G.R. Nos. 237106-07 - FLORENDO B. ARIAS, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
G.R. Nos. 237106-07 - FLORENDO B. ARIAS, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
In its Resolution12 dated January 15, 2018, the Sandiganbayan denied the motions for reconsideration filed by some of the accused, including that of the petitioner. The court stood by its earlier findings that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner and his other co-accused. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution reads as follows:
Petitioner raised the following issues for our consideration:
All the elements of the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Official/Commercial Documents were established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) reads, as follows:
Thus, as aptly ruled by the Sandiganbayan, all the elements of the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Official/Commercial Documents are present because the petitioner and his co-accused utilized false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means to make it appear that the DPWH service vehicles underwent emergency repairs or required the purchase of spare parts, and that reimbursements are due to petitioner by using falsified documents. Through those falsified documents, petitioner and his co-accused employed fraudulent means in order to defraud the government in paying the claims for the fictitious emergency repairs/purchases of spare parts. Therefore, the government suffered undue injury or damages in the amount of P5,166,539.00 through such fraudulent act.
As held by the Sandiganbayan:
Petitioner further seeks a review of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses for allegedly being "self-serving" and "perjured."
Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are generally accorded great respect by an appellate court. Well-settled is the rule that findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. For this reason, the trial court's findings are accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the results of the case.30
At any rate, the records of this case show no reversible error to warrant a reversal of the assailed decision. It appears that petitioner did not impugn his signatures appearing in the Disbursement Vouchers, Reports of Waste Materials, Requisitions for Supplies and/or Equipment and Certificates of Emergency Purchase. Furthermore, the repeated issuance and execution of these documents belies petitioner's claim that his participation was not necessary and that his function in signing documents is merely ministerial; on the contrary, these documents were necessary for the claims for payment of emergency repairs of DPWH service vehicles and/or purchases of spare parts which were found to be fictitious. Thus, petitioner's signatures on these documents were a clear manifestation of his assent and participation or complicity to the illegal transactions, and his assertion of lack of participation is without merit.
With regard to petitioner's contention as to the Best Evidence Rule, or, more specifically, to the Sandiganbayan's admission on the prosecution's exhibits despite the non-presentation of the original documents, such is misplaced. Instructive on this point is the case of Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano,31 wherein this Court stated that:
As to petitioner's guilt for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, such has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads, as follows:
Petitioner acted with evident bad faith when he affixed his signature to the falsified documents in order to induce the government to pay the claim for fictitious emergency repairs and purchases of spare parts of certain vehicles. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.35
In view, however, of R.A. No. 10951 (An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on which a Penalty is Based, and the Fines Imposed under the Revised Penal Code, amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815, otherwise known as "The Revised Penal Code"), a modification must be made as to the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan. Section 85 of the said law provides the following:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari dated March 15, 2018 of petitioner Florendo B. Arias is DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated November 10, 2016, in the consolidated Criminal Case No. 28100 and Criminal Case No. 28253, and its Resolution dated January 15, 2018 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 28100 for Estafa through Falsification of Official/Commercial Documents, petitioner is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen, A. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, and Inting, JJ., concur.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs / Mesdames:
Please take notice that on June 10, 2019 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on July 17, 2019 at 8:23 a.m.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 237106-07, June 10, 2019
FLORENDO B. ARIAS, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated March 15, 2018, of petitioner Florendo B. Arias assailing the Sandiganbayan's Decision2 promulgated on November 10, 2016, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa Thru Falsification of Official/Commercial Documents in Criminal Case No. 28100, and for Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, in Criminal Case No. 28253, and its Resolution3 issued on January 15, 2018, denying his Motion for Reconsideration.
Culled from documentary and testimonial evidence, the antecedents of this case are summarized by the Sandiganbayan, as follows:
During the period March to December 2001, or sometime subsequent thereto, reimbursements were claimed and paid by DPWH in an amount totaling millions of pesos covering 409 transactions purportedly for the emergency repairs of 39 DPWH service vehicles. Of the 409 transactions, 274 transactions were made in the name of accused Martinez for which the total sum of P5,166,539.00, not P6,368,364.00, were claimed and paid as reimbursements. The spare parts were purportedly supplied by J-CAP Motorshop, owned by accused Capuz, and DEB Repair Shop and Parts Supply owned by accused Dela Cruz. The transactions are covered by Disbursement Vouchers with supporting documents to justify the release of checks, pertinent details of which are as follows:On May 16, 2005,5 petitioner, together with his co-accused, was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 28100 in an Information that reads, as follows:
1) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. TSC 482 purportedly underwent 44 emergency repairs and reimbursements for 2 of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
2) Nissan Pathfinder with Plate No. PND-918 purportedly underwent 27 emergency repairs and reimbursements for 21 of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
3) Nissan Pick-Up with Plate No. PLH-256 purportedly underwent 30 emergency repairs and reimbursements for 20 of them were made in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
4) Nissan Pick-Up with Plate No. PMY-110 purportedly underwent 24 emergency repairs and reimbursements for 18 of them were made in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
5) Toyota Land Cruiser (Jeep) with Plate No. CEJ-591 purportedly underwent 23 emergency repairs and reimbursements for all of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
6) Toyota Land Cruiser with Plate No. TNY-416 purportedly underwent 22 emergency repairs and reimbursements for 18 of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
7) Toyota Land Cruiser with Plate No. CEJ-514 purportedly underwent 19 emergency repairs and reimbursements for 15 of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
8) Mitsubishi Pajero with Plate No. TKL-106 purportedly underwent 17 emergency repairs and reimbursements for 15 of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
9) Nissan Pick-Up with Plate No. PMB-631 / HI-4148 purportedly underwent 17 emergency repairs and reimbursements for 16 of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
10) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SFG-496 purportedly underwent 19 emergency repairs and reimbursements for 10 of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
11) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SFC-309 purportedly underwent 15 emergency repairs and reimbursement for 1 of them is in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
12) Nissan Pathfinder with Plate No. PND-908 / HI-4321 purportedly underwent 11 emergency repairs and all reimbursements were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
13) Nissan Pick Up with Plate No. PME-676 purportedly underwent 17 emergency repairs and reimbursements for 7 of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
14) Toyota Land Cruiser with Plate No. SFT-208 purportedly underwent 11 emergency repairs and reimbursements for all of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
15) Toyota Land Cruiser with Plate No. SFT-308 / HI-4398 purportedly underwent 10 emergency repairs and reimbursements for all of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
16) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SFG-417 purportedly underwent 12 emergency repairs and reimbursements for 8 of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
17) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SED-999 purportedly underwent 6 emergency repairs and reimbursements for all of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
18) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SFG-361 / HI-4237 purportedly underwent 6 emergency repairs and reimbursements for all of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
19) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SFG-346 purportedly underwent 20 emergency repairs and reimbursements for 15 of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
20) Toyota Land Cruiser with Plate No. SFT-304 purportedly underwent 5 emergency repairs and reimbursements for all of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
21) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SFG-455/H1-4231 purportedly underwent 8 emergency repairs and reimbursements for 2 of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
22) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SFG-292 purportedly underwent 4 emergency repairs and reimbursements for all of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
23) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SFG-465 purportedly underwent 6 emergency repairs and reimbursements for one of them was in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
24) Mitsubishi L-300 with Plate No. SFT-272 purportedly underwent 3 emergency repairs and reimbursements for all of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
25) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SFT-282 purportedly underwent 3 emergency repairs and reimbursements for all of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.15,220.00 DEB
26) Toyota Corolla with Plate No. TEG-822 purportedly underwent 2 emergency repairs and reimbursements for both were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
27) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SFG-527 purportedly underwent 5 emergency repairs and reimbursements for 4 of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
28) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SFK-735 purportedly underwent 4 emergency repairs and reimbursements for 3 of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
29) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SFT-715 purportedly underwent 2 emergency repairs and reimbursements for both of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
30) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SED-732 purportedly underwent 3 emergency repairs and reimbursements for one of them was in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
31) Nissan Pick-Up with Plate No. PME-687 purportedly underwent 3 emergency repairs and reimbursements for 2 of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
32) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SFT-732 purportedly underwent 1 emergency repair and reimbursement was in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.AMOUNT
33) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SFG-485 purportedly underwent 3 emergency repairs and reimbursements for 2 of them were in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
34) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SFG-407 purportedly underwent 1 emergency repair and reimbursement was in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
35) Toyota Prado with Plate No. SFG-402 purportedly underwent 1 emergency repair and reimbursement was in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
36) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SFD-732 purportedly underwent 1 emergency repair and reimbursement was in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
37) Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SFG-369 purportedly underwent 1 emergency repair and reimbursement was in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
38) Toyota Land Cruiser with Plate No. SFD-302 purportedly underwent 1 emergency repair and reimbursement was in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
39) Toyota Prado with Plate No. SFT-207 purportedly underwent 1 emergency repair and reimbursement was in the name of accused Martinez, to wit:
VOUCHER NO.
Of the 39 vehicles aforementioned, only the Mitsubishi L-200 with Plate No. SFG-361/H1-4237 was assigned to accused Martinez. The others were assigned to other agencies or officials of the DPWH.
To support the issuance of the Disbursement Vouchers (DVs) and checks for the reimbursements of the amounts claimed and paid by the DPWH, the following documents were submitted: Job Orders; Pre-Repair Inspection Reports; Requisitions for Supplies and Equipment (RSEs); Accreditation Papers; Sales Invoices or Official Receipt; Certificates of Acceptance; Post-Repair Inspection Reports; Reports of Waste Materials; Requests for Obligation of Allotment (ROAs); Certificates of Emergency Purchase; Certificates of Fair Wear and Tear; Canvas from 3 suppliers and Price Monitoring Sheets.4 (Citations omitted.)
That during the period from March to December, 2001, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named high-ranking public officials and employees of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Port Area, Manila, namely: JULIO T. MARTINEZ, then the Clerk/Supply Officer, BURT FAVORITO y BARBA, Director III, Administrative and Manpower Management Services (SG 27), FLORENDO ARIAS y BUNAG, Assistant Director, Bureau of [Equipment (SG 27), VIOLETA AMAR y CASTILLO, NAPOLEON ANAS y SEBASTIAN, ROGELIO BERAY y LAGANGA, MAXIMO BORJE y AQUINO, ROLANDO CASTILLO y COMIA, JESSICA CATIBAYAN y JARDIEL, MA. LUISA CRUZ y TALAO, RICARDO JUAN, JR. y MACLANG, AGERICO PALAYPAY y CORTES, ERDITO QUARTO y QUIAOT, FELIPE A. SAN JOSE, RONALDO G. SIMBAHAN, VIOLETA TADEO y RAGASA, NORMA VILLARMINO y AGCAOILI and JOHN DOES, whose true names are not yet known, acting with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, committing the offense in relation to their office, and taking advantage of their official positions, and private individuals, namely: JESUS D. CAPUZ and CONCHITA M. DELA CRUZ and JOHN DOES, whose true names are not yet known, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to defraud the government, did then and there, willfully[,] unlawfully and feloniously forge and falsify or cause to be forged and falsified documents, purportedly for emergency repairs of various DPWH vehicles and/or purchase of spare parts, with a total amount of SIX MILLION THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR PESOS (P6,368,364.00), and thereafter, cause the payment of said fictitious repairs and/or purchase of spare parts in the said total amount from funds held in trust and for administration by the said public officers, and which payments were made by the government on the basis of and relying on said forged and falsified documents, when in truth and in fact, the accused knew fully well that there were no emergency repairs of DPWH vehicles and/or purchases of spare parts, which said amount, accused, thereafter, willfully, unlawfully and criminally take, convert and misappropriate, to the personal use and benefit of person(s) not entitled to receive said funds, to the damage and prejudice of the government and the public interest in the aforesaid sum.While in Criminal Case No. 28253, petitioner was arraigned on July 20, 2005,7 under an Information that states the following:
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
That during the period from March to December, 2001, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named high-ranking public officials and employees of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Port Area, Manila, namely: JULIO T. MARTINEZ, then the Clerk/Supply Officer, BURT FAVORITO y BARBA, Director III, Administrative and Manpower Management Services (SG 27), FLORENDO ARIAS y BUNAG, Assistant Director, Bureau of [E]quipment (SG 27), VIOLETA AMAR y CASTILLO, NAPOLEON ANAS y SEBASTIAN, ROGELIO BERAY y LAGANGA, MAXIMO BORJE y AQUINO, ROLANDO CASTILLO y COMIA, JESSICA CATIBAYAN y JARDIEL, MA. LUISA CRUZ y TALAO, RICARDO JUAN, JR. y MACLANG, AGERICO PALAYPAY y CORTES, ERDITO QUARTO y QUIAOT, FELIPE A. SAN JOSE, RONALDO G. SIMBAHAN, VIOLETA TADEO y RAGASA, NORMA VILLARMINO y AGCAOILI, and JOHN DOES, whose true names are not yet known, committing the offense in relation to their office, and taking advantage of their official positions, and private individuals, namely: JESUS D. CAPUZ and CONCHITA M. DELA CRUZ and JOHN DOES, whose true names are not yet known, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, acting with evident bad faith, manifest partiality or at the very least gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously forge and falsify or cause to be forged and falsified documents purportedly for emergency repairs of various DPWH vehicles and/or purchase of spare parts, with a total amount of SIX MILLION THREE HUNDRED SIXTY EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FOUR PESOS (P6,368,364.00), and which payments were made by the government on the basis of and relying on said forged and falsified documents, when in truth and in fact, as the accused fully well knew, that there were no emergency repairs of DPWH vehicles and/or purchases of spare parts, and these are ghost repairs in the total amount of SIX MILLION THREE HUNDRED SIXTY EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FOUR PESOS (P6,368,364.00), thereby causing undue injury to the government in the aforesaid sum.The Sandiganbayan, on November 10, 2016, promulgated its Decision,9 the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:On November 24, 2016, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,11 contending, among others, that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were self-serving. He argued that the findings of fact made by the Sandiganbayan were not proven during the trial and that its ruling was based mainly on conjectures and surmises. Petitioner maintained that in signing documents, he performed only ministerial functions and that he relied on the tasks performed by his subordinates which were done in a regular manner.
1) In Criminal Case No. 28100, the Court finds accused Florendo Arias y Bunag, Maximo Borje y Aquino, Rolando Castillo y Comia, Burt Favorito y Barba, Erdito Quarto y Quiaot, Felipe A. San Jose and Conchita M. dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa Through Falsification Of Documents, defined and penalized under Article 315, in relation to Article 171 and Article 48, of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the Information dated March 1, 2005. Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, all said accused are hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment often (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with perpetual absolute disqualification for public office. The aforementioned accused are also hereby declared solidarity liable to pay the Department of Public Works and Highways civil indemnity in the sum of P5,166,539.00.
For insufficiency of evidence, the following accused are hereby acquitted: Napoleon Anas y Sebastian, Rogelio Beray y Laganga, Jessica Catibayan y Jardial, Maria Luisa Cruz y Talao, Ricardo Juan, Jr. y Maclang, Ronaldo G. Simbahan, Violeta Tadeo y Tagasa and Norma Villarmino y Agcaoili.
By reason of their death, the case is dismissed as against accused Julio T. Martinez, Violeta Amar y Castillo, Agerico Palaypay y Cortez and Jesus N. Capuz by reason of their death.-and-
2) In Criminal Case No. 28253, the Court finds accused Florendo Arias y Bunag, Maximo Borje y Aquino, Rolando Castillo y Comia, Burt Favorito y Barba, Erdito Quarto y Quiaot, Felipe A. San Jose and Conchita dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, as charged in the Information dated June 8, 2005. All said accused are hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum. They shall also suffer perpetual disqualification from public office.
For insufficiency of evidence, the following accused are hereby acquitted: Napoleon Anas y Sebastian, Rogelio Boray y Laganga, Jessica Catibayan y Jardiel, Maria Luisa Cruz y Talao, Ricardo Juan, Jr. y Maclang, Ronaldo G. Simbahan, Violeta Tadeo y Ragasa and Norma Villarmino y Agcaoili.
By reason of their death, the case is dismissed as against Julio T. Martinez, Violeta Amar y Castillo, Agerico Palaypay y Cortez and Jesus N. Capuz.
SO ORDERED.10 (Emphases in the original.)
In its Resolution12 dated January 15, 2018, the Sandiganbayan denied the motions for reconsideration filed by some of the accused, including that of the petitioner. The court stood by its earlier findings that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner and his other co-accused. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to deny the following:Hence, the present petition.
1) Motion for Reconsideration dated November 22, 2016, filed by accused Maximo A. Borje, Jr., through counsel;
2) Motion for Reconsideration dated November 24, 2016, filed by accused Florendo B. Aries (sic), through counsel;
3) Motion for Reconsideration (Of The Decision Dated November 10, 2016) dated November 24, 2016, filed by accused Conchita M. dela Cruz, through counsel;and
4) Motion for Reconsideration dated November 18, 2016, filed by accused Burt B. Favorito, through counsel.13
Petitioner raised the following issues for our consideration:
The petition lacks merit.I
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FOURTH DIVISION, HAS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FOUND PETITIONER-APPELLANT FLORENDO B. ARIAS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(E) OF R.A. 3019, CONTRARY TO THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE.II
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FOURTH DIVISION, COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT GAVE DUE COURSE TO THE PROSECUTION'S EXHIBITS DESPITE FAILURE TO PRESENT THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN FALSIFIED.14
All the elements of the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Official/Commercial Documents were established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) reads, as follows:
Article 315. Swindling (Estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:The elements of the above crime are the following:x x x x
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:x x x x
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
1. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;Article 171, paragraph 4 of the RPC provides that:
2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and
4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
Article 171. x x x. - The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:In this case, certain funding requirements were set forth by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for the payment of claims for emergency repairs of DPWH service vehicles, thus:x x x x
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts[.]
D. FUNDING REQUIREMENTSBased on the evidence presented by the prosecution, it was proven that except for the Cash Invoices issued by the suppliers, the documents required under the DPWH Memorandum,16 dated July 31, 1997, were prepared, accomplished and signed by all the public officials concerned, taking advantage of their official positions in making untruthful statements in the narration of facts. The said documents were made to appear that the 39 service vehicles underwent emergency repairs or required purchase of spare parts. In addition, in order to claim payment from DPWH, the Disbursement Vouchers were also falsified to justify the release of checks.
1. Documentation - No claim for payment for the emergency minor/major repair of service vehicles of this Department shall be processed by the Accounting Division, CFMS without strictly following provisions of COA Circular No. 92-389 dated November 03, 1992. The following documentary requirements shall be complied with prior to funding and/or processing of payment, to wit:
1.1 Request for Obligation of Allotment (ROA) for said claim which shall be signed by the concerned Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Directors, Project Director/Manager, Service Chief, or the duly designated representative of the office of the end-user;
1.2 Certification of Emergency Purchase/Repair which shall be signed by the end-user, duly approved by the Head of Office concerned (with the rank higher than Division Chief)[;]
1.3 Abstract of Open Canvass and corresponding written quotations for the purchase of spare parts and repair of vehicles duly signed by the Supply Officer, Canvasser, and supplier concerned[;]
1.4 The Requisition for Supplies or Equipment (RSE) which shall be prepared and signed by the end-user, recommended for approval and duly approved by the official concerned, in accordance with the existing delegation of authorities;
1.5 The Motor Vehicle Pre-repair/Post-repair Inspection Report which shall indicate the Control Series No. and the date of inspection, duly signed by all the members of the Special Inspectorate Team (SIT);
1.6 The Certificate of Acceptance which shall be signed by the end-user of said vehicle. All documents, under accounting and auditing rules and regulations, shall be signed by the official and/or supplier concerned over their respective printed names.15
Thus, as aptly ruled by the Sandiganbayan, all the elements of the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Official/Commercial Documents are present because the petitioner and his co-accused utilized false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means to make it appear that the DPWH service vehicles underwent emergency repairs or required the purchase of spare parts, and that reimbursements are due to petitioner by using falsified documents. Through those falsified documents, petitioner and his co-accused employed fraudulent means in order to defraud the government in paying the claims for the fictitious emergency repairs/purchases of spare parts. Therefore, the government suffered undue injury or damages in the amount of P5,166,539.00 through such fraudulent act.
As held by the Sandiganbayan:
The Court finds, and so holds, that all the aforementioned documents submitted were falsified. Except for the Cash Invoices issued by the suppliers, the documents were prepared, accomplished and/or executed and signed by public officers/employees taking advantage of their official positions in making untruthful statements in the narration of facts. Through these documents, it was made to appear, albeit untrue, that the 39 vehicles subject of reimbursements claimed and paid to accused Martinez in the total sum of P5,166,539.00 underwent emergency repairs that required purchases of spare parts. The Disbursement Vouchers were also falsified to justify the release of checks for payment of the reimbursements claimed. The Cash Invoices issued by the suppliers were also falsified because they pertain to fictitious or non-existent purchases of spare parts. As earlier stated, these falsified documents were all utilized in sinister schemes to steal government funds.In Tanenggee v. People,18 this Court discussed the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, thus:
The evidence on record shows that the falsified documents were accomplished and signed or initialed by the accused, as follows:x x x x
The aforementioned falsified documents, as well as the Cash Invoices issued by suppliers DEB and JCAP, were all utilized to defraud the government in a manner constituting Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC. All the elements thereof were present, to wit:First. There were false pretenses, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means in that it was made to appear, through the use of the falsified documents, that the DPWH service vehicles in question underwent emergency repairs that required purchases of spare parts, and that reimbursements were due to accused Martinez;The crime committed was the complex crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Documents, as charged in the Information dated March 1, 2005.
Second. The false pretenses, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means, in the form of falsification of documents, were employed prior to the commission of the fraud; that is to deceive the government in paying the claims for the fictitious emergency repairs/purchases of spare parts;
Third. The government was induced to pay the claims relying on the false pretenses, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means employed;- and-
Fourth. The government suffered damages in the total amount of P5,166,539.00, the sum total of the false claims paid.
When the offender commits on a public, official or commercial document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC as a necessary means to commit another crime like Estafa under Article 315 of the RPC, the two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same law. A complex crime, as earlier defined, may refer to a single act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an offense as a necessary means for committing another.
In a complex crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Public, Official or Commercial Document, the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another. The falsification is already consummated and it is the defraudation which causes damage or prejudice to another that constitutes estafa.x x x x
After a careful and meticulous scrutiny of the records, the Court finds, and so holds, that the prosecution evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt that the following accused are guilty of the offense charged, namely: Arias, Borja, Castillo, Favorito, Quarto, San Jose and Dela Cruz. These accused conspired with one another, and with accused Martinez whose criminal liability has been extinguished by death.
Accused Arias, an OIC Asst. Director of the Bureau of Equipment, affixed his signature approving and/or recommending approval of the falsified Disbursement Vouchers, Reports of Waste Materials, Requisitions for Supplies and/or Equipment (RSE) and Certificates of Emergency Purchase.17
When the offender commits on a public, official or commercial document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 as a necessary means to commit another crime like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime. Under Article 48 of the RPC, there are two classes of a complex crime. A complex crime may refer to a single act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an offense as a necessary means for committing another.19In Domingo v. People,20 we held:
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official, or commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official, or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official, or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit estafa.It must be emphasized that the falsified documents (Disbursement Vouchers, Reports of Waste Materials, Requisition for Supplies and/or Equipment and Certificates of Emergency Purchase) involved in this case are official or public documents. Public documents are: (a) the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines or of a foreign country; (b) documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and (c) public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.22 A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court.23 In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, it would be wrong to consider the component crimes separately from each other.24 While there may be two component crimes (estafa and falsification of public documents), both felonies are animated by and result from one and the same criminal intent for which there is only one criminal liability.25 That is the concept of a complex crime.26 In other words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one, subject to a single criminal liability.27 While a conviction for estafa through falsification of public documents requires that the elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that the criminal liability for estafa may be determined and considered independently of that for falsification.28 The two crimes of estafa and falsification of public documents are not separate crimes but component crimes of the single complex crime of estafa and falsification of public documents.29 In this case, the prosecution was able to prove the elements of the crime.
In general, the elements of estafa are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury.21 (Citation omitted.)
Petitioner further seeks a review of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses for allegedly being "self-serving" and "perjured."
Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are generally accorded great respect by an appellate court. Well-settled is the rule that findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. For this reason, the trial court's findings are accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the results of the case.30
At any rate, the records of this case show no reversible error to warrant a reversal of the assailed decision. It appears that petitioner did not impugn his signatures appearing in the Disbursement Vouchers, Reports of Waste Materials, Requisitions for Supplies and/or Equipment and Certificates of Emergency Purchase. Furthermore, the repeated issuance and execution of these documents belies petitioner's claim that his participation was not necessary and that his function in signing documents is merely ministerial; on the contrary, these documents were necessary for the claims for payment of emergency repairs of DPWH service vehicles and/or purchases of spare parts which were found to be fictitious. Thus, petitioner's signatures on these documents were a clear manifestation of his assent and participation or complicity to the illegal transactions, and his assertion of lack of participation is without merit.
With regard to petitioner's contention as to the Best Evidence Rule, or, more specifically, to the Sandiganbayan's admission on the prosecution's exhibits despite the non-presentation of the original documents, such is misplaced. Instructive on this point is the case of Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano,31 wherein this Court stated that:
As the afore-quoted provision states, the best evidence rule applies only when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document. The scope of the rule is more extensively explained thus -Here, petitioner's objection to the prosecution's documentary evidence, as stated in his Comment/Objections to Formal Offer of Exhibits,33 essentially relates to the materiality, relevance or purpose for which the documents were offered which had nothing to do with the contents thereof.But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need for accounting for the original.This Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it considered and weighed in evidence the photocopies and microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters submitted by the petitioners to establish the existence of respondent's loans. The terms or contents of these documents were never the point of contention in the Petition at bar. It was respondent's position that the PNs in the first set (with the exception of PN No. 34534) never existed, while the PNs in the second set (again, excluding PN No. 34534) were merely executed to cover simulated loan transactions. As for the MCs representing the proceeds of the loans, the respondent either denied receipt of certain MCs or admitted receipt of the other MCs but for another purpose. Respondent further admitted the letters she wrote personally or through her representatives to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank acknowledging the loans, except that she claimed that these letters were just meant to keep up the ruse of the simulated loans. Thus, respondent questioned the documents as to their existence or execution, or when the former is admitted, as to the purpose for which the documents were executed, matters which are, undoubtedly, external to the documents, and which had nothing to do with the contents thereof.32 (Citations omitted.)
Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is offered not as documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of execution of the documents is allowed.
In Estrada v. Desierto, this Court had occasion to rule that -
It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only [a] copy of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that:
"Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.
"xxx xxx xxx
"In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned, for certain documents in which ordinarily no real dispute arised. This measure is a sensible and progressive one and deserves universal adoption. Its essential feature is that a copy may be used unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect it." x x x
As to petitioner's guilt for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, such has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads, as follows:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:The elements of the above violation are:x x x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official[,] administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
All the above elements are present in this case. The petitioner is a public officer, being then the Assistant Director of the Bureau of Equipment of DPWH, discharging administrative and official functions. Petitioner and his co-accused acted with evident bad faith by falsifying official documents to defraud the DPWH into paying the claims for fictitious emergency repairs or purchase of spare parts under the name of Julio Martinez. The act of petitioner caused undue injury or damage to the government in the total amount of P5,166,539.00.
Petitioner acted with evident bad faith when he affixed his signature to the falsified documents in order to induce the government to pay the claim for fictitious emergency repairs and purchases of spare parts of certain vehicles. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.35
In view, however, of R.A. No. 10951 (An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on which a Penalty is Based, and the Fines Imposed under the Revised Penal Code, amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815, otherwise known as "The Revised Penal Code"), a modification must be made as to the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan. Section 85 of the said law provides the following:
SEC. 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, Presidential Decree No. 1689, and Presidential Decree No. 818, is hereby further amended to read as follows:Applying the above provisions, the maximum term of the penalty that must be imposed should be within the maximum period of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, considering that the amount defrauded is P5,166,539.00 and the crime committed is a complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC, where the penalty of the most serious of the crimes should be imposed which, in this case, is the penalty for Estafa. Hence, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the penalty should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree or prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium and the maximum term should be taken from the maximum period of prision mayor minimum. Thus, an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the minimum term, to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as the maximum term, is appropriate.
"ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
"1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over Two million four hundred thousand pesos (P2,400,000) but does not exceed Four million four hundred thousand pesos (P4,400,000), and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional Two million pesos (P2,000,000); but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal as the case may be.x x x x
"4th. The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period, if such amount is over Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000).
"5th. By prision mayor in its minimum period, if such amount does not exceed Forty thousand pesos (P40,000).
"3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:
"(a) By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document.
"(b) By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a gambling game.
"(c) By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any court record, office files, document or any other papers." (Emphasis ours.)
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari dated March 15, 2018 of petitioner Florendo B. Arias is DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated November 10, 2016, in the consolidated Criminal Case No. 28100 and Criminal Case No. 28253, and its Resolution dated January 15, 2018 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 28100 for Estafa through Falsification of Official/Commercial Documents, petitioner is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen, A. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, and Inting, JJ., concur.
July 17, 2019
Sirs / Mesdames:
Please take notice that on June 10, 2019 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on July 17, 2019 at 8:23 a.m.
Very truly yours, (SGD) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN Division Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 18-43.
2Id. at 73-133. Penned by Associate Justice Oscar C. Herrera, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose R. Hernandez and Alex L. Quiroz.
3Id. at 44-50.
4Id. at 96-109.
5Id. at 77.
6Id. at 75.
7Id. at 77.
8Id. at 76.
9Supra note 2.
10Id. at 131-132.
11Rollo, pp. 51-65.
12Supra note 3.
13Id. at 49.
14Rollo, p. 23.
15Id. at 71.
16Id. at 67-72.
17Id. at 123-126.
18 712 Phil. 310 (2013).
19Id. at 334.
20 618 Phil. 499 (2009).
21Id. at 517-518.
22 Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 19.
23Patula v. People, 685 Phil. 376, 397 (2012).
24Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong v. People, et al., 626 Phil. 177, 206 (2010).
25Id.
26Id.
27Id.
28Id. at 208.
29Id.
30People v. Suarez, 496 Phil. 231, 242-243 (2005).
31 535 Phil. 384 (2006).
32Id. at 457-458.
33Rollo, pp. 219-254.
34Sison v. People, 628 Phil. 573, 583 (2010).
35Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan, 308 Phil. 661, 693 (1994).
