SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 242860, March 11, 2019
THE LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD (LTFRB) AND THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (DOTR), PETITIONERS, v. HON. CARLOS A. VALENZUELA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANDALUYONG CITY, BRANCH 213 AND DBDOYC, INC., RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 is the Order2 dated August 20, 2018 (Assailed Order) rendered by public respondent Judge Carlos A. Valenzuela of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 (RTC) in R-MND-18-01453-SC which directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent DBDOYC, Inc. (DBDOYC) essentially enjoining petitioners the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation (DOTr; collectively, petitioners) from regulating DBDOYC's business operations conducted through the Angkas mobile application.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.34In ruling on whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in this case, the Court turns to the basic principles governing the issuance of preliminary injunctive writs.
[P]revent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully[.] Thus, it will be issued only upon a showing of a clear and unmistakable right that is violated. Moreover, an urgent necessity for its issuance must be shown by the applicant.36 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)In Spouses Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc.,37 the Court held that "[t]he plaintiff praying for a writ of preliminary injunction must x x x establish[, inter alia,] that he or she has a present and unmistakable right to be protected; x x x [t]hus, where the plaintiffs right is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for a preliminary injunction."38
(b) The term "public service" includes every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street railway, traction railway, sub-way motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both with or without fixed route and whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express service, steamboat or steamship line, pontines, ferries, and water craft, engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine railway, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas electric light, heat and power, water supply and power, petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless communications system, wire or wireless broadcasting stations and other similar public services; Provided, however, That a person engaged in agriculture, not otherwise a public service, who owns a motor vehicle and uses it personally and/or enters into a special contract whereby said motor vehicle is offered for hire or compensation to a third party or third [parties] engaged in agriculture, not itself or themselves a public service, for operation by the latter for a limited time and for a specific purpose directly connected with the cultivation of his or their farm, the transportation, processing, and marketing of agricultural products of such third party or third parties shall not be considered as operating a public service for the purposes of this Act. (Emphases and underscoring supplied).Section 15 of the same law requires that, except for certain exemptions, no public service shall operate in the Philippines without possessing a CPC.46 In turn, the then DOTC (which had supervision and control over the LTFRB that had assumed certain powers of the old Public Service Commission47 ) issued DO 97-1097 providing for the standard classifications of all PUVs before they can be issued a CPC. This department order was later amended by the above-stated DOs 2015-11 and 2017-11 and thereafter, the LTFRB issued various memorandum circulars governing the rules for TNC and TNVS accreditation, which rules DBDOYC purportedly failed to comply.
Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public. (Emphases supplied)For its part, DBDOYC claims reprieve from the above-stated regulatory measures, claiming that it and its accredited drivers are not common carriers or transportation providers.49 It argues that "[its] technology [only] allows a biker willing to give a ride and a passenger willing to pay the set price to meet and contract with each other. Under this set-up, an Angkas biker does not offer his/her service to an indefinite public."50 Since the application "merely pairs an Angkas biker with a potential passenger under a fare scheme which [DBDOYC] fixes for both, [DBDOYC] may not compel an Angkas driver to pick up a potential passenger even after the latter confirms a booking because as between the biker and the passenger, there is but a purely private contractual arrangement."51
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article [1732] deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.In this relation, DBDOYC posits that its accredited bikers are private carriers as they do not hold out their services generally to the public because they cannot just be hailed on the street as they only contract via the Angkas online front. However, the Court is hard-pressed to rule - at least at this point, and for the purpose of determining the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction - that these bikers are only private carriers who may publicly ply their trade without any regulation. As the Court observes, the genius behind the Angkas app is that it removes the inconvenience of having to physically hail for public transportation by creating a virtual system wherein practically the same activity may now be done at the tip of one's fingers. As it is the trend of modern technology, previously cumbersome mundane activities, such as paying bills, ordering food, or reserving accommodations, can now be accomplished through a variety of online platforms. By DBDOYC's own description,55 it seems to be that Angkas app is one of such platforms. As such, the fact that its drivers are not physically hailed on the street does not automatically render Angkas-accredited drivers as private carriers.
So understood, the concept of "common carrier" under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with the notion of "public service," under the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which at least partially supplements the law on common carriers set forth in the Civil Code. x x x.54 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Section 7. Registration Classification. - Every motor vehicle shall be registered under one of the following described classifications:That being said, the Court therefore concludes that no clear and unmistakable right exists in DBDOYC's favor; hence, the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed injunctive writ. In the final analysis, the business of holding one's self out as a transportation service provider, whether done through online platforms or not, appears to be one which is imbued with public interest and thus, deserves appropriate regulations. With the safety of the public further in mind, and given that, at any rate, the above-said administrative issuances are presumed to be valid until and unless they are set aside,58 the nullification of the assailed injunctive writ on the ground of grave abuse of discretion is in order.
(a) private passenger automobiles; (b) private trucks; and (c) private motorcycles, scooters, or motor wheel attachments. Motor vehicles registered under these classifications shall not be used for hire under any circumstances and shall not be used to solicit, accept, or be used to transport passengers or freight for pay.
x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case subject to the latter's outcome. It is not a cause of action in itself. Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case.Under this limited scope, it is thus beyond the power of the Court to determine the ultimate rights and obligations of the parties, else it unduly prejudges the main case for declaratory relief which is still pending before the court a quo. While the Court acknowledges the contemporary relevance of the topic at hand, it remains self-aware of this case's procedural and jurisdictional parameters. Accordingly, the definitive resolution of the issue of regulating ride-booking or ride-sharing applications must await the proper case therefor.
The writ is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action.60
Endnotes:
1 With Very Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction; rollo, pp. 3-57.
2 Id. at 219-225.
3 Entitled "FURTHER AMENDING DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 97-1097 TO PROMOTE MOBILITY" (see rollo, pp. 226-231).
4 Entitled "PROVIDING STANDARD CLASSIFICATION FOR ALL PUBLIC TRANSPORT CONVEYANCES," issued on September 29, 1997.
5 See Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, entitled "AN ACT TO REORGANIZE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, PRESCRIBE ITS POWERS AND DUTIES, DEFINE AND REGULATE PUBLIC SERVICES, PROVIDE AND FIX THE RATES AND QUOTA OF EXPENSES TO BE PAID BY THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known as the "PUBLIC SERVICE ACT" (November 7, 1936).
6 See rollo, pp. 229-230.
7 Id. at 229; emphasis supplied.
8 Entitled "OMNIBUS GUIDELINES ON THE PLANNING AND IDENTIFICATION OF PUBLIC ROAD TRANSPORTATION SERVICES AND FRANCHISE ISSUANCE" (see rollo, pp. 232-249).
9Rollo, p. 232.
10 See Item 1.34 of DO 2017-11 (rollo, p. 233); emphasis supplied.
11 Item 2.2 of DO 2017-11 reads in full:
2.2 Hierarchy and Classification of Public Transportation ModesAs a matter of policy, the modes of transportation shall follow the hierarchy of roads. Thus, higher capacity transportation modes shall have priority in terms of CPC allocation and transit right of way in trunk lines or main thoroughfares over lower capacity modes. Taxis, TNVS, tourist transport services, and shuttle services are excluded as they are considered door-to-door services and do not have specific routes. Thus, as a general rule, assigning higher capacity modes to routes currently traversed by lower capacity modes in the Local Public Transport Route Plan may be allowed, but not otherwise.12 These include: LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 2015-015-A or the "RULES AND REGULATIONS TO GOVERN THE ACCREDITATION OF TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES," issued on October 23, 2017 (see rollo, pp. 250-253); LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 2015-016-A or the "TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF A CERTIFICATE OF TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANY ACCREDITATION," issued on October 23, 2017 (see rollo, pp. 254-257); LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 2015-017 or the "IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES ON THE ACCEPTANCE OF APPLICATIONS FOR A CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE TO OPERATE A TRANSPORTATION NETWORK VEHICLE SERVICE," issued on May 28, 2015 (see rollo, pp. 258-260); and LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 2015-018-A or the "TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF A CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE TO OPERATE A TRANSPORTATION NETWORK VEHICLE SERVICE," issued on October 23, 2017 (see rollo, pp. 261-263).
The operation of tricycles shall be in accordance with Joint Memorandum Circular No. 1, series of 2008 of the DILG and the DOTC, which states that tricycle operation should only be confined along city or municipal roads, not along national roads and is limited only to routes not traversed by higher modes of public transport. Motorcycles and other farm implements such as the kuliglig are likewise not allowed as public transport conveyance. Further basis of the provision of this mode should also be the LPTRP [(Local Public Transport Route Plan; No. 1.15)]. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
13 See LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 2015-015-A (see rollo, p. 250).
14 See LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 2015-016-A (see rollo, p. 254).
15 See LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 2015-018-A (see rollo, p. 261).
16 See rollo, pp. 13-14 and 604.
17 See id. at 14.
18 Id.
19 Dated June 26, 2018. Id. at 86-123.
20 Pertinent portions of Section 7 of RA 4136, entitled "AN ACT TO COMPILE THE LAWS RELATIVE TO LAND TRANSPORTATION AND TRAFFIC RULES, TO CREATE A LAND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (June 20, 1964), read:Section 7. Registration Classification. - Every motor vehicle shall be registered under one of the following described classifications:21 See rollo, pp. 97-120.
(a) private passenger automobiles; (b) private trucks; and (c) private motorcycles, scooters, or motor wheel attachments. Motor vehicles registered under these classifications shall not be used for hire under any circumstances and shall not be used to solicit, accept, or be used to transport passengers or freight for pay.
x x x x
For the purpose of this section, a vehicle habitually used to carry freight not belonging to the registered owner thereof, or passengers not related by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree to such owner, shall be conclusively presumed to be "for hire."
x x x x
22 Id. at 299-305.
23 See id. at 303.
24 Id at 304.
25 Referring to the Order dated August 20, 2018; id. at 219-225.
26 Id. at 224.
27 Id. at 223.
28 See id.
29 See id. at 224.
30 Id. at 502-503. See also TRO dated December 5, 2018; id. at 502-506.
31 See Malay ang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 716 Phil. 500, 514 (2013).
32 See id. at 514-515.
33The Office of the Ombudsman v. Valencerina, 739 Phil. 11, 24 (2014).
34Department of Public Works and Highways v. City Advertising Ventures Corporation, 799 Phil. 47, 62 (2016).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 545 Phil. 138 (2007).
38 Id. at 160-161.
39Rollo, p. 223.
40 Id.
41Manila Memorial Park, Inc. v. Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, 722 Phil. 538, 575 (2013).
42 Id. at 575-576.
43Rollo, p. 31.
44 Entitled "AN ACT TO REORGANIZE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, PRESCRIBE ITS POWERS AND DUTIES, DEFINE AND REGULATE PUBLIC SERVICES, PROVIDE AND FIX THE RATES AND QUOTA OF EXPENSES TO BE PAID BY THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (November 7, 1936).
45 As Amended by RA 2677, entitled "AN ACT TO AMEND SECTIONS TWO, THREE, FOUR, TEN, THIRTEEN, AND AND FOURTEEN OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED FORTY-SIX, AS AMEN OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PUBLIC SERVICE ACT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (June 18, 1960).
46 Section 15 of CA 146 (as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454, entitled "AN ACT TO AMEND VARIOUS SECTIONS OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX, KNOWN AS THE PUBLIC SERVICE ACT" [June 8, 1939]) pertinently reads:Section 15. With the exception of those enumerated in the preceding section, no public service shall operate in the Philippines without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission, known as "certificate of public convenience," or "certificate of convenience and public necessity," as the case may be, to the effect that the operation of said service and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner.47 See Executive Order No. 202, entitled "CREATING THE LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD" (June 19, 1987).
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
48 See Section 1 of RA 1270, entitled "AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION THIRTEEN OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PUBLIC SERVICE ACT, AS AMENDED BY COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FOUR" (June 14, 1955), Amending Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146. See also Section 1 of RA 2677.
49 See Comment dated December 17, 2018; rollo, p. 635.
50 Id. at 100; underscoring supplied.
51 Id. at 100-101; underscoring supplied.
52 Id. at 99.
53 250 Phil. 613 (1988).
54 Id. at 618-619.
55 See rollo, pp. 91 and 604.
56 Id. at 642.
57De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, supra note 53, at 618.
58 "It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue. Unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply the same." (Landbank of the Philippines v. Celada, 515 Phil. 467, 479 [2006]).
59 623 Phil. 596 (2009).
60 Id. at 600-601.
61Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Hontanosas, Jr., 737 Phil. 38, 59-60 (2014); citations omitted.