THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198849, August 07, 2019
CAMP JOHN HAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, v. CHARTER CHEMICAL AND COATING CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
Rescission under Article 1191 of the Civil Code is the proper remedy when a party breaches a reciprocal obligation. Because each case has its own distinct circumstances, this Court's power to fix a period of an obligation under Article 1197 is discretionary and should be exercised only if there is just cause.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the May 13, 2011 Decision2 and September 30, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108335. The Court of Appeals affirmed the March 30, 2009 Final Award4 in CIAC Case No. 19-2008 issued by the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, which found that Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation (Charter Chemical) is entitled to the payment of the monetary equivalent of two (2) units in Camp John Hay Suites in the total amount of P5,900,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P590,000.00.5
Camp John Hay Development Corporation (Camp John Hay Development) is the investment arm of a consortium engaged in the construction of the Camp John Hay Manor in Baguio City.6
In January 2001, Camp John Hay Development entered into a Contractor's Agreement7 with Charter Chemical, the company awarded to complete the interior and exterior painting works of unit 2E of the Camp John Hay Manor for the contract price of P15,500,000.00. This was inclusive of the price of two (2)-studio type units at Camp John Hay Suites, the total amount of which would be based on the units chosen by Charter Chemical.8
Although the Contractor's Agreement contained no date of the units' turnover, it allowed Charter Chemical to choose the units for offsetting under an offsetting scheme:
1. Compensation:Charter Chemical chose Units 102 and 104 studio type in the second phase of Camp John Hay Suites.10
. . . .
b. Off-setting against Two (2) Units - Studio Type at Suite 2A. Total amount shall be based on the final unit[s] chosen by the Contractor.9
[P]ossession of the Unit shall be delivered by Seller to Buyer within a reasonable period of time from the date of completion of the Unit either by (a) serving written Notice of Completion to the Buyer or (b) by delivering to the Buyer the Limited Warranty Deed covering the Unit. The delivery of the Notice of Completion or the Limited Warranty Deed shall constitute constructive delivery of the Unit and immediately thereafter the risk of loss to the Unit and all obligations and assessments provided in this Contract, the Project Plan and Declaration of Restrictions, the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of the Association, and the House Rules, shall pertain to Buyer.14In August 2005, Camp John Hay Development issued certifications to Charter Chemical that the two (2) units were fully paid under their offsetting scheme. However, the units were not delivered because the construction of Camp John Hay Suites was not yet complete.15
On the basis of the evidence the Arbitration Tribunal finds and so holds that:Camp John Hay Development filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review26 under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It argued that the arbitral tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the dispute because the arbitration clause had been superseded by a subsequent dispute resolution clause contained in the contracts to sell.27 It further asserted that it had neither agreed on the completion date of the two (2) units nor admitted that the units were to be completed within three (3) years from 2003 or 2005.28 Instead, it asked for a fixing of the term or period when the units would be completed.29
1. Claimant is entitled to its claim for the monetary equivalent of the two (2) units CJH Suites in the total sum of Php5,900,000.00.
2. Claimant is not entitled to its claim for exemplary damages.
3. Claimant is entitled to its claim for attorney's fees for the sum of Php590,000.00 which is 10% of the total monetary value for the two (2) units CJH Suites of Php5,900,000.00 which had not been delivered by respondent.
4. The Court should not fix the period for the delivery of the subject units as provided for in Article 1197 of the Civil Code because the reciprocal nature of the contract itself provides for the period of their delivery. Moreover, CIAC can fix the period if necessary.25
From the dispute resolution clause, petitioner points out that disputes must be adjudicated by the proper courts of Pasig City, to the exclusion of all other courts. The contracts to sell also effectively removed the parties' dispute outside the ambit of a construction dispute since they are not the construction contracts contemplated by Executive Order No. 1008, or the Construction Industry Arbitration Law.50ARTICLE XIV
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISION
. . . .
4. Venue - All actions involving this Contract shall be instituted only in the proper courts of Pasig City, Metro Manila to the exclusion of all other courts.49
SECTION 4. Jurisdiction. - The CIAC shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute arises before or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. These disputes may involve government or private contracts. For the Board to acquire jurisdiction, the parties to a dispute must agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration.For the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission to acquire jurisdiction, the law merely requires that the parties agree to submit to voluntary arbitration any dispute arising from construction contracts.
The jurisdiction of the CIAC may include but is not limited to violation of specifications for materials and workmanship; violation of the terms of agreement; interpretation and/or application of contractual time and delays; maintenance and defects; payment, default of employer or contractor and changes in contract cost.
Excluded from the coverage of this law are disputes arising from employer-employee relationships which shall continue to be covered by the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Under Section I, Article III of the CIAC Rules, an arbitration clause in a construction contract shall be deemed as an agreement to submit an existing or future controversy to CIAC jurisdiction, "notwithstanding the reference to a different arbitration institution or arbitral body in such contract. . . ." . . .Arbitration of construction disputes through the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission was incorporated into the general statutory framework on alternative dispute resolution through Republic Act No. 9285, or the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004.63 Chapter 6, Section 34 of this law explicitly referenced the Construction Industry Arbitration Law, while Section 35 affirmed the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission's jurisdiction:
. . . The arbitration clause in the construction contract ipso facto vested the CIAC with jurisdiction. This rule applies, regardless of whether the parties specifically choose another forum or make reference to another arbitral body. Since the jurisdiction of CIAC is conferred by law, it cannot be subjected to any condition; nor can it be waived or diminished by the stipulation, act or omission of the parties, as long as the parties agreed to submit their construction contract dispute to arbitration, or if there is an arbitration clause in the construction contract. The parties will not be precluded from electing to submit their dispute to CIAC, because this right has been vested in each party by law.
. . . .
It bears to emphasize that the mere existence of an arbitration clause in the construction contract is considered by law as an agreement by the parties to submit existing or future controversies between them to CIAC jurisdiction, without any qualification or condition precedent. To affirm a condition precedent in the construction contract, which would effectively suspend the jurisdiction of the CIAC until compliance therewith, would be in conflict with the recognized intention of the law and rules to automatically vest CIAC with jurisdiction over a dispute should the construction contract contain an arbitration clause.62 (Citations omitted)
Arbitration, "[b]eing an inexpensive, speedy[,] and amicable method of settling disputes . . . is encouraged by the Supreme Court."64 If any doubt will arise, it "should be resolved in favor of arbitration."65CHAPTER 6
Arbitration of Construction Disputes
SECTION 34. Arbitration of Construction Disputes: Governing Law. - The arbitration of construction disputes shall be governed by Executive Order No. 1008, otherwise known as the Construction Industry Arbitration Law.
SECTION 35. Coverage of the Law. Construction disputes which fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (the "Commission") shall include those between or among parties to, or who are otherwise bound by, an arbitration agreement, directly or by reference whether such parties are project owner, contractor, subcontractor, fabricator, project manager, design professional, consultant, quantity surveyor, bondsman or issuer of an insurance policy in a construction project.
The Commission shall continue to exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction over construction disputes although the arbitration is "commercial" pursuant to Section 21 of this Act.
Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, arbitration also hastens the resolution of disputes, especially of the commercial kind. It is thus regarded as the "wave of the future" in international civil and commercial disputes. Brushing aside a contractual agreement calling for arbitration between the parties would be a step backward.Here, petitioner and respondent agreed to submit to arbitration any dispute arising from the construction contract, as clearly stipulated in their Contractor's Agreement. The arbitration clause should, thus, be given primacy in accordance with the State's policy to favor arbitration. It follows that if there is any doubt as to what provision should be given effect, this Court will rule in favor of the arbitration clause.
Consistent with the above-mentioned policy of encouraging alternative dispute resolution methods, courts should liberally construe arbitration clauses. Provided such clause is susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute, an order to arbitrate should be granted. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of arbitration.67(Citations omitted)
ARTICLE 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.This provision refers to rescission applicable to reciprocal obligations. It is invoked when there is noncompliance by one (1) of the contracting parties in case of reciprocal obligations. "Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. They are to be performed simultaneously such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other."69
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
The right of rescission of a party to an obligation under Article 1191 of the Civil Code is predicated on a breach of faith by the other party who violates the reciprocity between them. The breach contemplated in the said provision is the obligor's failure to comply with an existing obligation. When the obligor cannot comply with what is incumbent upon [him or her], the obligee may seek rescission and, in the absence of any just cause for the court to determine the period of compliance, the court shall decree the rescission.72 (Citations omitted)"Resolution grants the injured party the option to pursue, as principal actions, either a rescission or specific performance of the obligation, with payment of damages in either case."73
Article 1197 is part and parcel of all obligations contemplated therein. Hence, whenever a period is fixed pursuant to said Article, the court merely enforces or carries out an implied stipulation in the contract in question. In fact, insofar as contracts not fixing a period are concerned, said legal provision applies only if, from the nature and circumstances surrounding the contract involved, "it can be inferred that a period was intended" by the parties thereto. For this reason, the last paragraph of Article 1197, ordains that "in every case, the courts shall determine such period as may under the circumstances have been probably contemplated by the parties." In other words, in fixing said period, the Court merely ascertains the will of the parties and gives effect thereto.77As stipulated in Article 1197, this Court must determine that the obligation does not fix a period or that the period is made to depend upon the will of the debtor, but it can be inferred from its nature and the circumstances that a period was intended. Then, it must be determined what period was probably contemplated by the parties.78
This general rule however cannot be applied considering the different set of circumstances existing in the instant case. More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when such procedure would be a mere technicality and formality and would serve no purpose that to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits. Moreover, under Art. 1191 of the Civil Code, when one of the obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee may seek rescission and the court shall decree the same unless there is just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. In the absence of any just cause for the court to determine the period of the compliance, there is no more obstacle for the court to decree the rescission claimed.80 (Citation omitted)In Gregorio Araneta, Inc. v. Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd.,81 this Court held that if a reasonable period was agreed upon in a contract, all that the court should have done was determine if that reasonable time had already elapsed:
If the contract so provided, then there was a period fixed, a "reasonable time"; and all that the court should have done was to determine if that reasonable time had already elapsed when suit was filed. If it had passed, then the court should declare that petitioner had breached the contract, as averred in the complaint, and fix the resulting damages. On the other hand, if the reasonable time had not yet elapsed, the court perforce was bound to dismiss the action for being premature. But in no case can it be logically held that under the plea above quoted, the intervention of the court to fix the period for performance was warranted, for Article 1197 is precisely predicated on the absence of any period fixed by the parties.82There is no just cause for this Court to determine the period of compliance. As can be gleaned from the records of this case, the obligation of petitioner to build the Camp John Hay Suites had been dragging for years even before it entered into the Contractor's Agreement with respondent.
Rescission has the effect of "unmaking a contract, or its undoing from the beginning, and not merely its termination." Hence, rescission creates the obligation to return the object of the contract It can be carried out only when the one who demands rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to restore. To rescind is to declare a contract void at its inception and to put an end to it as though it never was. It is not merely to terminate it and release the parties from further obligations to each other, but to abrogate it from the beginning and restore the parties to their relative positions as if no contract has been made.85Mutual restitution is required in cases involving rescission under Article 1191. "Where a contract is rescinded, it is the duty of the court to require both parties to surrender that which they have respectively received and to place each other as far as practicable in his original situation[;] the rescission has the effect of abrogating the contract in all parts."86
Generally, the rule is that to rescind a contract is not merely to terminate it, but to abrogate and undo it from the beginning; that is, not merely to release the parties from further obligations to each other in respect to the subject of the contract, but to annul the contract and restore the parties to the relative positions which they would have occupied if no such contract had ever been made. Rescission necessarily involves a repudiation of the contract and a refusal of the moving party to be further bound by it.88 (Citation omitted)This Court has explained that restitution under Article 1385 of the Civil Code equally applies for rescission under Article 1191. In Laperal v. Solid Homes, Inc.:89
Despite the fact that Article 1124 of the old Civil Code from whence Article 1191 was taken, used the term "resolution", the amendment thereto (presently, Article 1191) explicitly and clearly used the term "rescission". Unless Article 1191 is subsequently amended to revert back to the term "resolution", this Court has no alternative but to apply the law, as it is written.Article 1385 of the Civil Code provides:
Again, since Article 1385 of the Civil Code expressly and clearly states that "rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of the contract, together with their fruits, and the price with its interest," the Court finds no justification to sustain petitioners' position that said Article 1385 does not apply to rescission under Article 1191.90
ARTICLE 1385. Rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of the contract, together with their fruits, and the price with its interest; consequently, it can be carried out only when he who demands rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to restore.Although rescission repeals the contract from its inception, it does not disregard all the consequences that the contract has created. What mutual rescission entails is "the return of the benefits that each party may have received as a result of the contract."91
Neither shall rescission take place when the things which are the object of the contract are legally in the possession of third persons who did not act in bad faith.
In this case, indemnity for damages may be demanded from the person causing the loss. (Emphasis supplied)
ARTICLE 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:Generally, attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages, as no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Court of Appeals:96
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff; (4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. (Emphasis supplied)
[Attorney's fees] are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.97 (Citations omitted)The grant of attorney's fees depends on the evaluation of each case and is within this Court's discretion. Attorney's fees may be awarded if a party was forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect its right and interest due to another party's unjustified act or omission.98
Very truly yours, WILFREDO V. LAPITAN Division Clerk of Court By: (SGD) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG III Deputy Division Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
* Designated additional Member per Raffle dated July 31, 2019.
1Rollo, pp. 8-38. Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2 Id. at 40-48. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III, and concurred in by Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Manuel M. Barrios of the Eighth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3 Id. at 50. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III, and concurred in by Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Manuel M. Barrios of the Former Eighth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4 Id. at 236-249. The arbitral tribunal was composed of Chairman Beda G. Fajardo and Members Ernesto S. De Castro and Wilfredo H. Guerzon, Jr.
5 Id. at 17.
6 Id. at 40.
7 Id. at 64-71.
8 Id. at 40-41.
9 Id. at 67.
10 Id. at 41 and 238.
11 Id. at 41.
12 Id. at 12 and 237. The CA Decision erroneously indicated P5,906,000.00 as the balance.
13 Id. at 41.
14 Id. at 81.
15 Id. at 42.
16 Id. at 98-122.
17 Id. at 368.
18 Id. at 369.
19 Id. at 16.
20 Id. at 43 and 96-97.
21 Id. at 156-164.
22 Id. at 236-249.
23 Id. at 247.
24 Id. at 245.
25 Id. at 247.
26 Id. at 250-292, Amended Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
27 Id. at 44-45.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 40-48.
31 Id. at 44-45.
32 Id. at 47.
33 Id. at 50.
34 Id. at 9.
35 Id. at 9-10.
36 Id. at 363-364.
37 Id. at 8-38.
38 Id. at 365-379.
39 Id. at 413-419.
40 CIVIL CODE, art. 1191 provides:
ARTICLE 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
41 CIVIL CODE, art. 1197 provides:
ARTICLE 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof.
The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will of the debtor.
In every case, the courts shall determine such period as may under the circumstances have been probably contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by the courts, the period cannot be changed by them.
42Rollo, p. 8.
43 Id. at 21.
44 CIVIL CODE, art. 1311 provides:
ARTICLE 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent.
If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.
45Rollo, p. 22.
46 Id. at 22-23.
47 Id. at 24.
48 Id. at 28.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 28-29.
51 Id. at 30-31.
52 Id. at 365-366.
53 Id. at 377.
54 Id. at 367.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 377.
58Metro Rail Transit Development Corporation v. Gammon Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 200401, January 17, 2018, 13 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
59 Id.
60Hi-Precision Steel Center, Inc. v. Lim Kim Steel Builders, Inc., 298-A Phil. 361 (1993) [Per J. Feliciano, Third Division].
61 604 Phil. 631 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division).
62 Id. at 644-646.
63CE Construction Corporation v. Araneta Center, Inc., G.R. No. 192725, August 9, 2017, 19 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 447 Phil. 705 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
67 Id. at 714.
68See Metro Construction, Inc. v. Chatham Properties, Inc., 418 Phil. 176 (2001) [Per C.J. Davide, Jr., First Division].
69The Wellex Group, Inc. v. U-Land Airlines, Co., Ltd., 750 Phil. 530, 585 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] citing Ong v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 243-257 (1999) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
70 Id. at 587.
71 413 Phil. 360 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
72 Id. at 373.
73Lalicon v. National Housing Authority, 669 Phil. 231, 237 (2011) [Per J. Abad, Third Division].
74Central Philippine University v. Court of Appeals, 316 Phil. 616, 627 (1995) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
75 Id.
76 G.R. No. L-13768, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 129 [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].
77 Id. at 140.
78Gregorio Aranela, Inc. v. Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co., Ltd., 126 Phil. 678, 684 (1967) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].
79 316 Phil. 616 (1995) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
80 Id. at 627.
81 126 Phil. 678 (1967) (Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].
82 Id. at 683.
83Spouses Velarde v. Court of Appeals, 413 Phil. 360, 373 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
84 759 Phil. 373 (2015) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
85 Id. at 384-385 citing Unlad Resources Development Corporation v. Dragon, 582 Phil. 61, 79-80 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
86Carrascos, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 514 Phil. 48, 89 (2005) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
87 463 Phil. 77 (2003) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
88 Id. at 89.
89 499 Phil. 367 (2005) [Per J. Garcia, Third Division].
90 Id. at 379.
91Raquel-Santos v. Court of Appeals, 609 Phil. 630, 659 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
92 CIVIL CODE, art. 2210 provides:
ARTICLE 2210. Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract.
93 CIVIL CODE, art. 1169 provides:
ARTICLE 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.
However, the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that delay may exist:
(1) When the obligation or the law expressly so declare; or
(2) When from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it appears that the designation of the time when the thing is to be delivered or the service is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the establishment of the contract; or
(3) When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform.
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other begins.
94 716 Phil. 267, 278-279 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc]. Nacar provides:
When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
95See Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Apac Marketing Corporation, 710 Phil. 389 (2013) [Per C.J. Sereno, First Division].
96 361 Phil. 499 (1999) [Per C.J. Davide, Jr., First Division].
97 Id. at 529.
98Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v. Goodyear Phils., Inc., 666 Phil. 546, 564 (2011) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
99Rollo, p. 246.
100 Id. at 47.