THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186403, September 05, 2018
MAYOR "JONG" AMADO CORPUS, JR. AND CARLITO SAMONTE, Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE RAMON D. PAMULAR OF BRANCH 33, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA, MRS. PRISCILLA ESPINOSA,* AND NUEVA ECIJA PROVINCIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FLORO FLORENDO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
An allegation of conspiracy to add a new accused without changing the prosecution's theory that the accused willfully shot the victim is merely a formal amendment.1 However, the rule provides that only formal amendments not prejudicial to the rights of the accused are allowed after plea.2 The test of whether an accused is prejudiced by an amendment is to determine whether a defense under the original information will still be available even after the amendment is made and if any evidence that an accused might have would remain applicable even in the amended information.3
This Petition for Certiorari4 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the February 26, 2009 Order5 and Warrant of Arrest6 issued by Judge Ramon D. Pamular (Judge Pamular) of Branch 33, Regional Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva Ecija in Civil Case No. 2618-G. The assailed Order granted the prosecution's Motion to Amend the Original Information for murder filed against Carlito Samonte (Samonte) to include Mayor Amado "Jong" Corpus (Corpus) as his co-accused in the crime charged.7 Furthermore, it directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Corpus.8
Angelito Espinosa (Angelito) was shot by Samonte at Corpuz Street, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecjia on June 4, 2008, causing his death.9 Samonte was caught in flagrante delicto and thereafter was arrested.10 After the inquest proceedings, an Information11 for murder dated June 5, 2008 was filed against him, thus:12
INFORMATION
Undersigned Inquest Prosecutor accuses CARLITO SAMONTE y LAPITAN of the crime of Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of June, 2008 at around 10:30 a.m. at Corpuz St., Dist., in the Municipality/City of Cuyapo, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, with malice aforethought and with deliberate intent to take the life of ANGELITO ESPINOSA, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, treacherously and taking advantage of superior strength attack the latter and shot with an unlicensed firearm (1 Colt .45 cal. pistol with SN 217815), thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wounds, which directly caused the death of said Angelita Espinosa, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Cabanatuan City for Guimba, Nueva Ecija
June 5, 2008.13
a.) Affidavit19 of Mr. John Diego, Vice Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija; b.) Original Affidavit20 and a supplemental affidavit21 of witness Alexander Lozano y Jacob; and c.) Joint Affidavit22 of Victoria A. Miraflex, Ma. Floresmina S. Sacayanan, Ma. Asuncion L. Silao and Corazon N. Guerzon.23
INFORMATION
Undersigned Prosecutor accuses Carlito Samonte y Lapitan and Amado Corpuz, Jr. y Ramos of the crime of Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of June, 2008 at around 10:30 a.m. at Corpuz St., Dist., in the Municipality of Cuyapo, Province of Nueva Ecija, Phillippines (sic), and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, with malice aforethought and with deliberate intent to take [the] life of ANGELITO ESPINOSA, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, treacherously and taking advantage of superior strength attack the latter and shot with an unlicensed firearm (1 Colt .45 cal. Pistol with SN 217815), thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wounds, which directly caused the death of said Angelito Espinosa, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Cabanatuan City for Guimba, Nueva Ecija, January 26, 2009.38 (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the foregoing and probable cause, the Resolution of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Edison V. Rafanan, dated October 7, 2008, being in accord with the facts obtaining in this case and with established rules, procedures and jurisprudence, is reinstated.
The criminal complaint for murder against respondent Mayor Amado "Jong" Corpu[s] is DISMISSED.40 (Emphasis in the original)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court after personally examining the amended information and its supporting documents finds probable cause and hereby orders to:SO ORDERED.51
- Grant the motion to amend the information;
- Admit the attached amended information;
- Issue the Warrant of Arrest for the immediate apprehension of the respondent-movant Amado Corpu[s], Jr.; and
- Deny the motion to defer/suspend arraignment and further proceedings of this case.
[F]irst, because there would only be an addition of another accused with prior authority f[ro]m the Honorable Provincial Prosecutor, second, the amendment will not cause any prejudice to the rights of the accused and more importantly, that is what is provided for by the Rules[.]59
Yes, indeed, while the undersigned could rely on the findings of the Honorable Provincial Prosecutor, I am nevertheless not bound thereby. The termination by the latter of the existence of probable cause is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the herein respondent judge. I have no cogent reason to question the validity of the findings of the Honorable Provincial Prosecutor. I have much respect for the latter. Thus, after giving due course to the arguments of parties and their respective counsels, I was fully convinced in good faith that, indeed, there was a reasonable ground to believe in the existence of probable cause for ... the immediate apprehension and prosecution of Mayor Amado "Jong" Corpu[s], Jr. Hence, the issuance of the assailed controversial Order....63
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby dismissed. Accordingly, the Officer-in-Charge Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija is directed to file the appropriate Information against the respondent Mayor Amado Corpu[s], Jr., and to report the action taken thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.68 (Emphasis supplied)
[Priscilla] should have been more candid. [She] should have informed the Honorable Court that a motion for reconsideration with the Department of Justice was filed by the herein petitioner, and is still pending resolution. And in the event said motion for reconsideration is denied, and as a part of petitioner/accused right to due process of law, it being clearly provided by the rules, he would elevate said resolution to the Court of Appeals on certiorari – and, certainly, the aggrieved party would bring the matter before this Honorable Court - during which interregnum, the appealed resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor . . . would not have yet attained finality which is what jurisprudence underscores before the respondent court should have proceeded with the amended information.72 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Even if one or all of the elements of the crime of murder as alleged in the original information filed against petitioner Samonte is not proven, the addition of conspiracy in the amended information, if duly proven, would not in any way result in his conviction because conspiracy is not an essential or qualifying element of the crime of murder.80
Where the secretary of justice exercises his power of review only after an information has been filed, trial courts should defer or suspend arraignment and further proceedings until the appeal is resolved. Such deferment or suspension, however, does not signify that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the secretary of justice. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution by the secretary of justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case.86
While [w]e have noted from the expediente that the petitioner has utilized dilatory tactics to bring the case against her to trial, still she is entitled to the remedy she seeks. The respondent judge should not be more anxious than the prosecution in expediting the disposition of the case absent any indication of collusion between it and the defense. The Ministry of Justice should not be deprived of its power to review the action of the City Fiscal by a precipitate trial of the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The respondent judge is hereby ordered not to proceed with the trial of the above-numbered criminal case until after the Ministry of Justice has resolved the petition for review filed by Mila P. Tolentino. No costs.89 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the respondent is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Resolution promulgated on June 26, 2009 (Resolution No. 473) is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija is hereby directed to cause the withdrawal of the information for murder against the respondent, if one has been filed in court, and to report the action taken thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.98 (Emphasis in the original)
Rule 116
Arraignment and Plea
Section 11. Suspension of Arraignment. — Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
....
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
Elementary is the rule that the existence of probable cause is indispensable in the filing of the complaint or information and in the issuance of warrant of arrest. The legion of jurisprudence has defined probable cause to be concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man and not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full blown trial. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. It is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.103
Rule 110
Prosecution of Offenses
Section 14. Amendment or Substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.104 (Emphasis in the original)
The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-accused, which was not previously included in the original information, is likewise a substantial amendment saddling the respondents with the need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial court. In People v. Zulueta, it was held that:Surely the preparations made by herein accused to face the original charges will have to be radically modified to meet the new situation. For undoubtedly the allegation of conspiracy enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe to the accused Zulueta all the acts, knowledge, admissions and even omissions of his co-conspirator Angel Llanes in furtherance of the conspiracy. The amendment thereby widens the battlefront to allow the use by the prosecution of newly discovered weapons, to the evident discomfiture of the opposite camp. Thus it would seem inequitable to sanction the tactical movement at this stage of the controversy, bearing in mind that the accused is only guaranteed two-days' (sic) preparation for trial. Needless to emphasize, as in criminal cases, the liberty, even the life, of the accused is at stake, it is always wise and proper that he be fully apprised of the charges, to avoid any possible surprise that may lead to injustice. The prosecution has too many facilities to covet the added advantage of meeting unprepared adversaries.
To allow at this stage the proposed amendment alleging conspiracy among all the accused, will make all of the latter liable not only for their own individual transgressions or acts but also for the acts of their co-conspirators.107 (Emphasis in the original)
SALAYSAY
Ako si Carlita Samonte kasalukuyang nakakulong sa Provincial Jail ng Cabanatuan City sa kasong Murder kay Angelita Espinosa sa utos po ni Mayor Amado R. Corpuz Jr. ay matagal na pong plano ang pagpatay kay Angelita Espinosa. Nagsimula po ito sa pagwasak sa aircondition sa magiging opisina ni Angelita Espinosa at sa motor niyang single, at iyon ay sa utos ni Mayor Amado R. Corpuz Jr. hanggang umabot sa puntong sabihan ako na ang tagal-tagal mo namang patayin si Angelita Espinosa pagalit na sinabi sa akin.
At noong June 4, 2008 sa pagitan ng 9:30 AM at 10 AM ng nasabing oras sinabi sa akin muli na "Ayokong maupo yang si Angelita Espinosa bilang secretaryo ng Sangguniang Bayan." Sinabi ni Mayor Amado R. Corpuz Jr. na gumawa ka ng senaryo para huwag makaupo yan bilang B-SEC (Sangguniang Bayan Secretary) Bayan at kahit anong klaseng senaryo patayin mo kung kaya mong patayin at ako na ang bahala sa lahat. Kunin mo ang baril dito sa opisina ko, iyan po ang utos sa akin ni Mayor Amado Corpuz Jr.
Kusa po akong gumawa ng sarili kong affidavit at salaysay na walang nagbayad, pumilit at nanakot sa akin para gawin ang salaysay at affidavit kong ito, at marami pa po akong isasalaysay pagharap ko po sa korte.
Gumagalang, Subscribed and sworn to before me:
(signed) Carlita Samonte
(signed) Atty. Marcus Marcellinus S. Gonzales113
Section 1. Petition for Certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis supplied)
(1) [T]he writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.118 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
(a) where the order is a patent of nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings [were] ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.124
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is afimction that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
[T]he public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and that courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the person charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor.129 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereqfter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibl[y be] designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.
The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as [to] its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.133 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
RULE 116
Arraignment and Plea
....
Section 11. Suspension of arraignment — Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
....
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. (Emphasis supplied)
In the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez; and considering that the issue of the correctness of the justice secretary's resolution has been amply threshed out in petitioner's letter, the information, the resolution of the secretary of justice, the motion to dismiss, and even the exhaustive discussion in the motion for reconsideration — all of which were submitted to the court — the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw the information, based solely on his bare and ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial court's order is inconsistent with our repetitive calls for an independent and competent assessment of the issue(s) presented in the motion to dismiss. The trial judge was tasked to evaluate the secretary's recommendation finding the absence of probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so. He merely ruled to proceed with the trial without stating his reasons for disregarding the secretary's recommendation.
Had he complied with his judicial obligation, he would have discovered that there was, in fact, sufficient ground to grant the motion to withdraw the information. The documents before the trial court judge clearly showed that there was no probable cause to warrant a criminal prosecution for libel.149 (Emphasis supplied)
When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While the secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A trial court, however, commits reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext of having already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action.150 (Emphasis supplied)
Where the secretary of justice exercises his power of review only after an information has been filed, trial courts should defer or suspend arraignment and further proceedings until the appeal is resolved. Such deferment or suspension, however, does not signify that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the secretary of justice. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution by the secretary of justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case.152
While We have noted from the expediente that the petitioner has utilized dilatory tactics to bring the case against her to trial, still she is entitled to the remedy she seeks. The respondent judge should not be more anxious than the prosecution in expediting the disposition of the case absent any indication of collusion between it and the defense. The Ministry of Justice should not be deprived of its power to review the action of the City Fiscal by a precipitate trial of the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The respondent judge is hereby ordered not to proceed with the trial of the above-numbered criminal case until after the Ministry of Justice has resolved the petition for review filed by Mila P. Tolentino. No costs.155
Rule 110
Prosecution of Offenses
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. ... (Emphasis supplied)
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
RULE 117
Motion to Quash
....
Section 7. Former Conviction or Acquittal; Double Jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
....
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as in the first.174
(a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.175
Double jeopardy provides three related protections: (1) against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) against multiple punishments for the same offense.
....
The ban on double jeopardy is deeply rooted in jurisprudence. The doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.180 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
(1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.187 (Citations omitted)
Even if one or all of the elements of the crime of murder as alleged in the original information filed against petitioner Samonte is not proven, the addition of conspiracy in the amended information, if duly proven, would not in any way result to his conviction because conspiracy is not an essential or qualifying element of the crime of murder. The addition of conspiracy would only affect petitioner Corpuz, if together with the crime of murder leveled against petitioner Samonte, both circumstances are duly proven by the prosecution.189 (Emphasis supplied)
There is merit in this special civil action. The trial Judge should have allowed the amendment ... considering that the amendments sought were only formal. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in his memorandum, "[T]here was no change in the prosecution's theory that respondent Ruiz wilfully[,] unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and shot with a gun Ernesto and Rogelio Bello ... The amendments would not have been prejudicial to him because his participation as principal in the crime charged with respondent Ruiz in the original informations, could not be prejudiced by the proposed amendments."192 (Emphasis supplied)
Otherwise stated, the amendments ... would not have prejudiced Ruiz whose participation as principal in the crimes charged did not change. When the incident was investigated by the fiscal's office, the respondents were Ruiz, Padilla and Ongchenco. The fiscal did not include Padilla and Ongchenco in the two informations because of "insufficiency of evidence." It was only later when Francisco Pagcalinawan testified at the reinvestigation that the participation of Padilla and Ongchenco surfaced and, as a consequence, there was the need for the amendment of the informations or the filing of new ones against the two.193 (Emphasis supplied)
Surely the preparations made by herein accused to face the original charges will have to be radically modified to meet the new situation. For undoubtedly the allegation of conspiracy enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe to the accused Zulueta all the acts, knowledge, admissions and even omissions of his co-conspirator Angel Llanes in furtherance of the conspiracy. The amendment thereby widens the battlefront to allow the use by the prosecution of newly discovered weapons, to the evident discomfiture of the opposite camp. Thus it would seem inequitable to sanction the tactical movement at this stage of the controversy, bearing in mind that the accused is only guaranteed two-days' preparation for trial. Needless to emphasize, as in criminal cases, the liberty, even the life, of the accused is at stake, it is always wise and proper that he be fully apprised of the charges, to avoid any possible surprise that may lead to injustice. The prosecution has too many facilities to covet the added advantage of meeting unprepared adversaries.201
Indeed, contrasting the two informations one will perceive that whereas in the first the accused is charged with misappropriation of public property because: (1) he deceived Angel Llanes into approving the bargain sale of nails to Beatriz Poblete or (2) at least, by his abandonment he permitted that woman to obtain the articles at very cheap prices, in the amended information a third ground of responsibility is inserted, namely, that he connived and conspired with Angel Llanes to consummate the give-away transaction.
Again it will be observed that the third ground of action in effect contradicts the original theory of the information: if the accused conspired with Llanes, he did not deceive the latter, and did not by mere negligence permit the sale.202 (Emphasis supplied)
[T]he change in the items, articles and jewelries allegedly stolen into entirely different articles from those originally complained of, affects the essence of the imputed crime, and would deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet all the allegations in the amended information, in the preparation of their defenses to the charge filed against them. It will be observed that private respondents were accused as accessories-after-the-fact of the minor Ricardo Cabaloza who had already been convicted of robbery of the items listed in the original information. To charge them now as accessories-after-the-fact for a crime different from that committed by the principal, would be manifestly incongruous as to be allowed by the Court.204 (Emphasis supplied)
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an information has been said to be whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an amendment to an information introduced after the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does not expose the accused to a charge which could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance — not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court.207 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Article III
Bill of Rights
....
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
At the same time, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires "... probable cause to be personally determined by the judge ..." not by any other officer or person.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require.
....
We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest.225 (Emphasis supplied)
RULE 112
Preliminary Investigation
....
Section 6. When Warrant of Arrest May Issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information. (Emphasis supplied)
(1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue a warrant of arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause, order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice, the issue to be resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing of the information.228 (Citation omitted)
On February 13, 2009, a hearing was held wherein the parties presented their arguments. On the issue regarding the undated motion to amend information without notice of hearing and the motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution, the court ruled that the same is moot and academic due to the conduct of the said hearing.232
Elementary is the rule that the existence of probable cause is indispensable in the filing of complaint or information and in the issuance of warrant of arrest. The legion of jurisprudence has defined probable cause to be concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man and not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full blown trial. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. It is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.233
Be that as it may, still, the undersigned respondent judge made a careful perusal of the records of the case. Sufficient copies of supporting documents and/or evidence were read and evaluated upon wlticll, independent judgment as to the existence of probable cause was based. But, then again, still not satisfied, the undersigned even went beyond the face of the resolution and evidences (sic) presented before this Court. On 13 February 2009, Criminal Case No. 2618-G was set for hearing. The prosecution and the defense were given the chance to argue on the matter and ample opportunity to be heard.234 (Emphasis supplied)
Endnotes:
November 14, 2018N O T I C E O F J U D G M E N T
Sirs / Mesdames:
Please take notice that on September 5, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on November 14, 2018 at 3:05 p.m.Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of CourtEndnotes:
* In some pleadings, Mrs. Espinosa is referred to as "Priscila." For consistency, this Decision will use "Priscilla" as per her signed Reply-Affidavit. See rollo, p. 62.
1 People v. Court of Appeals, 206 Phil. 637 (1983) [Per J. Relova, First Division].
2 Pacoy v. Cajigal, 560 Phil. 598 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
3 People v. Casey, 190 Phil. 748-767 (1981) [Per J. Guerrero, En Banc].
4 Rollo, pp. 3-50.
5 Id. at 51-54.
6 Id. at 55.
7 Id. at 53.
8 Id. at 54.
9 Id. at 410.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 58.
12 Id. at 410.
13 Id. at 58.
14 Id. at 410.
15 Id. at 59-62, in I.S. No. 08F-1445 entitled Priscilla Alcantara-Espinosa v. Mayor Amado "Jong" Corpus, Jr.
16 Id. at 410.
17 Id. at 63-67.
18 Id. at 410.
19 Id. at 68.
20 Id. at 69.
21 Id. at 70-72.
22 Id. at 73-74.
23 Id. at 411. Ma. Floresmina Sacayanan is named as "Floremina" in the signed Joint Affidavit. See rollo, p. 74.
24 Id. at 310-311. The Department of Justice June 26, 2009 Resolution stated, in part:. . . .
"Thereafter, the complainant's witness, Alexander Lozano, executed a supplemental affidavit stating, among others, that on the day of the shooting, at past nine o'clock in the morning (9:00 A.M.), he went to the Sangguniang Bayan Office to inquire from Vice Mayor John Diego about palay seeds being distributed by the Municipality to the farmers. Lozano took the route going to the gym at the back of the respondent mayor's office. When he was beside respondent's office, he saw Samonte whispering something to respondent outside the latter's office. He noticed from the respondent's face that he got angry from what Samonte whispered to him. Lozano saw respondent hand to Samonte a stainless gun, then heard respondent angrily say, "PUTANG INANG LITO YAN, SIGE! BIRAHIN MO!" Lozano immediately assumed that respondent referred to the victim, Espinosa, because he knew respondent entertained a grudge against the victim, since the latter led a campaign against the alleged abuses in the respondent mayor's office, and instigated the filing of criminal and administrative charges against him before the Ombudsman. Thus, he immediately proceeded to the victim's office and told the latter what he witnessed and heard, and advised him to take care.
Lozano did not include the foregoing matters in his first affidavit due to fear of reprisal, since it will implicate the respondent mayor in the killing of the victim."
25 Id. at 514.
26 Id. at 84-88 and 411.
27 Id. at 75-83. See rollo, p. 311 where the Department of Justice June 26, 2009 Resolution stated, in part:....
"Respondent, in his counter-affidavit, denied the accusation against him and stated that he neither had any involvement nor participation in the quarrel between Samonte and the victim. What happened between them was a personal matter. Respondent further quoted the police witness' statement that the shooting incident was preceded by a heated altercation between Samonte and the victim.
"Among others, respondent further stressed that Lozano's statement is biased, an afterthought, full of improbabilities and were highly opinionated surmises and conjectures."
28 Id. at 411.
29 Id. at 89-95. The Resolution, docketed as I.S. No. 08F-1445, was penned by Prosecutor II Edison V. Rafanan and approved by First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Floro F. Florendo of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija, Cabanatuan City.
30 Id. at 411.
31 Id. at 96-107.
32 Id. at 411-412.
33 Id. at 108-109.
34 Id. at 412.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 122-125.
37 Id. at 412.
38 Id. at 56.
39 Id. at 110-121.
40 Id. at 120-121.
41 Id. at 230-231 and 413.
42 Id. at 232-240 and 413.
43 Id. at 413. No copy of this Motion for Reconsideration is attached in the rollo.
44 Id. at 241-263.
45 Id. at 242-243.
46 Id. at 244-249.
47 Id. at 254-257.
48 Id. at 126-225.
49 Id. at 226-229.
50 Id. at 53-54.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 3-50.
53 Id. at 254-255.
54 Id. at 256-258.
55 Id. at 268-276.
56 459 Phil. 542 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
57 Rollo, p. 269.
58 Id. at 269-270.
59 Id. at 270.
60 Id. at 271.
61 Id. at 279-282.
62 Id. at 281-282.
63 Id. at 282.
64 Id. at 307-309.
65 Id. at 308.
66 Id. at 307-308.
67 Id. at 310-313. The Resolution, docketed as I.S. No. 08F-1445, was signed by Acting Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera of the Department of Justice.
68 Id. at 313.
69 Id. at 308.
70 Id. at 315-328.
71 Id. at 316.
72 Id. at 316-317.
73 Id. at 326.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 327.
76 Id. at 409-430.
77 Id. at 416.
78 Id. at 418.
79 Id. at 419.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 424-425.
82 Id. at 427-428.
83 Id. at 431-449.
84 Id. at 433.
85 344 Phil. 207 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
86 Id. at 232.
87 223 Phil. 558 (1985) [Per J. Abad-Santos, Second Division].
88 Rollo, pp. 472-473.
89 Id. at 435.
90 Id. at 436-437.
91 Id. at 440.
92 Id. at 446.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 450-451.
95 Id. at 456-495.
96 Id. at 496-499.
97 Id. at 457.
98 Id. at 498.
99 Id. at 473.
100 Id. at 473-474.
101 Id. at 485.
102 Id. at 476-477.
103 Id. at 477-478.
104 Id. at 490.
105 242 Phil. 655 (1988) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].
106 Rollo, p. 491.
107 Id. at 491-492.
108 Id. at 500-523.
109 Id. at 534-544.
110 Id. at 556-560.
111 Id. at 559, handwritten Affidavit of Samonte dated October 30, 2013, executed before Atty. Marcus Marcellinus S. Gonzales of the Public Attorney's Office, Cabanatuan City.
112 Id. at 556.
113 Id. at 559.
114 Id. at 564-565. The letter stated, in part:
April 11, 2014
Hon. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
Padre Faura cor. Taft, Manila
Dear Ma'am,
....
Ma'am I do appreciate the court's initiative to bring justice to its oppressed people but it seems that efforts made we're all be in vain if orders will not be implemented with sincerity and can be an avenue for the criminals to escape their crime and left the victims in agony and pain.
Last October 30, 2013 an unexpected turn of event came where Carlita "Kuratong" Samonte executed his extrajudicial confession freely and voluntarily before Atty. Marcus Marcellinus S. Gonzales of the Public Attorney's office in Cabanatuan City where he admitted that it was Mayor Amado Corpus Jr. who ordered him to kill my husband.
This vital event have given me an opportunity to file a manifestation before the honorable Supreme court through my counsel on March 19, 2014 hoping that the case will be brought back to court to resume trial as petitioner Samonte has, in effect, parted ways with his co-petitioner Corpuz; and the allegation that "the new theory of conspiracy in the Amended Information would substancially prejudice accused Samonte's right to due process" would now be not applicable. (Grammatical errors in the original)
115 Id. at 270.
116 Id. at 3-4.
117 425 Phil. 169 (2002) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
118 Id. at 179-180.
119Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 743, 753 (2002) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
120 Id. at 752.
121 Republic v. Bayao, 710 Phil. 279, 287 (2013) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
122 Id.
123 Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 743, 753 (2002) [Per J. Carpio, First Division).
124 Id. at 751, citing Abraham v. NLRC, 406 Phil. 310 (2001) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].
125 Republic v. Pantranco North Express, Inc. (Resolution), 682 Phil. 186 (2012) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., First Division].
126 Id. at 195.
127 People v. Castillo, 607 Phil. 754 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
128 607 Phil. 754 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
129 Id. at 764-765.
130De Lima v. Reyes, G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
131 Id., citing Crespo v. Mogul, 235 Phil. 465 (1987) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].
132 235 Phil. 465 (1987) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].
133 Id. at 474-476.
134 De Lima v. Reyes, G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016 < http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/january2016/209330.pdf> [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
135 Rollo, p. 469.
136 Id. at 54.
137 344 Phil. 207 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
138 223 Phil. 558 (1985) [Per J. Abad-Santos, Second Division].
139 Rollo, pp. 472-473.
140 Id. at 473.
141 Id. at 226-229.
142 Id. at 227.....
3. As regards both accused, the said 26 January 2009 Florendo's resolution having been elevated to the DOJ Secretary, by way of appeal, and giving due respect to the power of the DOJ Secretary under its power of control and supervision over all prosecutors, notwithstanding the filing of the information in court, any further proceedings thereto need be immediately deferred/suspended.
....
143 RULES OF COURT, Rule 116, sec. 11.
144 Samson v. Daway, 478 Phil. 793 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
145 Rollo, pp. 126-225.
146 Id. at 413.
147 344 Phil. 207 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
148 Id. at 218.
149 Id. at 235-236.
150 Id. at 217.
151 Rollo, p. 433.
152 Id. at 434-435.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 472-473.
155 Id. at 435.
156 Tolentino v. Bonifacio, 223 Phil. 558 (1985) [Per J. Abad-Santos, Second Division].
157 Rollo, p. 490.
158 242 Phil. 655 (1988) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].
159 Rollo, pp. 489-490.
160 Matalam v. Second Division of the Sandiganbayan, 495 Phil. 664. (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
161 Mendez v. People, 736 Phil. 181 (2014) [Per J. Brion, Second Division] stated: "Once the accused is arraigned and enters his plea, however, Section 14 prohibits the prosecution from seeking a substantial amendment, particularly mentioning those that may prejudice the rights of the accused."
162 Id.
163 Kummer v. People, 717 Phil. 670 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
164 Id. at 687.
165 Id.
166 Mendez v. People, 736 Phil. 192 (2014) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
167 Buhat v. Court of Appeals, 333 Phil. 562 (1996) [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr., First Division].
168 Id. at 575.
169 Bill of Rights.
170 Ada v. Virola, 254 Phil. 341 (1989) [Per C.J Fernan, Third Division].
171 Mallari v. People, 250 Phil. 421 (1988) [Per J. Fernan, Third Division].
172 Id. at 424.
173 Braza v. Sandiganbayan, 704 Phil. 476 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
174 Id. at 493.
175 Id. at 492.
176 Id.
177 Caes v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 258-A Phil. 620, 626 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
178 Id. at 626-627.
179 430 Phil. 420 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
180 Id. at 430.
181 Borja v. Mendoza, 168 Phil. 83 (1977) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].
182 Id. at 87.
183 Id.
184 People v. Estomaca y Garque, 326 Phil. 429 (1996) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].
185 People v. Montenegro, 242 Phil. 655 (1988) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].
186 Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, 544 Phil. 237 (2007) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Third Division].
187 Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, 283 Phil. 956, 966 (1992) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].
188 Id.
189 Rollo, p. 419.
190 People v. Court of Appeals, 206 Phil. 637 (1983) [Per J. Relova, First Division].
191 Id. at 640.
192 Id. at 641.
193 Id. at 642.
194 Rollo, p. 410.
195 Id. at 70-72. Lozano's affidavit stated, in part:
KARAGDAGANG SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY.
Ako ay si Alexander Lozano y Jacob, ... ay malaya at kusang loob na nagsasalaysay gaya ng mga sumusunod:
....
3. Na bago ako pumunta sa tanggapan ni Atty. Geminiano ay nagtungo muna ako sa Sangguniang Bayan lagpas alas-9 ng umagang iyon upang itanong kay Vice Mayor John Diego ang tungkol sa binhi ng palay na ipinamamahaging kasalukuyan ng munisipyo sa mga magsasaka.
4. Na papunta sa tanggapan ni Vice Mayor ay doon ako dumaan sa pasukan papuntang gym sa may likod ng opisina ni Mayor Amado "Jong" Corpus, Jr.
5. Na pagtapat ko sa tanggapan ni Mayor Corpus ay nakita ko si Carlito Samonte na may ibinubulong kay Mayor habang sila ay nandoroon sa labas sa may gilid ng tanggapan ni Mayor, at naging kapansin pansin sa akin na ang sinasabi ni Samonte kay Mayor ano man iyon dahil pabulong ang pagsasalita niya ay ikinakagalit ni Mayor na bakas na bakas ko sa anyo ng mukha ng nahuli.
6. Na kitang-kita ko rin ng abotan ni Mayor si Samonte ng puting baril na eskwalado (stainless) at dinig na dinig ko ang sabay na pagalit na sinabi nito kay Samonte na "Putang inang Lito yan! Sige! Birahin mo!"
....
196 Id. at 514.
197 Id.
198 242 Phil. 655 (1988) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].
199 89 Phil. 752 (1951) [Per J. Bengzon, Third Division].
200 Rollo, p. 491.
201 Id. at 491-492.
202 People v. Zulueta, 89 Phil. 752, 754 (1951) [Per J. Bengzon, Third Division].
203 People v. Montenegro, 242 Phil. 655 (1988) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].
204 Id. at 662.
205 Pacoy v. Cajigal, 560 Phil. 598 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
206 190 Phil. 748 (1981) [Per J. Guerrero, En Banc].
207 Id. at 759.
208 Rollo, p. 410.
209 Id. at 476.
210 Id. at 477.
211 249 Phil. 394 (1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
212 Id. at 399.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 399-400.
216 Abdula v. Guiani, 382 Phil. 757 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].
217 Id.
218 Id. at 773.
219 Allado v. Diokno, 302 Phil. 213 (1994) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
220 Id. at 235.
221 Ho v. People, 345 Phil. 597 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
222 272 Phil. 122 (1991) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].
223 Id. at 130.
224 Id. at 138.
225 Id. at 135-137.
226 Soliven v. Makasiar, 249 Phil. 394 (1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
227 Judicial Affidavit Rule, A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC (2012).
228 Ong v. Genio, 623 Phil. 835, 843 (2009) (Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Rollo, p. 51.
232 Id. at 52.
233 Id. at 53.
234 Id. at 281-282.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 556-558.
237 Id. at 559-560.
238 Id. at 556.
239 Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 290 Phil. 649 (1992) [Per J. Campos, Jr., Second Division].
240 Id. at 658.
241 Land Bank of the Phils. v. Livioco, 645 Phil. 337 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].
242 Alicer v. Compas, 664 Phil. 730 (2011) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].