THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 204759, November 14, 2018
PEOPLE'S GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. EDGARDO GUANSING AND EDUARDO LIZASO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
As a general rule, personal service is the preferred mode of service of summons. Substituted service is the exception to this general rule. For the sheriff to avail of substituted service, there must be a detailed enumeration of the sheriffs actions showing that a defendant cannot be served despite diligent and reasonable efforts. These details are contained in the sheriffs return. Thus, the sheriffs return is entitled to a presumption of regularity. Courts may allow substituted service based on what the sheriffs return contains.1
Failure to serve summons means that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.2 Absent proper service of summons, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendant unless there is voluntary appearance. The filing of an answer and other subsequent pleadings is tantamount to voluntary appearance.
This resolves a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari,3 assailing the Court of Appeals December 10, 2012 Decision4 in CA-G.R. CV No. 96720, which granted Edgardo Guansing (Guansing) and Eduardo Lizaso's (Lizaso) appeal5 and set aside the Regional Trial Court January 28, 2010 Decision6 and February 23, 2011 Order7 in Civil Case No. 06115736.
On February 4, 2006, at around 9:45 a.m., Lizaso, Guansing's employee, was driving Guansing's truck along Legarda Street, Sampaloc, Manila when he hit the rear portion of Andrea Yokohama's (Yokohama) Isuzu Crosswind. The strong impact caused the Isuzu Crosswind to hit other vehicles, rendering it beyond repair.8
Yokohama's Isuzu Crosswind was insured with People's General Insurance Corporation. Yokohama filed a total loss claim under her insurance policy, which paid the full amount of P907,800.00 as settlement. Thus, People's General Insurance Corporation claimed to have been subrogated to all the rights and interests of Yokohama against Guansing.9
People's General Insurance Corporation sought from Guansing reimbursement of the total amount paid to Yokohama, less the salvage value of P470,000.00. Despite repeated demands, Guansing failed to reimburse the amount claimed.10
On August 28, 2006, People's General Insurance Corporation filed a Complaint for a sum of money and damages11 against Guansing and Lizaso. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 06115736 at Branch 41, Regional Trial Court, Manila City. The sheriff served the summons on Guansing's brother, Reynaldo Guansing.12 The sheriff's return did not explain why summons was served on his brother instead of Guansing.13
The sheriffs return read:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On September 27, 2006, Guansing filed a Motion to Dismiss15 the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He alleged that he did not personally receive the summons. People's General Insurance Corporation argued that summons was properly served since substituted service was an alternative mode of service.16SHERIFF'S RETURN
This is to certify:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. That on September 20, 2006, I was able to served (sic) Summons, Complaint and its Annexes thereto attached, upon the defendant EDGARDO GUANSING at his given address in Barangay Tibagan, Bustos, Bulacan thru the assistance of Brgy. Kagawad Nestor Reyes and received by his brother REYNALDO GUANSING of sufficient discretion who acknowledge[d] the receipt hereof as evidence[d by] his signature.
. . . .
WHEREFORE, I respectfully return the original copy of Summons to the Honorable Court, DULY SERVED, to the defendant EDGARDO GUANSING . . . for its records and information.14
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Edgardo Guansing, ordering the latter to pay the former the following:On March 11, 2010, Guansing filed his Motion for Reconsideration,29 where he reiterated his contention that the Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person due to invalid service of summons. In its February 23, 2011 Order,30 the Regional Trial Court denied Guansing's Motion for Reconsideration.
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrarySO ORDERED.28
- The sum of P437,800 for the reimbursement of the remaining cost of the Isuzu Crosswind plus twelve percent (12%) interest from August 28, 2006, the date of the filing of this case, until fully paid;
- The sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees;
- Costs of the suit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The January 28, 2010 Decision and the February 23, 2011 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, in Civil Case No. 06-115736 are SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to the said trial court for further proceedings which shall include the valid service of summons.On January 29, 2013, People's General Insurance Corporation filed a Petition for Review34 before this Court.
SO ORDERED.33 (Emphasis in the original)
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.This Court has consistently held that jurisdiction over a defendant is acquired upon a valid service of summons or through the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. In Interlink Movie Houses Inc. et al. v. Court of Appeals et al.,42 this Court reiterated:
Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
It is settled that jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired either through service of summons or through voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority. In the absence of service or when the service of summons upon the person of the defendant is defective, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment rendered against him is null and void.In the same case, this Court explained:
In actions in personam, such as collection for a sum of money and damages, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant through personal or substituted service of summons.
Personal service is effected by handling a copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him . . .43 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
It is settled that resort to substituted service is allowed only if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time. In such cases, substituted service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with a competent person in charge. Because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service, and personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service, parties do not have unbridled right to resort to substituted service of summons.44 (Emphasis supplied)Sheriffs, in doing substituted service, must strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals:45
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal ServiceIn this case, the basis for resorting to substituted service on respondent Guansing's brother is not provided for in the Sheriffs Return,47 which read:
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no specific time frame is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any, to the other party." Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However, when the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the latter submits the return of summons, then the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if the service of summons has failed. What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriffs Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable time" with regard to personal service on the defendant.
For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of one month which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" mean at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriffs Return of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact of failure. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires that "impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts," which should be made in the proof of service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
If the substituted service will be effected at defendant's house or residence, it should be left with a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing therein." A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed". Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the "relation of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at defendant's office or regular place of business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return.46 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The Sheriffs Return did not contain a specific narration of the serious efforts to attempt to serve the summons on the person of respondent Guansing.SHERIFF'S RETURN
This is to certify:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. That on September 20, 2006, I was able to served (sic) Summons, Complaint and its Annexes thereto attached, upon the defendant EDGARDO GUANSING at his given address in Barangay Tibagan, Bustos, Bulacan thru the assistance of Brgy. Kagawad Nestor Reyes and received by his brother REYNALDO GUANSING of sufficient discretion who acknowledge[d] the receipt hereof as evidence[d by] his signature.
. . . .
WHEREFORE, I respectfully return the original copy of Summons to the Honorable Court, DULY SERVED, to the defendant EDGARDO GUANSING . . . for its records and information.
Section 20. Voluntary appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.In Navale et al. v. Court of Appeals et al.:53
Defects of summons are cured by voluntary appearance and by the filing of an answer to the complaint. A defendant [cannot] be permitted to speculate upon the judgment of the court by objecting to the court's jurisdiction over its person if the judgment is adverse to it, and acceding to jurisdiction over its person if and when the judgment sustains its defense.Any form of appearance in court by the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, is equivalent to service except where such appearance is precisely to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.54
There is voluntary appearance when a party, without directly assailing the court's lack of jurisdiction, seeks affirmative relief from the court. When a party appears before the court without qualification, he or she is deemed to have waived his or her objection regarding lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons.56 (Citations omitted)Rapid City Realty Development Corporation v. Villa57 laid down the rules on voluntary appearance as follows:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;Respondent Guansing filed his: (1) Answer dated January 28, 2007; (2) Pre-trial Brief dated February 27, 2007; (3) Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Postponement dated February 2, 2008; (4) Motion for Reconsideration dated March 8, 2010; and (5) Notice of Appeal dated March 8, 2011. His filing of these pleadings amounts to voluntary appearance. He is considered to have submitted himself to the court's jurisdiction, which is equivalent to a valid service of summons. By filing numerous pleadings, he has confirmed that notice has been effected, and that he has been adequately notified of the proceedings for him to sufficiently defend his interests.
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.58 (Emphasis supplied)
The filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief - to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration - are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Having invoked the trial court's jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief, respondents cannot - after failing to obtain the relief prayed for - repudiate the very same authority they have invoked.66 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)In this case, not only did respondent Guansing file his answer and pre trial brief, but he also filed pleadings seeking affirmative reliefs such as the February 2, 2008 Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Postponement and March 8, 2011 Notice of Appeal. Clearly, he cannot negate that affirmative reliefs were sought.
The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "A litigation is not a game of technicalities." "Lawsuits unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. . . .68 (Citation omitted)Lastly, this Court notes that the Court of Appeals not only erred when it ruled that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Guansing but more so when it remanded the case for further proceedings with a directive for the proper service of summons. A decision remanding the case for further proceedings serves no purpose if the court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in the first place. Jurisdiction is the power of the courts to issue decisions that are binding on the parties. Since the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Guansing, the trial court would have had no power to issue binding decisions over the parties. Hence, all the proceedings would have been considered void.
Very truly yours, (SGD) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN Division Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
1De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, 758 Phil. 706 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
2 Id.
3Rollo, pp. 18-55.
4 Id. at 199-207. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser and concurred in by Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Ramon R. Garcia of the Fourth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
5 Id. at 163.
6 Id. at 146-149. The Decision was penned by Acting Presiding Judge Teresa P. Soriaso of Branch 41, Regional Trial Court, Manila.
7 Id. at 159-161. The Order was penned by Presiding Judge Rosalyn D. Mislos-Loja of Branch 41, Regional Trial Court, Manila.
8 Id. at 20-21.
9 Id. at 21-22.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 56-62.
12 Id. at 201.
13 Id. at 203-204.
14 Id. at 86.
15 Id. at 80.
16 Id. at 83.
17 Id. at 89. The Order was penned by Judge Vedasto B. Marco of Branch 41, Regional Trial Court, Manila.
18 Id. at 91-92.
19 Id. at 100. The Order was penned by Judge Vedasto B. Marco of Branch 41, Regional Trial Court, Manila.
20 Id. at 102.
21 Id. at 23.
22 Id. at 128.
23 Id. at 133-134.
24 Id. at 24-25.
25 Id. at 135-140.
26 Id. at 146-149.
27 Id. at 25.
28 Id. at 149.
29 Id. at 151-152.
30 Id. at 159-161.
31 Id. at 163.
32 Id. at 199-207.
33 Id. at 207.
34 Id. at 18-55.
35 Id. at 28-29.
36 618 Phil. 346 (2009) [Per J. Velasco, Third Division].
37Rollo, p. 30.
38 Id. at 213-219.
39 Id. at 259-267.
40De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, 748 Phil. 706 (20 14) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], citing Manotoc v. CA, 530 Phil. 454 (2006) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
41 Id.
42 G.R. No. 203298, January 17, 2018 , [Per J. Martires, Third Division].
43 Id. at 5.
44 Id. at 6.
45 530 Phil. 454 (2006) [Per J. Velasco, Third Division].
46 Id. at 468-471.
47Rollo, p. 79.
48De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp., 748 Phil. 706 (2014) [Per. J. Leonen, Second Division].
49 530 Phil. 454 (2006) [Per J. Velasco, Third Division], citing Veturanza v. Court of Appeals, 240 Phil. 306 (1987) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].
50Interlink Movie Houses Inc. et. al. v. Court of Appeals et. al., G.R. No. 203298, January 17, 2018, [Per J. Martires, Third Division].
51 Id. at 7.
52Prudential Bank v. Magdamit, Jr., 746 Phil. 649 (2014) [Per J. Perez, First Division].
53 324 Phil. 70 (1996) [Per J. Romero, Second Division]. See also La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 306 Phil. 84 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
54 Id. at 78, citing Carballo v. Encarnacion, 92 Phil. 974 (1953) [Per J. Montemayor, First Division] and Republic v. Ker & Company, Ltd., 124 Phil. 822 (1966) [Per J. Bengzon, J.P., En Banc].
55 G.R. No. 201378, October 18, 2017 [Per J. Jardeleza, First Division].
56 Id. at 11.
57 626 Phil. 211 (2010) (Per J. Carpio Morales, First Division].
58 Id. at 216.
59 618 Phil. 346 (2009) [Per J. Velasco, Third Division].
60 Id. at 359.
61 Id. at 368.
62 Id. at 367, citing RULES OF COURT, Rule 14, sec. 20.
63 Id. at 368.
64Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, 497 Phil. 748 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
65 459 Phil. 542 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
66 Id. at 555.
67 549 Phil. 39 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
68 Id. at 45-46.
69Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].