THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 205068, March 06, 2019
HEIRS OF RENATO P. DRAGON, REPRESENTED BY PATRICIA ANGELI D. NUBLA, PETITIONERS, v. THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
Payment of the correct amount of filing fees should not be made contingent on the result of a case.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the June 27, 2012 Decision2 and December 5, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92266. The Court of Appeals upheld the September 26, 2007 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court, which ordered Renato P. Dragon (Dragon) to pay The Manila Banking Corporation (Manila Banking) P6,945,642.00, plus interest and penalties, as well as attorney's fees. The amount corresponded to several loans Dragon obtained from Manila Banking from 1976 to 1983.
From 1976 to 1982, Dragon obtained several loans from Manila Banking, which were evidenced by four (4) Promissory Notes: (1) Promissory Note No. 20669 dated March 30, 1976;5 (2) Promissory Note No. 20670 dated March 30, 1976;6 (3) Promissory Note No. 7426 dated June 28, 1979;7 and (4) Promissory Note No. 10973 dated February 26, 1982.8 The total principal amount of his loans was P6,945,642.00.9 Each Promissory Note stipulated a rate of interest, penalty interest in case of default, and attorney's fees, and due dates from 1976 to 1983.
In 1987, Manila Banking was placed under receivership by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. The bank's receiver sent Dragon several demand letters10 requiring him to pay his outstanding loans, the final letter being dated August 12, 1998.11 In a Statement of Account attached to the final letter, Manila Banking computed the amount Dragon owed as P44,038,995.00, consisting of the principal amount of P6,945,642.00, plus accrued interest, penalties, and attorney's fees as of July 31, 1998.12
Dragon failed to pay his outstanding obligation. Thus, on January 7, 1999, Manila Banking filed before the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for collection of sum of money.13 The prayer of the Complaint read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that, after hearing, judgment be rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the above principal sum of P6,945,642, plus interests, penalties, and attorney's fees computed up to the date of actual payment pursuant to the corresponding Promissory Notes. Plaintiff further prays for such other reliefs and remedies as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.14In his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,15 Dragon claimed that he had already partially paid his debts to Manila Banking,16 and that his loans with the bank had been extinguished by novation. Allegedly, in 1984, Kalilid Wood Industries Corporation (Kalilid Wood), of which he was an officer and stockholder, wrote to Manila Banking requesting that Kalilid Wood's loans and the accounts of other persons, including that of Dragon's, be restructured. Manila Banking allegedly agreed to the restructuring, allowing Kalilid Wood to assume Dragon's loan obligations, including those covered by the four (4) Promissory Notes. Supposedly, this novation was confirmed in an April 22, 1991 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 of Makati City in Civil Case No. 46961 titled, "The Manila Banking Corporation v. Builders Wood Products, Inc., Claudio J. Sanchez, Horacio Abrantes, and Renato P. Dragon" which had become final and executory.17
WHEREFORE, plaintiff having proved its claim by preponderance of evidence against defendant Renato P. Dragon, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the following:The Regional Trial Court noted that Dragon's defenses of prescription and novation were neither pleaded in his Answer nor raised in a motion to dismiss.22 Even if it could have taken cognizance of these defenses, the Regional Trial Court found that Manila Banking's cause of action had not prescribed and that the obligations were not novated. It held that Manila Banking's cause of action began to accrue only on August 12, 1998, when Dragon refused to pay, and not on the maturity dates stated in the promissory notes.23SO ORDERED.21
- The amount of Php6,945,642.00 plus interest and penalties, the rates of which are indicated in the [preceding] paragraphs starting August 12, 1998 until the obligation is fully paid;
- Attorney's fees equivalent to 5% of the total amount due;
- Costs of suit.
In addition, it cannot be said that appellant-bank's cause of action based on such promissory notes had prescribed. Actions based upon a written contract should be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues. Indubitably, such right of action accrue from the moment the breach of right or duty occurs. Prescription of actions is, nevertheless, interrupted when they are filed before the courts, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgement of the debt by the debtor. In the present case, the ten-year (10) prescriptive period on the enforcement of said promissory notes that matured in 1982 - 1983, was timely interrupted by appellant-bank's demand letters to defendant-appellant in November 1988, October 1991, February 1993, November 1994, January 1996 and August 1998. Verily, every time the defendant-appellant receives said demand letters, a new ten-year (10) period is added, and the elapsed period is, thereby, eliminated. Indeed, a written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period which has already elapsed, and it starts anew the prescriptive period.72 (Citations omitted)
In [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy], it took Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. 15 years before assailing the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. As early as 1948, the surety company became a party to the case when it issued the counter-bond to the writ of attachment. During trial, it invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance by seeking several affirmative reliefs, including a motion to quash the writ of execution. The surety company only assailed the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in 1963 when the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. This court said:In this regard, this Court has consistently held that a party may be estopped from questioning the lack of jurisdiction due to insufficient payment of filing or docket fees, if the objection is not timely raised.77. . . Were we to sanction such conduct on [Manila Surety and Fidelity, Co. Inc.'s] part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel [the spouses Tijam] to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.After this court had rendered the decision in Tijam, this court observed that the "non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction" has been ignored, and the Tijam doctrine has become more the general rule than the exception. In Calimlim v. Ramirez, this court said:A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy]. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. . . .Thus, the court reiterated the "unquestionably accepted" rule that objections to a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This is because jurisdiction over the subject matter is a "matter of law" and "may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties."
In Figueroa, this court ruled that the Tijam doctrine "must be applied with great care;" otherwise, the doctrine "may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice":. . . estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely — only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. ... a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. ... No laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction[.]76 (Citations omitted)
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious.Later, in Sun Insurance Office,86 this Court laid down the rules concerning the payment of filing fees, taking into consideration Magaspi, Manchester Development Corporation, and other earlier rulings:
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.85 (Citation omitted)
Thus, the Court rules as follows:Notwithstanding Sun Insurance Office, it must be emphasized that payment of filing fees in full at the time the initiatory pleading or application is filed is still the general rule. Exceptions that grant liberality for insufficient payment are strictly construed against the filing party. In Colarina v. Court of Appeals:88
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.87
While the payment of docket fees, like other procedural rules, may have been liberally construed in certain cases if only to secure a just and speedy disposition of every action and proceeding, it should not be ignored or belittled lest it scathes and prejudices the other party's substantive rights. The payment of the docket fee in the proper amount should be followed subject only to certain exceptions which should be strictly construed.89Moreover, the filing party must show that there was no intention to defraud the government of the appropriate filing fees due it.90 In Manchester Development Corporation, this Court found that the filing party, in repeatedly omitting the amount of damages it was asking for, aimed to evade payment of docket fees.
If respondent Pyramid's counsel had only been forthright in drafting the complaint and taking the cudgels for his client and the trial judge assiduous in applying Circular No. 7 vis-a-vis prevailing jurisprudence, the precious time of this Court, as well as of that of the appellate court, would not have been unnecessarily sapped.Likewise, this Court applied the Manchester Development Corporation doctrine in Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals.94 There, private respondent Producers Bank of the Philippines concealed its intent to collect damages by making it appear that its complaint was principally for injunction. Thus, it avoided the need to pay filing fees on the amount of damages.
The Court at this juncture thus reminds Pyramid's counsel to observe Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Ethics which enjoins a lawyer to "exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice," and Rule 12.04 of the same Canon which enjoins a lawyer "not [to] unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes." And the Court reminds too the trial judge to bear in mind that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the pleadings and to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence, consistent with the standard that magistrates must be the embodiments of competence, integrity and independence.93 (Citations omitted)
The court however is intrigued with the issue raised for the first time by defendant in his reply and supplemental opposition. According to the defendant, since plaintiff willfully and deliberately evaded payment of the correct docket fees for the amounts claimed for interests, penalties and attorney's fees, plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned such claims. Defendant further argues that as a consequence of the non-payment of the correct docket fees by plaintiff, this court has not acquired jurisdiction to award the amounts claimed by the plaintiff.The trial court should have closely examined whether the circumstances here warrant the liberality of the Sun Insurance Office doctrine, especially when even a cursory application of the governing rules on docket fees at that time shows a glaring omission on respondent's part.
The concern of defendant in this case is not novel. Nevertheless, the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. Et al. vs. Hon. Maximiano C. Asuncion and Manuel ChuaUy Po (G.R. Nos. 79937-38, 13 February 1989) provides a solution on this issue. Hence, there is no more necessity of delving further on this matter.96
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or similar pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, "specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case."When respondent filed its Complaint in 1999, the applicable rule on the basis of the assessment of docket fees was the Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 11-94, dated June 28, 1994, amending Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. It states in part:
Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for money or damages and there is no precise statement of the amounts being claimed. In this event the rule is that the pleading will "not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record." In other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become time-barred. The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of action.98
Thus, the basis for the assessment of the filing fees for respondent's Complaint should not have been only the principal amounts due on the loans, but also the accrued interests, penalties, and attorney's fees. These amounts should have all been specified in both the Complaint's body and prayer.RULE 141
LEGAL FEES
. . . .
Sec. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts
(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for all clerical services in the same, if the total sum claimed, inclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, or the stated value of the property in litigation, is: . . . (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that the computation of such interest, penalties and attorney's fees would have been impossible to perform on the date of filing of the Complaint as the date of actual payment of the instant claim could not be foreseen or forecasted when the Complaint was filed as evidenced by the fact that to date, Decedent Dragon has willfully and deliberately evaded payment of these loan obligations he obtained from plaintiff TMBC.101 (Emphasis supplied)Similarly, the Court of Appeals explained:
Truly, the payment of complete docket fees for the claimed interests, penalties and attorney's fees cannot be made at the time of the filing of the complaint since their true or exact amount cannot be determined as yet with certainty until after the resolution of the case.102However, the demand letters sent to Dragon prior to the filing of respondent's Complaint already contained respondent's computation of the accrued interests, penalties, and attorney's fees corresponding to the Promissory Notes.103 In its last demand letter before it filed its Complaint, respondent demanded P37,093,353.00 in addition to the P6,945,642.00 principal amount.104
8. Following the Sun Insurance (Supra.) ruling, any additional filing fees due on the award made by this Honorable Court upon its proper determination of the interest, penalties and attorney's fees that should rightfully be paid by defendant Dragon for putting plaintiff TMBC through all this trouble, shall constitute a lien upon this Honorable Court's Judgment. As such, the government will not be defrauded, of the filing fees due it and defendant Dragon will not be spared from paying what he should rightfully be held liable for.108 (Emphasis in the original)In its October 23, 2009 Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief:109
19. Following the Sun Insurance (Supra.) and Soriano and Padilla (Supra.) rulings, any additional filing fees due on the award in favor of TMBC, upon the proper determination of the amount of interest, penalties and attorney's fees that should rightfully be paid by Defendant Dragon to TMBC, shall constitute a lien upon such award. As such, the government will not be defrauded of the filing fees due it and Defendant Dragon will not be spared from paying what he should rightfully be held liable for.112 (Emphasis in the original)In its June 10, 2013 Comment:113
96. Following the Sun Insurance (Supra.) and Soriano and Padilla (Supra.) rulings, any additional filing fees due on the Appealed Decision, upon the proper determination of the amount of interest, penalties and attorney's fees that should rightfully be paid by Decedent Dragon to TMBC, shall constitute a lien upon the Judgment. As such, the government will not be defrauded of the filing fees due it and Decedent Dragon will not be spared from paying what he should rightfully be held liable for.114 (Emphasis in the original)In its May 8, 2014 Memorandum:115
106. Following the Sun Insurance (Supra.) and Soriano and Padilla (Supra.) rulings, any additional filing fees due on the Appealed Decision, upon the proper determination of the amount of interest, penalties and attorney's fees that should rightfully be paid by Decedent Dragon to TMBC, shall constitute a lien upon the judgment. As such, the government will not be defrauded of the filing fees due it and Decedent Dragon will not be spared from paying what he should rightfully be held liable for.116 (Emphasis in the original)What respondent forgets is that the payment of correct docket fees cannot be made contingent on the result of the case.117 Otherwise, the government and the judiciary would sustain tremendous losses, as these fees "take care of court expenses in the handling of cases in terms of cost of supplies, use of equipmen[t], salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, etc., computed as to man hours used in handling of each case."118
SEC. 2. Fees in lien. — Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief different from, or more than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and collect the corresponding fees.However, the rule on after-judgment liens applies to instances of incorrectly assessed or paid filing fees, or where the court has discretion to fix the amount to be awarded.119 In Proton Pilipinas Corporation:120
In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag, in interpreting the third rule laid down in Sun Insurance regarding awards of claims not specified in the pleading, this Court held that the same refers only to damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.Further, nowhere in any of respondent's pleadings filed before any court did respondent manifest its willingness, to the Regional Trial Court or to the Court of Appeals or to this Court, that it will be paying additional docket fees when required. Its repeated invocation of Sun Insurance Office is not a manifestation of willingness to pay additional docket fees contemplated in United Overseas Bank and subsequent cases.122 In none of its pleadings did respondent allude to paying any additional docket fee if so ordered; instead, it left it to the courts to constitute a lien over a hypothetical award, to which it was not entitled, as both lower courts have already held.. . . The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading should be specified. While it is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.121 (Emphasis in the original)
| Very truly yours, |
(SGD) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN | |
Division Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
* Designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2624 dated November 28, 2018.
1Rollo, pp. 18-56. The Petition was filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2 Id. at 57-68. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios, and concurred in by Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. of the Special Fourth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3 Id. at 69-72. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios, and concurred in by Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. of the Former Special Fourth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4 Id. at 225-248. The Decision was penned by Judge Elmo M. Alameda of Branch 150, Regional Trial Court, Makati City.
5 Id. at 264.
6 Id. at 265-266.
7 Id. at 267.
8 Id. at 268.
9 Id. at 270.
10 Id. at 514-523.
11 Id. at 522.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 524-527.
14 Id. at 526.
15 Id. at 256-259.
16 Id. at 256-257.
17 Id. at 233-235 and 272-273. Abrantes is at times spelled as "Abantes."
18 Id. at 239-240.
19 Id. at 257-258.
20 Id. at 225-248.
21 Id. at 248.
22 Id. at 240.
23 Id. at 240-241.
24 Id. at 245-246.
25 Id. at 246-247.
26 Id. at 249.
27 Id. at 311-332.
28 Id. at 312-314.
29 Id. at 249-250.
30 252 Phil. 280 (1989) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].
31Rollo, p. 250.
32 Id. at 57-68.
33 Id. at 63-64.
34 Id. at 64.
35 Id. at 64-66.
36 Id. at 65.
37 Id. at 66.
38 Id. at 66-67.
39 Id. at 69-72.
40 Id. at 71.
41 Id. at 3-7.
42 Id. at 16-A-16-C.
43 Id. at 18-56.
44 Id. at 31-36.
45 Id. at 34-35.
46 259 Phil. 927 (1989) [Per J. Narvasa, En Banc].
47Rollo, pp. 35.
48 Id. at 36-42.
49 Id. at 42-44.
50 Id. at 48-52.
51 Id. at 455.
52 Id. at 461-508.
53 Id. at 470-481.
54 Id. at 481-485.
55 Id. at 495-499.
56 Id. at 499-505.
57 Id. at 872.
58 Id. at 877-886.
59 Id. at 877-883.
60 Id. at 890-890-A.
61 Id. at 891-935.
62 Id. at 936-975.
63David v. David, 724 Phil. 239 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
64Rollo, pp. 36-43.
65 Id. at 294-295.
66 Id. at 294.
67 Id. at 295-296.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 298.
70Arco Pulp and Paper Company, Inc. v. Lim, 737 Phil. 133 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
71Crisostomo v. Garcia, Jr., 516 Phil. 743 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division].
72Rollo, pp. 66-67.
73Cacho v. Balagtas, G.R. No. 202974, February 7, 2018, [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division]; Cabrera v. Clarin, G.R. No. 215640, November 28, 2016 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]; and Adlawan v. Joaquino, G.R. No. 203152, June 20, 2016 [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
74Amoguis v. Ballado, G.R. No. 189626, August 20, 2018, 15 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
75 734 Phil. 239 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
76 Id. at 259-261.
77Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 296 Phil. 335 (1993) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third Division]; National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 362 Phil. 150 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]; and International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 185622, October 17, 2018, [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
78Rollo, pp. 256-259.
79 Id. at 311-332.
80 RULES OF COURT, Rule 141, sec. 1 states:
SECTION 1. Payment of fees. — Upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an action or proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor shall be paid in full.
81Lazaro v. Endencia, 57 Phil. 552 (1932) [Per J. Hull, En Banc]; Malimit v. Degamo, 120 Phil. 1247 (1964) [Per J. Dizon, Second Division]; Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 484 Phil. 438 (2004) [Per J. Quisimbing, First Division]; and Montañer v. Shari'a District Court, 596 Phil. 815 (2009) [Per C.J. Puno, First Division].
82 200 Phil. 583 (1982) [Per J. Abad Santos, Second Division].
83 Id. at 595.
84 233 Phil. 579 (1987) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].
85 Id. at 585.
86 252 Phil. 280 (1989) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].
87 Id. at 291-292.
88 363 Phil. 271 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
89 Id. at 278.
90Heirs of Hinog v. Melicor, 495 Phil. 422 (2005) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second Division]; Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation v. Legasto, 521 Phil. 469 (2006) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]; and United Overseas Bank v. Ros, 556 Phil. 178 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
91 579 Phil. 679 (2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division].
92 Id. at 681.
93 Id. at 693.
94 284-A Phil. 143 (1992) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
95United Overseas Bank v. Ros, 556 Phil. 178 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
96Rollo, p. 250.
97 259 Phil. 927 (1989) [Per J. Narvasa, En Banc].
98 Id. at 937-938.
99Rollo, p. 923.
100 Id. at 495.
101 Id. at 497.
102 Id. at 71.
103 Id. at 514-518, 520, and 522.
104 Id. at 522.
105 Id. at 698 and 708-709.
106 499 Phil. 247 (2005) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
107Rollo, pp. 657-682.
108 Id. at 662.
109 Id. at 751-796.
110 Id. at 766-767.
111 Id. at 797-830.
112 Id. at 805-806.
113 Id. at 461-508.
114 Id. at 499.
115 Id. at 891-935.
116 Id. at 926-927.
117Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 253 Phil. 660 (1989) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].
118 Id. at 667. See also Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Shemberg Marketing Corporation, 540 Phil. 7 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Second Division].
119Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. v. Security Bank Corporation, 654 Phil. 35 (2011) [Per J. Abad, Second Division].
120 499 Phil. 247 (2005) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
121 Id. at 266-267.
122See Heirs of Reinoso, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 669 Phil. 272 (2011) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division]; Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. v. Hon. Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court-Negros Occidental, Branch 52, Bacolod City, 595 Phil. 1158 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]; and Spouses Gutierrez v. Spouses Valiente, 579 Phil. 486 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
123See Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. v. Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court-Negros Occidental, Branch 52, BacolodCity, 595 Phil. 1158 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division] and Ku v. RCBC Securities, Inc., G.R. No. 219491, October 17, 2018, [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
124Rollo, p. 333.
125 Id. at 334.