THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 238104, February 27, 2019
ODELON ALVAREZ MIRANDA, Petitioner, v. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION AND SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, REPRESENTED BY CARINA L. CATAHAN, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision1 dated November 20, 2017 and the Resolution2 dated March 12, 2018 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 151522.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On July 20, 2006, herein respondent Social Security System (SSS), through its duly authorized representative, Carina L. Catahan, filed before co-respondent Social Security Commission (SSC) a Petition3 for collection of unpaid SSS contributions and penalties against Onise Marketing (Onise) and herein petitioner Odelon Alvarez Miranda (Miranda). The Petition was docketed as SSC Case No. 7-16922-06.
In its Petition, SSS alleged that: Onise is an employer which is registered with SSS and that Miranda is the Manager/Owner of Onise; Onise and Miranda are liable for violation of Section 22, paragraphs (a), (c) and (d) of Republic Act (RA) No. 1161, otherwise known as "The Social Security Act of 1954," as amended by RA No. 8282, for having failed to remit the SSS contributions of their employees, as well as penalty liabilities, for the period between February 2002 and March 2006, in the total amount of P113,896.26, subject to final computation upon reconciliation of the correct premium contributions paid, if any. SSS prayed that "after due hearing a Warrant be issued to the Sheriff of the Honorable Commission, commanding him to levy upon and sell any real and/or personal property of [Onise and Miranda] wherever said property or properties may be found, and to garnish their bank accounts sufficient to satisfy [their] total amount of Contributions and Penalty liabilities to Social Security System."4
In its Order5 dated February 5, 2007, the SSC declared Onise and Miranda in default for their failure to timely file their answer.
On April 24, 2013, the SSC issued a Resolution6 with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds and so holds respondents Onise Marketing and Odelon A. Miranda, as Owner/Manager, liable for the balance of the unpaid SS contributions for the period February 2002 to March 2006 (not inclusive) in the amount of P16,659.00 and the 3% per month penalties thereon computed at P44,137.58, or the total amount of P60,796.58 as of March 15, 2013, plus the additional penalties accruing after the aforesaid date until fully paid, pursuant to Sections 18, 19 and 22(a) of R.A. 8282 of the SS Act of 1997.The SSC held that:
Accordingly, said respondents are ordered to pay the SSS the aforementioned liability within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof.
This is without prejudice to the right of the SSS to file other appropriate actions against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.7
After a perusal of the records of the case, this Commission notes that despite the declaration of default against them, x x x Onise Marketing and Odelon A. Miranda made partial payments to cover their obligation to the SSS and receipt of said payments were acknowledged by the [respondent SSS] as rei1ected in its files. Likewise, part of [Onise and Miranda's] penalty liability was condoned in view of payments made, leaving a balance of P60,796.58, broken down into the contributions delinquency of P16,659.00 and the penalty liability of P44,137.58 based on the revised statement of liabilities detailing the same.Subsequently, the SSC issued a Writ of Execution9 on July 15, 2015 and a Notice of Garnishment10 on February 26, 2016.
There is no question as to [Onise and Miranda's] liability for SS contributions and penalties under the SS Law, the amount of which the latter did not contest. On the other hand, [Onise and Miranda's] act of paying part of their obligation is a tacit admission of their liabilities as employer under the SS Law.8
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Order dated August 10, 2016 and the Resolution dated January 25, 2017 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, but only in so far as these deny the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution dated July 15, 2016 in SSC Case No. 7-16922-06, which is hereby SET ASIDE.15The CA held that Miranda belatedly filed his Motion for Reconsideration of the August 10, 2016 Order of the SSC. As such, the questioned Order has become final and executory. Nonetheless, the CA held that the April 24, 2013 Resolution of the SSC did not attain finality and its execution was irregular and void on the ground that the SSS and the SSC failed to present evidence to prove that there was valid service of the said Order to Miranda and Onise or to their counsel.
A
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN PARTLY GRANTING ONLY THE PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION AND IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ASSAILED DECISION DATED NOVEMBER 20, 2017.B
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULES ON THE LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULES.16
It is clear from the records, particularly the Proof of Service and the Sheriff's Return of Service dated August 25, 2006, that the Summons dated August 3, 2006 was served upon and personally received on August 25, 2006 by respondent Odelon Miranda, Owner/Manager of Onise Marketing. Since there was proper service of Summons, the Commission had properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Odelon Miranda. Likewise, because of the valid service of Summons with a copy of the Petition. suffice it to state that the requirements of due process had been met contrary to the claim of movant [herein petitioner].20Settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded not only respect but finality, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.21 Moreover, aside from their blanket denial that they received summons and other legal processes from the SSC, petitioner and Onise did not present evidence to prove such denial. Thus, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the SSC that it had, indeed, validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and Onise.
The rule on service by registered mail contemplates two situations: (1) actual service, the completeness of which is determined upon receipt by the addressee of the registered mail; and (2) constructive service, the completeness of which is determined upon expiration of five days from the date the addressee received the first notice of the postmaster. A party who relies on constructive service or who contends that his adversary has received a copy of a final order or judgment upon the expiration of five days from the date the addressee received the first notice sent by the postmaster must prove that the first notice was actually received by the addressee. Such proof requires a certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
In the instant case, there is no postmaster's certification to the effect that the registered mail containing the NLRC decision was unclaimed by the addressee and thus returned to sender, after first notice was sent to and received by the addressee on a specified date. All that appears from the records are the envelopes containing the NLRC decision with the stamped markings and notation on the face and dorsal sides thereof showing "RTS" (meaning, "Return To Sender") and "MOVED." Still, we must rule that service upon PAL and the other petitioners was complete.Thus, in the present case, the service at the old address of petitioner and Onise should be considered valid. Otherwise, no process can be served on them if they simply disappeared without leaving a forwarding address.
First , the NLRC Deputy Executive Clerk issued a Certification that the envelopes containing the NLRC decision addressed to Mr. Jose Pepiton Garcia and Atty. Bienvenido T. Jamoralin, Jr. were returned to the NLRC with the notation "RTS" and "MOVED." Yet, they and the other petitioners, including PAL, have not filed any notice of change of address at any time prior to the issuance of the NLRC decision up to the date when the Certification was issued on January 24, 2000.
Second, the non-receipt by PAL and the other petitioners of the copies of the NLRC decision was due to their own failure to immediately file a notice of change of address with the NLRC, which they expressly admitted. It is settled that where a party appears by attorney in an action or proceeding in a court of record, all notices or orders required to be given therein must be given to the attorney of record. Accordingly, notices to counsel should be properly sent to his address of record, and, unless the counsel files a notice of change of address, his official address remains to be that of his address of record.
x x x[.] To our mind, it would have been more prudent had PAL informed the NLRC that it has moved from one floor to another rather than allowed its old address at Allied Bank Center to remain as its official address. To rule in favor of PAL considering the circumstances in the instant case would negate the purpose of the rules on completeness of service and the notice of change of address, which is to place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgments and processes beyond the power of the party being served to determine at his pleasure.
Resultantly, service of the NLRC decision via registered mail was deemed completed as of August 16, 1999, or five days after the first notice on August 11, 1999. As such, PAL only had 1 0 days from August 16, 1999 to file its motion for reconsideration. Its motion filed on October 29, 1999 was, therefore, late. Hence the NLRC decision became final and executory.31 (Emphases, underscores and italics in the original; citation omitted.)
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on February 27, 2019 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on March 14, 2019 at 1:45 p.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
* Designated as additional member per Special Order No. 2624 dated November 28, 2018.
1Rollo, pp. 45-51. Penned by Associate Justice Pablito A. Perez, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario and Ramon A. Cruz.
2Id. at 52-54.
3Id. at 85-88.
4Id. at 87 .
5Id. at 81.
6Id at 81-84.
7Id. at 83.
8Id. at 82-83.
9Id. at 73 .
10Id.
11Id.
12Id. at 73-78.
13Id. at 79-80.
14Id. at 55-68.
15Id. at 50 .
16Id. at 27-28.
17Co v. Vargas , 676 Phil. 463,470 (2011).
18Gatus v. Social Security System , 655 Phil. 550, 561 (2011).
19 Recognized exceptions to this rule are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion (Rep. of the Phils. v. Asiapro Cooperative, 563 Phil. 979, 997 [2007]).
20Rollo, p. 75.
21Oasay, Jr. v. Palacio del Gobernador Condominium Corp., et al., 681 Phil. 69, 79 (2012); and Gatus v. Social Security System, supra note 18, at 562.
22Rollo, p. 75.
23Id. at 75-76.
24Id. at 76.
25Id. at 49-50.
26 520 Phil. 828 (2006).
27Rollo, p. 50.
28Vill Transport Service, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 271 Phil. 25, 31 (1991 ).
29 651 Phil. 57,64 (2010).
30 601 Phil. 655 (2009).
31Arra Realty Corp., et al. v. Paces Industrial Corp., supra note 29, at 65-66.
32Supra note 26.
33Land Bank of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals. et al., 789 Phil. 577, 583 (2016).
34Id.
35Id.
36Alamayri v. Pabale, et al., 576 Phil. 1 46, 165 (2008).