EN BANC
A.C. No. 7578, August 14, 2019
PAQUITO PELIPEL, JR., COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. CIRILO A. AVILA, RESPONDENT.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, which is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Likewise, charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence. Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence - as opposed to preponderance of evidence - is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential considerations attending this type of cases. As case law elucidates, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, it also involves neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.25 (Citation omitted)Second, this Resolution is written in contemplation of the extraordinary accountability of lawyers serving in government. A lawyer's holding of public office does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to discipline and impose penalties upon him or her for unethical conduct. On the contrary, holding public office amplifies a lawyer's disciplinary liability. In Fuji v. Atty. Dela Cruz:26
Lawyers in government service should be more conscientious with their professional obligations consistent with the time-honored principle of public office being a public trust. The ethical standards under the Code of Professional Responsibility are rendered even more exacting as to government lawyers because they have the added duty to abide by the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics, competence, and professionalism in public service.27This was demonstrated in this Court's Decision in Collantes v. Atty. Renomeron.28 Confronted with the issue of "whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official[,]"29 this Court ruled, "yes, for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer."30
. . . on the first week of August 2000, respondent [Atty. Edilberto Barcelona] phoned him and introduced himself as a lawyer and chief of the Public Assistance Center, [National Labor Relations Commission]. Respondent informed him that his employees filed a labor complaint against him in his office and it was necessary for him to see and talk with respondent. From then on respondent would often call him. Respondent visited him in his office and told him to settle the case or else his business, Top Gun Billiards, would be shut down. Lim recalled that on August 14, 2000, at around 7:30 p.m., respondent again visited his establishment and told him to settle the case for P20,000.00.35On Lim's request for assistance, the National Bureau of Investigation conducted an entrapment operation where respondent Atty. Edilberto Barcelona, was arrested after receiving the marked bribe money.36 He was subsequently indicted for robbery.37 Emphasizing that he was a lawyer serving in government, this Court disbarred38 the respondent, explaining:
We had held previously that if a lawyer's misconduct in the discharge of his official duties as government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, he may be disciplined as a member of the Bar on such ground. More significantly, lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office. Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Extortion by a government lawyer, an outright violation of the law, calls for the corresponding grave sanctions. With the aforesaid rule a high standard of integrity is demanded of a government lawyer as compared to a private practitioner because the delinquency of a government lawyer erodes the people's trust and confidence in the government.In Collantes, charges of extortion and "[d]irectly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official transaction before him"40 were levelled against respondent Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. He was disbarred after he had been shown to have told "the complainant that he would act favorably on the 163 registrable documents of [a corporation of which the complainant was counsel] if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a round trip plane ticket for him."41
. . . .
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably foiled to cope with the strict demands and high standards of the legal profession.
In Montano v. IBP, this Court said that only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer may disbarment be imposed as a penalty. In the instant case, the Court is convinced that the evidence against respondent is clear and convincing. He is administratively liable for corrupt activity, deceit, and gross misconduct. As correctly held by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, he should not only be suspended from the practice of law but disbarred.39 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Very truly yours, (SGD) EDGAR O. ARICHETA Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 1-5.
2 I, . . . do solemnly swear that 1 will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and 1 impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
3Rollo, p. 2.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 3.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 3-4.
9 Id. at 1.
10 Id. at 52.
11 Id. at 66-68.
12 Id. at 140-141.
13 Id. at 141.
14 Id. at 32.
15 Id. at 33.
16 Id. at 37.
17 Id. at 40-45.
18 Id. at 161-169.
19 Id. at 167.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 169.
22 Id. at 159-160.
23In re: Almacen v. Yaptinchay, G.R. No. 1-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562, 600 [Per J. Castro, First Division].
24 A.C. No. 9257, March 5, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63986> [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
25 Id.
26 807 Phil. 1 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
27 Id. at 14-15 citing Ramos v. Imbang, 557 Phil. 507, 513 (2007) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 703, 723 (1998) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc]; and Republic Act No. 6713 (1989), sec. 4.
28 277 Phil. 668 (1991) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
29 Id. at 674.
30 Id.
31See Macayan, Jr. v. People, 756 Phil. 202 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
32 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Rule 1.01 states:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
33 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Rule 7.03 states:
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
34 469 Phil. 1 (2004) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
35 Id. at 4.
36 Id. at 6.
37 Id. at 7.
38 Id. at 14.
39 Id. at 12-14.
40 277 Phil. 668, 670 (1991) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
41 Id. at 671.
42 691 Phil. 572 (2012) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
43 Id. at 574.
44 Id. at 573.
45 Id. at 582.