THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EANNA O'COCHLAIN, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
On appeal is the February 9, 2016 Decision1 and July 21, 2016 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36412, which affirmed the November 22, 2013 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, Laoag City, in Criminal Case No. 15585-13, finding accused-appellant Eanna O'Cochlain (Eanna) guilty of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
At the time of his arrest, Eanna was a 53-year old Irish national married to a Filipina and residing in Barangay Aring, Badoc, Ilocos Norte. In an Information4 dated July 15, 2013, he was charged with illegal possession of marijuana, committed as follows:
That on or about [the] 14th day of July 2013 in the City of Laoag and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had in his possession, custody and control: two (2) sticks of dried Marijuana Leaves, a dangerous drug, with an aggregate weight of 0.3824 grams, without any license or authority to possess, in violation of the aforesaid law.5With the assistance of a counsel de parte and in the presence of a public prosecutor, Eanna pleaded "NOT GUILTY" in his arraignment.6 He was allowed to post bail for his temporary liberty, but a hold departure order was issued to prevent him from leaving the Philippines and his passport was surrendered to the court for its custody in the course of the proceedings.7
WHEREFORE, accused Eanna O'Cochlain is hereby pronounced GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the charge of illegal possession of marijuana weighing 0.3824 gram and is therefore sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and to pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00).The search conducted on Eanna and his subsequent arrest were upheld. According to the RTC, the search upon his person was not unreasonable but was actually an exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and seizures. It was justified as it proceeded from a duty or right that was enforced in accordance with the aviation rules and regulations to maintain peace, order and security at the airports. In fact, Eanna's plane ticket carried a proviso allowing airport authorities to check on his person and baggage pursuant to the requirement of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235.14 Moreover, another exception to the rule is consented warrantless search and seizure. In this case, Eanna agreed to the body pat down search that was requested by SSO Suguitan.
The two sticks of marijuana subject hereof are confiscated, the same to be disposed in the manner that the law prescribes.
SO ORDERED.13
In this case, the Court does not doubt a bit that the two sticks of marijuana presented in evidence are the same sticks of marijuana confiscated from the accused. There was not only compliance by the airport authorities of the requirements of Section 21 of the law and its implementing rules and regulations, there is a complete account of the complete chain of custody of the two sticks of marijuana that negates any doubt that their integrity and evidentiary value have been preserved. As it has been established by the prosecution, upon being informed of the arrest of the accused, after SSO Suguitan had confiscated the two [sticks] of marijuana from the accused, PO3 Joel Javier, the duty police investigator at the airport at [the] time who was at the ramp outside the departure terminal was called and when he arrived at the place where the accused was accosted and was informed of the arrest of the accused, he took custody of the two sticks of marijuana which were then on the screening desk or table and invited the accused to the office of the PNP-CAAP Aviation Security Group located within the premises of the airport not far tram the departure terminal. There, PO3 Javier marked the two sticks of marijuana with E0-1 and. E0-2. Upon the arrival of two Barangay officials, Barangay Chairman Edilberto Bumanglag and Kagawad Benjamin Teodoro of Barangay Araniw, Laoag City which has territorial jurisdiction over the airport, and a member of the media in the person of Juanito Badua, a cameraman of ABS-CBN, Laoag, PO3 Javier also conducted the required inventory not only of the two sticks of marijuana but the other belongings of the accused contained in his luggage. In the course of the inventory, PO1 Erald Terson, also a member of the PNP Aviation Security Group, took pictures of the seized items as he was directed to do by their superior. Sometime later, as the accused was brought for medical examination, PO3 Javier was the one who brought the two sticks of marijuana together with the prepared letter request to the Ilocos Norte Provincial Crime Laboratory Office for examination. And to complete the chain, the prosecution established that at the said crime lab, the two sticks were received by PO3 Padayao who thereupon turned them over to the forensic chemist, Police Inspector Amiely Ann Navarro. As the Court takes judicial notice from the record of the case, the two sticks were finally submitted to court on July 19, 2013, received by the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Bernadette Espejo[,] who issued the corresponding Acknowledgment Receipt therefor.Eanna moved to reconsider the RTC judgment, but it was denied; hence, a notice of appeal was filed.16
Significantly relative to the chain of custody and as would have equally done by the other concerned witnesses such as forensic chemist Police Inspector Navarro who issued her written chemistry reports of the qualitative examinations she conducted on the specimens, and PO3 Padayao, both of the crime lab, SSO Suguitan[,] who discovered the two sticks of marijuana[,] identified the same in open court, pointing in the process the respective markings E0-1 and E0-2 that he witnessed to have been placed by the investigating police officer, PO3 Javier[,] which, after the inventory, the latter placed in a plastic bag (Ziploc). PO3 Javier himself also identified the two sticks of marijuana.
At this point, the Court is not oblivious of the fact that in his testimony SSO Suguitan initially claimed that he turned over the two sticks of marijuana to PO1 Manadao, Jr. But actually[,] as it can be clearly appreciated from the testimony of SSO Suguitan, the turn over that he said was merely the placing of the two sticks of marijuana on top of the table at the final screening area, in front of PO1 Manadao and the accused. In fact, as SSO Suguitan conoborated PO3 Javier, the two sticks of marijuana which were still on the screening desk were thereafter placed on a tray and PO3 Javier was the one who then actually took custody thereof as the accused was invited to the office of the PNP-CAAP Aviation Security Group. PO3 Javier himself, when he was asked by the defense if it was PO1 Manadao who turned over the specimens to him, categorically said, "No, sir, Mr. Dexter Suguitan."
Also, the Court cannot be amiss to point out that the two sticks of marijuana could not have been switched with another or contaminated while it was in the custody of PO3 Javier. While admitting that there were many things that they prepared while they were already in their office, he testified in effect that no such [thing] happened. The people there at the office were not examining the specimens, they were just looking and not holding it.
The Court at this point cannot but express its observation that PO3 Javier, just like SSO Suguitan, was equally credible. He was straightforward, consistent and candid in his testimony that it cannot in any way be considered suspect.15
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.21Thus, while the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed by Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,22 a routine security check being conducted in air23 and sea24 ports has been a recognized exception. This is in addition to a string of jurisprudence ruling that search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) customs search; (4) seizure of evidence in "plain view"; (5) consented warrantless search; (6) "stop and frisk" search; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstance.25
[S]earches conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, rather than as part of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime, may be permissible under the Fourth Amendment though not supported by a showing of probable cause directed to a particular place or person to be searched.The constitutional bounds of an airport administrative search require that the individual screener's actions be no more intrusive than necessary to determine the existence or absence of explosives that could result in harm to the passengers and aircraft.43 The search cannot also serve unrelated law enforcement purposes as it effectively transforms a limited check for weapons and explosives into a general search for evidence of crime, substantially eroding the privacy rights of passengers who travel through the system.44 As in other exceptions to the search warrant requirement, the screening program must not turn into a vehicle for warrantless searches for evidence of crime.45 It is improper that the search be tainted by "general law enforcement objectives" such as uncovering contraband unrelated to that purpose or evidence of unrelated crimes or evidencing general criminal activity or a desire to detect "evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing."46 In United States v. $124,570 US. Currency,47 the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that the US Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of keeping criminal investigatory motives from coloring administrative searches.48
As we have seen, screening searches of airline passengers are conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, namely, to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent hijackings. The essential purpose of the scheme is not to detect weapons or explosives or to apprehend those who carry them, but to deter persons carrying such material from seeking to board at all.
Of course, routine airport screening searches will lead to discovery of contraband and apprehension of law violators. This practical consequence does not alter the essentially administrative nature of the screening process, however, or render the searches unconstitutional. x x x.
There is an obvious danger, nonetheless, that the screening of passengers and their carry-on luggage for weapons and explosives will be subverted into a general search for evidence of crime. If this occurs, the courts will exclude the evidence obtained.42 (Citations omitted.)
Necessity alone, however, whether produced by danger or otherwise, does not in itself make all non-probable-cause searches reasonable. Reasonableness requires that the courts must weigh more than the necessity of the search in terms of possible harm to the public. The equation must also take into account the likelihood that the search procedure will be effective in averting the potential harm. On the opposite balance we must evaluate the degree and nature of intrusion into the privacy of the person and effects of the citizen which the search entails.According to United States v. Aukai,60 US case law had erroneously suggested that the reasonableness of airport screening searches is dependent upon the passenger's consent, either ongoing consent or irrevocable implied consent. It opined:
In undertaking our calculation of the weight to be accorded to these three factors in the case at bar - public necessity, efficacy of the search, and degree of intrusion - we need not reiterate what was said in Moreno about the dangers posed by air piracy; suffice it to say that there is a judicially-recognized necessity to insure that the potential harms of air piracy are foiled. The search procedures have every indicia of being the most efficacious that could be used. The group being screened is limited to persons with the immediate intention of boarding aircraft. Metal detectors, visual inspection, and rare but potential physical searches appear to this court to provide as much efficiency to the process as it could have.
On the other side of the judicial scales, the intrusion which the airport search imposes on the public is not insubstantial. It is inconvenient and annoying, in some cases it may be embarrassing, and at times it can be incriminating. There are several factors, however, which make this search less offensive to the searched person than similar searches in other contexts. One such factor is the almost complete absence of any stigma attached to being subjected to search at a known, designated airport search point. As one commentator has put it in the border search context, "individuals searched because of their membership in a morally neutral class have less cause to feel insulted . . . ." In addition, the offensiveness of the screening process is somewhat mitigated by the fact that the person to be searched must voluntarily come to and enter the search area. He has every opportunity to avoid the procedure by not entering the boarding area. Finally, the circumstances under which the airport search is conducted make it much less likely that abuses will occur. Unlike searches conducted on dark and lonely streets at night where often the officer and the subject are the only witnesses, these searches are made under supervision and not far from the scrutiny of the traveling public.
Moreover, the airlines, which have their representatives present, have a definite and substantial interest in assuring that their passengers are not unnecessarily harassed. The officers conducting the search under these circumstances are much more likely to be solicitous of the Fourth Amendment rights of the traveling public than in more isolated, unsupervised surroundings.
Our conclusion, after this tripartite weighing of the relevant factors, is that the standards for initiating a search of a person at the boarding gate should be no more stringent than those applied in border crossing situations. In the critical pre-boarding area where this search started, reasonableness does not require that officers search only those passengers who meet a profile or who manifest signs of nervousness or who otherwise appear suspicious. Such a requirement would have to assume that hijackers are readily identifiable or that they invariably possess certain traits. The number of lives placed at hazard by this criminal paranoia forbid taking such deadly chances. As Judge Friendly has stated:Determination of what is reasonable requires a weighing of the harm against the need. When the object of the search is simply the detection of past crime, probable cause to arrest is generally the appropriate test . . . . When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness, so long as the search is conducted in good faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking or like damage and with reasonable scope and the passenger has been given advance notice of his liability to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air. (Citations omitted.)
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether [he] was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether [he] objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence [will] be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.81Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.82 The government bears the burden of proving "consent."83 In the US, it has been held that when the government relies on the "consent" exception to the warrant requirement, two main issues must be litigated: did the defendant indeed consent, and did the defendant do so with the requisite voluntariness?84 Here, we have ruled that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and, lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.85
[T]he duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody [was] made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.93The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must be authenticated prior to its admission into evidence.94 To establish a chain of custody sufficient to make evidence admissible, the proponent needs only to prove a rational basis from which to conclude that the evidence is what the party claims it to be.95 In a criminal case, the prosecution must offer sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably believe that an item still is what the government claims it to be.96 As regards the prosecution of illegal drugs, the well-established US federal evidentiary rule is when the evidence is not readily identifiable and is susceptible to alteration by tampering or contamination, courts require a more stringent foundation entailing a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.97 This evidentiary rule was adopted in Mallillin v. People,98 where this Court also discussed how, ideally, the chain of custody of seized items should be established:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.99In the present case, the prosecution was able to prove, through the documentary and testimonial evidence, that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved in every step of the way.
The dissent agreed with accused-appellant's assertion that the police operatives failed to comply with the proper procedure in the custody of the seized drugs. It premised that non-compliance with the procedure in Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 creates an irregularity and overcomes the presumption of regularity accorded police authorities in the performance of their official duties. This assumption is without merit.People v. Daria, Jr.,132Peop1e v. Gratil,133 and People v. Bala134 have followed the Agulay ruling.
First, it must be made clear that in several cases decided by the Court, failure by the buy-bust team to comply with said section did not prevent the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty from applying.
Second, even prior to the enactment of R.A. 9165, the requirements contained in Section 21 (a) were already there per Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979. Despite the presence of such regulation and its non-compliance by the buy-bust team, the Court still applied such presumption. We held:
The failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979 is a matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting officers and is totally irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case for the reason that the commission of the crime of illegal sale of a prohibited drug is considered consummated once the sale or transaction is established and the prosecution thereof is not undermined by the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the regulations of the Dangerous Drugs Board.131 (Emphasis in the original)
Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will [be] accorded [to] it by the courts. x x xWe restated in People v. Moner143 that if the evidence of illegal drugs was not handled precisely in the manner prescribed by the chain of custody rule, the consequence relates not to inadmissibility that would automatically destroy the prosecution's case but rather to the weight of evidence presented for each particular case. The saving clause under Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 recognizes that the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses and the admissibility of other evidence are well within the power of trial court judges to decide. The Court went on to state that under the doctrine of separation of powers, it is important to distinguish if a matter is a proper subject of the rules of evidence, which are promulgated by the Court pursuant to paragraph (5), Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, or if it is a subject of substantive law, which is passed by an act of Congress. Taking into account the distinction in criminal law that a substantive law declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them while a procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished, it was concluded that the chain of custody rule is a matter of evidence and a rule of procedure; therefore, it is the Cmni which has the last say regarding the appreciation of evidence.
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight - evidentiary merit or probative value - to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case.142 (Italics in the original.)
At this point, it is not amiss for the ponente to express his position regarding the issue of which between the Congress and the Judiciary has jurisdiction to determine sufficiency of compliance with the rule on chain of custody, which essentially boils down to the application of procedural rules on admissibility of evidence. In this regard, the ponente agrees with the view of Hon. Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro in People v. Teng Moner y Adam that "if the evidence of illegal drugs was not handled precisely in the manner prescribed by the chain of custody rule, the consequence relates not to inadmissibility that would automatically destroy the prosecution's case but rather to the weight of evidence presented for each particular case." As aptly pointed out by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, the Court's power to promulgate judicial rules, including rules of evidence, is no longer shared by the Court with Congress.Strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible under field conditions; the police operates under varied conditions, many of them far from ideal, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence.147 Like what have been done in past cases, we must not look for the stringent step-by-step adherence to the procedural requirements; what is important is to ensure the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would detennine the guilt or innocence of the accused.148 The identity of the confiscated drugs is preserved when the drug presented and offered as evidence in court is the exact same item seized from the accused at the time of his arrest, while the preservation of the drug's integrity means that its evidentiary value is intact as it was not subject to planting, switching, tampering or any other circumstance that casts doubt as to its existence.149
The ponente subscribes to the view of Justice Leonardo-De Castro that the chain of custody rule is a matter of evidence and a rule of procedure, and that the Court has the last say regarding the appreciation of evidence. Evidentiary matters are indeed well within the powers of courts to appreciate and rule upon, and so, when the courts find appropriate, substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved may wanant the conviction of the accused.
The ponente further submits that the requirements of marking the seized items, conduct of inventory and taking photograph in the presence of a representative from the media or the DOJ and a local elective official, are police investigation procedures which call for administrative sanctions in case of non-compliance. Violation of such procedure may even merit penalty under R.A. No. 9165, to wit:Section 29. Criminal Liability for Planting of Evidence. - Any person who is found guilty of "planting" any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, regardless of quantity and purity, shall suffer the penalty of death.However, non-observance of such police administrative procedures should not affect the validity of the seizure of the evidence, because the issue of chain of custody is ultimately anchored on the admissibility of evidence, which is exclusively within the prerogative of the courts to decide in accordance with the rules on evidence. (Emphasis and italics in the original)
Section 32. Liability to a Person Violating Any Regulation Issued by the Board. - The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person found violating any regulation duly issued by the Board pursuant to this Act, in addition to the administrative sanctions imposed by the Board.
Very truly yours, (SGD) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN Division Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
1 Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate Justices Rodil Y. Zalameda and Pedro B. Corales concurring; rollo, pp. 3-26.
2 CA rollo , p. 237.
3 Records, pp. 116-133.
4Id. at 1-2.
5Id. at 1.
6Id. at 43-45.
7Id. at 31, 40, 44-45.
8 The presentation of CSI Flor Tamayo as a witness for the prosecution was dispensed with after the parties stipulated that the affidavit he previously executed would be his direct testimony and admitted that he did not witness the search othe person of Eana and on his luggage (TSN, September 11, 2013, pp. 23-25). Likewise, PO3 John Edwin Padayao and Police Inspector Amiely Ann Luis Navarro were no longer presented as Witnesses after their proffered testimonies were admitted (TSN, August 20, 2013, pp. 2-3). The prosecution admitted that. PO3 Padayao and Police Inspector Navarro have no personal knowledge of the specific source of the specimens they received on July 15, 2013 (TSN, August 20, 2013, pp. 3-4).
9 Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines.
10 Records, p. 6; TSN , August 20, 2013, p p. 54-55.
[I I] Also referred to as PO1 Judel Tugon (see TSN , September 11, 2013, p. 14).
12 Eanna contended that it was actually one rolled paper containing flavored tobacco that was broken into two (TSN , October 2, 2013, pp. 36-38). There were two red Marlboro boxes, one almost full, containing 19 cigarettes, and the other one contained pre-rolled crushed tobacco (TSN, October 2, 2013, p. 19).
13 Records, p. 133; CA rollo, pp. 70, 136.
14Section 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier.
15 Records. pp. 129-131; CA rollo, pp. 66-68, 132-134.
16 Records. pp. 165-166.
17Rollo, pp. 54-57.
18Id. at 41-52.
19 See People v. Cadidia, 719 Phil. 538 (2013); Sales v. People, 703 Phil. 133 (2013); People v. Suzuki, 460 Phil. 146 (2003); People v. Canton, 442 Phil. 743 (2002); and People v. Johnson, 401 Phil. 734 (2000).
20Id.
21People v. Johnson, id. at 743, as cited in People v. Cadidia, supra note 19, at 556; Sales v. People, supra note 19, at 140; People v. Suzuki, supra note 19, at 159-160; and People v. Canton, supra note 19, at 758-759. See also Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2018; People v. Gumilao, G.R. No. 208755, October 5, 2016 (Resolution); and Dela Cruz v. People, 653 Phil. 653, 683 (2016).
22 SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
23People v. Cadidia, supra note 19; Sales v. People, supra note 19; People v. Suzuki, supra note 19; People v. Canton, supra note 19; and People v. Johnson, supra note 19.
24People v. Gumilao, supra note 21 ; and Dela Cruz v. People, supra note 21, at 683.
25 See Martinez v. People, 703 Phil. 609, 617 (2013); Luz v. People, 683 Phil. 399, 411 (2012); Valdez v. People, 563 Phil. 934, 949 (2007); People v. Chua Ho San, 367 Phil. 703, 715-716 (1999); People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 627-628 (1999); and Malacat v. CA, 347 Phil. 462, 479 (1997).
26Saluday v. People, supra note 21.
27People v. Marti, 271 Phil. 51, 57 (1991), as cited in Pallo v. Chairperson Constantino-David, et al., 675 Phil. 225, 249 (2011).
28 See United States v. McCarty, 648 F.3d 82.0 (2010); Higerd v. State, 54 So. 3d 513 (2010); United States v. Fofana, 620 F. Supp. 2d 857 (2009): and United State v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (2007).
29United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 371 (6th Cir. 1982); Higerd v. State, id.; and United States v. Fofana, id.
30Griffin v. Wis., 483 U.S. 868 (1987). See also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
31Corbett v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 767 F.3d 1171 (2014).
32United States v. McCarty, supra note 28, citing United States v. Aukai, supra note 28 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 [2000]).
33Corbett v. Transp. Sec. Admin., supra note 31.
34 See United States v. McCarty, supra note 28, citing United States v. Aukai, supra note 28 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 [1997]).
35State v. Hanson, 97 Haw. 77 (2001).
36United States v. Aukai, supra note 28, citing City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, supra note 32; Chandler v. Miller, supra note 34; and Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). See also Corbett v. Tramp. Sec. Admin, supra note 31; United States v. McCarty, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18874 (2011) and supra note 28; and Vanbrocklen v. United States, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24854 (2009).
37Schaffer v. State, 988 P.2d 610 (1999).
38Corbell v. Transp. Sec. Admin., supra note 31.
39United States v. Aukai, supra note 28.
40United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612 (2005), citing United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (1973).
41Id.
42 See also United States v. McCarty, supra note 28; Higerd v. State, supra note 28; United States v. Aukai, supra note 28; and United States v. Marquez, supra note 40.
43United States v. McCarty, id., citing United States v. $124,570 U.S Currency, 873 F.2d 1240 (1989).
44 See United Stat es v. $124, 570 U.S Currency, id.
45State v. Salit, 613 P.2d 245 (1980), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
46 See United States v. Fofana, supra note 28; United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, supra note 43; and State v. Salit, id.
47Id., citing Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 ( 1967); and Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
48 See also United States v. Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547 (1998); and Alexander v. City & County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355 (1994).
49United States v. McCarty, supra note 28, citing United States v. $ 124,570 U.S. Currency, supra note 43. See also Higerd v. State, supra note 28; and United States v. Fofana, supra note 28.
50United States v. McCarty, id.
51United States v. Fofana, supra note 28.
52United States v. Fofana, id., citing United States v. Davis, supra note 40.
53State v. Hanson, supra note 35, citing United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899 (1986).
54United States v. Davis, supra note 40, citing Camara v. Municipal Court, supra note 47.
55Bruce v. Beary, 498 F.3d 1232 (2007), citing United States v. Davis, supra note 40. See also Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125 (2006).
56United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, supra note 53. See also Higerd v. State, supra note 28; United States v. Fofana, supra note 28; United States v. Marquez, supra note 40; and State v. Hanson, supra note 35.
57 See also United States v. McCarty, supra note 28; Higerd v. State, supra note 28; United States v. Fofana, supra note 28; United States v. Aukai, supra note 28; Gilmore v. Gonzales, supra note 55; State v. Book, 165 Ohio App. 3d 511 (2006); United States v. Marquez, supra note 40; United States v. PulidoBaquerizo, supra note 53; and United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223 (1980).
58Supra note 35.
59 482 F.2d 1272 (1973).
60Supra note 28. See Arrahim v. Cho, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32708 (2018); and Herrera v. Santa Fe Pub. Sch., 956 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (2013).
61United States v. Aukai, id., citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
62 According to United States v. Davis, supra note 40, "airport screening searches of the persons and immediate possessions of potential passengers for weapons and explosives are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment provided each prospective boarder retains the right to leave rather than submit to the search." It held that "as a matter of constitutional laws, a prospective passenger has a choice: he may submit to a search of his person and immediate possessions as a condition to boarding; or he may turn around and leave. If he chooses to proceed, that choice, whether viewed as a relinquishment of an option to leave or an election to submit to the search, is essentially a 'consent,' granting the government a license to do what it would otherwise be barred from doing by the Fourth Amendment." See also Gilmore v. Gonzales, supra note 55.
63United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, supra note 53.
64State v. Hanson, supra note 35, citing United Stutes v. Pulido-Baquerizo, id.
65 See United States v. Marquez, supra note 40; and State v. Hanson, supra note 35.
66 During the administration of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, acts constituting dollar salting or dollar black marketing was declared illegal and was screened in airports (see Executive Order No. 934 dated February 13, 1984; Executive Order No. 953 dated May 4, 1984; Presidential Decree No. 1936 dated June 22, 1984; Letter of Instructions No. 1445 dated January 11, 1985; and Presidential Decree No. 2002 dated December 16, 1985). Likewise, due to the alarming increase in the number of overseas Filipino workers who have been enticed, duped, and subsequently recruited to act as drug couriers by international drug trafficking syndicates, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo created the Drug Couriers Task Force, which was an Inter-Agency Task Force composed of the PDEA as Chairman, the Department of Foreign Affairs as Co-Chairman, and the Department of Labor and Employment, Bureau of Immigration, Bureau of Customs, National Bureau of Investigation. Philippine Information Agency, Manila International Airport Authority and Philippine Tourism Authority as Members (see Administrative Order No. 279 dated February 8, 2010).
67 Taking into account the series of aircraft hijackings which have threatened the airline industry and civil aviation, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 399 dated April 28, 1976. It constituted the National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking (NACAH), under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of National Defense, to formulate plans for, coordinate, integrate, direct, control and supervise all measures aimed at preventing/suppressing any and all forms of hijacking; ensuring the safe and continuous operation of civil aviation; and handling all incidents of hijacking to include immediate and follow-up actions to be taken up to the termination or resolution thereof.
In the implementation of LOI No. 399, LOI No. 961, dated November 22, 1979, created the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to be responsible for the protection of the airline industry to ensure its continued and uninterrupted operations. It was tasked to maintain peace and order within airport complexes and secure all airports against offensive and terroristic acts that threaten civil aviation. In the discharge of its responsibilities, the A VSECOM was directed to confine itself to its primary responsibility of security.
Pursuant to Executive Order (EO) No. 393 dated January 24, 1990, then President Corazon C. Aquino, reconstituted the NACAH and mandated it to formulate plans to coordinate, integrate, direct, control and supervise all measures aimed at preventing or suppressing all forms of hijacking or kidnapping involving civil aviation and airline industry operations; ensuring the safe and continuous operation of the airline industry and civil aviation; and handling all incidents of hijacking and all other offensive and terroristic activities. EO No. 452, dated April 5, 1991, further reconstituted the NACAH by designating the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government as its Chairman.
On Ma y 18, 1995, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued EO No. 246, reconstituting and renaming the NACAH as the National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking and Anti-Terrorism (NACAHT). In addition to the provisions of LOI No. 399 and EO No. 393, NACAHT was empowered to: (a) formulate plans to direct, control, supervise and integrate all measures aimed at preventing and suppressing hijacking, other threats to civil aviation, and all other forms of terrorism with the end in view of protecting national interests, and (b) adopt measures geared towards the implementation of the following main objectives: (1) to effectively monitor the activities of suspected terrorists, and (2) to develop the capability of local law enforcement agencies to contain the threats of terrorism . The NACAHT was ordered to establish close coordination and cooperation with concerned agencies of countries which are vi gorously opposing international terrorism and to enhance the intelligence and operational functions of concerned entities and authorities in dealing with crimes perpetrated by terrorist.
Under the administration of then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the NACAHT was reconstituted and renamed as the National Council for Civil Aviation Security (NCCAS). In addition to the provisions of LOI No. 399, EO No. 393 . and EO No. 246, the NCCAS was tasked by EO No. 336, dated January 5, 2001, to (a) formulate plans to direct, control, supervise and integrate all measures aimed at preventing and suppressing all terrorist threats to civil aviation especially hijacking, commandeering, sabotage of plane and airport facilities, violence directed against civil aviation personnel as well as the plane riding public and/or the citizens-at-large, and all other forms of terrorism with the end in view of protecting Philippine national interests, and (b) to develop and continue enhancing the level of operational effectiveness of local law enforcement agencies under jurisdiction and immediate supervision of the NCCAS.
On January 30, 2004, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO No. 277 in view of the urgent need to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference and the responsibility of the NCCAS for formulating plans to direct, control, supervise and integrate all measures aimed at preventing and suppressing all terrorist threats to civil aviation. The executive order created an OTS under the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), which shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of Annex 17 of the ICAO Convention on aviation security. Moreover, the NCCAS was reconstituted as the National Civil Aviation Security Committee (NCASC) under the Chairmanship of the DOTC Secretary. In addition to its existing functions, the NCASC shall be responsible for the implementation and maintenance of the National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP) and shall:Barely three months after, President Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO No. 311, on April 26, 2004. It took note of the recent international and domestic events reminding that the nation must constantly be vigilant to prevent weapons, explosives, other dangerous elements or devices, hazardous materials and cargoes, which may be used to commit an act of terrorism and the carriage or bearing of which is not authorized, from being introduced into and carried on board a public transport system. The OTS was designated as the single authority responsible for the security of the transportation systems of the country, including, but not limited to civil aviation, sea transport and maritime infrastructure, and land transportation, rail system and infrastructure. The OTS shall exercise the following powers and functions:
- Define and allocate tasks and coordinate activities among the agencies of the government, airport authorities, aircraft operators and other entities concerned with, or responsible for, the implementation of various aspects of the NCASP;
- Coordinate security activities among the agencies of the government, airport authorities, aircraft operators and other entities concerned with, or responsible for, the implementation of various aspects of the NCASP;
- Define and allocate tasks for the implementation of the NCASP among the agencies of the government, airport authorities, aircraft operators and other concerned entities;
- Ensure that each airport serving international civil aviation shall establish and implement a written airport security programme appropriate to meet the requirements of the NCASP;
- Arrange for an authority at each airport serving international civil aviation to be responsible tor coordinating the implementation of security controls;
- Arrange for the establishment of an airport security committee at each airport serving international civil aviation to assist the authority mentioned in paragraph (e) above, in the coordination of the implementation of security controls and procedures;
- Coordinate and collaborate with the Task Force for Security of Critical Infrastructure under the Cabinet Oversight Committee on International Security; and
- Perform such other functions as the President may direct.
Under the same EO, the NCASC shall henceforth act as an advisory body to, and consu ltative forum for the DOTC Secretary in matters relative to civil aviation security. For this purpose, the NCASC was transferred to the DOTC and its composition was reconstituted. The OTS shall continue to serve as the Secretariat of the NCASC.
- Assume the functions of the NCASC enumerated in Section 4 of EO No. 277 as well as all other powers and function s of the NCASC subject, however, to Section 3 of the Executive Order;
- Exercise operational control and supervision over all units of law enforcement agencies and agency personnel providing security services in the transportation systems, except for motor vehicles in land transportation , jointly with the heads of the bureaus or agencies to which the units or personnel organically belong or are assigned;
- Exercise responsibility for transportation security operations including, but not limited to, security screening of passengers, baggage and cargoes, and hiring, retention, training and testing of security screening personnel;
- In coordination with the appropriate agencies and/or instrumentalities of the government, formulate, develop, promulgate and implement comprehensive security plans, policies, measures, strategies and programs to ably and decisively deal with any threat to the security of transportation systems, and continually review, assess and upgrade such security plans, policies, measures, strategies and programs to improve and enhance transportation security and ensure the adequacy of these security measures;
- Examine and audit the performance of transportation security personnel, equipment and facilities, and, thereafter, establish, on a continuing basis, performance standards for such personnel, equipment and facilities, including for the training of personnel;
- Prepare a security manual/master plan or programme which shall prescribe the rules and regulations for the efficient and safe operation of all transportation systems, including standards for security screening procedures. prior screening or protiling of individuals for the issuance of security access passes, and determination of levels of security clearances for personnel of the OTS, the DOTC and its attached agencies, and other agencies of the government;
- Prescribe security and safety standards for all transportation systems in accordance with existing laws, rules, regulations and international conventions;
- Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the DOTC, issue Transportation Security Regulations/Rules and amend, rescind or revise such regulations or rules as may be necessary for the security of the transportation systems of the country;
- Enlist the assistance of any department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, to carry out its functions and mandate including, but not limited to, the use of their respective personnel, facilities and resources;
- Actively coordinate with law enforcement agencies in the investigation and prosecution of any illegal act or unlawful interference committed at or directed to any public transportation system;
- Perform such other functions necessary to effectively carry out the provisions of this Executive Order or as may be directed by the Secretary of the DOTC.
68 See https://ext.eurocontrol.int/lexicon/ index.php/ Acts of unlawful_interference and https://to70.com/ unlawful-interference/. (last accessed on December 5, 2018).
69 Entitled "An Act Prohibiting Certair; Acts inimical To Civil Aviation, And For Other Purposes," Approved on June 19, 1971.
70 Section 5 of R.A. No. 6235 states:
SEC. 5. As used in this Act
(1) "Explosive" shall mean any substance, either solid or liquid, mixture or single compound, which by chemical reaction liberates heat and gas at high speed and causes tremendous pressure resulting in explosion. The term shall include but not limited to dynamites, firecrackers, blastin g caps, black powders, bursters, percussions, cartridges and other explosive materials, except bullets for firearm.
(2) "Flammable" is any substance or m aterial that is highly combustible and self-igniting by chemical reaction and shall include but not limited to acrolein, allene, aluminum dyethyl monochloride, and other aluminum compounds, ammonium chlorate and other ammonium mixtures and other similar substances or materials.
(3) "Corrosive" is any substance or material , either liquid, solid or gaseous, which through chemical reaction wears away, impairs or consumes any object. It shall include but not limited to alkaline battery fluid packed with empty storage battery, allyl chloroformate, allytrichlorosilane, ammonium dinitro-orthocresolate and other similar materials and substances.
(4) "Poisonous" is any substance or materials, except medicinal drug, either liquid, solid or gaseous, which through chemical reactions kills, injures or impairs a living organism or person, and shall include but not limited to allyl isothiocyanate, ammunition (chemical, non-explosive but containing Class A , B or poison), aniline oil, arsine, bromobenzyle cyanide, bromoacetone and other similar substances or materials.
71Supra note 19.
72Supra note 19.
73Supra note 19.
74Supra note 19.
75 See State v. Salit, supra note 45.
76 See Fla. v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
77Valdez v. People, 563 Phil. 934, 950 (2007).
78 See Fla. v. Bostick, supra note 76.
79Schaffer v. State, supra note 37. See also Luz v. People, supra note 25, at 411; and Valdez v. People, supra note 25, at 950.
80Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), as cited in United States v. Henry, supra note 57; and United States v. Davis, supra note 40. See also Luz v. People, supra note 25, at 411; and Valdez v. People, supra note 25, at 950.
81Luz v. People, id. at 411-412; and Valdez v. People, id. at 950.
82Luz v. People, id. at 411; and Valdez v. People, id.
83United States v. Henry, supra note .57; and United States v. Davis, supra note 40.
84Schaffer v. State, supra note 37, citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra note 80.
85People v. Chua Ho San, supra note 25, at 721.
86Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra note 80, as cited in United States v. Davis, supra note 40.
87Valdez v. People, supra note 25, at 951.
88 See Schaffer v. State, supra note 37, and United States v. Miner, 484 F.2d 1075 (1973).
89Fla. v. Bostick , supra note 76.
90Id.
91 TSN, October 2, 2013, pp. 20, 41.
92 R.A. No. 9165 took effect on July 4, 2002 (see People v. De la Cruz, 591 Phil. 259, 272 [2008]). R.A. No. 10640 was approved on July 15, 2014, amending R.A. No. 9165.
93 See People v. Badilla, 794 Phil. 263, 278 (2016); People v. Arenas, 791 Phil. 601, 610 (2016); and Saraum v. People, 779 Phil. 122, 132 (2016).
94United States v. Rawlins, 606 F.3d 73 (2010).
95Id., as cited in United States v. Mehmood, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19232 (2018); United States v. De Jesus-Concepcion, 652 Fed. Appx. 134 (2016); United States v. Rodriguez, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35215 (20 15); and United States v. Mark, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95130 (2012).
96 See United States v. Rawlins, id., as cited in United States v. Mark, id.
97 See United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528 (1989), as cited in United States v. Yeley-Davis, 632 F.3d 673 (2011); United States v. Solis, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (1999); United States v. Anderson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9193 (1994); United States v. Hogg, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 13732 (1993); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563 (1993); United States v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 1360 ( 1992); and United States v. Clonts, 966 F.2d 1366 (1992).
98 576 Phil. 576 (2008).
99Id. at 587, as cited in People v. Tamaño, G.R. No. 208643, December 5, 2016, 812 SCRA 203, 229; People v. Badilla, supra note 91, at 280; Saraum v. People, supra note 93, at 132-133; People v. Dalawis, 772 Phil. 406,417-418 (2015); and People v. Flores, 765 Phil. 535, 541-542 (2015). It appears that Mallillin was erroneously cited as "Lopez v. People" in People v. Abelarde, G.R. No. 215713, January 22, 2018; People v. Denoman, 612 Phil. 1165 (2009); People v. Garcia, 599 Phil. 416 (2009); People v. Sanchez, 590 Phil. 214 (2008); and People v. Dela Cruz, 589 Phil. 259 (2008).
100 TSN, August 20, 2013, pp. 20-21; TSN, September 4, 2013, p. 7.
101Id. at 21-22.
102 "Arrest" or "apprehend" should be understood in its traditional terminology. It contemplates one which "eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime" and not merely "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." "An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual's freedom of movement, whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows." (See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 [1968]).
103 TSN, September 11, 2013, pp. 5-6. 104 TSN , September 4, 2013, p. 13.
105 Records, p. 24.
106Id. at 25.
107 TSN, August 20, 2013, pp. 2-3.
108Id. at 30-31; TSN, September 11, 2013, pp. 3-4.
109 TSN, September 27, 2013, p. 11.
110 See People v. Guillergan, 797 Phil. 775 (2016); People v. Asislo, 778 Phil. 509 (2016); People v. Yuble, 731 Phil. 650 (2014); People v. Ladip, 729 Phil. 495 (2014); People v. Macala, G.R. No. 203123, March 24, 2014 (First Division); People v. Amadeo, G.R. No. 199099, June 5, 2013 (First Division); People v. Brainer, 697 Phil. 171 (2012); People v. Bautista, 682 Phil. 487 (2012); People v. Mondejar, 675 Phil. 91 (2011); People v. Politico, et al., 647 Phil. 728 (2010); People v. Resurreccion, 618 Phil. 520 (2009); and People v. Rivera, 590 Phil. 894 (2008).
111 795 Phil. 859 (2016), citing People v. Asislo, supra note 110; People v. Mammad, et al., 769 Phil. 782 (2015); Miclat , Jr. v. People, 672 Phil. 191 (2011); and People v. Felipe, 663 Phil. 132 (2011).
112 Under the original provision of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, after seizure and confiscation of the drugs, the apprehending team was required to immediately conduct a physical inventory and to photograph the same in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) a representative from the media and (3) the DOJ, and (4) any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. As amended by R.A. No. 10640, it is now mandated that the conduct of physical inventory and photograph of the seized items must be in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/ her representative or counsel , (2) with an elected public official and (3) a represemative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof (See People v. Lim, G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018; People v. Sipin, G.R. No. 224290, June 11, 2018; People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 219953, April 23, 2018; and People v. Mola, G.R. No. 226481, April 18, 2018).
113 TSN, September 11, 2013, pp. 17-18.
114 TSN, September 17, 2013, pp. 15-16.
115 Id at 14-15.
116 TSN, September 11, 2013, pp. 18-20.
117 Id. at 21-23.
118 Id at 21.
119 Id at 19.
120 Records, pp. 131-132.
121 Id. at 26.
122 TSN, October 2, 2013, pp. 20, 41.
123 See Records, p. 131.
124 See United States v. Osuna-Alvarez, 614 Fed. Appx. 353 (2015), citing United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (1995).
125United States v. Johnson, 688 F.3d 494 (2012), citing United States v. Robinson, 617 F.3d 984 (2010).
126United States v. Granderson, 651 Fed. Appx. 373 (2016); United States v. Williams, 640 Fed. Appx. 492 (2016); and United States v. Allen, 619 F.3d 518 (2010).
127 See United States v. Cardenas, supra note 97.
128United States v. Mehmood, supra note 95, citing United States v. Allen, supra note 126.
129People v. Miranda, 560 Phil. 795, 810 (2007), as cited in People v. Dela Cruz, supra note 99, at 524-525; People v. Ando, et al., 793 Phil. 791, 800 (2016); People v. Ygot, 790 Phil. 236, 247 (2016); People v. Domingo, 786 Phil. 246, 255 (2016); People v. Akmad, et al., 773 Phil. 581, 591 (2015); People v. Baticolon, 762 Phil. 468, 482 (2015); People v. Dela Peña, et al., 754 Phil. 323, 344 (2015); People v. Tapugay, 753 Phil. 570, 581 (2015); People v. De la Trinidad, 742 Phil. 347, 360 (2014); People v. Ortega, 738 Phil. 393, 403-404 (2014); People v. Yable, supra note 110, at 660-661; People v. Octavio, et al., 708 Phil. 184, 195-196 (2013); People v. De Mesa, et al., 638 Phil. 245, 254 (2010); Balarbar v. People, 632 Phil. 295, 299 (2010); People v. Hernandez, et al., 607 Phil. 617, 640 (2009); People v. Macatingag, 596 Phil. 376, 392 (2009); and People v. Agulay, 588 Phil. 247, 302 (2008).
130Id.
131Id. at 299-300, citing People v. De los Reyes, 299 Phil. 460, 470-471 (1994). See also People v. Naelga, 615 Phil. 539, 559 (2009).
132 615 Phil. 744, 757-758 (2009).
133 667 Phil. 681, 696-697 (2011).
134 741 Phil. 254, 266 (2014).
135 See People v. Moner, G.R. No. 202206, March 5, 2018.
136People v. Tamaño, supra note 99, at 229; People v. Badilla, supra note 93, at 280; Saraum v. People, supra note 93, at 133; and People v. Asislo, supra note 110, at 517.
137United States v. Johnson, supra note 125; United States v. Yeley-Davis, supra note 97; and United States v. Cardenas, supra note 97.
138United States v. Mitchell, 816 F.3d 865 (2016); and United States v. Rawlins, supra note 94.
139People v. Tamaño, supra note 99, at 229; People v. Badilla, supra note 93, at 280; Saraum v. People, supra note 93, at 133; People v. Asislo, supra note 110, at 517; People v. Dalawis, supra note 99, at 416; and People v. Flores, supra note 99, at 540-542.
140People v. Tamaño, id. at 229; People v. Badilla, id. at 280; and People v. Asislo, id. at 517.
141 575 Phil. 576 (2008).
142Id. at 586-587, as reiterated in People v. Moner, supra note 135; People v. Calvelo, G.R. No. 223526, December 6, 2017; People v. Tripoli, G.R. No. 207001, June 7, 2017; Saraum v. People, supra note 93, at 133; People v. Mercado, 755 Phil. 863, 879 (2015); People v. Steve, et al., 740 Phil. 727, 739-740 (2014); People v. Gamata, 735 Phil. 688, 700-701 (2014); People v. Ladip, supra note 110, at 517; People v. Cardenas, 685 Phil. 205, 221 (2012); People v. Soriaga, 660 Phil. 600, 606-607 (2011); People v. Domado, 635 Phil. 74, 93-94 (2010); Zalameda v. People, 614 Phil. 710, 741-742 (2009); and People v. Macatingag, supra note 129, at 392-393.
143Supra note 135.
144United States v. Mehmood, supra note 95; United States v. Wilson, 720 Fed. Appx. 209 (2018); United States v. Arnold, 696 Fed. Appx. 903 (2017); United States v. Marrero, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 4570 (2016); United States v. Mitchell, supra note 138; United States v. Granderson, supra note 126; United States v. Hemphill, 642 Fed. Appx 448 (2016); United States v. Williams, supra note 126; United States v. Perez, 625 Fed. Appx. 919 (2015); United States v. Osuna-Alvarez, supra note 124; United States v. Johnson, supra note 125; United States v. Yeley-Davis, supra note 97; United States v. Allen, supra note 126; United Stat es v. Rawlins, supra note 94; United States v. Mejia, 597 F.3d 1329 (2010); and United States v. Cardenas, supra note 97.
145 See United States v. Wilson, supra note 144; United States v. Arnold, supra note 144; United States v. Yeley-Davis, supra note 97; and United States v. Cardenas, supra note 97.
146Supra note 112.
147People v. Sanchez, supra note 99.
148 See People v. Domado, supra note 142, at 93, as cited in People v. Calvelo, supra note 142; People v. Mercado, supra note 142, at 879; People v. Steve, et al., supra note 142, at 739; People v. Alcala, 739 Phil. 189, 201 (2014); People v. Ladip, supra note 110, at 516-517; and People v. Soriaga, supra note 142, at 606.
149People v. Bintaib, G.R. No. 217805, April 2, 2018.
150United States v. Mitchell, supra note 138.
151United States v. Cardenas, supra note 97.
152Id.
153Id.
154United States v. Mehmood, supra note 95; United States v. Mitchell, supra note 138; United States v. Williams, supra note 126; United States v. Johnson, supra note 125; United States v. Allen, supra note 126; United States v. Mejia, supra note 144; and United States v. Stewart, 104 F.3d 1377 (1997).
155United States v. Johnson, id.
156 See People v. Umipang, 686 Phil. 1024, 1037 (2012).
157 NITAFAN, DAVID G., Annotations on the Dangerous Drugs Act, First Edition (1995), Central Professional Books, Inc., pp. 135-146.
LEONEN, J.:
To emphasize, a reasonable search, on the one hand, and a warrantless search, on the other, are mutually exclusive. While both State intrusions are valid even without a warrant, the underlying reasons for the absence of a warrant are different. A reasonable search arises from a reduced expectation of privacy, for which reason Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application. Examples include searches done at airports, seaports, bus terminals, malls, and similar public places. In contrast, a warrantless search is presumably an "unreasonable search," but for reasons of practicality, a search warrant can be dispensed with. Examples include search incidental to a lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain view, consented search, and extensive search of a private moving vehicle.5Nonetheless, for an inspection of passengers and their belongings under routine security procedures to be a valid reasonable search, certain conditions must be met.6 In Saluday:
In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the bus terminal and the search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities, children and other similar groups should be protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.7If the conditions are not met, then an initially reasonable search will be unreasonable.
The presentation of petitioner's bag for x-ray scanning was voluntary. Petitioner had the choice of whether to present the bag or not. He had the option not to travel if he did not want his bag scanned or inspected. X-ray machine scanning and actual inspection upon showing of probable cause that a crime is being or has been committed are part of reasonable security regulations to safeguard the passengers passing through ports or terminals. Probable cause is:This Court has, in several instances, upheld the validity of searches under routine security procedures, resulting in convictions for possession of illegal items because there had been probable cause.reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.It is not too burdensome to be considered as an affront to an ordinary person's right to travel if weighed against the safety of all passengers and the security in the port facility.10 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Thus, the following links should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.34 (Citation omitted)The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty only arises when it can be shown that the apprehending officer followed the requirements in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, or met the conditions for the saving clause in the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165.35 As to the latter:
All the above requirements must be complied with for a successful prosecution for the crime of illegal sale and possession of drugs under Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165. Any deviation in the mandatory procedure must be satisfactorily justified by the apprehending officers. Under Section 21 of the IRR, the Court may allow deviation from the procedure only where the following requisites concur: (a) the existence of justifiable grounds to allow departure from the rule on strict compliance; and (b) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. If these two elements are present, the seizure and custody over the confiscated items shall not be rendered void and invalid.36 (Citation omitted)Here, several deviations from the procedures in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 cast in doubt the links in the chain of custody of the seized items. First, Suguitan made no immediate marking, physical inventory, and photograph of the seized items.37 Instead, the seized items were merely placed on a screening table at the final checkpoint area.38 Second, there was no immediate turnover of the seized items from Suguitan to Police Officer 3 Joel Javier, the investigator on duty for the Philippine National Police-Airport Security Group.39 Moreover, it was Javier, instead of Suguitan, who marked the seized items with "EO-1" and "EO-2," and inventoried them in the presence of two (2) barangay officials and a member of the media.40
Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and normal procedure in the implementation of the warrant and in taking post-seizure custody of the evidence, the blind reliance by the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is manifestly misplaced. The presumption of regularity is merely just that - a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed under police custody before offered in court, strongly militates a finding of guilt.The doubts on the existence of probable cause for the search and seizure of the confiscated drugs, and the noncompliance with the mandatory requirements in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 should be resolved in favor of the accused.
In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown. In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.45 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Endnotes:
1 Republic Act No. 9165 (2002), art. II, sec. 11 states:
SECTION 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - . . .
. . . .
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
2 CONST. art. III, sec. 2 states:
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of anest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
3People v. Johnson, 401 Phil. 734 (2000) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
4Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2018, [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
5 Id. at 14.
6 Id. 15.
7 Id.
8People v. Johnson, 401 Phil. 734 (2000) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]; People v. Suzuki, 460 Phil. 146 (2003) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
9 776 Phil. 653 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
10 Id. at 684-685.
11 401 Phil. 734 (2000) [Per J . Mendoza, Second Division].
12 442 Phil. 743 (2002) [Per C.J. Davide, Jr., First Division].
13 460 Phil. 146 (2003) [Per J. Sandoval-Guiterrez, En Banc].
14 703 Phil. 133 (2013) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., First Division].
15 719 Phil. 538 (2013) [Per J. Perez, Second Division].
16 776 Phil. 653 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
17 G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2018 > [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
18 Ponencia, p. 3.
19 703 Phil. 133 (2013) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., First Division].
20 Ponencia, pp. 2-3.
21Dela Cruz v. People, 776 Phil. 653, 684 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], citing People v. Mariacos, 635 Phil. 315, 329 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
22Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017, > [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
23 Ponencia, p. 30.
24 CONST. art. III, sec. 14(2) states:
SECTION 14. . . .
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
25People v. Holgado, et al., 741 Phil. 78 (2014) [Per J . Leonen, Third Division]; People v. Ramos, 791 Phil. 162 (2016) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
26 Republic Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 21 states:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; (2)Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours; (4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-two (72) hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and through the PDEA shall within twenty-four (24) hours thereafter proceed with the destruction or burning of the same, in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public official. The Board shall draw up the guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s which shall be borne by the offender: Provided, That those item/s of lawful commerce, as determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate purposes: Provider, further, That a representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained; (5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or burning of the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s in the custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In all instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as determined by the Board; (6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to personally observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute an admission of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or fails to appoint a representative after due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall appoint a member of the public attorney's office to represent the former; (7) After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the representative sample/s was presented as evidence in comt, the trial prosecutor shall inform the Board of the final termination of the case and, in turn, shall request the court for leave to turn over the said representative sample/s to the PDEA for proper disposition and destruction within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the same; and (8) Transitory Provision: a) Within twenty-four (24) hours from the effectivity of this Act, dangerous drugs defined herein which are presently in possession of law enforcement agencies shall, with leave of court, be burned or destroyed, in the presence of representatives of the Court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH) and the accused and/or his/her counsel, and, b) Pending the organization of the PDEA, the custody, disposition, and burning or destruction of seized/surrendered dangerous drugs provided under this Section shall be implemented by the DOH.
27People v. Cayas, 789 Phil. 70 (2016) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
28 Id. at 79. See also People v. Andrada, G.R. No. 232299, June 20, 2018 [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
29People v. Callejo, G.R. No. 227427, June 6, 2018, > [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division].
30People v. Holgado, et al., 741 Phil. 78 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
31Sales v. People, 703 Phil. 133 (2013) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., First Division]; People v. Cadidia, 719 Phil. 538 (2013) [Per J. Perez, Second Division].
32 Ponencia, p. 11.
33People v. Lorenzo, 633 Phil. 393, 403 (2010) [Per J. Perez, Second Division]. See also Mallillin v. People, 576 Phil. 576 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]; People v. Baga, 649 Phil. 232 (2010) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., First Division]; People v. Climaco, 687 Phil. 593 (2012) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division]; People v. Balibay, et al., 742 Phil. 746 (2014) [Per J. Perez, First Division]; People v. Que, G.R. No. 212994, January 31, 2018, > [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
34People v. Nandi, 639 Phil. 134, 144-145 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
35People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 225690, January 17, 2018, > [Per J. Martires, Third Division].
36People v. Callejo, G.R. No. 227427, June 6, 2018 > 9-10 [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division].
37 Ponencia, pp. 3-4.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 4.
41 Id. at 26-28.
42 Id. at 28.
43People v. Holgado, et al., 741 Phil. 78 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
44 576 Phil. 576 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
45 Id. at 593.