUES
- WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF MISTAKE OF FACT; AND
- WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY QUALIFIED THE KILLING TO MURDER.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of US. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.Further, in Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan,17 the Court has laid down the requisites for such defense to prosper, viz:
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil. 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise x x x16
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain failure. In the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution. Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the crime. It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only general intent. The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant, and it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person. A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the crime or the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.First, there was no reason for the accused not to recognize the victims because they were traversing an open area which was illuminated not only by moonlight, but also by a light bulb. In addition, the witnesses testified that the victims were conversing and laughing loudly. It must be borne in mind that it was not the first time that the accused had seen the victims as, in fact, accused Bañes and Castigador met Hernando just a few hours before the shooting. Moreover, they all reside in the same town and, certainly, the accused who were all members of the CAFGU would know the residents of that town so as to easily distinguish them from unknown intruders who might be alleged members of the NPA. Second, when Jose fell down, Hernando identified himself and shouted, "This is Hernando!" However, instead of verifying the identities of the victims, the accused continued to fire at them. One of them even shouted, "Birahi na!" ("Shoot now!"). Third, when the victims fell down, the accused approached their bodies. At that point, they could no longer claim that they didn't recognize the victims; and still not contented, they sprayed them with bullets such that Jose suffered 14 gunshot wounds,19 Hernando 16 gunshot wounds,20 and Benito 20 gunshot wounds.21Fourth, contrary to their testimonies during trial to the effect that the victims were the first to fire their weapons, Brgy. Capt. Balinas testified that when he asked the accused whether the victims had fired at them, the accused answered him in the negative. Fifth, the accused would like the Court to believe that the victims knew the safe word "Amoy" which must be uttered in response to "Simoy" in order to easily determine whether they were members of the NPA. However, the victims could not have known the safe words as accused Gervero himself stated in his testimony that only he and his co-accused were present when their commanding officer briefed them about the safe words to be used in their operation.22 All these circumstances negate accused-appellants' claim of mistake of fact and point instead to a concerted action to eliminate the victims.
The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in United States v. Ah Chong, but in that setting, the principle was treated as a function of self-defense where the physical circumstances of the case had mentally manifested to the accused an aggression which it was his instinct to repel. There, the accused, fearful of bad elements, was woken by the sound of his bedroom door being broken open and, receiving no response from the intruder after having demanded identification, believed that a robber had broken in. He threatened to kill the intruder but at that moment he was struck by a chair which he had placed against the door and, perceiving that he was under attack, seized a knife and fatally stabbed the intruder who turned out to be his roommate. Charged with homicide, he was acquitted because of his honest mistake of fact. Finding that the accused had no evil intent to commit the charge, the Court explained:
x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability, provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." x x x
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing-or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does not believe them -he is legally guiltless of homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason, and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be, the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he has really no occasion for the extreme measure.
x x x x
Besides, as held in People v. Oanis and Baxinela v. People, the justification of an act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact, must preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of the accused. Thus, Ah Chong further explained that -
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. [emphases supplied]18
ART. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:Generally, the elements of murder are: 1) That a person was killed; 2) That the accused killed him; 3) That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248; and 4) That the killing is not parricide or infanticide.25
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin;
4. On occasion of any calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity;
5. With evident premeditation;
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
Very truly yours, |
(SGD) |
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN |
Division Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 3-18; penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. with Associates Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos and Gabriel T. Ingles, concurring.
2 Records, pp. 805-827; penned by Pairing Judge Loida J. Diestro-Mapurol.
3 Remegildo P. Arbolonio and Jesus A. Catequista, Jr. died during the pendency of the case.
4 Records, p. 1.
5 Records, pp. 994-999.
6 Records,pp. 886-890, 905-907, 1000.
7 Records, pp. 890-891, 908, 1000-1002.
8 Records, pp. 891-893, 908-909, 1001-1002.
9 Records, pp. 910-911, 941-942.
10 Records, pp. 1054-1057, 1106.
11 Records, pp. 1059-1064.
12 Records, p. 827.
13Rollo, p. 17.
14 CA rollo, pp. 38-58.
15 74 Phil. 257 (1943).
16 Id. at 257-258.
17 689 Phil. 75 (2012).
18 Id. at 115-118.
19 Records, p. 927.
20 Records, pp. 808-809.
21 Records, p. 930.
22 Records, p. 1106.
23 Supra note 15.
24 Id. at 259.
25 Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code Criminal Code, Book Two, 17th Ed., p. 496 (2008).
26People v. Manzano, Jr., G.R. No. 217974, 5 March 2018.
27People v. Amora, 748 Phil. 608, 621 (2014).
28 783 Phil. 806 (2016).
29 Id. at 847.