THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 221428, February 13, 2019
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. RENATO GALUGA Y WAD-AS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
HERNANDO, J.:
Challenged in this appeal is the Decision dated June 9, 20151 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05592, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated November 15, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19 of Cauayan City, Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 19-1972, finding accused-appellant Renato Galuga y Wad-as guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against AAA.3
Accused-appellant was charged before the RTC with violating Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, and further amended by R.A. No. 8353, in relation with R.A. No. 7610, Article III, Section 5, paragraph b, in an Information4 that reads:
That on or about the 16th of April, 2002, in the municipality of x x x, province of Isabela, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation and with lewd designs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lay with, and have carnal knowledge [of] one [AAA], a minor girl of 12 years of age, thereby subjecting her to exploitation and sexual abuse, against her will and consent.
With the aggravating circumstance, that the victim [AAA], is a minor below 18 years of age, during the commission of the crime.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused RENATO GALUGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay complainant AAA the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.6
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated November 15, 2011 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The awards of moral damages and civil indemnity are REDUCED from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00, each. The award of exemplary damages is INCREASED from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.7
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED ALTHOUGH HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES DESPITE THEIR PATENT INCONSISTENCIES.10
In the review of rape cases, we continue to be guided by the following principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and, (3) the evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the complainant's credibility becomes the single most important issue.11 (Citation omitted.)
PROSECUTION: Q: Now, after meeting Junjun, did you go somewhere else? A: He invited me x x x to go to plaza, sir. Q: And did you accede with his invitation? A: No, sir. Q: And so when you turned down his invitation what if any [did] Junjun do? A: He asked me if I want to go to the public market, sir. Q: And what was your reply? A: I did not accede, sir. Q:And when you again declined the offer of Junjun, what if any did Junjun do?
A: He [held] me and brought me to the public market, sir. Q: By the way, if that Junjun is in court, will you please identify? A: Yes, sir, he is the one. (Witness pointing to a man who previously entered the courtroom wearing a green choleko (sic) and when asked by the Court Interpreter he gave his name as Renato Galuga y [Wad]-as). Q: You said a while ago [that] when you refused to go [to] the public market, the accused held your arms[.] [W]hat next did he do aside from holding your arms? A: He pulled me and brought me to the public market, sir. Q: And did you not resist when he pulled you? A: I resisted, sir, but he [was] stronger than me. Q: [Were] there other people around when the accused pulled you? A: There were, sir. Q: How many? A: About twelve (12) persons, sir. Q: And did you not shout, AAA? A: I was then confused, sir. x x x x A: I was threatened by the accused and if I will shout he will kill me, sir. x x x x Q: Was the accused holding anything at that time? A: There was, sir. Q: What? A: He was holding a bag and inside the bag there was a protruding knife, sir. Q: Did he bring out the knife? A: No, sir. Q: And did the accused succeed in bringing you to the market from the fountain? A: Yes, sir. x x x x Q: While the accused was taking you to the public market, what if any did you do, AAA? A: I was struggling and pulling away my hands from him, sir. Q: And did you succeed? A: No, sir. x x x x Q: Upon reaching the public market, what if any [did] the accused do? A: We stopped at the parlor place, sir. Q: And was that parlor [open]? A: No, sir. Q: What did you do then? A: He removed his clothes, sir. x x x x Q: And when the accused was removing his clothes, what did you do? A: I was trying to pull my hand from him but still he was removing my clothes, sir. Q: [Were] there people around [at or] near the parlor x x x? A: None, sir. x x x x Q: And after the accused [removed] his clothes, what did you do next? A: He placed his clothes [on] the ground floor and he layed (sic) me down, sir. Q: When the accused was already naked and when he laid you down on the ground, what occurred [in] your mind, AAA? A: I was crying, sir. Q: And so was the accused able to lay you down on the ground? A: Yes, sir. Q: Did you not resist? A: I tried to push him, sir, but he was still strong, sir. Q: Did you not shout? A: If I will shout he will kill me, sir. Q: What was your attire at that time? A: Shorts and shirt, sir. Q: What happened to your attire when you were already laid to the ground by the accused AAA? A: He removed, sir. Q: Who removed? A: Junjun, sir. Q: And when you were already naked, what if any [did] the accused do? A: He went on top of me, sir. Q: And when he was already on top of you, what if any did [he] do? A: He inserted his penis [into] my vagina, sir. Q: And could you tell us your x x x exact position when the accused inserted his penis [into] your vagina? A: I was lying down, sir. Q: What about the accused? A: He was on top of me, sir. Q: And could you tell us how was he able to insert his penis [into] your vagina? A: Yes, sir. Q: While the accused was inserting his penis [into] your vagina, did you not resist? A: I was crying and tried to push him, sir. Q: And did you succeed? A: No, sir. Q: And was he able to insert his penis [into] your vagina? A: Yes, sir. Q: And was he still on top of you when the accused inserted his penis into your vagina? A: Yes, sir. x x x x Q: But did you push him all the time? A: Yes, sir. Q: So after the accused inserted his penis into your vagina, AAA, what if any did he tell you? A: I was crying, sir, and he threatened me that if I will make any noise he will kill me.13
The trial court correctly gave full faith and credence to Rachelle[']s testimony. There was no showing that Rachelle had an improper motive to testify against accused-appellant. The non-attendance of any ill motive on the part of Rachelle gains more weight in the light of Merlyn Magtibay[']s description of Rachelle as a nice person. Accused-appellant also had no reason why Rachelle would falsely accuse [him] of such serious crime as rape if she were not motivated to bring her perpetrator to justice. Needless to say, it is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
A girl of such age as the victim would not concoct a tale of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, make public the offense, undergo the trouble and humiliation of a public trial, and endure the ordeal of narrating all its gory details, if she had not in fact been raped. If the accused-appellant had really nothing to do with the crime, it would be against the natural order of events and of human nature, and against the presumption of good faith, that a prosecution witness would falsely accuse him of such a serious crime as rape. (Emphasis ours, citations omitted.)
[BBB], the victim's mother, saw her daughter at the police precinct in a state of confusion. AAA did not respond immediately after she was asked what happened. AAA was crying. It was only when a policewoman arrived that AAA confessed to having been raped by appellant, in the presence of her mother. AAA's initial silence, her state of confusion, and crying are natural reactions of a rape victim who suffered pain, trauma and shame in appellant's brutal hands. Besides, AAA was only a 12-year-old child at the time she got raped. Be that as it may, different people react differently to the same situation, and not every victim of a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably to the expectations of everyone. In any event, this matter is post facto and totally irrelevant to the fact that appellant raped the victim. 17
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. – Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant for a probationable penalty and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best. No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction: Provided, That when a judgment or conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be allowed to apply for probation based on the modified decision before such decision becomes final. The application for probation based on the modified decision shall be filed in the trial court where the judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty was rendered, or in the trial court where such case has since been raffled. In a case involving several defendants where some have taken further appeal, the other defendants may apply for probation by submitting a written application and attaching thereto a certified true copy of the judgment of conviction. (Emphasis ours.)
Endnotes:
* Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2624 dated November 28, 2018.
1Rollo, pp. 2-19; penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier with Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Melchor Q.C. Sadang concurring.
2 CA rollo, pp. 71-77; penned by Executive Judge Raul V. Babaran.
3 Under Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004), its implementing rules, and A.M. No. 12-7-15-SC, the real name of the woman or child victim and those of the victim's immediate relatives, as well as other personal circumstances that would establish or compromise their identities, are withheld and replaced with fictitious initials to protect the victim's privacy.
4 Records, pp. 1-2.
5Id. at 39.
6 CA rollo, p. 77.
7Rollo, p. 18.
8Id. at 20.
9Id. at 28-32; id. at 36-40.
10 CA rollo, p. 56.
11People v. Ramos, 743 Phil. 344, 355-356 (2014).
12People v. Regaspi, 768 Phil. 593, 598 (2015).
13 TSN, May 4, 2004, pp. 6-14.
14People v. Invencion, 446 Phil. 775, 787 (2003) citing People v. Ramos, 371 Phil. 66, 78 (1999).
15 435 Phil. 353, 370-371 (2002).
16People v. Cacayan, 579 Phil. 803, 815 (2008).
17Rollo, p. 16.
18People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016).
19 An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty, approved on June 24, 2006.
20 Presidential Decree No. 968 as amended by R.A. No. 10707.
21Dimakuta v. People, 771 Phil. 641, 660-661 (2015) citing Sable v. People, 602 Phil. 989, 997 (2009).