FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 219774, July 23, 2018
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ROSITA DE LEON, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TIJAM, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court over the Decision2 dated March 19, 2015 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 132576, which set aside the Decision3 dated June 10, 2013 and Resolution4 dated September 4, 2013 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-LAC No. 01-000432-13 reversing the Decision5 dated December 10, 2012 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) in NLRC-NCR Case No. 08-12795-11, dismissing Rosita De Leon's (respondent) complaint for illegal dismissal and the CA Resolution6 dated July 31, 2015 which denied Manila Hotel Corporation's (petitioner) Motion for Partial Reconsideration.7
At the time she received said Notice, respondent was 57 years old10 and held the position of Assistant Credit and Collection Manager/Acting General Cashier.11 She had by then rendered 34 years of service to petitioner.12Re: Notice of Compulsory Retirement
Dear Ms. De Leon:
Following your verbal conversation with the Vice President of Human Resources and Security, P/SSupt Felipe H. Buena Jr. (Ret), the undersigned would like to formally inform you of the intention of the Management to exercise its prerogative to compulsorily retire you having been rendered 35 years in service from the Hotel [sic] effective at the close of office hours of June 10, 2011. You shall, however, be paid your retirement pay accordingly.
We thank you and wish you good luck in your future endeavors. (Emphasis in the original)
WHEREFORE, a Decision is hereby rendered declaring that [respondent] was illegally dismissed. Corollarily, [petitioner] are hereby ordered to reinstate [respondent] to her former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to pay her backwages from the time of dismissal up to actual reinstatement, which is only up to the retirable age of 60, for which a retirement pay is hereby also ordered to be paid by the [petitioner].
In addition, [petitioner] are hereby ordered to return the amount illegally deducted from the [respondent]. An [sic] attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) of the total award is hereby granted. Computation is as follows:
a) BACKWAGES 6/10/11- 12[/]10/12 - 16.06 mos. P24,749.00 x 16.06 = 397,468.9413th MONTH PAY P397,468.94/12 = 33,122.41SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE PAY P24,749/26 x 5/12 x 16.06 6,369.00 430,961.04b) ILLEGAL DEDUCTION (given) 72,616.77 509,577.8110% Attorney's fees 50,957.78Total P560,535.59
SO ORDERED.29
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated December 10, 2012 is reversed and set aside. Accordingly, the complaint for illegal constructive dismissal is dismissed for lack of merit.According to the NLRC, while managerial employees are ordinarily outside the scope of CBA, nothing prevents employers from granting them benefits equal to or higher than those given to union members. It held that in extending the retirement benefits under the CBA to respondent, petitioner was merely exercising a management prerogative, and by immediately processing her retirement requirements, including the Personnel Clearance, respondent accepted petitioner's offer of retirement. The NLRC noted that respondent, as a managerial employee, was presumed to be well-educated and to have understood the import of the Personnel Clearance when she signed it.32
However, [petitioner] is ordered to pay [respondent] the amount of P72,616.77 representing its illegal deductions as previously granted and the amount of P7,261.67 which is equivalent to 10% of the monetary award for and by way of attorney's fees.
Likewise, [petitioner] is ordered to immediately pay [respondent] her retirement pay and benefits based on law and the [CBA].
SO ORDERED.31
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PETITION is GRANTED. The assailed 10 June 2013 Decision of the NLRC, and its assailed Resolution promulgated on 4 September 2013, in so far as these hold that [respondent] had been validly compulsorily retired and dismissing [respondent's] complaint for illegal dismissal, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration,40 petitioner asked that the NLRC's ruling be affirmed. However, it was denied in the Resolution41 dated July 31, 2015.
[Petitioner] is hereby ORDERED to pay [respondent] her backwages from the termination of her employment on 10 June 2011, her last day at work, until the date when [respondent] has turned sixty (60) years of age, and thereupon, to immediately pay her retirement benefits in accordance with law.
[Petitioner] is likewise ORDERED to pay [respondent] the amount of Php72,616.77, representing illegal deductions, as held by the NLRC and uncontested by [petitioner], as well as Php7,261.67, representing attorney's fees of 10% of the amount unlawfully withheld.
SO ORDERED.39
Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, §8 infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, §8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes "not contrary to law." In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor organizations. As Justice Davide, Jr., himself a constitutional commissioner, said in his ponencia in Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC:Thus, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, managerial employees cannot be allowed to share in the concessions obtained by the labor union through collective negotiation. Otherwise, they would be exposed to the temptation of colluding with the union during the negotiations to the detriment of the employer.46In the first place, all these employees, with the exception of the service engineers and the sales force personnel, are confidential employees. Their classification as such is not seriously disputed by PEO-FFW; the five (5) previous CBAs between PIDI and PEO-FFW explicitly considered them as confidential employees. By the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations. As such, the rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or join a labor union equally applies to them.
In Bulletin Publishing Co., Inc. v. Hon. Augusto Sanchez, this Court elaborated on this rationale, thus:"... The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership."To be sure, the Court in Philips Industrial was dealing with the right of confidential employees to organize. But the same reason for denying them the right to organize justifies even more the ban on managerial employees from forming unions. After all, those who qualify as top or middle managers are executives who receive from their employers information that not only is confidential but also is not generally available to the public, or to their competitors, or to other employees. It is hardly necessary to point out that to say that the first sentence of Art. 245 is unconstitutional would be to contradict the decision in that case.45 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Art. 287. Retirement. - Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract."Undoubtedly, under this provision, the retirement age is primarily determined by the existing agreement or employment contract."48 "By its express language, the Labor Code permits employers and employees to fix the applicable retirement age at below 60 years."49 Absent such an agreement, the retirement age shall be that fixed by law, and the above-cited law mandates that the compulsory retirement age is 65 years, while the minimum age for optional retirement is set at 60 years.50
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: Provided, however, That an employee's retirement benefits under any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements shall not be less than those provided herein.
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half (1/2) month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.
x x x x
18. On June 3, 2011, P/SSupt. Felipe H. Buena, Jr., V.P.-HRD & Security required [respondent] to come to his office. During the middle of the conversation, he suddenly commented "You know Rose I resigned effective June 5, 2011 because I am not happy with my boss anymore; so same thing with you. Why don't you just resign? With conviction he uttered, "Rose, you have to resign.These conversations were never denied by petitioner.55 It bears noting, too, that petitioner itself acknowledged in its June 6, 2011 letter that Buena had discussed with respondent her compulsory retirement, lending credence to the above-cited exchanges. As the CA found, the June 4, 2011 exchange between respondent and Buena establish that "the information regarding respondent's retirement was not an offer at all, but an order, and that respondent had questioned her coverage in the CBA."56
19. [Respondent] stated in response, "I am not yet planning to resign nor retire since I am the sole breadwinner of the family and my son will continue his studies in college for two (2) more years, which mainly [sic] my primary reasons why I am maintaining love, concern, good working relationship, being hardworking employee [sic], above all my honesty and integrity for almost 35 years of continues [sic] dedication to the company."
20. On June 4, 2011, P/SSupt. Felipe H. Buena asked [respondent] to see him in his office. Right away he informed [respondent] that management decided to compulsory [sic] retire her. The same was manifested by respondent Aurora Caday, Asst. Director to HR-Legal.
21. [Respondent] asked him what was the reason and why? He said that management opted to apply what is stated in the CBA of the employees-"20 years of service or 50 years old whichever comes first" and he added that this applied to all". [Respondent] simply commented that if its [sic] true that it applies to all, how come that there are lots of rank & file employees, supervisors and managers/officers who are older than her and working for more than 35 years of service, are [sic] still with the company?54 (Emphasis in the original)
It is a familiar axiom that employer and employee do not stand on equal footing, a situation which often causes an employee to act out of need instead of any genuine acquiescence to the employer. It cannot be ignored that [respondent] has only six days before she. is deemed "compulsorily retired." She has appealed the decision of [petitioner] but its representatives remained adamant. Therefore, it is unsurprising that [respondent] would process her clearances; after all, without such clearance, her retirement pay would not be released, and she would still be out of work. Hence, it was not out of eagerness, excitement, and acceptance that she attended to her retirement requirements, but only out of sheer necessity and to assure the release of her retirement pay.60Furthermore, the CA correctly observed that respondent's refusal to accept her retirement pay and her objections to being retired early, as well as the filing of her complaint for illegal dismissal, confirm that she did not consent to her compulsory retirement.61 Apropos is the following pronouncement in Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp. (URSUMCO) and/or Cabatt v. Caballeda, et al.:62
Furthermore, the fact that respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners completely negates their claim that respondents voluntarily retired. To note, respondents vigorously pursued this case against petitioners, all the way up to this Court. Without doubt, this is a manifestation that respondents had no intention of relinquishing their employment, wholly incompatible to petitioners' assertion that respondents voluntarily retired.63Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the exercise of management prerogative cannot justify its compulsory retirement of respondent's services. There can be no debate that the exercise of management prerogatives cannot trounce the requirements of the law which, in this case, demand the employee's unequivocal agreement to an early retirement. The Court has held:
It is true that an employer is given a wide latitude of discretion in managing its own affairs. The broad discretion includes the implementation of company rules and regulations and the imposition of disciplinary measures on its employees. But the exercise of a management prerogative like this is not limitless, but hemmed in by good faith and a due consideration of the rights of the worker. In this light, the management prerogative will be upheld for as long as it is not wielded as an implement to circumvent the laws and oppress labor.64 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)All told, an employee in the private sector who did not expressly agree to an early retirement cannot be retired from the service before he reaches the age of 65 years.65 "Acceptance by the employee of an early retirement age option must be explicit, voluntary, free and uncompelled."66 "The law demanded more than a passive acquiescence on the part of the employee, considering that his early retirement age option involved conceding the constitutional right to security of tenure."67 Thus, We held that "[r]etirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his or her employment with the former."68
Although the employer could be free to impose a retirement age lower than 65 years for as long its employees consented, the retirement of the employee whose intent to retire was not clearly established, or whose retirement was involuntary is to be treated as a discharge.70 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)Having been unjustly dismissed, respondent is entitled to the reliefs under Article 279 of the Labor Code which provides:
Article 279. Security of tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.71In ICT Marketing Services, Inc. v. Sales,72 the Court held that:
The normal consequences of respondents' illegal dismissal, then, are reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and payment of backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative. The payment of separation pay is in addition to payment ofbackwages.73The CA held that reinstatement was no longer feasible as it would not work to the best interest of the parties. It found that petitioner had consistently objected to respondent's return to work and concluded that reintroducing her into the workplace may initiate conflicts which would ultimately hamper the efficient management of petitioner's hotel and foster ill feelings and enmity between respondent and her former superiors.74 In this light, We hold that separation pay in lieu of actual reinstatement should be awarded. Indeed, "[t]he accepted doctrine is that separation pay may avail in lieu of reinstatement if reinstatement is no longer practical or in the best interest of the parties."75
Endnotes:
* Designated as Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2559 dated May 11, 2018.
** Designated as Acting Member per Special Order No. 2560 dated May 11, 2018.
1Rollo, pp. 17-40.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Ramon A. Cruz; rollo, pp. 314-336.
3 Penned by Commissioner Numeriano D. Villena, concurred in by Commissioners Angelo Ang Palaña and Herminio V. Suelo; id. at 161-178.
4 Id. at 214-216.
5 Penned by Labor Arbiter Lilia S. Savari; id. at 129-143.
6 Id. at 356-357.
7 Id. at 337-353.
8 Id. at 64-66 and 315.
9 Id. at 42-A.
10 Id. at 20.
11 Id. at 20, 66, 122 and 315.
12 Id. at. 20.
13 Emilio Yap, Rogelio Quiambao, Cecilia Go and Aurora Caday who eventually became Human Resources Director; id. at 46-47 and 64.
14 Id. at 64.
15 Id. at 70 and 73.
16 Id. at 51.
17 Id. at 52.
18 Id. at 48-49 and 51.
19 Id. at 52-54.
20 Id. at 55.
21 Id. at 84-86.
22 Id. at 90-92.
23 Id. at 121-122.
24 Id. at 122 and 125-126.
25 Id. at 126-127.
26 Id. at 317.
27 Id. at 317-318.
28 Id. at 129-143.
29 Id. at 142-143.
30 Id. at 161-178.
31 Id. at 177.
32 Id. at 319.
33 Art. 287. Retirement. Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: Provided, however, That an employee's retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those provided therein.
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishmert, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
x x x x
34Rollo, p. 319.
35 Id. at 319-320.
36 Id. at 179-185 and 207-212.
37 Id. at 214-215.
38 Id. at 314-336.
39 Id. at 335.
40 Id. at 337-353.
41 Id. at 356-357.
42 Id. at 24.
43 Id. at 329.
44 351 Phil. 244 (1998).
45 Id. at 279-280.
46Martinez v. NLRC, 358 Phil. 288, 297 (1998).
47 AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLE 287 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BY PROVIDING FOR RETIREMENT PAY TO QUALIFIED PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYEES IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY RETIREMENT PLAN IN THE ESTABLISHMENT. Approved on December 9, 1992.
48Obusan v. Philippine National Bank, 639 Phil. 554, 562 (2010).
49Jaculbe v. Silliman University, 547 Phil. 352, 3456 (2007).
50Obusan v. Philippine National Bank, supra at 562.
51Rollo, p. 37.
52 Id. at 28-29.
53 Id. at 63-79.
54 Id. at 67-68.
55 Id. at 329.
56 Id. at 327.
57 Id. at 69 and 316.
58 Id. at 28.
59Obusan v. Philippine National Bank, supra note 48, at 565.
60Rollo, pp. 328-329.
61 Id. at 328.
62 582 Phil. 118 (2008).
63 Id. at 137.
64Dongon v. Rapid Movers and Forwarders Co., Inc., et al., 716 Phil. 533, 545 (2013).
65Alfredo F. Laya, Jr. v. Philippine Veterans Bank and Ricardo A. Balbido, Jr., G.R. No. 205813, January 10, 2018.
66Cercado v. UNIPROM, Inc., 647 Phil. 603, 612 (2010).
67Alfredo F. Laya, Jr. v. Philippine Veterans Bank and Ricardo A. Balbido, Jr., supra.
68Cercado v. UNIPROM, Inc., supra at 608.
69 G.R. No. 205813, January 10, 2018.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 769 Phil. 498 (2015).
73 Id. at 524-525, citing Aliling v. Feliciano, et al., 686 Phil. 889, 917 (2012).
74Rollo, p. 332.
75Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines and/or Lindsay, 597 Phil. 494, 501 (2009) citing Velasco v. NLRC, 525 Phil. 749, 761 (2006).
76Rollo, p. 335.
77Alfredo F. Laya, Jr. v. Philippine Veterans Bank and Ricardo A. Balbido, Jr., supra note 65, citing Nacar v. Gallery Frames, et al., 716 Phil. 267, 281 (2013); ICT Marketing Services, Inc. v. Sales, supra at 525.
78Alfredo F Laya, Jr. v. Philippine Veterans Bank and Ricardo A. Balbido, Jr., supra note 65; ICT Marketing Services, Inc. Sales, supra at 525.
79Nacar v. Gallery Frames, et al., supra at 283.
80Bani Rural Bank, Inc., et al. v. De Guzman, et al., 721 Phil. 84, 102 (2013).