THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 232675, July 17, 2019
MUNICIPALITY OF DASMARIÑAS, PETITIONER, v. DR. PAULO C. CAMPOS, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS CHILDREN JOSE PAULO CAMPOS, PAULO CAMPOS, JR., AND ENRIQUE CAMPOS, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 233078, July 17, 2019
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, PETITIONER, v. DR. PAULO C. CAMPOS, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS CHILDREN JOSE PAULO CAMPOS, PAULO CAMPOS, JR., AND ENRIQUE CAMPOS, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, A., JR., J.:
Before this Court are two separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which were ordered consolidated in a Resolution1 dated September 20, 2017. These challenge the Decision2 dated November 10, 2016 and Resolution3 dated July 3, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100259, which affirmed the Decision4 dated March 16, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. 2459-01, the latter dismissing the complaint filed by the Municipality of Dasmariñas (now City of Dasmariñas) and the National Housing Authority (NHA) (collectively, the petitioners) for lack of merit.
Petitioner Municipality of Dasmariñas is a local government unit, while co-petitioner NHA is a government instrumentality created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 757.5 Respondent, the late Dr. Paulo C. Campos (Dr. Campos), substituted by his children-heirs Jose Paulo Campos, Paulo Campos, Jr. and Enrique Campos (respondents-heirs), was the former registered owner of the property subject of the case at bar who first filed a Petition for Revocation of Donation.6
B. WHEREAS, the DONOR has agreed to donate in favor of the DONEE portions of the above listed properties to be traversed by the 36 meter wide access road to be constructed by the National Housing Authority from Highway 17 to the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project which are particularly described in the technical descriptions x x x[.]In an attempt to comply with the provisions of the Deed of Donation, the NHA constructed a 20-m-wide access road, in lieu of the stipulated 36-m-wide access road.11 The NHA reasoned that the volume of the traffic at that time did not justify the outright construction of the 36-m-wide access road, and that it had reserved the remaining 16 m for road widening purposes. The NHA also promised that the property had not been diverted or used for any other purpose.12
x x x x
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the DONOR by these presents hereby convey and transfer by way of donation in favor of the DONEE, the parcels of land described in Annexes "A", "B", "C" and "D" which will be traversed by the [36] meter wide access road to be constructed by the National Housing Authority from Highway 17 to the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project and designated as Lots 2-C-1; 2-D-2; 2-B-1-A and 1-B, all situated in the Municipality of Dasmariñas, Province of Cavite, containing a total area of TWELVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT (12,798) square meters, more or less[.] x x x
It is hereby stipulated that should the DONEE fail to use the area or part of it for the 36 meter access road, or should its development be delayed, the DONOR reserves the right to use it until such a time that DONEE is in a position to use the said parcel of properties.10
WHEREAS, the DONOR being the registered owner and developer of Dasmariñas Bagong Bayan Resettlement Project has made possible the concreting of road networks containing an aggregate land area of 219,765.60 sq. meters more or less[.]Due to the failure of the NHA to fully comply with the provisions in the Deed of Donation despite the long lapse of time, and due to the foregoing transaction between the petitioners, on November 13, 2001, Dr. Campos filed an action for Revocation of Donation against the NHA with the RTC of Dasmariñas, Branch 90.15 Dr. Campos claimed that the NHA failed to comply with the condition attached to the donation and construct the 36-m-wide access road. He also alleged that the NHA further violated the parties' agreement by subsequently donating the subject property to the Municipality of Dasmariñas.16
x x x x
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 31 of [P.D.] No. 957, as amended by Section 2 of [P.D.] No. 1216, the owner or developer of a subdivision shall provide adequate roads, alleys, sidewalks and open spaces for public purposes, the donation of which to the City or Municipality where the same belongs and the acceptance of said donation is mandatory.
WHEREAS, pursuant to Board Resolution No. 2696 dated June 2, 1993, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "E", the DONOR has agreed to donate in favor of the DONEE the above-stated road works.
WHEREAS, the DONEE under Resolution No. 65-S-88 dated June 20, 1988 of its Sangguniang Bayan. attached hereto as Annex "F", has agreed to the donation by the DONOR of all roads in the Project.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the DONOR by these presents does hereby cede, transfer and convey by way of donation in favor of the DONEE the abovementioned roads, containing a total area of 219,765.60 square meters, more or less, all situated at Dasmariñas Bagong Bayan Resettlement Project, the as-built-plan of which are attached as Annexes "A", "B", "C" and "D", subject to the following conditions:The DONOR has reserved sufficient properties in its full possession and ' enjoyment in accordance with the provisions of its Charter.14
1.) The donated concreted roads shall be used exclusively for public purpose as roads and shall not be converted to other uses; 2.) The expenses to be incurred in the maintenance and repair of such roads shall be shouldered solely by the DONEE; 3.) Appropriate traffic precautionary measures shall be implemented by the DONEE on the subject roads.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially granted in that:The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the NHA was denied by the RTC on August 12, 2011.22 Both the petitioners, thus, filed their Notices of Appeal.23
(a) The Deed of Donation dated July 28, 1976 involving 12,798 square meters of land covered by [TCT] Nos. T-69124, T-69125, T-76195 and T-17786 is declared partially revoked to the extent of the area of the property not included in the 20-meter wide access road;
(b) The Deed of Donation and Acceptance dated 1993 is declared without legal effect to the extent of the area of the property not included in the 20-meter wide access road referred to in paragraph (a) above;
(c) [Dr. Campos], as represented by his legal heirs, is declared the rightful owner of the area of the property not included in the 20-meter wide access road referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) above and reconveyance of the said area is hereby ordered in favor of [Dr. Campos] as represented by his legal heirs; and,
(d) [The petitioners] are ordered to immediately turn over the possession and control of the subject property in favor of [Dr. Campos'] legal heirs.
[Dr. Campos'] claims for moral damages, attorney's fees and cost of suit are denied.
SO ORDERED.21
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision issued by the [RTC] of Imus, Cavite Br. 22 dated March 16, 2011 in Civil Case No 2459-01 is AFFIRMED.28The petitioners' respective Motions for Reconsideration were likewise denied by the CA in a Resolution29 dated July 3, 2017, prompting the petitioners to file with the Court the instant consolidated Petition.
For all intents and purposes, at present, the City of Dasmariñas is still the owner of the 36 meter wide access road which includes the donated lot of [Dr. Campos]. Being the owner of the 36 meter access road, the local government can make the necessary road works including the road widening that the City of Dasmariñas is currently undertaking.On August 8, 2018, the respondents-heirs filed a Motion for Early Resolution,34 praying for the Court to resolve the subject Petitions at the earliest opportunity.
Moreover, if the City will exclude the portion donated by [Dr. Campos] to the road widening and construction of drainage in Governor Mangubat Avenue, the portion starting from the exit ramp of the DLSLJ-HIS going towards the 7-Eleven convenience store near the creek the road will be having an uneven width instead of the six (6) lanes as originally planned. There will be no drainage in that area and flooding will occur which shall not only unduly prejudice the occupants of nearby establishments but also those who are passing in the area.
In the event that the Supreme Court shall rule in favor of the revocation of the donation, for the promotion of general welfare and considering that Governor Mangubat is the primary road from Aguinaldo Highway going to Congressional Avenue in Kadiwa linking the town proper to different barangays in the Dasmariñas Bagong Bayan, the City of Dasmariñas shall be constrained and left without any alternative but to exercise its power of eminent domain and expropriate the property.33
It is hereby stipulated that should the donee fail to use the area or part of it for the 36[-]meter access road, or should its development be delayed, the donor reserves the right to use it until such time that the donee is in a position to use the property.47The petitioners also state that even assuming that there was a breach of the condition imposed, the same does not warrant the revocation of the donation, as this constituted merely a casual breach of the Deed of Donation, and not a substantial breach that would warrant the rescission of the same.48
(1) Conduct on the part of the defendant or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy;In this case, it cannot be said that Dr. Campos slept on his rights and is guilty of laches, as the second requisite of delay is factually and legally absent. Dr. Campos had shown patience in allowing the NHA the time to finish its obligation despite the long period that was starting to elapse, and filed the case only when it was clear that the NHA could no longer fulfill its obligation.
(1) Conduct on the part of the defendant or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy; (2) Delay in asserting the complainant's right, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his claim; and (4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.58
The second element cannot be deemed to exist. Although the collection suit was filed more than seven years after the obligation of the sureties became due, the lapse was within the prescriptive period for filing an action. In this light, we find immaterial petitioners1 insistence that the cause of action accrued on December 31, 1968, when the obligation became due, and not on August 30, 1976, when the judicial demand was made. In either case, both submissions fell within the ten-year prescriptive period. In any event, "the fact of delay, standing alone, is insufficient to constitute laches."To note, the petitioners themselves point out that nothing in the Deed of Donation gives an exact timeline for the NHA to complete the building of the access road, saying that "[t]he construction of the exactly [36-m-wide] access road is not time-bound,"61 which means that, for the time NHA was in control of the property, the respondents-heirs' cause of action could not have arisen. This would explain the relatively long period before which the late Dr. Campos filed a complaint for Revocation of Donation, because before the subsequent donation to the Municipality of Dasmariñas, the respondents-heirs, in their generosity, gave the NHA leeway to hopefully deliver on its pledge to complete the construction. Unfortunately, the second donation completely eradicated any vestiges of hope that would be fulfilled, prompting respondents to take action, well within the time allowed by the statute.
Petitioners insist that the delay of seven years was unreasonable and unexplained, because demand was not necessary. Again we point that, unless reasons of inequitable proportions are adduced, a delay within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not considered to be a delay that would bar relief. x x xThus, where the claim was filed within the three-year statutory period, recovery therefore cannot be barred by laches.60 (Citations omitted)
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari, for the simple reason that this Court is not a trier of facts. It is not for the Court to calibrate the evidence on record, as this is the function of the trial court. Although there are well-defined exceptions to the rule, nevertheless, after a review of the records, we find no justification to depart therefrom. Moreover, the trial courts' findings of facts, as affirmed by the appellate court on appeal, are binding on this Court, unless the trial and appellate courts overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would change the outcome of the case.64 (Emphasis and underscoring Ours)The Court finds that the petitioners were unable to prove the presence of any possible oversight that would create doubt on the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA. The Court's own review of the evidence on record will show that indeed, a substantial breach, and not just a slight breach, was committed by the NHA that would validate a revocation of the donation and a rescission of the subject contract between the NHA and the respondents-heirs necessitating the immediate return of the unused property back to the respondents-heirs.
The rule is that where the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, its meaning should be determined without reference to extrinsic facts or aids. The intention of the parties must be gathered from that language, and from that language alone. Stated differently, where the language of a written contract is elear and unambiguous, the contract must be taken to mean that which, on its face, it purports to mean, unless some good reason can be assigned to show that the words should be understood in a different sense. Courts cannot make for the parties better or more equitable agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make, or rewrite contracts because they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the parties, or alter them for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other, or by construction, relieve one of the parties from the terms which he voluntarily consented to, or impose on him those which he did not.73 (Emphasis and underscoring Ours)Thus, any assertions that there was compliance with the provisions of the Deed of Donation are simply and completely spurious in light of the fact that there was clear failure to build the access road despite the long period of time given for the NHA to do so. The NHA's contention that outside factors, such as the volume of traffic at that time,74 were to blame for any apparent breach do not offer a semblance of validity. Even assuming that this was true, almost two decades had lapsed from the time the property was donated, to the subsequent donation from the NHA to the Municipality of Dasmariñas. It is simply inconceivable that in that lengthy span of time, the NHA would have not been able to address the problem of traffic and/or found a way to alleviate that specific obstacle in order to complete the construction of the access road. The NHA's failure to do so indicates the lack of prioritizing on its part to comply with the agreement, and it cannot now use extraneous factors as justification for its own lack of diligence.
The Court, however, understands that such a condition was written with a specific purpose in mind, which is, to ensure that the primary objective for which the donation was intended is achieved. A reasonable construction of such condition rather than totally striking it would, therefore, be more in accord with the spirit of the donation. Thus, for as long as the contracts of lease do not detract from the purpose for which the donation was made, the complained acts of the donee will not be deemed as substantial breaches of the terms and conditions of the deed of donation to merit a valid revocation thereof by the donor.As mentioned, substantial, unlike slight or casual breaches of contract are fundamental breaches that defeat the object of the parties in entering into an agreement.78 Thus, the object of the parties is a vital indicator in determining whether the breach is substantial, or merely casual and minor. The stark difference in the C-J Yulo & Sons, Inc. case with the one advocated by the petitioners is that the subsequent acts of the donee, which would have constituted material breaches of the provisions of the donation contract should they be considered in isolation sans the purpose, were held to be casual breaches as they were actually done in furtherance for the avowed purpose to construct a home for the aged.
Finally, anent petitioner's contention that the [CA] failed to consider that respondent had abandoned the idea of constructing a home for the aged and infirm, the explanation in respondent's comment is enlightening. Petitioner relies on Bishop Bantigues letter dated June 21. 1990 as its basis for claiming that the donee had altogether abandoned the idea of constructing a home for the aged and the infirm on the property donated. Respondent, however, explains that the Bishop, in his letter, written in the vernacular, expressed his concern that the surrounding area was being considered to be re-classified into an industrial zone where factories are expected to be put up. There is no question that this will definitely be disadvantageous to the health of the aged and the infirm. Thus, the Bishop asked permission from the donor for a possible exchange or sale of the donated property to ultimately pursue the purpose for which the donation was intended in another location that is more appropriate.
The Court sees the wisdom, prudence and good judgment of the Bishop on this point, to which it conforms completely. We cannot accede to petitioner's view, which attributed the exact opposite meaning to the Bishop's letter seeking permission to sell or exchange the donated property.77
Sec. 31. Donations of roads and open spaces to local government. The registered owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium project, upon completion of the development of said project may, at his option, convey by way of donation the roads and open spaces found within the project to the city or municipality wherein the project is located. Upon acceptance of the donation by the city or municipality concerned, no portion of the area donated shall thereafter be converted to any other purpose or purposes unless after hearing, the proposed conversion is approved by the Authority.This provision is inapplicable and cannot be used to justify the subsequent transfer for the simple reason that the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project is neither a subdivision project nor a condominium project, either of which would legally mandate a transfer. Under the same P.D. No. 957, a subdivision project, as well as a condominium project, is respectively defined as such:
15(d) Subdivision project. "Subdivision project" shall mean a tract or a parcel of land registered under Act No. 496 which is partitioned primarily for residential purposes into individual lots with or without improvements thereon, and offered to the public for sale, in case or in installment terms. It shall include all residential, commercial, industrial and recreational areas as well as open spaces and other community and public areas in the project.In the mind of this Court, and in agreement with the CA, the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project does not constitute a subdivision nor a condominium project that would necessitate the transfer. The onus was on the petitioners to prove that the project was classified as such, but they were not able to produce any evidence aside from their bare assertions. Perforce, this justification cannot stand even as to show a possibility that the transfer was effected in good faith.
x x x x
Condominium project. "Condominium project" shall mean the entire parcel of real property divided or to be divided primarily for residential purposes into condominium units, including all structures thereon.
Very truly yours, WILFREDO V. LAPITAN Division Clerk of Court | |
By: | |
(SGD) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG III | |
Deputy Division Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
1Rollo (G.R. No. 232675), pp. 46-47.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, with Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez and Elihu A. Ybañez concurring; id. at 18-29.
3 Id. at 15-16.
4Rollo (G.R. No. 233078), pp. 92-100.
5 CREATING THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY AND DISSOLVING THE EXISTING HOUSING AGENCIES, DEFINING ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (approved on July 31, 1975).
6Rollo (G.R. No. 233078), pp. 3-4.
7 Id. at 4.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 44.
10 Id. at 44-45.
11 Id. at 4.
12 Id. at 8.
13 REGULATING THE SALE OF SUBDIVISION LOTS AND CONDOMINIUMS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF (Approved on July 12, 1976).
Section 31. Donations of roads and open spaces to local government. The registered owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium project, upon completion of the development of said project may, at his option, convey by way of donation the roads and open spaces found within the project to the city or municipality wherein the project is located. Upon acceptance of the donation by the city or municipality concerned, no portion of the area donated shall thereafter be converted to any other purpose or purposes unless after hearing, the proposed conversion is approved by the Authority.
14Rollo (G.R. No. 233078), pp. 51-52.
15 Id. at 141.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 92-100.
20 Id. at 100.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 116-118.
23 Id. at 6.
24 Id. at 40.
25 Id. at 32.
26 Id. at 37-38.
27 Id. at 39.
28 Id. at 40.
29 Id. at 42-43.
30Rollo (G.R. No. 232675), pp. 85-86.
31 Id. at 86.
32 Id. at 86-87.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 85-89.
35Rollo (G.R. No. 233078), pp. 213-221.
36 Id. at 12.
37Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
38Rollo (G.R. No. 233078), p. 12.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 16.
41 Id.
42Rollo (G.R. No. 232675), p. 5.
43Rollo (G.R. No. 233078), p. 8.
44 Id. at 7.
45Rollo (G.R. No. 232675), p. 8.
46Rollo (G.R. No. 233078), pp. 10-11.
47 Id.
48Rollo (G.R. No. 232675), pp. 6-7.
49 Id. at 51-53.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 49.
52 Id. at 50.
53 Id.
54 494 Phil. 282 (2005).
55Republic of the Phils. v. Silim, 408 Phil. 69, 77 (2001).
56Agra v. Philippine National Bank, 368 Phil. 829, 842 (1999).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 843.
59 368 Phil. 829 (1999).
60 Id. at 843-844.
61Rollo (G.R. No. 233078), p. 10.
62People v. Tamolon, et al., 599 Phil. 542, 551 (2009).
63 516 Phil. 244 (2006).
64 Id. at 251.
65Song Fo & Co. v. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., 47 Phil. 821, 827 (1925).
66Maglasang v. Northwestern University, Inc., 707 Phil. 118, 125-126 (2013).
67G.G. Sportswear Mfg. Corp. v. World Class Properties, Inc., 627 Phil. 703, 715 (2010).
68Rollo (G.R. No. 232675), p. 5.
69 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 1370.
70The Wellex Group, Inc. v. U-Land Airlines Co., Ltd., 750 Phil. 530, 568 (2015).
71 789 Phil. 270 (2016).
72 620 Phil. 381, 388-389 (2009).
73Century Properties, Inc. v. Babiano, et al., supra note 71, at 280.
74Rollo (G.R. No. 233078), p. 8.
75 Supra note 54.
76 Id. at 287.
77 Id. at 295-296.
78Maglasang v. Northwestern Inc. University, supra note 66, at 125-126.