A.M. No. P-19-3916 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 17-4710-P) - ANONYMOUS, COMPLAINANT, v. JESSICA MAXILINDA A. IBARRETA, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF IRIGA CITY, CAMARINES SUR, BRANCH 36, RESPONDENT.

The  instant  administrative  case arose  from the  letter indorsement¹ dated  January  8,  2016  of  Assistant  Ombudsman  Joselito  P.  Fangon (Assistant Ombudsman Fangon) and the undated anonymous complaint² charging respondent Jessica Maxilinda A. Ibarreta (respondent), Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Camarines Sur, Branch 36 (RTC) of: (a) acquiring ill-gotten wealth; and (b) engaging in lending business with high interest and devoting her official time in promoting her financial and propriety pursuit, respectively.

The-Facts
At around two (2) o'clock  in the afternoon of January 7, 2016, the Office of  the  Ombudsman received an anonymous call reporting that respondent displays wealth which is disproportionate  to her monthly wage, has a money lending  business,  and is a powerful and influential person because judges  in  the  RTC  always  give  special preference  to  her.³   The Office of the Ombudsman,   through Assistant Ombudsman Fangon, forwarded  the complaint  to the Office of the Court  Administrator  (OCA), which referred the matter to Executive Judge Timoteo  A. Panga, Jr. (Judge Panga) of the RTC for investigation. After Judge Panga submitted his partial report,⁴  Hon. Manuel M. Rosales (Judge Rosales) was designated as the new executive  judge of the RTC, and as such, he took over the investigation  of the case,⁵  and thereafter, submitted his own report.⁶

In their reports, Judge Panga and Judge Rosales observed that: (a) respondent's marriage  had been annulled; (b)  she has two (2) college-level children who are both studying at a private university  in Naga City; (c) she owns  a  house  and  two  (2)  vehicles,  all of which  are  declared  in  her Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth; (d) no adverse findings regarding her work performance as Sheriff was reported nor was there any complaints  or  accusation  filed  relative  to her misuse of  her office or any reports of harassment or oppression from any litigant or counsel; (d) she, however, runs a money lending  business, locally  known  as "5-6,"  wherein she  charges  excessive  interest  rates of  as much  as ten  percent  (10 %)  per month, which apparently  is the source of her wealth; and (e) she personally conducts such money lending business even during office hours.⁷

In a Memorandum⁸ dated May 24, 2017, the OCA found the charges of acquisition of ill-gotten wealth against respondent to be without merit. Nevertheless, it found prima facie evidence against respondent for simple misconduct, taking into account her acts of engaging in a money lending business during office hours and devoting her official time to foster her proprietary  pursuits.  Hence,  the  OCA recommended that the matter be docketed for purposes of preliminary inquiry and that respondent be made to comment.⁹

In her Comment,¹⁰ respondent made a point-by-point  refutation of the accusation on acquisition of ill-gotten wealth against her. Notably, however, as to the issue about her money lending business, she merely asserted that it was the business of her late mother which was discontinued when she passed away.¹¹


In a report and recommendation¹² dated November 6, 2018, the OCA recommended, among others, that: (a) respondent be found guilty of Simple Misconduct for violating Reasonable Rules and Regulation and Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel,¹³ and accordingly, fined  in  the amount  of  P5,000.00  payable within thirty  (30)  days from receipt of notice; and (b) she be directed to cease and desist from her money lending activities and be sternly warned that her failure to do so shall be dealt with more severely.¹⁴

Prefatorily,  the OCA  pointed out that as  per their Memorandum¹⁵ dated May 24, 2017, it already cleared respondent from the allegation of acquisition of ill-gotten wealth, and that she was only being made to answer for her money lending activities.¹⁶ Despite this, respondent took more time in explaining the origins of her wealth and property, and only made an unconvincing and dismissive retort to address the latter charge. The OCA took this as an implicit admission that respondent is indeed engaging in a money lending business during office hours.   The OCA held that respondent's acts violated: (a) Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which mandates that court personnel shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours; and (b) Administrative Circular No. 5 dated October 4, 1988, which prohibits all officials and employees of the Judiciary from engaging in, inter alia, money lending activities during office hours, and thus, constitutes Simple Misconduct for which she must be held administratively liable. Finally, the OCA recommended the imposition of a fine in lieu of suspension, considering respondent's first offense in her thirty (30) years of service, and that such imposition would prevent any adverse effect on the public service that would ensue if respondent, a Sheriff performing frontline functions, is suspended.¹⁷


At the outset, the Court notes that as early as in  the  OCA's Memorandum dated May 24, 2017, respondent was already cleared of the charge of acquisition  of ill-gotten  wealth. As such, the sole issue for the Court's  resolution  is whether  or not  respondent  should  be  held administratively  liable  for  her alleged  money  lending  business  activities during office hours.


After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court adopts the findings and recommendations  of the OCA,  except  as to the amount  of fine to be imposed on respondent.

Administrative Circular No. 5 dated October 4, 1988 reads in full:

TO: ALL OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY SUBJECT: PROHIBITION TO WORK AS INSURANCE AGENT

In line with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, the Executive Department issued Memorandum Circular No. 17 dated September 4, 1986 authorizing heads of government offices to grant their employees permission to "engage directly in any private business, vocation and profession ... outside office hours."

However, in its En Bane resolution dated October 1, 1987, denying the request of Atty. Froilan L. Valdez of the Office of Associate Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, to be commissioned as a Notary Public, the Court expressed the   view that the provisions of Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Executive Department are not applicable to officials or employees of the courts considering the express prohibition in the Rules of Court and  the nature of their  work which requires them to serve with the highest degree of efficiency and responsibility, in order  to maintain public confidence in the Judiciary. The same policy was adopted in Administrative Matter No. 88-6-002-SC, June  21,  1988,  where the  court  denied  the  request  of  Ms.  Esther  C. Rabanal,  Technical  Assistant  II,  Leave  Section,  Office  of  the Administrative Services of this Court, to work as an insurance agent after office  hours  including  Saturdays,  Sundays  and  holidays. Indeed,   the entire  time  of Judiciary officials and  employees  must  be devoted  to government service  to insure  efficient  and  speedy  administration of justice.

ACCORDINGLY, all officials and employees of the Judiciary are  hereby  enjoined from being commissioned  as insurance agents or from engaging in any such related activities, and, to immediately desist therefrom if  presently  engaged  thereat. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Verily,  Administrative Circular No. 5 dated October 4, 1988 has prohibited all  officials and  employees of the Judiciary from engaging directly in any private business, vocation or profession, even outside their office hours. The prohibition is aimed at ensuring that full-time officers and employees of the courts render full-time service, for only then could any undue delays in the administration of justice and in the disposition of court cases be avoided. The nature of the work of court employees and officials demanded their highest degree of efficiency and responsibility, and they would not ably meet the demand except by devoting their undivided time to the government service. This explains why court employees have been enjoined to strictly observe official time and to devote every second or moment of such time to serving the public.¹⁸  This is in line with Section 1, Canon IV of A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC, entitled the "Code of Conduct of Court Personnel," which reads:

CANON IV
PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

Section 1. Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with diligence. They shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours.

Although many "moonlighting" activities were themselves legal acts that would be permitted or tolerated had the actors not been employed in the public sector, moonlighting, albeit not usually treated as a serious misconduct, can amount to a malfeasance in office by the very nature of the position held. In this case, respondent's act of engaging in a money lending business - an  accusation  which  she  failed to  sufficiently  rebut - while concurrently being a Sheriff of the RTC surely put the integrity of her office under so, much undeserved  suspicion.  She  should  have  been  more circumspect in her  acts,  knowing that sooner  or  later,  it would  be unavoidable that the impression that she had taken advantage of her position and abused the confidence reposed in her office and functions would arise. Undoubtedly, her activities greatly diminished the reputation of her office and of the courts in the esteem of the public.¹⁹  As such, the OCA correctly found her administratively liable for Simple Misconduct.²⁰

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, Section 46 (D) (2),  Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service²¹  (RRACCS) classifies Simple Misconduct as a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal from the service for the second offense. Nonetheless, in Cabigao v. Nery²²(Cabigao), the Court explained that it has the discretion  to temper the harshness of the penalties  imposed  on erring officials and employees  of  the judiciary  when  warranted by  the circumstances, to wit:

"However, while this Court is duty-bound to sternly wield a corrective hand to discipline its errant employees and to weed out those who are undesirable, this Court also has the discretion to temper the harshness of its judgment  with   mercy." "In several jurisprudential precedents, the  Court has refrained from imposing the actual administrative  penalties prescribed by law or regulation in   the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondent's length of service, the respondent's acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondent's advanced age, among other things, have had varying significance in the determination by the Court of the imposable penalty."²³  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Here, considering  the fact that this is respondent's first offense in her thirty (30) years of service, and that she is performing a frontline function as a Sheriff, the Court finds it proper to impose on her a fine equivalent to her salary for one (1) month and one (1) day, pursuant to Section 47 (1) (b) and (2)²⁴of the RRACCS. This imposition also finds support in Cabigao where the Court held:

While the recommended penalty of one-month suspension is reasonable, the same is not practical at this point, considering that his work would be left unattended by reason of his absence. Furthermore, he may use his suspension as another excuse to justify his inaction and inefficiency in other matters pending before his office. Instead of suspension, we impose a fine equivalent to his one-month salary, so that he can finally implement the subject writs and perform the other duties of his office.²⁵

As a final note, the Court emphasizes that the conduct required of court personnel must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the judiciary.   They shall endeavor to discourage  wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage. Court employees should act with more circumspection and to steer clear of any situation, which may cast the slightest suspicion on  their conduct.²⁶  Relatedly, '"[s]heriffs, as officers of the court and agents of the  law, play an important role in the administration of justice. They are in the forefront of things, tasked as they are to serve judicial writs, execute all processes, and carry into effect the orders of the  court.' As a front-line representative of the judicial system, sheriffs must always demonstrate integrity in their conduct for once they lose the people's trust, they also diminish the people's faith in the entire judiciary."²⁷

WHEREFORE, The Court finds respondent Jessica Maxilinda A. Ibarreta, Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Camarines Sur, Branch 36 GUlLTY of Simple Misconduct. Accordingly, she is ordered to pay a FINE equivalent to her salary for one (1) month and one (1)  day, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to her personal record.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr. and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

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¹Rollo, p. 7.

² Id. at 9.

³ Id. at 1.

⁴ See Report (on the alleged ill-gotten wealth of Sheriff Jessica Maxilinda A. Ibarreta) dated July 20, 2016; id. at 12-14.

⁵ See id. at 1-3.

⁶  See Report on the Alleged III-Gotten Wealth of Sheriff Jessica Maxilinda A. Ibarreta dated January 23, 2017; id. at 32-33.

⁷ See id. at 12-14 and 32-33. See also id. at 2-4.

⁸ Id.  at  1-6. Penned  by OCA  Legal Office Chief  Wilhelmina  D. Geronga  and approved  by Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez.

⁹ See id. at 4-6.

¹⁰ Dated August 4, 2017. Id. at 37-39.

¹¹ See id.

¹² Id. at 42-49. Signed by Deputy Court Administrator and Office-in-Charge Raul Bautista Villanueva.

¹³ See A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC effective on June 1, 2004.

¹⁴Rollo, p. 49.

¹⁵ Id. at 1-6.

¹⁶ See id. at 42-45.

¹⁷ See id. at 47-49.

¹⁸Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint Against Lopez and Montalvo, 744 Phil. 541, 553-554 (2014).

¹⁹ See id. at 554.

²⁰ "[M]isconduct   is intentional wrongdoing  or deliberate violation of  a rule  of  law or standard  of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance  of  the  official  functions  and  duties  of  a  public  officer.  In  grave  misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest. Without any of these elements, the transgression  of  an  established  rule  is  properly  characterized  as  simple  misconduct  only. Most importantly, without a nexus between the act complained of and the discharge of duty, the charge of grave  misconduct  shall  necessarily  fail." (Daplas  v.  Department of  Finance, 808  Phil. 763, 772 [2017].)

²¹ Promulgated on November 8, 2011.

²² 719 Phil. 475 (2013).

²³ Id. at 484; citations omitted.

²⁴ Section 47 (1) (b) and (2) of the RRACCS reads:

Section 47. Penalty of Fine. -The following are the guidelines for the penalty of fine:

1. Upon the request of the head of office or the concerned party and when supported  by justifiable  reason/s  the disciplining  authority may allow payment of fine in  place  of suspension  if any of the following circumstances are present:

xxxx

b.  When  the  respondent   is  actually  discharging frontline  functions or those  directly dealing  with  the  public and the personnel complement of the office  is  insufficient to perform such function;

xxxx

2. The payment of penalty of fine in lieu of suspension shall be available  in Grave,  Less Grave, and Light Offenses  where the penalty imposed  is for six (6) months or less at the ratio of one (1) day of suspension  from the service to one (1) day fine; Provided,  that in Grave Offenses  where the penalty  imposed is six (6) months and one (1) day suspension in view of the presence of mitigating circumstance[/s], the conversion  shall only apply to the suspension  of six (6) months. Nonetheless,  the remaining  one (1) day suspension  is deemed included therein.

²⁵Cabigao  v. Nery, supra note 22, at 486, citing Mariñas v. Florendo, 598 Phil. 322, 331 (2009).

²⁶ See id. at 483, citing Macinas v. Arimado, 508 Phil. 161, 165 (2005).

²⁷ See id.; citations omitted.