THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 213023, April 10, 2019
MICHAEL C. GUY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. RAFFY TULFO, ALLEN MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., JANET BAY, JESUS P. GALANG, RANDY HAGOS, JEANY LACORTE, AND VENUS TANDOC, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
The degree of freedom by which journalists operate to uncover and write the news is an indication of the current state of our country's democracy. By freely obtaining vital information on matters of public concern, citizens become socially aware and well-equipped to participate in different political processes to exercise their rights enshrined in the fundamental law. Journalists are the sentinels who keep watch over the actions of the government. They are the eyes and ears of the citizenry. In today's digital age, the work of journalists is held to a higher standard more than ever. Beyond the multitude that participate on social media, they have value as part of a profession that should be trusted with the truth.
Nevertheless, the probing done by journalists must be made "with good motives and for justifiable ends[.]”1 The protection afforded by the Constitution2 to the press is not carte blanche that allows journalists to abandon their responsibility for truth and transparency. It is incumbent upon them to exercise a high degree of professionalism in their work, regardless of the subject of their stories.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assailing the Court of Appeals June 13, 2014 Amended Decision4 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33256.
On March 24, 2004, an article entitled "Malinis ba talaga o naglilinis-linisan lang (Sino si Finance Sec. Juanita Amatong?)"5 was published in Abante Tonite, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.6
Written by Raffy T. Tulfo (Tulfo), the article reported that a certain Michael C. Guy (Guy), who was then being investigated by the Revenue Integrity Protection Service of the Department of Finance for tax fraud, went to former Department of Finance Secretary Juanita Amatong (Secretary Amatong)'s house to ask for help.7 Secretary Amatong then purportedly called the head of the Revenue Integrity Protection Service and directed that all the documents that the Revenue Integrity Protection Service had obtained on Guy's case be surrendered to her.8 The article read:
Ang mga tanong ngayon, may katotohanan kaya ang akusasyon ni Salanga laban kay Amatong? Nagsasabi naman kaya ng totoo si Amatong nang itanggi niya ang akusasyon ni Salanga laban sa kanya?
Narito ang isang balitang natanggap ng SHOOT TO KILL mula sa isang mapagkakatiwalaan at A-1 source na kung saan ay inarbor ni Amatong sa kanyang mga tauhan ang isang negosyanteng iniimb[e]st[i]gahan ng DoF dahil sa katiwalian sa tax refund. Narito ang kwento at kayo na ang bahalang manghusga kung sino ang may kredibilidad, si Amatong o si Salanga?
Noong March 20, 2004, Sabado ng hapon pumunta ang isang negosyanteng nagngangalang Michael Guy sa bahay ni Amatong. Si Guy ay iniimb[e]st[i]gahan ng mga tauhan ng Revenue Integrity Protection Service (RIPS) ng DOF dahil sa kahinahinalang mga tax refund na natanggap nito mula sa BIR simula 1998 hanggang 2003.
Problemado si Guy sapagkat natunugan niyang iniimbestigahan na siya ng RIPS. Ito'y matapos magpadala ng sulat ang RIPS sa Central Bank at hinihingi rito ang lahat ng mga transaksyon ng kumpanya ni Guy sa lahat ng mga bangko. Ang nakatanggap ng sulat sa Central Bank ay kakilala ni Guy.
Noong Sabado ng hapon din, ayon sa aking source, tinawagan ni Amatong ang hepe ng RIPS para hilingin dito na ihinto imbestigasyon laban kay Guy at isurender sa kanyang opisina ang lahat ng mga dokumentong nakalap ng RIPS laban dito!!!9
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Allen Macasaet, Nicolas V. Quijano, Jr., Janet Bay, Jesus P. Galang, Randy Hagos, Jeany Lacorte, Venus Tandoc and Raffy Tulfo, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences each of the accused to pay a fine of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.
They are likewise hereby ordered to pay private complainant Michael C. Guy, jointly and severally, the sum of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) as actual damages, FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) as moral damages, and TWO HUNDRED ELEVEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P211,200.00) as attorney's fees.15 (Emphasis in the original)
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The February 24, 2010 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 132, Makati City in Criminal Case No. 04-3614 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that all accused-appellants are ordered to pay Michael Guy, jointly and severally, P500,000.00 moral damages and P500,000.00 exemplary damages.19 (Emphasis in the original)
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The February 24, 2010 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 132, Makati City in Criminal Case No. 04-3614 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that all accused-appellants are ORDERED to pay Michael Guy, jointly and severally, P500,000.00 moral damages and P211,200.00 attorney's fees. The award of P5,000,000.00 actual damages is DELETED for lack of factual and legal basis.23 (Emphasis in the original)
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable" (Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code). Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. . . . While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another.46 (Citations omitted)
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.51 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Accordingly, jurisprudence holds that if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court or if there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG that may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect representing the People. The rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not the petitioners who are mere complaining witnesses. For this reason, the People are therefore deemed as the real parties in interest in the criminal case and, therefore, only the OSG can represent them in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. In view of the corollary principle that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit, an appeal of the criminal case not filed by the People as represented by the OSG is perforce dismissible. The private complainant or the offended party may, however, file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG but only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. He may also file a special civil action for certiorari even without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the end of preserving his interest in the civil aspect of the case.53 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures . . .; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible . . .; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion . . .; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts . . .; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting . . .; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee . . .; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court . . .; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based . . .; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents . . .; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record . . . .59 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
COURT:
This is my problem. Now, Php50 Million is not a small amount of money and it has to be based on, for example, the business standing. You did not give me any financial statement. Are you saying that you are making PhP50 Million a year?
MR. GUY:
No, Your Honor. In my understanding, in moral damages, it is not only the amount of money for a certain period of time. It also includes the sleepless nights. You do not know if there will be new articles against you which are not true. So, I put them all together.
COURT:
So; it is clear. You do not make PhP50 Million a year?
MR. GUY:
No.
COURT:
Maybe in ten years, you can make that?
MR. GUY:
It is possible.61 (Emphasis in the original)
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as is duly proven. Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable [.]
. . . .
This Court has, time and again, emphasized that actual damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award, must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne. An award of actual damages is "dependent upon competent proof of the damages suffered and the actual amount thereof. The award must be based on the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and unsubstantial proof."64 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
It must be remembered that moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule in determining the proper amount.76 (Citations omitted)
Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages must nevertheless be somehow proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. This is so because moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.78 (Citations omitted)
This Court cannot remind the bench and the bar often enough that in order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. In Francisco vs. GSIS, the Court held that there must be clear testimony on the anguish and other forms of mental suffering. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to take the witness stand and testify as to his/her social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, moral damages cannot be awarded. In Cocoland Development Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court held that "additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code, these being, . . . social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., that resulted therefrom."86 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Exemplary damages are designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences, and its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an offender. However, it cannot be recovered as a matter of right. It is based entirely on the discretion of the court. Jurisprudence sets certain requirements before exemplary damages may be awarded, to wit:
(1) (T)hey may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition, among others, to compensatory damages, and cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant;
(2) the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages; and
(3) the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.98 (Citations omitted)
Endnotes:
* Designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2624 dated November 28, 2018.
1U.S. v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 58, 62 (1922) [Per J. Johnson, En Banc].
2 CONST., art. III, sec. 4 provides:
SECTION 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
3Rollo, pp. 17-37. Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
4 Id. at 39-60. The amended Decision was penned by Associate Justice Pedro B. Corales, and concurred in by Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Florito S. Macalino of the Former Seventeenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
5 Id. at 18.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 18-19.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 19.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 48.
14 Id. at 49.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 62-82. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Pedro B. Corales, and concurred in by Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Florito S. Macalino of the Seventeenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
18 Id. at 81.
19 Id. at 82.
20 Id. at 39.
21 Id. at 39-60.
22 Id. at 58-59.
23 Id. at 59.
24 Id. at 17-37.
25 Id. at 22.
26 Id. at 22-23.
27 Id. at 24.
28 Id. at 25.
29 Id. at 26.
30 Id. at 26 and 41.
31 Id. at 43-44.
32 Id. at 43.
33 Id. at 30.
34 Id. at 32.
35 Id. at 83-84.
36 Id. at 97-98.
37 Id. at 99-103.
38 Id. at 114-119.
39 Id. at 114.
40 Id. at 115-116.
41 Id. at 120-121.
42 Id. at 122-130.
43Heirs of Burgos v. Court of Appeals, 625 Phil. 603, 609 (2010) [Per J. Abad, Second Division].
44Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., 240 Phil. 327, 331 (1987) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division].
45 240 Phil. 327 (1987) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division].
46 Id. at 331.
47People v. Santiago, 255 Phil. 851, 861 (1989) [Per J. Gancayco, First Division].
48 Id.
49People v. Gabriel, 539 Phil. 252, 256 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Second Division].
50 255 Phil. 851 (1989) [Per J. Gancayco, First Division].
51 Id. at 861-862.
52 740 Phil. 616 (2014) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].
53 Id. at 622-623.
54City of Dagupan v. Maramba, 738 Phil. 71, 96 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
55 RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1 provides:
SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis in the original)
56Frondarina v. Malazarte, 539 Phil. 279, 291 (2006) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
57Medina, Jr. v. People, 724 Phil. 226, 234 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
58People v. Deloso, G.R. No. 215194, December 14, 2017, [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
59Medina v. Mayor Asistio. Jr., 269 Phil. 225, 232 (1990) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division].
60Rollo, p. 58.
61 Id. at 23.
62International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Chua, 730 Phil. 475, 489 (2014) [Per J. Perez, Second Division].
63 CIVIL CODE, art. 2199 provides:
ARTICLE 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
64International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Chua, 730 Phil. 475, 489-490 (2014) [Per J. Perez, Second Division].
65Metro Rail Transit Development Corporation v. Gammon Philippines, Inc, G.R. No. 200401, January 17, 2018, < http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63930> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
66International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Chua, 730 Phil. 475, 492 (2014) [Per J. Perez, Second Division].
67 CIVIL CODE, art. 2224 provides:
ARTICLE 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
68Rollo, p. 58.
69 Id. at 45.
70 Id.
71People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 828 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
72Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral, 510 Phil. 637, 651 (2005) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second Division].
73Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Suyom, 437 Phil. 244, 257 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
74 Id. at 258.
75 510 Phil. 637 (2005) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second Division].
76 Id. at 651-652.
77 437 Phil. 244 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
78 Id. at 257-258.
79Punongbayan-Visitacion v. People, G.R. No. 194214, January 10, 2018, < http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63864> [Per J. Martires, Second Division].
80 CIVIL CODE, art. 2219 (7) provides:
ARTICLE 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
....
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation[.]
81Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. Sesante, 791 Phil. 409, 427-428 (2016) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
82Rollo, p. 25.
83 Id. at 26.
84Kierulf v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 414, 431-432 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
85 336 Phil. 414 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
86 Id. at 431-432.
87 736 Phil. 460 (2014) [Per J. Perez, Second Division].
88 Id. at 480.
89 499 Phil. 228 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
90 Id. at 243-244.
91Rollo, p. 59.
92 Id.
93People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 832 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
94Spouses Timado v. Rural Bank of San Jose, Inc., 789 Phil. 453, 459 (2016) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
95Torreon v. Aparra, Jr., G.R. No. 188493, December 13, 2017 < http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63764> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
96Spouses Timado v. Rural Bank of San Jose, Inc., 789 Phil. 453, 459 (2016) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
97Octot v. Ybañez, 197 Phil. 76, 82 (1982) [Per J. Teehankee, First Division].
98Kierulf v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 414, 428-429 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
99Rollo, p. 56.
100About SPJ – Society of Professional Journalists, < https://www.spj.org/aboutspj.asp> (last accessed April 10, 2019).
101Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics, (last accessed April 10, 2019).
102 Id.
103See Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].