EN BANC
A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC, December 04, 2018
IN RE: SPECIAL REPORT ON THE ARREST OF ROGELIO M. SALAZAR, JR., SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BOAC, MARINDUQUE, FOR VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165,
A.M. NO. P-16-3450 (FORMERLY A.M. No. 15-12-379-RTC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. ROGELIO M. SALAZAR, JR., SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BOAC, MARINDUQUE, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
No less than the Constitution mandates that a public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.Before this Court are two consolidated administrative matters against Rogelio M. Salazar, Jr. (respondent), Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Office of the Clerk of Court, Boac, Marinduque, for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The image of the court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat. The conduct of a person serving the Judiciary must, at all times, be characterized by propriety and decorum and above all else, be above suspicion so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the Judiciary. The Court would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those in the administration of justice, which will violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.1 (Emphasis ours)
No other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than the Judiciary. The Court is mindful that any act of impropriety on the part of judicial officers and personnel, be they the highest or the lowest members of the work force, can greatly erode the people's confidence in our justice system. Hence, it is the sacred duty of every worker in the Judiciary to maintain the good name and standing of the courts. Every employee of the court should be an exemplar of integrity, uprightness, and honesty. The Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty on those who have fallen short of their accountabilities.2 (Emphasis ours)
1. A.M. No. P-16-3450 xxx and A.M. No.15-05-136-RTC be CONSOLIDATED;In its Memorandum, the OCA emphasized that only substantial evidence is needed in administrative proceedings; that administrative liability is separate and distinct from criminal liability; and that in administrative proceedings, the Court is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence. The OCA also noted that the instant administrative cases are not intended to preempt the DOJ's review of the dismissal of I.S. No. XV-05-INV-15C-087 nor to determine respondent's guilt in Criminal Case Nos. 62-15 and 63-15.17
2. Respondent Roge1io M. Salazar, Jr., Sheriff IV, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque be found GUILTY in both A.M. No. P-16-3450 and A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service pursuant to Sections 46(A)(3) and (B)(8), respectively, under Rule 10 of Revised Rules for Administrative Cases in the Civil Service; and
3. Respondent Salazar, Jr. be meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
xxx The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. While substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required in an ordinary civil case, or evidence beyond reasonable doubt as is required in criminal cases, it should be enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. xxx (citations omitted and emphasis ours)The question now is, taking into consideration the inadmissibility in the criminal cases of the drugs obtained by virtue of the search warrant and the positive result of the confirmatory test conducted on the respondent upon arrest, is there substantial evidence to hold the respondent administratively liable in this case?
(1) The admission partakes of a testimonial evidence, and not a "personal property" that can be the subject of a search and seizure.Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court enumerates the personal property that may be seized for which a search warrant may be issued: (a) the subject of the offense; (b) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or (c) used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. In Retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud v. People30 , We explained that "personal property" as used under the Rules pertain to the thing's mobility. Referencing Article 416 of the Civil Code, We expounded that in general, all things which can be transported from place to place are deemed to be personal property. Testimonial evidence, therefore, cannot be treated as a "fruit" of the quashed search warrant. People v. Uy31 was emphatic in saying that the "inadmissible evidence termed as the fruit of the poisonous tree" refers to "object, not testimonial, evidence" and even more constricting when it held that "it refers to an object seized in the course of an illegal search and seizure."
(2) The admission was already far removed from the illegal search warrant that it cannot be regarded as a fruit of the poisonous tree.The lapse of time from the illegal search and the admission itself sufficiently "attenuate[s] the link."32 It should be stressed that the adjudged irregularity in the application and implementation of the search warrant does not have any clear causal relation between the evidence which was illegally obtained by virtue of such quashed warrant and respondent's admission before a separate and distinct proceeding and authority. Stating it in a different manner, the admission cannot be considered as a logical consequence of the latter. As eloquently put by one Justice's opinion, "[t]he admission was a voluntary act of respondent; it was not as if he was put into such an inescapable situation wherein he would be forced to admit to his guilt, since nothing precluded him from contesting the admissibility - as he did, in fact, contest the admissibility - of the evidence illegally obtained from him. Thus, as respondent had valid claims and defenses, it would be a stretch to conclude that the admission made during the preliminary investigation was a direct result of the evidence illegally seized from him. That being said, the admission is a distinct and separate piece of evidence that should not be tarnished by the illegal search conducted and hence, cannot be deemed as a fruit of poisonous tree."
xxxxFurther, in A.M. No. 06-1-01-SC dated January 17, 2006, the Court has adopted guidelines for a program to prevent drug use and eliminate the hazards of drug abuse in the Judiciary, specifically in the first and second level courts. Its objectives are as follows:
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, which shall be borne by the employer, for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall have to undergo a mandatory drug test; and
xxxx
In addition to the above-stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 1536 of this Act.
1. To detect the use of dangerous drugs among lower court employees, impose disciplinary sanctions, and provide administrative remedies in cases where an employee is found positive for dangerous drug use.There is thus no reason to turn a blind eye, for purposes of this administrative proceeding, on the results of the confirmatory urine test when RA 9165 itself, as well as this Court's guidelines, sanction the conduct of a mandatory random drug testing of officers and employees of public and private offices.37 The character of the drug test being made at random actually dispenses with the usual requirement of probable cause. In the case of Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, et al.,38 We upheld the validity and constitutionality of the mandatory but random drug testing of officers and employees of both public and private offices. This is allowed "for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace." This legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace is upheld because an employee's privacy interest is "circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace."39 Specifically, as regards public officers, this Court pronounced in SJS that:
2. To discourage the use and abuse of dangerous drugs among first and second level court employees and enhance awareness of their adverse effects by information dissemination and periodic random drug testing.
3. To institute other measures that address the menace of drug abuse within the personnel of the Judiciary.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.40Thus, despite the absence of probable cause, and the basis being only a positive drug test result, an employer is allowed by law to pursue an administrative case against the public or private officer or employee and thereafter, to suspend or terminate them.
xxx a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge grave misconduct.42There is no doubt that the use of prohibited drugs constitute grave misconduct. It is a flagrant violation of the law, in fact a crime in itself, thus considered as grave misconduct. In Re: Administrative Charge of Misconduct Relative to the Alleged Use of Prohibited Drug ("Shabu") of Reynard B. Castor, Electrician II, Maintenance Division, Office of Administrative Services,43 the Court ruled that under Section 46(A)(3), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), grave misconduct is a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first offense. Also, under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 13, series of 2010,44 any official or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be subjected to disciplinary/administrative proceedings with a penalty of dismissal from the service at first offense pursuant to Section 46(19) of Book V of Executive Order (E.O.) 292 and Section 22(c) of its Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 and other pertinent civil service laws.45
Section 50. Penalty for the Most Serious Offense. - If the respondent is found guilty of two (2) or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.Finding respondent guilty of both grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, We find the penalty of dismissal for grave misconduct, the most serious offense in this case, proper, pursuant to the aforecited provision.47 Besides, respondent's propensity to lie as above-mentioned, which bolsters a finding of moral turpitude, thus aggravating the offense, cannot go unnoticed.
This Court is a temple of justice. Its basic duty and responsibility is the dispensation of justice. As dispensers of justice, all members and employees of the Judiciary are expected to adhere strictly to the laws of the land, one of which is Republic Act No. 9165 which prohibits the use of dangerous drugs.This Court's mandate to preserve and maintain the public's faith in the Judiciary, as well as its honor, dignity, integrity, can only be achieved by imposing strict and rigid standards of decency and propriety governing the conduct of Justices, judges, and court employees. Thus, it is only by weeding out the likes of respondent from the ranks that We would be able to achieve such objective.
The Court has adhered to the policy of safeguarding the welfare, efficiency, and well-being not only of all the court personnel, but also that of the general public whom it serves. The Court will not allow its frontline representatives xxx to put at risk the integrity of the whole judiciary. xxx.49
Very truly yours, (SGD) EDGAR O. ARICHETA Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
1Re: Administrative Charge of Misconduct Relative to the Alleged Use of Prohibited Drug ("Shabu") of Reynard B. Castor, Electrician II, Maintenance Division, Office of Administrative Services, 719 Phil. 96, 101-102 (2017).
2Security and Sheriff Division, Sandiganbayan v. Ronald Allan Gale R. Cruz, A.M. No. SB-17-24-P, July 11, 2017.
3Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), p. 67.
4 Id. at 69.
5 Id. at 68-69.
6 Id. at 69.
7 Id.
8Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), p. 148.
9 Id. at 1-2.
10 Id. at 8-9.
11Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), pp. 2-3.
12 Id. at 54-57.
13Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), pp. 7-9 and rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), pp. 10-32.
14Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), p. 8.
15Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), pp. 61-63.
16 Id. at 67-75.
17 Id. at 69-71.
18 Id. at 73.
19Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), pp. 148-154.
20 Id. at 163-164.
21 Id. at 168-177.
22 Id. at 178-179.
23 Id. at 163-164.
24Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez, 291-A Phil. 1 (1993).
25Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, 654 Phil. 602, 607 (2011).
26Hon. Ombudsman Marcelo v. Bungubung, et al., 575 Phil. 538, 557 (2008).
27Dadulo v. Court of Appeals, 549 Phil. 872, 877 (2007).
28Hon. Ombudsman Marcelo v. Bungubung, et al., supra note 26, id. at 557-558.
29Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), p. 49.
30 747 Phil. 503, 524 (2014).
31 508 Phil. 637, 655 (2005).
32Hudson v. Michigan, 547 US 586, 592 (2006).
33 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
34The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, Arizona v. Evans: Expanding Exclusionary Rule Exceptions and Contracting Fourth Amendment Protection by Heather A. Jackson.
35 Section 38. Laboratory Examination or Test on Apprehended/Arrested Offenders. - Subject to Section 15 of this Act, any person apprehended or arrested for violating the provisions of this Act shall be subjected to screening laboratory examination or test within twenty-four (24) hours, if the apprehending or arresting officer has reasonable ground to believe that the person apprehended or arrested, on account of physical signs or symptoms or other visible or outward manifestation, is under the influence of dangerous drugs. If found to be positive, the results of the screening laboratory examination or test shall be challenged within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the result through a confirmatory test conducted in any accredited analytical laboratory equipment with a gas chromatograph/mass spectrometry equipment or some such modern and accepted method, if confirmed, the same shall be prima facie evidence that such person has used dangerous drugs, which is without prejudice for the prosecution for other violations of the provisions of this Act: Provided, That a positive screening laboratory test must be confirmed for it to be valid in a court of law.
36 Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. - A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section II of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.
37 Section 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - xxx
The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, which shall be borne by the employer, for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxxx
38 591 Phil. 393 (2008).
39Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, et al., supra note 38 at 414.
40 Id. at 417.
41Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), p. 51.
42Re: Administrative Charge of Misconduct Relative to the Alleged Use of Prohibited Drug of Castor, supra note 1, id at 100-101.
43 Id at 101.
44 Guidelines for a Drug-Free Workplace in the Bureaucracy.
45Re: Administrative Charge of Misconduct Relative to the Alleged Use of Prohibited Drug ("Shabu") of Reynard B. Castor, Electrician II, Maintenance Division, Office of Administrative Services, supra note 1.
46 Id. at 101.
47Laspiñas, et al. v. Judge Banzon, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2488, February 21, 2017.
48 635 Phil. 490 (2010).
49 Id. at 498-499.
PER CURIAM:
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.The "preceding section" referred to in Section 3 (2) pertains to the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures found under Section 2, Article III:
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)According to case law, the exclusionary rule is the "practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures."6 In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be repressed.7In simple terms, the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter law enforcement in engaging in fishing expeditions,8 and ultimately, protect the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures.
ARTICLE [IV] (Amendment 4 - Search and Seizure) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.However, it should be highlighted that under the Fourth Amendment, the phrase "of whatever nature and for any purpose" does not appear as a qualifier to the above-stated right.
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but, also, to spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.In contrast to the US experience, our evolving jurisprudence on the exclusionary rule culminated in its express incorporation in Section 4 (2), Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Significantly, this ensured the firm application of the exclusionary rule in our jurisdiction.21 As one constitutionalist pointed out, "by making such evidence inadmissible, the Constitution has closed the door to any judicial temptation to erode the rule by distinguishing and splitting hairs."22 Therefore, the very act of expressly incorporating the exclusionary rule in our fundamental law begs a different treatment of the same from that in the US.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed by agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually - but, understandably - finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.20
Endnotes:
1Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), pp. 163-164.
2Ponencia, pp. 5-6.
3 Id. at 3.
4 Id. at 6.
5Jaca v. People of the Philippines, 702 Phil. 210, 250 (2013).
6Stonehill v. Diokno, 126 Phil. 738, 750 (1967).
7 Id.
8People v. Cogaed, 740 Phil. 212 (2014).
9 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746, 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1806, 3 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 2488.
10 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, 1914 U.S. LEXIS 1368.
11See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 41 L. Ed. 2d 182, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 71.
12United States v. Herrera, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9830, 444 F.3d 1238.
13 178 Cal. App. 4th 568, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 516, 2009 Cal. App. LEX IS 1690, 158 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P60,883.
14 213 Cal. App. 3d 711, 262 Cal. Rptr. 112, 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 886.
15 9 Neb. App. 561 , 615 N.W.2d 497, 2000 Neb. App. LEXIS 243.
16 42 Phil. 886, 899 (1920).
17See Alvarez v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, 47 (1937).
18 See 80 Phil. 1, 3-4 (1948).
19 Supra note 6.
20 Id. at 753-754.
21 See People v. Marti, 271 Phil. 51 (1991); Bernas, Joaquin, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, p. 229.
22 Id.
23 See National Food Authority v. Masada Security Agency, Inc., 493 Phil. 241, 250-251 (2005); and Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr., 437 Phil. 289, 295 (2002).
24Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council, 691 Phil. 173, 201 (2012).
25 592 Phil. 102 (2008).
26 324 Phil. 63 (1996).
27 321 Phil. 656 (1995).
28 Id. at 690.
29 Emphasis supplied.
30Ponencia, p. 9.
31Menor v. Guillermo, 595 Phil. 10, 15 (2008).
32 635 Phil. 490 (2010).
33 Id. at 498-499.
LEONEN, J.:
WHEREFORE, the following is ordered:On the other hand, a complaint for violation of Sections 11 and 15 of Republic Act No. 9165, which was docketed as IV-05-INQ-lSC-086, was also filed against Salazar, due to the seizure of seven (7) sachets of shabu in his beach house.19
1. An information for violation of Section 5 and 15 of R.A. 9165 be filed against respondent Raymond Mistal @Raymond. No bail and Php100,000, respectively, is recommended.
2. The same charges be dismissed against respondent Rogelio Salazar[,] Jr. or @Ogie and Melvin Lubrin or @Melvin. Consequently[,] they are ordered released, unless detained for some other lawful cause or causes.
3. Let the records of this case be elevated to the Department of Justice for its automatic review of the herein resolution as per Department Circular No. 46, Series of 2003.18
In the present case, after a careful and thorough review of the records, the inconsistencies on the testimonies of both police officers from their Sworn Affidavit and from their testimony that was given before Executive Judge Sagun provides a clear and convincing justification to cast reasonable doubt whether test-buy operations actually occurred. It can be concluded that when Agents Villanueva and Alcima applied for a search warrant with the Quezon City, Regional Trial Comi, they [did] not have personal knowledge about Salazar. Deliberate falsehoods were made by both Intelligence Officers just to impress [upon] the Quezon City Executive Judge that they had reason to believe that a crime ha[d] been committed.Salazar moved for the dismissal43 of the cases against him, and on August 18, 2017, the Regional Trial Court44 granted the motion. The Regional Trial Court reiterated that all evidence obtained through the quashed search warrant, including the urine test conducted on Salazar, was considered illegal:
....
Applying the rule on the present case, the finding of probable cause is a nullity, because the trial judge was intentionally misled by the witnesses.
....
Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant is central to the right, and its existence largely depends on the finding of the judge conducting the examination. In the light of the nullity of Search Warrant No. 5043 (15), the search conducted on its authority is likewise null and void. Based on the above provision, any evidence obtained in violation of a person's right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. With the inadmissibility of the drugs seized from Salazar's home, there is no more evidence to support his conviction. Thus, we see no reason to further discuss the other issues raised in this petition.
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing, Search Warrant No. 5043 (15) is hereby QUASHED. The Motion to Quash Search Warrant with Motion to Suppress Evidence is hereby GRANTED for lack of probable cause and non-conformity of the conducted searches with established constitutional rules and statutory guidelines.
SO ORDERED.42 (Emphasis supplied)
In the May 4, 2017 resolution of this Court, Search Warrant No. 5043 which was obtained and used by the police was Quashed and declared NULL AND VOID for lack of probable cause and non-conformity in the search with the established constitutional rules and statutory guidelines. It was also declared that in the light of the nullity of Search Warrant No. 5043(15), the search conducted on its authority is likewise null and void. Based on the above provision (Section 2, Article III of the Constitution), any evidence obtained in violation of a person's right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. All the evidence obtained as a result of such search is considered illegal, being the fruit of the poisonous tree. Ergo, even the urine test conducted on accused Salazar, having been done as a result of such arrest, occasioned by the search, is also considered as a fruit of such search, hence illegal.Following the quashal of the search warrant and the dismissal of the criminal charges against him, Salazar prayed for, among others, the dismissal of the administrative cases against him, the revocation of his suspension order, and payment of his back salaries and other benefits withheld during his suspension and detention.46
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, there being no more prosecution evidence to support the charges against the accused with the Quashal of the Search Warrant used thereto, the Motion is hereby granted. Criminal Case No. 62-15 for Violation of Sec. 15 in relation to Sec. 28, Art. II of R.A. 9165 and Criminal Case No. 63-15 for violation of Section 11 in relation to Sec. 28, Art. II of R.A. 9165 against accused Rogelio Salazar, Jr. y Mondragon are hereby DISMISSED.
The Provincial Jail Warden or any of his authorized representative is hereby directed to release the accused from custody unless his further detention is warranted for some other lawful cause or causes.
SO ORDERED.45 (Emphasis supplied)
This prohibition on utilizing any evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure is also known as the exclusionary rule, or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, which originated in Stonehill v. Diokno.48 Stonehill overturned the ruling in Moncado v. People's Court,49 which deemed as admissible into evidence the things seized through an illegal search and seizure, in line with the common law rule that a criminal should not be allowed to go scot-free "because the constable has blundered."50Article III
Bill of Rights
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.47
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but, also, to spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.People v. Alicando53 explained how the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine was adopted in our jurisdiction:
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed by agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually - but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning, power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.52 (Emphasis in the original)
We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United States. According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. We applied this exclusionary rule in the recent case of People vs. Salanga, et al., a ponencia of Mr. Justice Regalado. Salanga was the appellant in the rape and killing of a 15-year old barrio lass. He was, however, illegally arrested. Soldiers took him into custody. They gave him a body search which yielded a lady's underwear. The underwear was later identified as that of the victim. We acquitted Salanga. Among other reasons, we ruled that the underwear allegedly taken from the appellant is inadmissible in evidence, being a so-called "fruit of the poisonous tree."54 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)In the case at bar, the sachets of shabu seized from the beach house, a positive finding for shabu of Salazar's urine sample, and his admission of using shabu during the preliminary investigation before the Provincial Prosecutor are all by-products, or fruits, of the quashed search warrant.
In the light of the nullity of Search Warrant No. 5043 (15), the search conducted on its authority is likewise null and void. Based on the above provision, any evidence obtained in violation of a person's right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. With the inadmissibility of the drugs seized from Salazar's home, there is no more evidence to support his conviction.58 (Emphasis in the original)The inadmissibility of both seized and derivative evidence was reiterated by the Regional Trial Court in its August 18, 2017 Order59 dismissing the criminal case against Salazar:
All the evidence obtained as a result of such search is considered illegal, being the.fruit of the poisonous tree. Ergo, even the urine test conducted on accused Salazar, having been done as a result of such arrest, occasioned by the search, is also considered as a fruit of such search, hence illegal.60 (Emphasis supplied)Furthermore, it is irrelevant that XV-05-INV-15C-087 is still pending automatic review before the Department of Justice. The evidence involved is also subject to the exclusionary rule since the evidence relative to Salazar's use of dangerous drugs, i.e., the positive finding of his urine sample and his admission to using dangerous drugs, was the same tainted evidence occasioned by the illegal and quashed search warrant. Thus, recognizing the illegality of his arrest on an imaginary buy-bust operation, the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed the charges for illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs against him:
It seems that the scenario of continuing operation of complainants against respondents was a mere build up to the search conducted at the beach house of [Salazar], thereby projecting him as the person behind the rampant selling of dangerous drugs in Marinduque. Doubtless, it was intended to convey the probability of the positive search of dangerous drugs in his beach house. There was no need for this unless nothing was really found inside the beach house of [Salazar].In as much as all forms of evidence obtained by the agents using the illegal search warrant had been suppressed as evidence, including the derivative evidence derived from the suppressed evidence, there is no substantial evidence to support a finding of administrative liability against Salazar because, as the ponencia correctly stated, substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."62 In this case, there is not even a scintilla of evidence to support the conclusion that Salazar is guilty of the administrative charges of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against him.
Considering the improbability of the succeeding buy-bust operation against [Salazar] and [Lubrin], with all the safeguards of the law against "instant" or imaginary buy bust operation, the charges against these respondents for illegal sale of drugs are hereby dismissed.
Consequently, the charges of illegal use of drugs, the filing of which can be warranted only upon their lawful arrests on drug[-]related charges, are likewise dismissed.61 (Emphasis supplied)
The right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed "critical stages" in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation can be no different from the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less than the State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal prosecution. In the case at bar, Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation and while he did have a counsel, for the latter's lack of vigilance and commitment to Sunga's rights, he was virtually denied his right to counsel.A careful review of the records of the case shows that Salazar was not assisted by counsel during his preliminary investigation before the Provincial Prosecutor. Neither was any written and signed confession on his use of dangerous drugs found or adverted to within the records. In fact, his confession was only briefly mentioned in the Provincial Prosecutor's April 20, 2015 Resolution finding probable cause against him:
The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections; rather it means an efficient and decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation. As in People v. Abano where the confession by the therein accused in the preliminary investigation was excluded as inadmissible due to the absence of her counsel, this Court will not admit Sunga's. This makes it unnecessary to discuss and emphasize the conflict on material points of Sunga's and Locil's accounts of the incident.64 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
With respect to the dangerous drug found in his urine sample, he readily admitted using drugs but he was quick to add that he had stopped doing it as he had promised her (sic) mother on her deathbed in December 2014.However, it is not as simple as the Provincial Prosecutor would like to believe. Any person arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation has the right to be assisted at all times by a competent counsel66 and the records show that Salazar was not afforded that right.
....
On the charge of illegal use of dangerous drugs, probable cause exists with a positive result of the confirmatory test conducted on the urine sample of [Salazar]. He himself admitted that he had used dangerous drugs. It is as simple as that.65 (Emphasis supplied)
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.Additionally, the rights afforded to an accused are available even before an arrest is made, as these rights not only encompass persons arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation, but also embrace invitations or requests for appearance67 extended by State agents to persons suspected of committing crimes.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
[T]he primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, by according the accused, deprived of normal conditions guaranteeing individual autonomy, an informed judgment based on the choices given to him by a competent and independent lawyer.69On the other hand, a person's rights in a preliminary investigation are derived from statute and not the Constitution; hence, such rights are subject to the limitations of procedural law.70 Furthermore, a preliminary investigation is considered merely preparatory to a trial and not part of a trial; thus, while parties may submit affidavits, they have no right to examine witnesses.71
Endnotes:
1Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), pp. 48-49.
2 Id. at 50-52.
3 Id. at 56.
4 Id. at 58.
5 Id. at 60-61.
6 Id. at 61-62.
7 Id. at 46-47.
8 Id. at 139.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 169.
14Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), pp. 46-47.
15Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), p. 138.
16 Id. at 142.
17 Id. at 142-143.
18 Id. at 143-144.
19Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), p. 48.
20 Id. at 48-50.
21 Id. at 18 and 21.
22 Id. at 19-20.
23Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), p. 1.
24 Id. at 1-2.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 8-9.
27 Id. at 10-32.
28 Id. at 16-25.
29 Id. at 11.
30 Id. at 11-12.
31Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), pp. 2-3.
32 Id. at 1.
33 Id. at 54-57.
34 Id. at 56-57.
35 Id. at 67-75.
36 Id. at 75.
37 Id. at 72.
38Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), pp. 148-154.
39 Id. at 168-177. The Order in the consolidated cases of People of the Philippines v. Salazar (Criminal Case No. 62-15) and People of the Philippines v. Salazar (Criminal Case No. 63-15) was penned by Judge Designate Dennis R. Pastrana.
40 Id. at 173.
41 Id. at 174-175.
42 Id. at 176-177. The Order was penned by Judge Designate Dennis R. Pastrana.
43 Id. at 178.
44 Id. at 178-179.
45 Id. at 179.
46 Id. at 163-164.
47 CONST., art. III, sec. 3.
48 126 Phil. 738 (1967) [Per C.J. Concepcion, En Banc].
49 80 Phil. 1 (1948) [Per J. Pablo, Second Division].
50Stonehill v. Diokno, 126 Phil. 738, 750 (1967) [Per C.J. Concepcion, En Banc], citing People v. Defore, 140 NE 585.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 753-754.
53 321 Phil. 656 (1995) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
54 Id. at 690-691.
55Ponencia, p. 9.
56 CONST., art. III, sec. 3(2).
57Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), pp. 168-177.
58 Id. at 177.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 179.
61 Id. at 143.
62Ponencia, p. 7, citing Ombudsman Marcelo v. Bungubung, 575 Phil. 538 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
63 447 Phil. 776 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
64 Id. at 807.
65Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), pp. 49-50.
66 Rep. Act No. 7438 (1992), sec. 2(a).
67Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 212186, June 29, 2016 > [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
68 321 Phil. 1028 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].
69 Id. at 1041.
70Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 206310-11, December 7, 2016 > [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]
71De Lima v. Reyes, G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016 > [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
72 671 Phil. 71 (2011) [Per J. Perez, Second Division].
CAGUIOA, J.:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.Known as the "exclusionary rule," this Constitutional mandate renders inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution, for any purpose, and in any proceeding. Thus, it is immaterial that what is involved here is merely an administrative case-the exclusionary rule still applies as long as it is shown that evidence was obtained in violation of the Constitution.
SEC. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United States. According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. xxx2 (Additional emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)Applying the foregoing to the present case, the admission and the confirmatory urine test should be considered as fruits of the poisonous tree because both were obtained as a result of an illegal search.
SEC. 38. Laboratory Examination or Teston Apprehended/Arrested Offenders. - Subject to Section 15 of this Act, any person apprehended or arrested for violating the provisions of this Act shall be subjected to screening laboratory examination or test within twenty-four (24) hours, if the apprehending or arresting officer has reasonable ground to believe that the person apprehended or arrested, on account of physical signs or symptoms or other visible or outward manifestation, is under the influence of dangerous drugs. If found to be positive, the results of the screening laboratory examination or test shall be challenged within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the result through a confirmatory test conducted in any accredited analytical laboratory equipment with a gas chromatograph/mass spectrometry equipment or some such modern and accepted method, if confirmed the same shall be prima facie evidence that such person has used dangerous drugs, which is without prejudice for the prosecution for other violations of the provisions of this Act: Provided, That a positive screening laboratory test must be confirmed for it to be valid in a court of law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)In ruling that the confirmatory urine test was not the direct or indirect result of the illegal search, the ponencia concludes that "[t]he basis for the confirmatory drug test was, in fact, a reasonable belief of drug use and a positive screening test, both of which are neither a necessary nor automatic consequence of an illegal search."3 I disagree as this statement is wholly belied by the facts and the law.
There is thus no reason to turn a blind eye, for purposes of this administrative proceeding, on the results of the confirmatory urine test when RA 9165 itself, as well as this Court's guidelines, sanction the conduct of a mandatory random drug testing of officers and employees of public and private offices. The character of the drug test being made at random actually dispenses with the usual requirement of probable cause. In the case of Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, et al., We upheld the validity and constitutionality of the mandatory but random drug testing of officers and employees of both public and private offices. This is allowed "for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace." xxxOnce more, I cannot subscribe to the ponencia's postulations.
xxxx
Thus, despite the absence of probable cause, and the basis being only a positive drug test result, an employer is allowed by law to pursue an administrative case against the public or private officer or employee and thereafter, to suspend or terminate them.4 (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
In the May 4, 2017 resolution of this Court, Search Warrant No. 5043 which was obtained and used by the police was [q]uashed and declared NULL AND VOID for lack of probable cause and non-conformity in the search with the established constitutional rules and statutory guidelines. It was also declared that in the light of the nullity of Search Warrant No. 5043(15), the search conducted on its authority is likewise null and void. Based on [Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution], any evidence obtained in violation of a person's right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. All the evidence obtained as a result of such search is considered illegal, being the fruit of the poisonous tree. Ergo, even the urine test conducted on accused Salazar, having been done as a result of such arrest, occasioned by the search, is also considered as a fruit of such search, hence illegal.8 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)That the foregoing is a factual finding by the trial court that should, as a rule, be binding on the Court, needs no further belaboring. All things considered, the confirmatory urine test imposed on Salazar should be, as it was so held by the RTC, declared inadmissible for being covered by the exclusionary rule.
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.In this case, there is no showing by the ponencia that Salazar was apprised of his Constitutional rights when he made the admission. Also, the records do not disclose whether Salazar was assisted by counsel during his preliminary investigation before the Provincial Prosecutor. Nor was there any showing of a valid waiver of his constitutional rights. Consequently, Salazar's admission should be declared inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of the exclusionary rule under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. Additionally, neither was any written and signed confession on Salazar's use of dangerous drugs found nor adverted to within the records, in violation of R.A. 7438,13 thereby rendering the same inadmissible under said law.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
With respect to the dangerous drug found in his urine sample, he readily admitted using drugs but he was quick to add that he had stopped doing it as he had promised her (sic) mother on her deathbed in December 2014.In evaluating Salazar's admission, I am of the opinion that the same is not enough to hold him criminally or administratively liable.
xxxx
On the charge of illegal use of dangerous drugs, probable cause exists with the positive result of the confirmatory test conducted on the urine sample of [Salazar]. He himself admitted that he had used dangerous drugs. It is as simple as that.14 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Endnotes:
1 321 Phil. 656 (1995).
2 Id. at 690.
3Ponencia, p. 11. Italics supplied.
4 Id. at 12-13.
5 591 Phil. 393 (2008),
6Ponencia, p. 12. Italics supplied.
7 R.A. 9165, Sec. 38. Underscoring supplied.
8Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), p. 179.
9Ponencia, pp. 8-9.
10 508 Phil. 637, 655 (2005) [Third Division, Per J. Carpio Morales].
11 Supra note 1, at 690. Additional emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied.
12 Id. Additional emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied.
13 AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING, AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF, April 27, 1992.
14Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), pp. 49-50.
15 See Diaz v. The Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 203217, July 2, 2018, p. 6.
16Ponencia, p. 9.
17 Id. at 13.
18People v. Alicando, supra note 1, at 692. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
19 400 Phil. 703 (2000).
20 Id. at 726. Emphasis supplied.
21 See People v. Bariquit, 395 Phil. 823, 852 (2000).