FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 223082, June 26, 2019
CMP FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, INC. AND/OR MS. CAROLINA MABANTA-PIAD, PETITIONERS, v. NOEL T. REYES, SR., RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review assails the August 28, 2015 Decision1 and January 26, 2016 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 138291 finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in ruling that petitioner CMP Federal Security Agency, Inc. (CMP Federal) had illegally dismissed respondent Noel T. Reyes, Sr. (Reyes) from service.
You are hereby directed to explain in writing within FIVE (5) days upon receipt hereof why you should not be charged [with] the following:On July 22, 2013, Reyes timely submitted his explanation,12 controverting the accusations against him. Nevertheless, CMP Federal barred Reyes from reporting to work, and told him instead to await the decision of the management regarding the complaints.13Failure to comply within the prescribed period shall be construed as [a] waiver of your right to be heard.
- Insubordination: For not: following the instruction of Mr. Arnel Maningat, Operations Manager[,] to designate SO Robert Sagun as Shift-in-Charge effective 01 May 2013, and designated him as ordinary guard instead;
- Negligence (4th Offense): For failure to report to the Operations Manager the incident pertaining to the two (2) security personnel in the persons of SG Rommy Ramiterre and SG Jesus Sumalbag who were confronted by the Personajes Trucking Personnel, wherein as Detachment Commander, [you] are duty-bound to report to the latter all matters pertaining to the [operations;
- Violation of Section 1.B.C, Rule X of RA 5487: For providing confidential information relative to the Cabcaben Vacant Lot takeover, wherein this office has received a reports [sic] that you allegedly leak [sic] the information to your subordinates on the drinking session last 02 December 2012 that eventually reached the knowledge of the [MG Terminal] General Manager.
For your strict compliance.11
After due investigation, you are hereby found liable for the following:Reyes thereafter lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of service incentive leave, separation pay, reimbursement of expenditures for supplies and cash bond, with a prayer for payment of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.17Such acts are punishable by dismissal under items No. 1.15, 3.24, and 1.2 of the Agency's Table of Offenses, Administrative Charges & Penalties.
- Insubordination - For failure to follow the instruction of the Operations Manager last 01 May 2013;
- Negligence (4th Offense) - For failure to report to the Operations Manager the incident involving two (2) security personnel [who were] confronted by the personnel of Personajes Tmcking; and
- Violation of Ethical Standard (Sec.1.B.c, Rule X of RA 5487) - For revealing confidential information to unauthorized persons relative to takeover of Cabcaben Vacant Lot.
In view of the foregoing, YOU ARE HEREBY DISMISSED FROM CMP FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, INC. FOR SERIOUS MISCONDUCT.16
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CMP Federal Security Agency, Inc. is hereby ordered to pay complainant the amount of P5,220.00 representing his service incentive leave pay.In so ruling, the Labor Arbiter ratiocinated that the just cause for Reyes' dismissal was adequately substantiated by the petitioners who also proved that they complied with the due process requirements for termination of employment. The claim for illegal dismissal and separation pay, therefore, must necessarily fail, according to the Labor Arbiter. Nevertheless, the Labor Arbiter held that Reyes was entitled to service incentive leave pay for the years 2011 and 2012, in the aggregate amount of Php 5,220.00, since the petitioners failed to establish prior payment thereof.24
All other claims are denied.
The complaint against individual respondent Ms. Carolina Mabanta-Piad is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.23
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision dated 26 June 2014 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent CMP Federal Security Agency, Inc. is directed to:Diametrically opposed to the Labor Arbiter's findings, the NLRC held that Reyes committed no serious misconduct that could have warranted his dismissal. Moreover, the NLRC held, that in dismissing Reyes,27 the petitioners did not comply with the detailed steps of procedural due process, as laid down in United Tourist Promotions v. Kemplin.28
a) Pay complainant separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in [an] amount equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service reckoned from his employment up to finality of this Decision; b) Pay full backwages to complainant from the time he was illegally dismissed on 20 July 2013 up to finality of this Decision; c) Pay the amount of Php 5,220.00 to complainant representing his service incentive pay; d) Pay the amount of Php 8,900.00 to complainant representing reimbursement of expenditures for supplies; e) Pay the amount of Php 3,400.00 to complainant for the cash bond; and f) Pay the amount corresponding to 10% of the judgment award to complainant as and by way of attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.26
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated 24 September 2014 and the challenged Resolution dated 20 October 2014 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LAC NO. 08-001993-14 are AFFIRMED.The CA sustained the NLRC's findings on the ground that the standards of due process were not strictly complied with; that, absent proof that an investigation was conducted by the petitioners or that Reyes was given an opportunity to be heard and present his countervailing evidence, it would be unfair for the CA to reverse the NLRC's Decision.35 The appellate court also held that, even if the perceived procedural lapses were to be brushed aside, the petitioners' recourse would still have been dismissible for there was no sufficient cause to terminate Reyes on the ground of serious misconduct, because Reyes committed the alleged infractions without deliberate and wrongful intent to violate CMP Federal's rules and regulations.36
SO ORDERED.34
Whether or not THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED in affirming the Decision of the NLRC, reversing the Decision of the Labor Arbiter Fe Cellan in finding that the Respondent Reyes was illegally dismissed.38
Section 2. Security of Tenure. xxxHarping on the above-quoted rule, both the NLRC and the CA gave credence to Reyes' argument.
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(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially observed:
For termination of employment based on just cases as defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side. (ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires, is given an opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him. (iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination. (Emphasis added)
ART. 277. Miscellaneous provisions. xxxAs the Court En Banc explained in Maula:
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. xxx42 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx The test for the fair procedure guaranteed under Article 277(b) cannot be whether there has been a formal pre-termination confrontation between the employer and the employee. The 'ample opportunity to be heard' standard is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing. To confine the employee's right to be heard to a solitary form narrows down that right. It deprives him of other equally effective forms of adducing evidence in his defense. Certainly, such an exclusivist and absolutist interpretation is overly restrictive. The 'very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.'Bearing in mind these guiding principles, the Court will now determine whether or not Reyes was denied procedural due process of law.
The standard for the hearing requirement, ample opportunity, is couched in general language revealing the legislative intent to give some degree of flexibility or adaptability to meet the peculiarities of a given situation. To confine it to a single rigid proceeding such as a formal hearing will defeat its spirit.
Significantly, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code itself provides that the so-called standards of due process outlined therein shall be observed 'substantially,' not strictly. This is a recognition that while a formal hearing or conference is ideal, it is not an absolute, mandatory or exclusive avenue of due process.
An employee's right to be heard in termination cases under Article 277(b) as implemented by Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code should be interpreted in broad strokes. It is satisfied not only by a formal face to face confrontation but by any meaningful opportunity to controvert the charges against him and to submit evidence in support thereof.
A hearing means that a party should be given a chance to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be taken into account in the adjudication of the controversy. 'To be heard' does not mean verbal argumentation alone inasmuch as one may be heard just as effectively through written explanations, submissions or pleadings. Therefore, while the phrase 'ample opportunity to be heard' may in fact include an actual hearing, it is not limited to a formal hearing only. In other words, the existence of an actual, formal 'trial-type' hearing, although preferred, is not absolutely necessary to satisfy the employee's right to be heard.
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In sum, the following are the guiding principles in connection with the hearing requirement in dismissal cases:
(a) 'ample opportunity to be heard' means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given to the employee to answer the charges against him and submit evidence in support of his defense, whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way.
(b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by the employee in writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances justify it.
(c) the "ample opportunity to be heard" standard in the Labor Code prevails over the 'hearing or conference' requirement in the implementing rules and regulations.43
Art. 297. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:Preliminarily, the Court agrees with the NLRC and the CA that Reyes' infractions did not constitute "serious misconduct" as contemplated under the first paragraph of Article 282 of the Labor Code. As held in Imasen Philippine Manufacturing Corporation v. Alcon:60
a. Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
b. Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
c. Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
d. Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and
e. Other causes analogous to the foregoing. (Emphasis added)
Misconduct is defined as an improper or wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. To constitute a valid cause for the dismissal within the text and meaning of Article 282 of the Labor Code, the employee's misconduct must be serious, i.e., of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant.61In the case at bar, the explanations proffered by Reyes showed that he was not animated by any wrongful intent when he committed the infractions complained of. Moreover, the finding that he was guilty of serious misconduct was incompatible with the charges for negligence which, by definition, requires lack of wrongful intent.
We cannot but agree with PEPSI that gross inefficiency falls within the purview of 'other causes analogous to the foregoing,' and constitutes, therefore, just cause to terminate an employee under Article 282 of the Labor Code. One is analogous to another if it is susceptible of comparison with the latter either in general or in some specific detail; or has a close relationship with the latter. 'Gross inefficiency' is closely related to 'gross neglect,' for both involve specific acts of omission on the part of the employee resulting in damage to the employer or to his business. In Buiser v. Leogardo, this Court ruled that failure to observe prescribed standards of work, or to fulfill reasonable work assignments due to inefficiency may constitute just cause for dismissal.64This doctrine had been applied in International School Manila v. International School Alliance of Educators65 when this Court held:
What can be gathered from a thorough review of the records of this case is that the inadequacies of Santos as a teacher did not stem from a reckless disregard of the welfare of her students or of the issues raised by the School regarding her teaching. Far from being tainted with bad faith, Santos's failings appeared to have resulted from her lack of necessary skills, in-depth knowledge, and expertise to teach the Filipino language at the standards required of her by the School.The ruling in International School Manila is squarely applicable herein. As with any private corporation, CMP Federal had the prerogative to set standards, within legal bounds, to be observed by its employees. In the exercise of this right, CMP Federal promulgated a Table of Offenses, Administrative Charges and Penalties, which prescribed a norm of conduct at work.67 Based on the admissions of Reyes in his Written Explanations, he was repeatedly remiss in complying with the standards set therein, hi view of his repeated unsatisfactory performance, CMP Federal had justifiable reasons to terminate Reyes from its employ.
Be that as it may, we find that the petitioners had sufficiently proved the charge of gross inefficiency, which warranted the dismissal of Santos from the School.
The Court enunciated in Peña v. National Labor Relations Commission that 'it is the prerogative of the school to set high standards of efficiency for its teachers since quality education is a mandate of the Constitution. As long as the standards fixed are reasonable and not arbitrary, courts are not at liberty to set them aside.' xxx
xxxx
Contrary to the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, it is not accurate to state that Santos was dismissed by the School for inefficiency on account of the fact that she was caught only once without a lesson plan. The documentary evidence submitted by petitioners, the contents of which we laid down in detail in our statement of facts, pointed to the numerous instances when Santos failed to observe the prescribed standards of performance set by the School in several areas of concern, not the least of which was her lack of adequate planning for her Filipino classes. Said evidence established that the School administrators informed Santos of her inadequacies as soon as they became apparent; that they provided constructive criticism of her planning process and teaching performance; and that regular conferences were held between Santos and the administrators in order to address the latter's concerns. In view of her slow progress, the School required her to undergo the remediation phase of the evaluation process through a Professional Growth Plan. Despite the efforts of the School administrators, Santos failed to show any substantial improvement in her planning process. Having failed to exit the remediation process successfully, the School was left with no choice but to terminate her employment.
The Court finds that, not only did the petitioners' documentary evidence sufficiently prove Santos's inefficient performance of duties, but the same also remained unrebutted by respondents' own evidence. On the contrary, Santos admits in her pleadings that her performance as a teacher of Filipino had not been satisfactory but she prays for leniency on account of her prior good record as a Spanish teacher at the School. Indeed, even the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals agreed that Santos was not without fault but the lower tribunals deemed that termination was too harsh a penalty.66
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 32-42; penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao and concurred in by Associate Justices Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan and Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla.
2 Id. at 44-45.
3 Id. at 32-33.
4 Id. at 140.
5 Id. at 141.
6 Id. at 141.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 141-142.
9 Id. at 62,65, 72, and 75.
10 Id. at 33.
11 Id. at 79. Emphasis in the original.
12 Id. at 80.
13 Id. at 33-34.
14 Id. at 143.
15 Id. at 34.
16 Id. at 81. Emphasis and underscoring in the original.
17 Id. at 34.
18 Id. at 144.
19 Id. at 146.
20 Id. at 210.
21 Id. at 126
22 Id. at 122-130.
23 Id. at 129-130.
24 Id. at 128-129.
25 Id. at 139-155; penned by Commissioner Isabel G. Panganiban-Ortiguerra and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Joseph Gerard E. Mabilog and Commissioner Nieves E. Vivar-De Castro.
26 Id. at 154.
27 Id. at 151.
28 726 Phil. 337, 350-352 (2014).
29Rollo, pp. 149-151.
30 Id. at 151.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 152-154.
33 Id. at 171-173.
34 Id. at 41.
35 Id. at 37.
36 Id. at 39.
37 Id. at 44-45.
38 Id. at 8.
39Brown Madonna Press, Inc. v. Casas, 759 Phil 479, 491 (2015).
40 804 Phil. 365 (2017).
41 602 Phil. 522, 537-542 (2009).
42 LABOR CODE, Article 292 as renumbered.
43Maula v. Ximex Delivery Express, Inc., supra note 40 at 383-385. Italics in the original. Emphasis added.
44Rollo, p. 38.
45 Id. at 61, 64, 66, 71, 74 and 116.
46 Id. at 61.
47 Id. at 64.
48 Id. at 71.
49 Id. at 74.
50 Id. at 113.
51 Id. at 116.
52 Id. at 62.
53 Id. at 65.
54 Id. at 75.
55 Id. at 79.
56 Id. at 80.
57 Id. at 83-84.
58 Id. at 81.
59 Formerly Article 282.
60 746 Phil. 172 (2014).
61 Id. at 181. Emphasis in the original.
62Noblado v. Alfonso, 113 Phil. 271, 283 (2015).
63 328 Phil. 843 (1996).
64 Id. at 858.
65 726 Phil. 147 (2014).
66 Id. at 175-177.
67Rollo, pp. 76-78.